The Executive in African Governments (a Comparative Study). by Selassie, Bereketab Habte
THE EXECUTIVE IN AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS 
(A C OMPARATIVE ■€ QN-fiTHOTIONA"L STUDZ)
By
BEKEKETAB HABTE SELASSIE
A T h esis subm itted  fo r  
the Degree o f  Ph* D* in  





INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010286
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
( i )
A b s t r a c t
My i n t e r e s t  t o  u n d e r t a k e  t h e  s t u d y  l e a d i n g  t o
t h i s  t h e s i s  was f i r s t  a r o u s e d  i n  Mayjl963, d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t
m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  A f r i c a n  H ea d s  o f  S t a t e s  w h ic h  e s t a b l i s h e d
t h e  OAU. f u r t h e r  i n q u i r i e s  r e v e a l e d  a  p o l i t i c a l  phenom enon
t h a t  h a s  b e e n  c a l l e d  A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m .  The a d g e n t
o f  o n e - p a r t y  g o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  was t h e  b a s i s  o f  A f r i c a n
p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m  h a s  b e e n  c o m p l i c a t e d  by t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f
Vf
t h e  m i l i t a r y  i n  p o l i t i c s ,  o r / t h r e a t s  o f  s u c h  i n t e r v e n t i o n *
A c o m p a r a t i v e  s t u d y  o f  A f r i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  f o c u s e d  on  t h e  
E x e c u t i v e  was t h e r e f o r e ,  I  f e l t ,  w o r t n  u n d e r t a k i n g .
The s c o p e  a n d  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  t h e s i s  i s  to |e x am in e  
t h e  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  i n  a  com­
p a r a t i v e  s e t t i n g .  The t h e s i s  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  f o u r  p a r t s .  
The i n t r o d u c t o r y  p a r t  ( ' f a r t  One) a im s  t o  p r o v i d e  a  h i s t o r i c a l  
a n d  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  b a c k g r o u n d  t o  t h e  s t u d y .  P a r t  Two 
d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  v a r i o u s  E x e c u t i v e  f o r m s  i n  A f r i c a :  C h a p t e r
t h r e e  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  m o n a r c h i e s ,  C h a p t e r  f o u r  w i t h  d u a l  
e x e c u t i v e  s y s t e m s ,  a n d  C h a p t e r  f i v e  w i t h  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n ­
c i e s .  The com monest  s y s t e m  i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  
p r e s i d e n c y ;  a c c o r d i n g l y , C h a p t e r  f i v e  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be  
t h e  c e n t r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  t h e s i s .  E x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n c y  f o r  
A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m )  r e s t s  on t h e  t w i n  p i l l a r s  o f  t h e
o n e - p a r t y  a n d  on t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  Hence p a r t  t h r e e  
d e a l s  w i t h  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e s e  two i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  A f r i c a .
The l a s t  p a r t  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  a d v e n t  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
i n  A f r i c a .  Some o f  t h e  m a j o r  c a u s e s  o f  c o u p s  d ’ e t a t  a r e  
e x a m in e d  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  some c a s e  s t u d i e s  ( c h a p t e r  e i g h t ) .
T h i s  i s  f o l l o w e d  by  b r i e f  a c c o u n t s  o f  s e l e c t e d  m i l i t a r y  
r e g i m e s  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  E x e c u t i v e s .
A c kn o wl e dg em en t  s
My t h a n k s  a r e  due  t o  P r o f e s s o r  A.H. A l l o t t  who 
s u p e r v i s e d  t h i s  w o rk .  H i s  k e e n  i n t e r e s t  h a s  b e e n  a  s o u r c e  ox 
e n c o u r a g e m e n t , a n d  h i s  c r i t i c i s m s  h a v e  b e e n  s t i m u l a t i n g .
I  m u s t  a l s o  e x p r e s s  my g r a t i t u d e  t o  I J r .  N e v i l l e  R u b in  f o r  
h i s  h e l p  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  r e s e a r c h .
Many p e o p l e  h e l p e d  i n  p r o v i d i n g  me w i t h  m a t e r i a l  
a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  t h e s i s .  O f f i c i a l s  o f  A f r i c a n  
e m b a s s i e s  i n  London a n d  P a r i s  s p e n t  v a l u a b l e  t i m e  i n  p r o v i d i n g  
s u c h  h e l p ?  d i s c u s s i n g  some s e n s i t i v e  q u e s t i o n s ,  a s  a  r e s u l t  
o f  w h ic h  I  g a i n e d  some i n s i g n t ^  i n t o  t h e  a c t u a l  w o r k i n g  o f  t h e  
E x e c u t i v e ,  i n  A f r i c a .  I  w i s h  t o  e x t e n d  my d eep  g r a t i t u d e  t o  
a l l  t h e s e  p e o p l e  w h o s e  nam es  I  c a n n o t  m e n t i o n .
I  am a l s o  g r e a t l y  i n u e b t e d  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
t h e  l i b r a r y  s t a f f  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t e  o f  A d v an c ed  L e g a l  S t u d i e s ,  
t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  L o n d o n ;  t h e  l i b r a r y  s t a f f  o f  t h e  Common­
w e a l t h  R e l a t i o n s  o f f i c e ;  t h e  I n s t i t u t  de 1 ’A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
Publiq,iy<9r, P a r i s ;  t h e  b e c r e ' t a r i a t  G e n e r a l e  du G-ouvernement 
D i r e c t i o n  de l a  D o c u m e n t a t i o n ,  P a r i s ;  a ^ d  t h e  I n s t i t u t  
U n i v e r s i t a i r e  de H a u t e s  E t u d e s  I n t e r n a t i o n a l e s ,  G en ev e ;  
a n d  l a s t ,  b u t  n o t  l e a s t ,  M rs .  V. V / i l l i a m s  f o r j t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  
o f  h e r  t y p i n g  s e r v i c e s .
T h i s  s t u d y  was made p o s s i b l e  t h r o u g h  a  g e n e r o u s  
g r a n t  ( l )  o f  a  r e s e a r c h  f e l l o w s h i p  o f  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f
A d v an c ed  L e g a l  S t u d i e s  ( 1 9 6 5 - 6 6 ) ;  an d  (2 “ J o f  a  B r i t i s h  
C o u n c i l  s c h o l a r s h i p  ( 1 9 6 6 - 67)1 £ 0# b o t h  o f  w h ic h  I  am 
d e e p l y  g r a t e f u l .
I.ly t h a n k s  a r e  a l s o  due t o  P r o f e s s o r  Jan ies  C.N.
P a u l ,  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  o f  H a i l e  S e l a s s i e  I  U n i v e r s i t y ,  a n d  f o r m e r  
L e a n  o f  t h e  Law S c h o o l ,  f o r  h i s  h e l p  i n  e x t e n d i n g  my l e a v e  
o f  a b s e n c e  f ro m  t h e  Law S c h o o l ,  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  p r e s s u r e .
Llost  i m p o r t a n t ,  I  am g r a t e f u l  t o  my f a m i l y  who h a v e  
h a d  t o  s u f f e r  a  l o n g  s e p a r a t i o n ,  a n d  who, f a r  f ro m  c o m p l a i n i n g ,  
h a v e  b e e n  a  co n s tan t  s o u r c e  o f  e n c o u ra g e m e n t  f ro m  a f a r .
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1* The Scope o f th e p resen t s tu d y .
A study o f the E xecu tive  could be made from a t  l e a s t
two p o in ts  o f view* One may be concerned w ith  an exam ination  
o f the s tru c tu r e  and o r g a n isa t io n , another w ith  th e  dynamics
of the E x ecu tiv e  in  terms o f i t s  fu n c tio n in g  in  r e la t io n  to
oth er in s t i t u t io n s .  In  the u lt im a te  a n a ly s is ,  however, i t  i s  
not p o s s ib le  to  sep ara te  the two; fo r ,  the s tr u c tu r a l a sp ect  
o f a system  can on ly  be m eaningfu l when seen  through i t s  
operation* S tru ctu re  p a r t ly  determ ines fu n c t io n , in  the same 
way th a t law a f f e c t s  conduct* Much o f p e o p le s1 conduct i s  
in flu e n c e d  by p r e -e x is t in g  in s t i t u t io n a l  s tr u c tu r e s  t o  which  
they are used  (som etim es even where some of th ese  had o u t liv e d  
th e ir  u s e fu ln e s s )*  This i s  s o  because th ere  are norms and 
v a lu es  in h eren t in  s tr u c tu r a l r e la t io n s h ip s  which h a b itu a lly  
guide or co n tr o l beh aviour. Man i s  a creatu re o f h a b it ,  and 
b eh av iou ra l r e la t io n s h ip  i s  im p l ic i t  in  in s t i t u t io n a l  fu n c­
tio n in g *  T herefore a study o f  fu n c tio n  needs a s tr u c tu r a l  
p o in t o f  departure as s tr u c tu r e  must be an alysed  in  terms of 
fu n c t io n a l im p lica tio n *
The p resen t study proceeds on t h is  assum ption, combining 
the two approaches* Part Two d ea ls  w ith  th e  form al c o n s t i ­
tu t io n a l  p o s it io n  o f  the E x e c u tiv e . I t  o f f e r s  a d e s c r ip t io n
and a n a ly s is  o f  the s ta tu s  and fu n c tio n s  o f th e E xecu tive  in  
a l l  independent A fr ica n  s t a t e s  which have a c i v i l ia n  govern­
ment. T his part i s  d iv id ed  in to  th ree  ch ap ters: the monarchic;
(Chapter T h ree), the dual E xecu tive  sy stem s, w ith  a f ig u r e ­
head o f s t a t e  (Chapter F our), and E xecu tive  p r e s id e n c ie s  
(Chapter F iv e ) .
The su r v iv a l o f  some m onarchies, and indeed  the advent 
of n e o -tr a d it io n a lis m  in  some A fr ica n  co u n tr ie s  in  th e fa c e  
o f r a d ic a l movements towards what has been c a l le d  A fr ican  
p r e s id e n t ia lis m  i s  a su b jec t o f grea t i n t e r e s t .  Some o f  the  
m onarchies have shown a ca p a c ity  fo r  a d a p ta tio n . The move 
towards an a u to c r a t ic  type o f government in  th e p r e s id e n t ia l  
system s and the ca p a c ity  fo r  ad ap ta tio n  shown by some mon­
a r c h ie s  would indeed  seem' to  show a p rocess o f  mutual 
in f lu e n c e  on the part o f A fr ica n  monarchy and A fr ica n  p r e s i ­
d e n tia lism , as we s h a l l  tr y  to  show. T his i s  n e ith e r  a defence 
o f  the monarchy nor an a tta c k  on A fr ica n  p r e s id e n t ia lism , as  
su ch . The p r in c ip a l o b jec t o f Chapter Three i s  to  d escr ib e  
the p o s it io n  and power o f the rem aining m onarchies in  a con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t t in g  and by r e fere n c e  to  t h i s ,  in  la t e r  
ch a p ters, to  draw com parisons between them and the p r e s id e n t ia l  
E x ecu tiv e  in  A fr ica n  governm ents. I t  i s  n ot my concern fo r
1 . I t  Is  s u f f i c i e n t  to  say a t  th is  s ta g e  th a t  King Hassan o f 
Morocco, fo r  exam ple, a c ts  as a kinjj, o f  a h ere d ita r y  p re­
s id e n t ,  w h ile  P resid en t Houphouet Boigny o f the Ivory  
C oast I s  a so r t  of an e le c t e d  monarch.
th e purpose o f t h is  stu d y , to  d ea l w ith  the q u estio n  whether 
m onarchies are d e s ir a b le  as system s or whether they  are  
a rch a ic  and u n su ita b le  fo r  t h i s  day and a ge .
In  the d isc u s s io n  on th e  dual (b icep h a lo u s) E x ecu tiv e , 
some ex p la n a tio n s  are o f fe r e d  which may account fo r  the  
p resen ce o f a b icep h a lou s ex e cu tiv e  in  th e  th ree  s ta te s  -  
Gambia, Lesotho and Som alia. The main th e se s  o f Chapter 
Four are th a t ( I )  a b icep h a lou s e x e c u tiv e  was d ev ised  by the  
fram ers o f the c o n s t i tu t io n  as a compromise between opposing  
fo r c e s  -  m ainly between t r a d it io n a l  fo r c e s  and modern (n a t­
i o n a l i s t )  p a r t ie s ;  ( i i )  where the arrangement had b u i l t  in  
w ith in  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  framework b i t t e r ly  opposed p o l i t i c a l  
fo r c e s  i t  would soon lead  to  a break up o f the system . Such 
a weakening arrangement can be th e cause fo r  m ilita r y  in t e r ­
v e n tio n  in  p o l i t i c s ,  a lth ou gh  by no means th e on ly  cau se.
Chapter F ive i s  the c e n tra l part o f the study* The 
u n ita r y  (m onocephalous) E xecu tive  p resid en cy  has been the  
c h a r a c te r is t ic  tren d  s in c e  the years o f independence. A 
d isc u s s io n  o f  the E x ecu tiv e  p r e s id e n ts  in  A fr ica  m ust, 
th e r e fo r e , in q u ire  in t o ,  among other th in g s , th e in s t i t u t io n a l  
an teced en t o f the new E xecu tive  p r e s id e n c ie s  e s ta b lis h e d  in  
A fr ic a . I t  m ust, fu r th e r , in q u ire  in to  the c o n s t itu t io n a l  
p o s it io n  o f th e p res id en t in c lu d in g  h is  a c c e s s io n  to  and 
tenure o f o f f i c e ,  and h is  powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  I t  
m ust, in  p a r t ic u la r , tr y  to  id e n t i f y  some of the most s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  fe a tu r e s  which d is t in g u is h  A fr ica n  p r e s id e n tia lism
ft
from other types o f  E xecu tiv es . Chapter Fto*g Is an attem pt  
to  do a l l  t h i s .  Moreover, the n otion  o f A fr ica n  p r e s i d e n t i a l ­
ism which im p lies  c e n tr a lis e d ,  concentrated  and p e r so n a l is e d  
power operating w ith in  a one party or a dominant p arty  system , 
i s  examined c r i t i c a l l y  in  the same chapter, b r i e f l y  and in  
a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  con tex t.
Part Three of the study in troduces another dim ension.
I t  i s  e n t i t l e d  ’ The Dynamics of E xecu tive  Power1, and the  
E xecu tive  i s  d iscu ssed  in  terms o f  i t s  r e la t io n  to  two other  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  v i z .  the public s e r v ic e  and the p o l i t i c a l  p a rty .  
These two i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  s e l e c t e d  because both  are c r u c ia l  
to  the p o s i t io n  and fu n ction  o f the E xecu tive  as indeed  to  
other a sp ec ts  o f  the n ation a l l i f e .  The d is c u s s io n  on 
A fr ican  p r e s id e n t ia l ism  s ta r ted  in  Chapter F ive in  a con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  con text i s  carried  over to  Part Three and seen  
i n  a d i f f e r e n t  p ersp ective  -  in  terms of the dynamics o f  i t s  
power r e la t io n s h ip  with the pub lic  s e r v ic e  and th e  p o l i t i c a l  
party .
Among the s a l i e n t  points which emerge out of th e  d is c u s s io n  
o f  the E xecu tive  in  r e la t io n  to  the p u b lic  s e r v ic e  (Chapterseven) 
StxY1 and the p o l i t i c a l  party (Chapter are ( i )  the
p o l i t i c i s a t i o n  of the public  s e r v ic e ;  ( i i )  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
fo r  dynamic a c t io n ,  u n ity  and n a tio n  b u ild in g  im p l ic i t  in  
the idea of the one-party s ta te  a t  t h i s  s ta g e  of A fr ica n  
h is to r y ;  ( i i i )  the dangers o f l o s s  of dynamism and o f i n ­
d if fe r e n c e  among the rank and f i l e  members of the p arty  th a t
can be engendered w ith  the disappearance of th e  h o s t i l e  
op p o s it io n  and the consequent lack  o f  v ig i la n c e  and v igour  
o f  the one party; ( iv )  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of theemergence  
o f  a s e lf -p e r p e tu a t in g  o liga rch y , o b l iv io u s  of i t s  o r ig in a l  
purpose, and (v) the p o ss ib le  (and in  some s t a t e s  a c t u a l )  
r e a c t io n  s e t t in g  in ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  the form o f an i n t e r ­
ven tion  of the m ilitary*  The idea of the one-party  s t a t e  
has been advanced as a dynamic fac tor  in  th e  econom ic, s o c i a l  
and p o l i t i c a l  transform ation  of a country. I t  has been  
p rescr ib ed  as a cure to  e th n o -cen tr ifu g a l tend en cies*  I t  
m an ifests  i t s e l f  aa a  c l o a e d  party m o r e  o r  l e s s  along L e n in is t  
l in e s *  T h is , at the government le v e l^ c r e a te s  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
o f forming c liq u es  and palace regimes. A p e r t in e n t  q u e s t io n  
i s  to  know how fa r  the party in flu en ce  keeps ”p u r i ty ” in  the 
government ( i . e *  an honest and p e r s i s t e n t  d e d ic a t io n  to  the  
o r ig in a l  p o l ic ie s  and programmes worked out by the p a r ty ) ;  
or how fa r ,  on the contrary, the government dominates (or  
even em asculates) the party thus destroy ing  i t s  c r i t i c a l ,
”c o n fe s s io n a l” and d ir e c t iv e  fu n ction .
The n egative  aspect of A frican  p r e s id e n t ia l is m  i s  i t s  
e x c e s s iv e  c e n t r a l i s a t io n  and p e r so n a l is a t io n  of power. No 
doubt th a t such a phenomenon i s  necessary  a t  t h i s  s ta g e  o f  
development* No doubt that a l! |u n i f i e d 1 command” i s  n ecessa ry  
in  a l l  emergency s i t u a t io n s ,  wherein i t  would be d isa s tr o u s  
to  have too  many centres  of power p u l l in g  In many d ir e c t io n s .  
The p resent stage  of A fr ican  h is to r y  has been a l l  too  o f t e n
l ik e n e d  to  an emergency s i t u a t io n  -  the war a g a in s t  p overty ,  
ignorance and d isea se  being  added to  the war a g a in s t  d iv i s io n  
and subversion. But monopoly o f power in  a c lo se d  system  can 
so e a s i l y  lead to  the in so le n c e  o f o f f i c e  and co rru p tion .
This in  turn can create  p u b lic  d i s a f f e c t io n  lea d in g  to  up­
h e a v a ls .  I t  i s  even p o s s ib le  th a t a l l  t h i s  may happen in  
s t a t e s  where the p res id en t and some manbers o f  h is  government 
are honest and ded icated  men.
The phenomenon of a s e r ie s  of m il i ta r y  coups in  the l a s t
two years i s  a t once a setback  to  A fr ican  p r e s id e n t ia l is m  as
w e l l  as perhaps a sobering experience t o  p o s s ib le  e x c e s se s
in  the one-party system of government. When the p rese n t
study was s ta r ted  only A lg er ia  had su ffer ed  such a s e t -b a c k .
Since January 1966, a kind o f  ”domino theory” seems to  have
s e t  in  leading to  a s e r ie s  of m il i ta r y  coups u n sea tin g
s e v e r a l  c i v i l ia n  governments, some of which had f e l t  S a fe ly
e s ta b l is h e d .  Part Four of t h i s  study i s  th er e fo re  devoted
to  case s tu d ie s  of many of the s ta t e s  where such upheavals
have occurred* An attempt i s  made t o  p o in t  to  c e r ta in  roo t
causes o f  m il i ta r y  in te r v e n t io n  in  p o l i t i c s  in  g e n e r a l;  and,
in  the l i g h t  of t h i s ,  an account of the main even ts  lea d in g
to  the m il i ta r y  coup in  each of the cases  s tu d ied  i s  given*  
followed by & selected •exawnaatiovi s f  ike wiihkavy executive-*
2 .  The purpose of the s tu d y .
The foregoing paragraphs show, In  o u t l in e ,  the nature  
and scope of the p resen t study . The o v e r a l l  purpose o f  the
study and the choice of an approach which combines s tr u c tu r a l  
a n a ly s is  w ith  what may be c a l le d  a fu n c t io n a l  rev iew , i s  to  
g iv e  a rounded p ic tu re  of the p o s i t io n  and power of the  
E xecutive  in  A fr ica  today -  an E xecutive  which has become 
the fo c a l  po int in  n a tio n a l l i f e *  I t  i s  a comparative study  
o f  a wide area, which aims a t  depth as w e l l  as  coverage -  
hardly an easy ta sk . Any comparative study covering  a wide 
area w ith  such an aim has c e r ta in  l im i t a t io n s :  a t tim es
depth may be s a c r i f ic e d  for coverage, or v ic e  v e r sa .  But 
t h i s  can be minimised by s e l e c t i v i t y  -  a s e l e c t i v e  treatm ent  
o f  s ig n i f i c a n t  m a t e r i a l s  which p r o v i d e  c e r ta in  b a s ic  common 
f a c t o r s ,  p o in ts  o f variance being noted# This would a l s o ,  
i t  i s  hoped, show the u n ity  of the s u b je c t .  I t  w i l l  be seen  
th a t  what g iv e s  u n ity  to  the subject under study i s  not  
merely geograph ica l, but a number of other f a c t o r s ,  c h ie f  
among them being: common or s im ila r  h i s t o r y ,  common problems
and common or s im ila r  p o lic y  o r ie n ta t io n .
From the standpoint of in t e r - d i s c i p l in e  i t  i s  n ecessary  
to  p o in t  out th a t many asp ects  of c o n s t i t u t io n a l  law l i e  in  
a t w i l ig h t  reg ion  between law and p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e .  A 
comparative study of the E xecutive w ith  an emphasis on 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a n a ly s is  would be incom plete, s u p e r f i c i a l  or 
even m isleading i f  i t  i s  not made a g a in s t  a g en era l s o c i a l  
and p o l i t i c a l  background.
"•••no  s e t  of g e n e r a lisa t io n s  can r e f l e c t  
the su b tle  gradations of power and in f lu e n c e  
that may be concealed behind c o n s t i t u t io n a l
forms. And when the forms o f #  w estern  
constitutionalism  are engrafted  upon an 
ancient s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  s tr u c tu r e ,  
appearance and r e a l i t y  may be as remote 
from c e r  as are c o n s t i tu t io n a l
law an _ ce in  England.tt ^
Y et, c le a r ly ,  i t  would be beyond the scope of t h i s  
study to  d iscu ss  a t  any len gth  the economic and s o c i o l o g i c a l  
fa c to r s  that a f f e c t  the nature and fu n c t io n  o f  th e  E xecutive*
Nor would i t  be p o ss ib le  to  deal w ith a l l  but the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  fa c to r s  which in f lu e n c e  the making and 
working of the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  system as regards the E x e c u t iv e .  
For example, the working of the e l e c t o r a l  machinery and the  
whole f i e l d  of franchise  i s  a su b ject c e n tra l to  a r e p r e ­
s e n ta t iv e  government and a f f e c t s  the s tru c tu r e  o f th e  E x e c u t iv e .
This i s  e s p e c ia l ly  true in  p lu ra l s o c i e t i e s .  But i n  the con­
t e x t  of the present study i t  i s  o f  perip h era l i n t e r e s t  on ly ,  
though i t s  presence in  the background i s  assumed.
The nature and scope of t h i s  study must p rec lude d e t a i l e d  
con sid eration s  of such m atters, though i t  i s  im p oss ib le  to  
avoid  d isc u ss io n  o f r e lev a n t questions which a r e ,  on the fa ce  
o f  them, ou tside  the su bject under stu d y . L ater s e c t io n s  o f  
t h i s  Introductory Chapter ex p la in  some of the most important 
q u e s t io n s ,  in  an attempt to  put the chapters th a t  f o l lo w  in  a 
h i s t o r i c a l  and s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  s e t t in g .  The focu s throughout
1 ,  de Smith. The New Commonwealth and i t s  C o n s t i tu t io n s ,  
pp. 155 -6 .
2 .  By ’ p lu r a l s o c i e t i e s 1 i s  meant s o c i e t i e s  in  which th ere  are  
sev e r a l  e th n ic  or l i n g u i s t i c  groups.
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remains on the E x ecu tiv e , so th a t  even where i t  i s  d isc u sse d  
in  r e la t io n  to  other i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  th ese  l a t t e r  concern us 
only t o  the ex ten t  th a t th e ir  s tr u c tu r e ,  fu n c t io n  and ethos  
a f f e c t  the working of the E x ecu tiv e . A ccord ingly  no d e t a i l e d  
account i s  g iven  o f the org an isa tion s  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  
and the p ub lic  s e r v ic e ,  though no a sp ect  con sid ered  to  be 
s ig n i f i c a n t  i s  l e f t  out.
In the chapter on H is to r ic a l  In tro d u ctio n  (Chapter Two) 
an attempt i s  made to  show th a t  the form and ch aracter  o f  
the A fr ican  E xecutive has been in flu en ced  by the "dual p a s t” 
v i z .  the p r e -c o lo n ia l  p ast  and the c o lo n ia l  ex p er ie n c e . The 
in f lu e n c e  o f the c o lo n ia l  legacy  can be seen  i n  the c e n t r a l i s e d  
and concentrated nature of power in  A fr ica n  s t a t e s .  This  
bears c lo se  r e la t io n  to  the power o f the c o lo n ia l  governor.  
Although th i s  phenomenon to  rev ert  to  an a u th o r ita r ia n  kind  
o f  ru le  cannot be explained  e n t ir e ly  by r e fere n c e  to  the  
c o lo n ia l  r u le ,  there i s  a s tr ik in g  p a r a l l e l ,  as w i l l  be seen  
in  the chapter on H is to r ic a l  In tro d u ctio n . I f  i t  i s  remem­
bered th a t ,  even in  bases where the impact of c o lo n ia l  ru le  
has been g re a t ,  i t  had succeeded in  handing to  the A fr ica n  
governments a machinery o f a s ta t e  but not a u n i f i e d  n a t io n ,  
the great ta sk  of the new governments in  w elding one n a t io n  
out of d i f f e r e n t  groups becomes c le a r .  The removal o f  an 
a u th o r ita r ia n  c o lo n ia l  regime l e f t  a vacuum which needed to  
be f i l l e d  by the new A frican  government.
With these observations in  mind we s h a l l  now d efin e  the  
A fr ica n  E xecutive and examine i t s  p lace  in  so c ie ty *  We s h a l l  
a l s o  examine some of the key concepts and id eas which h e lp ed  
to  provide i t  a new leg it im acy  and o u t l in e  some o f the prob­
lems -  which a r is e  in  connection  w ith  a l l  th is*
5* The meaning and p o s it io n  of the E xecutive  in  A f r ic a *
The d ic t io n a ry  meaning o f the term E xecu tive  i s  ( i )  th a t  
branch of the government charged w ith  the execu tion  of law s;  
and ( i i )  the person or persons in  whom th e h igh  m agistracy  
of the s t a t e  i s  v e s t e d *  The t e c h n i c a l  d e s c r ip t io n  of the  
term g iven  in  modern te x t  books on c o n s t i tu t io n a l  law i s  
as in vo lved  a s  the tasks performed by modern governments* In  
modern t im es , there has been a genera l in crea se  in  th e se  ta sk s  
as the so c a l le d  ’Welfare S ta te ’ has taken over more and more 
s o c i a l  and economic functions formerly performed by p r iv a te  
persons or i n s t i t u t i o n s .  This in crease  has been accompanied 
by an in crea s in g  share in  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n i t i a t i v e  by the 
E x ecu tive  which, according to  the d octr in e  of sep a ra tio n  o f  
powers, was the province of parliam ent.
In Western s o c i e t i e s ,  s p e c ia l i s a t io n  of fu n c t io n s  was 
not l im ite d  to  the "public sector"* The ’ econom ic’ had 
tended t o  be a sso c ia te d  w ith  s p e c ia l  s o c i a l  u n i t s  ( f ir m s ) ,  
the r e l ig io u s  w ith  other such u n its  (ch u rch es) , the advent o f
1 . Oxford E n g lish  D ictionary L i t t r e  has i t  as ’pouvoir charge 
d’ execu ter  l e s  lo is *
government in terv e n t io n  in  the r e g u la t io n  and co n tr o l  o f  
s o c ia l  and economic l i f e ,  th ere fo re , met w ith  s t i f f  oppo­
s i t i o n  from some of th ese  s o c ia l  u n i t s .
In A fr ica  i t  has been (and to  a g rea t  ex ten t s t i l l  i s )
common fo r  one s o c ia l  u n it  such as a l in e a g e  group t o  be
1
“economic" and " p o l i t ic a l"  and " r e l ig io u s " .  The advent, i n
A fr ic a ,  of the modern s t a t e ,  w ith  an in crea sed  share in  the
p lanning, r e g u la t io n  execution  and con tro l o f  s o c i a l  and
economic matters i s  thus a development which could  not be
expected  to  meet s im ila r  types* of o p p o s it io n  as in  w estern
s o c i e t i e s • The type of governments which have been organ ised
are a lso^  sometimes explained  in  terms o f the nature of
A fr ican  community l i f e ,  as w e l l  as in  terms of being creatu res
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or rea c tio n s  to  the c o lo n ia l  exp erience .
Turning to  the d e f in i t io n  o f  the E xecu tive  in  A fr ic a ,  
we may s ta r t  w ith  the d ic tion ary  d e f in i t io n  in  gen era l and 
p a r t ic u la r is e  i t  to  the A frican  ( t r a n s i t io n a l )  s i t u a t io n  by 
saying th at the E xecutive in  A frica  today i s  ( i )  th a t branch 
o f  government charged with the planning, i n i t i a t i o n  and 
execu tion  o f law s; and ( i i ) the person or persons In whom 
the h igh  m agistracy o f the s ta te  i s  v e s te d ,  in c lu d in g  the  
r o le  o f  in sp ir in g ,  guiding and leading the n a tion  in  a p er iod  
of s o c ia l  and economic transform ation and n a tion  b u ild in g .
lrf{Lloyd A. F a l le r s ,  "Bantu Bureaucracy”,
1962, pp. 4 -5 .
S.cf J u liu s  K. Nyerere, ^ jam a1 The b a s is  of A fr ica n  S o c ia l ism 1 , 
Dar-es-Salaam, 1962, p. 3 .
( i )  The I n s t i t u t i o n . When examining any i n s t i t u t i o n  I t  
Is  e s s e n t ia l  to  see i t  in  i t s  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  o th er  I n s t i ­
tu t io n s  in  the s o c ie ty  in  which i t  operates -  i t s  consequence
Qu
fo r  the l a t t e r ,  and v ice  versa . S u c h /r e la t io n s h ip  may be 
seen  in  terms of harmony and mutual support as w e l l  as in  
terms o f  c o n f l ic t*  The r e la t io n  o f the E x ecu tiv e  and the  
L e g is la tu r e ,  fo r  example, i s  one where the primacy o f  the  
E xecu tive  over a n a tion a l assembly i s  reco g n ise d  in  the  
m ajority  of A frican  s ta te s  and a sse r te d  through s e v e r a l  d e v ic e s .  
Parliamentary government in  the sense th a t  the government r e ­
q u ires  the continuous suppcrt of a m ajority  p arty  or a c o a l i t i o n  
o f  p a r t ie s  i s  abandoned in  favour o f  an assem bly composed o f  
members who belong to  a s in g le  p arty , headed (In  a lm ost a l l  
c a se s )  by the C hief E xecu tive . The E xecu tive  thus c o n tr o ls  
parliam ent, and i t  i s  one of the aims o f  the p rese n t  study  
to  show th a t such parliaments are not as v igoro u s  c r i t i c s  o f  
the government as in  Western ( c la s s i c a l )  parliam entary  gover­
nment; but th a t  they are not, fo r  a l l  th a t ,  n e c e s s a r i ly  u s e ­
l e s s .  Their r o le  i s  best seen as " le g it im a t in g  conventions"*  
What has been emphasised in  A fr ica  i s  u n ity  and a harmonious 
working fo r  a common g o a l .  The two-party dichotomy has not 
been ad m issib le  in  such a scheme of th in g s .
These ten d en cies  towards harmony in  the i n s t i t u t i o n s  are
1 . cf* Chapter Five*
among the primary desiderata  in  A frican  p o l i t i c a l  th in k in g .  
Arguments have been put forward in  support o f  t h i s .  A fr ica n  
community l i f e  w ith  i t s  emphasis on harmony and consensus  
i s  one argument. The t r a d it io n a l  A fr ican  method o f reaching  
"the tru th ” by means of the v i l l a g e  meeting seek ing  to  e s ta b ­
l i s h  a consensus of opinion seems to  have been p r o je c te d  to  
the n a tion a l l e v e l .  The argument for  th e  need to  weld a new 
n a tio n  out of many d if fe r e n t  groups i s  a l s o  i r r e s i s t i b l e .
Complete harmony in  i n s t i t u t io n a l  r e la t io n s h ip  i s ,  o f  
cou rse , im p ossib le , nor i s  i t  claimed th a t  A fr ica n  community 
l i f e  has been w i t h o u t  G o n f l i c t s *  o r  t h a t  th e  p resen t ta sk s  
o f  n a tion  b u ild in g  have no problems o f c o n f l i c t .  On th e  
contrary i t  i s  recognised  th a t  fe a r s  and su sp ic io n s  have to  
be overcome and ethn ic  r iv a lr i e s  transformed in t o  c o -o p e r a t iv e  
e f f o r t s  for  common g o a ls .  In  the r e la t io n s h ip  between the 
E xecu tive  and the L e g is la tu r e ,  moreover, the problem does not 
sto p  th e r e .  There may be r iv a lr i e s  w ith in  the same party  based  
on personal or other co n s id era t io n s , which might use the other  
fa c to r s  o f  d iv is io n  for  th e ir  own ends. I f  t h i s  were put in  
the con text of a c la s s i c a l  parliam entary system  i t  might in ­
v o lv e  the E xecutive and members of the L e g is la tu r e  i n  d i s ­
putes which could produce h o s t i l i t i e s  harmful t o  the whole 
s o c i e t y .  On the other hand I f  in c ip ie n t  c o n f l i c t s  are m uffled  
and suppressed the outcome may be expressed  in  e x p lo s iv e  forms % 
or , again , the r iv a lr i e s  may be cou n ter-produ ctive  in  terms of  
e f f i c i e n c y  and u n ited  e f f o r t .
The q u estio n , then , i s  how such c o n f l i c t s  or p o t e n t ia l  
c o n f l i c t s  can be reso lv ed  in s t i t u t io n a l ly *  In the case o f  
the E x ecu tiv e -L e g is la tu re  c o n f l i c t ,  the u lt im a te  means o f  
r e so lv in g  i t  i s  d i s s o lu t io n  of the L eg is la tu re*  D is s o lu t io n  
i s  the ffdemocratic fulcrum of the e n t ir e  p rocess o f  a d ju s t in g  
power c o n f l i c t s  by making the e le c to r a te  the u ltim o d e te r -  
mining fa c to r * ” In A fr ican  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  arrangement, the  
E xecu tive  has been g iven , in  most s t a t e s ,  the r ig h t  to  d i s ­
so lv e  parliam ent or to  r e fe r  the su bject o f  c o n f l i c t  to
popular judgment in  a referendum, which can perhaps be so
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tim£d and arranged as to  produce a d es ired  r e s u lt*  I t  I s
true th at in  the c l a s s i c a l  cabinet system , the th rea t o f
d is s o lu t io n  could be used by the Prime M in ister  to  p reserve
party d i s c ip l in e  and to  m aintain h is  government in  o f f i c e *
But t h i s  i s  pred icated  on the in terp lay  o f two r iv a l  p a r t i e s ,
whereas in  A fr ica  the E xecutive dominance i s  made more secure
through a one-party s ta te*
The im p lica tio n s  of such dominance are immense* The
E xecutive  togeth er  w ith  the one-party o r g a n isa t io n  i s  the
most important p o l i t i c a l  fa c to r  in  A fr ic a ,  as l a t e r  pages
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of th is  study w i l l  show* And one ”sch oo l o f  p o l i t i c a l  s c ie n c e ”
1* Karl Lowenstein, C on stitu tion s  and C o n s t i tu t io n a l  trends  
s in ce  World War I I ,  ed. Arnold J. Zurcher, $t* QTew
York, Univ. P ress , 195lj*
2 .  See Chapter F iv e , pjf.
3* When re feren ce  i s  made to  party o r g a n isa t io n s ,  t h i s  i s  to  be 
understood as excluding s ta te s  rule^U by th e  m il ita ry *
has o ffered  a d e f in i t io n  of th e  p o l i t i c a l  system , generous
enough to  in clud e systems in  t r a n s i t io n  and r e v o lu t io n a ry
regimes in  the process o f acquiring  " le g it im a c y ” * According
to  th is  study a p o l i t i c a l  system i s :
"■that system of in te r a c t io n s  to  he found in  a l l  
independent s o c i e t i e s  which performs the fu n c t io n s  
of in te g r a t io n  and ad ap tation  (both  in te r n a l ly  
and v i s - a - v i s  other s o c i e t i e s )  by means o f  the 
employment, or threat o f  employment, o f  more or 
l e s s  le g i t im a te  p h y s ica l com pulsion*” ■*
The p o l i t i c a l  system, not only as the le g i t im a te  order main­
ta in in g  but a ls o  as a "transforming system in  s o c i e t y ” acq u ires  
a dynamic s ig n i f ic a n c e  and hence becomes o f g re a t  re levan ce  
to  s o c i e t i e s  in  t r a n s i t io n  such as are a l l  A fr ica n  s o c i e t i e s  
today* Such systems in  A fr ica *  are la r g e ly  the crea tio n  o f  
the modern n a t io n a l i s t  lead ers  who are in  charge o f the govern­
ment* The ro le  of the E xecutive i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  h igh  in  the  
l i f e  of the p o l i t i c a l  system. The r o le  i t s e l f  i s  in  a la rg e  
measure created and developed by the le a d e r s  th em se lves , as  
are the p o l i t i c a l  in s t i t u t io n s  in  which the r o le  i s  cast*
A r o le  i s  what i s  expected of a person in  a g iv en  c o n te x t ,  
as w e l l  as what the person makes o f  It*  What i s  exp ected  o f  
a person Is the demand of an in te r e s t e d  p arty  who makes the  
expectation*  I t  may, of course, be re g u la te d  w ith in  reasonable  
l i m i t s ;  and In the case o f the c o n s t i t u t io n a l  r o le  of th e
1* G abriel A. Almond and James S* Coleman, (ed ) in  "The 
p o l i t i c s  of the ’Developing Areas” , ^ ^ ^ *  (*<*7.
E xecutive  i t  i s  f ix e d  w ith  cer ta in ty *  But, in  p r a c t ic e  
there must be "departures” from th e  s t a t i c  c o n d it io n , as 
f ix e d  in  the c o n s t i t u t io n a l  or other documents, owing to  
the demands o f changing s i tu a t io n s *  In sh o r t ,  r o le s  are  
c a s t  in  s t a t i c  term s, but are acted  in  dynamic terms in  
a g iven  s i tu a t io n *
( i i )  The men* This in trod uces the second element of 
our d e f i n i t i o n ,  namely the person or persons in  whom the  
High M agistracy of the s t a t e  i s  v e s t e d .  I t  w i l l  be seen  
from the fo reg o in g  th a t the r o le  o f " in sp ir in g " , guiding  
and lead ing  the n a tio n  In a framework of so c i a l  and economic 
transform ation  through a p er iod  of t r a n s i t i o n  must be part 
of the d e f in i t i o n  o f th e  A fr ica n  E x e c u t iv e .  I f  t h i s  i s  r e ­
membered i t  w i l l  be p o s s ib le  to  d ischarge the em otional 
content of words l i k e  " a u to cra t ic" , "authoritarian"  or 
" d ic ta to rsh ip " , and render a study of the su b je c t  more 
f r u i t f u l .
A study o f the E xecu tive  a t  a c r u c ia l  p er iod  o f  t r a n s i ­
t io n  i s  j u s t i f i e d  on the grounds, among o th e r s ,  th a t i t  may 
con tr ib u te  to  an understanding of th e  ch aracter  of the  
nation  In tr a n s it io n *  In  A fr ic a ,  more than e lsew h ere , the  
E xecu tive  today i s  very much the centre  o f  the network of  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  of the s ta te *  And the men who hold  E xecu tive  
o f f i c e s  are the c e n tr a l  and dominant f ig u r e s  of the s o c i e t y .  
Most of them le d  the movements for  n a t io n a l  independence 
from c o lo n ia l  r u le .  They were the c e n tr a l  ch aracters  during
the drama of n a tio n a l b ir th ,  and they embodied the hopes
and a sp ir a t io n s  of th e ir  f e l lo w  countrymen* I t  i s  indeed
d i f f i c u l t  at times to  separate the man from the o f f i c e ,
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which in  many cases was created  by or fo r  the man.
I t  might be sa id  th at the E xecutive  as a su p er -s tru c tu re  
merely r e f l e c t s  the character o f  the s o c ie t y  in  which it^  
o p era tes , or that the men rep resen t a sm all group of educated  
power e l i t e *  This i s  o f course tr u e .  But A fr ic a  i s  not  
unique in  providing examples which demonstrate the v a l i d i t y  
of the p ro p o sit io n  that people who dominate the s e a t  of  
government over a c e r ta in  period  leave  p e c u l ia r  marks on 
th e ir  s o c i e t i e s .  There are many such examples in  h istory*
In  some of th ese ,  in  p o in t o f  f a c t ,  some important a sp ec ts  
of the cen tra l in s t i t u t i o n s  were worked out w ith  the c e n tra l  
f ig u re  of the time in  mind. The p o s i t io n  of the P resid en t  
of the U .S .A .,  for  example, would have been made much weaker 
but fo r  the presence of a p ub lic  f ig u r e  l i k e  George Washington, 
who commanded the re sp ect  and confidence of a l l  the lea d ers  
of the s t a t e s  who were je a lo u s  o f th e ir  s t a t e s !  r ig h ts  and 
in te r e s t s *  President de G aulle and the C o n s t i tu t io n  of the  
F if t h  French Republic i s  another example.
In  the new A fr ican  s t a t e s  the E x ecu tiv es  do not r e f l e c t
1* For a b iograp h ica l account of some lea d e r s  and events  see  
Ronald S ega l, *A fr ican  P r o f i l e s 1, Penguin A fr ican  L ibrary, 
1963.
t h e ir  s o c i e t i e s  in  the (ev o lu tio n a ry ) sense th a t  t h e i r  
p o s i t io n s  represen t natura l outgrowths o f the co n fig u ra tio n  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  fo r ces  of the s o c i e t i e s .  They are new crea tio n s  
super-imposed on th e ir  s o c i e t i e s  which th ey  seek  to  transform . 
The term " n a tio n -b u ild in g ” sums up the p o l i t i c a l  asp ect of 
such attem pts a t  transform ation , and c h ie f  among the fa c to r s  
in  th i s  process i s  the p res id en t who a c t s ,  In te r  a l i a ,  as 
an outward symbol of a new centre o f l o y a l t y  and n a t io n a l  
u n ity .  Nor should the e p ith e ts  used w ith  the names o f  some 
of the A fr ican  lead ers  such as "Mwatimu", "Musdi", "El Rais" 
or "Osagefo" be understood as the whim sical c r e a t io n  o f  
power hungry men. Each has a s ig n i f ic a n c e  connected w ith  
the t r a d i t io n  of the p a r t ic u la r  s o c ie t y  ( e . g .  Musfti and 
Osagefo) or has a d e f in i t e  connection  w ith  the person al  
h is t o r y  o f  the p a r t ic u la r  lead er  ( e .g .  Mwalimu). To take  
Mwalimu, fo r  example, the word means tea ch er  in  S w ah ili  and 
P re s id en t  Nyerere who was a teach er by p r o fe s s io n  i s  re ferr ed  
to  as "Mwalimu" the teach er of a l l  h is  countrymen in  the  
sen se  o f  one who le a d s ,  who shows the way. But th is  i s  so  
not merely because he was a teach er by p r o fe s s io n ,  but be­
cause he went up and down the country to  organ ise  branches 
o f  the p o l i t i c a l  party which he had founded in  1954.
Such d ev ices  were designed to  s tren g th en  the image o f  the
1 .  c f .  R. S eg a l,  o p . c i t .  pp .123-130.
new lead ers and w ith  them the n a tion  which rep resen ted  a
wider lo y a l ty  than the "tribesa&tt* t o  which A fr ican s had
h ith e r to  been accustomed* The q u estio n  of how a t r ib a l  or
other lo y a l ty  can be rep laced  by or transform ed to  a wider
lo y a l t y  goes hand in  hand w ith  the q u e s t io n  of n a t io n a l
lea d ersh ip  and the s u c c e s s fu l  p r o je c t io n  o f new ideas and
va lu es  connected w ith  such leadersh ip*  The w r it  of the
c o lo n ia l  power a c t in g  through a network of p r o v in c ia l  and
d i s t r i c t  adm in istrators had tr ea ted  as a s t a t e  what had
p rev iou sly  been groups of people h e ld  to g e th e r  by k in gsh ip ,
k in sh ip  or r e l ig io n *  Boundaries e x i s t e d  in  A fr ic a  b efore
the Europeans arr ived; but they were c u ltu r a l  boundaries
(or marches); the ad jo in in g  p laces  of communities rather
than le g a l  d iv id in g  l i n e s .  The new A fr ica n  lea d ers  in h e r ite d
from the c o lo n ia l  powers s ta te s  w ith  a r b i t r a r i ly  f ix e d
boundaries cu tt in g  across e th n ic  and l i n g u i s t i c  groups and
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problems a l l i e d  w ith  th is*
I t  has been sa id  th at faced  w ith  such a s i t u a t io n  the
new A fr ican  E xecutives were,
"far l e s s  favourably placed than were the  
Governments of those  18th  century and 19th  ©
Century s ta t e s  which came in to  being as a
r e s u l t  o f  the a p p l ic a t io n  o f  organ ised  fo rce" ,
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f o r  example the U .S .A .,  I t a ly  and Germany. According to
1# c f .  John Fletcher-Cooke, f Parliam ent, E xecu tive  and C i v i l  
S ervice} in  Parliament as an E xpert. ?vr (W v,s
(ed) (1966) p. 154.
2 .  c f .  Paul Bohannan, "African O utline" , Penguin A fr ican  L ib ­
rary (1966) p . 2.8•
3 .  John-P'letcher-Cooke, ibid*
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t h i s  view the "p eacefu l11 passage to  independent sta tehood
o f  the new A frican  s t a t e s  has deprived them of an element
o f  cohesion* Such view i s  based on the assumption th a t  the
heat o f b a t t le  and the flow  of blood provides a kind o f
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s p ir i t u a l  mortar binding c i t i z e n s  together*  I f  so ,  and 
t h i s  i s  by no means c e r ta in ,  then the new n a tio n s  w i l l  have 
to  make do w ith  a p o l i t i c a l  s u b s t i tu te  to  t h i s  ’m issing  
elem en t1 • Such a s u b s t i tu te  can only be dynamic lea d ersh ip  
which can s u c c e s s fu l ly  m o b il ise  people on the b a s is  o f id eas  
th a t  can move people to  b u i ld  a nation*
One r e s u l t  of t h i s  can be the replacement o f  some fe a tu r e s  
o f the s ta te  apparatus (and the id eas  underly ing  i t )  l e f t  by 
the C o lon ia l power by new i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forms and patterns*
The p o l i t i c a l  awakening of the A fr ican s which had s ta r te d  
s low ly  prepared the ground fo r  such new forms and patterns*
4* P o l i t i c a l  Awakening
A fr ica  has a long h is to r y ,  and has had many awakenings
during th is  h is to r y .  The most recen t  awakening, i . e *  th a t
d erived  from European contact i s  a c r u c ia l  one, though by
no means the only important one. This l a s t  awakening in v o lv e s
the whole fa b r ic  of A fr ican  l i f e  and thought in  a l l  i t s  
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asp ects*  One of the in t e r e s t in g  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  process  
has been the emergence of a n a tion a lism  which has been
1 . Ib id .
2 .  c f .  Bupert Emerson and Martin Ki€son (ed)* ’The P o l i t i c a l  
Awakening of Af r i c a ’ jo..f.
accompanied by a profound search fo r  a h i s t o r y  and id e n t i ty *  
The search  was for an A fr ican  cu ltu re  which was thought 
to  have been put in  abeyance and an A fr ica n  p e r s o n a l i ty  
suppressed  by colonialism * This i s  o f  course not p e c u l ia r  
to  A frica*  N a t io n a l is t  movements are g e n e r a l ly  accompanied 
by a p a r a l l e l  movement of ideas which enable the lea d ers  to  
crea te  a p o ten t essence  of the new n a tio n  seek ing  recogn it ion *  
The need fo r  A fr ican  peoples to  ’ j u s t i f y  them selves* has been  
perhaps even more keenly f e l t  than in  o th er  n a t i o n a l i s t  move­
ments because of a b e l i e f  sed u lo u sly  m aintained th a t  A fr ica
was ’the dark continent* and i t s  past c o n s is te d  of f e t i s h -
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rid d en  ’p r im it iv e  c u l tu r e s ’ * But as Bohannan has put i t ,
"the darkness ha$l much more to  do w ith  the  
Europeans and American v i s i t o r s  t o  i t ,  and 
workers in  i t ,  than i t  had to  do with the  
A fr ic a n s .” 2
The seeds of th e  new n ation a lism  were v a r io u s ly  sown 
at var iou s tim es and p laces  before World War II* B efore  
World War I I  e x p l i c i t  p r o te s ts  did not take the form o f  
a g i t a t io n  and large  s c a le  o rg a n isa t io n  fo r  independence. 
R ather, they  took a * cultural* form* The r o le  o f  Afro-Ameri­
cans and Afro-Carribeans i s  o f s ig n i f ic a n c e  in  the shaping  
of id eas  which helped  the development of th e  new nationalism *  
The poems and other w r it in g s  of W.E*B. du B o is ,  Langston  
Hughes, and Aime Cesar to  mention a few, s t i r r e d  the  
em otional impulse fo r  a red iscovery  o f  an A fr ica n  id e n t ity *
1* c f .  Thomas Hodgkin, ’N ationalism  in  C o lo n ia l  Africa*
(London 1956), e sp . p* 169*
2 .  Paul Bohannan, ’A fr ican  o u t l in e ’ Penguin (1964), p. 13*
C erta in  id e a s ,  concepts and sentim ents grew nut of the  
experience of c o lo n ia l  ru le  which f a c i l i t a t e d  the growth 
o f  the new nationalism * As a student of t h i s  su b jec t  has 
put i t :
nin  order to  understand c e r ta in  a sp e c ts  of  
A frican  n ationa lism  and i t s  ca rry -o v ers , i t  
i s  important to  consider the f a c t  th a t  c o lo n ia l  
ru le was not only a p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
a f f a i r ,  but th at i t  a ls o  Imposed a s p e c i f i c  
s o c ia l  framework for  the A fr ic a n ’ s experience  
both of the world and of h im self* The fa c t  
of p o l i t i c a l  domination created  areas o f con­
ta c t  between A fricans and Europeans a l l  over 
the continent under con d ition s  th a t  co n sta n tly  
underscored r a c ia l  and c u ltu r a l  d if fe r e n c e s*
The c o lo n ia l  r e la t io n s h ip  thus in v o lv ed  the 1
t o t a l  c u ltu ra l  s i tu a t io n  and c u ltu r a l  d i f fe r e n c e s * ”
The concept o f1 negritude was the most e x p r e s s iv e  form
o f cu ltu ra l n ationalism  which was developed In Francophonic
A fr ican  c ir c le s *  The main ideas of n egritu d e may be gleaned
from the w rit in gs  of Aime Cesar and Leopold Sedar Senghor.
Senghor’ s poetry in  p a r t icu la r  shows the A fr ican  fa c in g  the
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dilemma of becoming a Frenchman and remaining an A fr ican .
Negritude was a conception of A fr ican  c u ltu r e ,  w ith in  
which the deprived and desp ised  peop les o f  A fr ic a  were to  
r e g a in  th e ir  b ir th r ig h t .  Pan-Africanism was i t s  (more 
s t r i c t l y )  p o l i t i c a l  counter-part* which was to  be used fo r  
the same end* Here again , Afro-Americans have played a role*
1* A biola  I r e le ,  ’Negritude or Black C u ltu ra l N a tion a lism 1
The Journal o f A fr ican  S tu d ies , V ol. 3 ,  N o .3 , (1965) p*321.
2 . Senghor the poet r e so lv e s  the dilemma In favour o f th e
l a t t e r ,  w hile  Senghor the p o l i t i c i a n  i s  perhaps the most
ardent Francophonist, as w itness h is  most re cen t  advocacy
of the n a tio n  of * francophonie’ which seek s  to  p reserve  
the u n ity  o f a l l  French-speaking peoples*
Marcus Garvey's 'B£ck to  A fr ic a 1 movement and th e  w r it in g s  
o f Dubois and Blyden i n i t i a l l y  moulded the concept o f  Pan- 
Africanism# I t  was perhaps more n atu ra l fo r  th e se  people who 
had l o s t  the knowledge of th e ir  A'frican p lace  of o r ig in  to  
order a search  fo r  d ig n ity  and e q u a l i ty  in  terms o f  an a l l -  
embracing concept# But i t  soon caught the im agination  o f  
A fr ica n  lead ers  o f  the in ter-w ar p er iod  in  t h e i r  student  
days (e .g #  Nkrumah, Kenyatta and $ z ik iw e ) .  The p o l i t i c a l  
lea d ers  o f  A fr ica  s e iz e d  on th ese  concepts and b u i l t  them 
in to  th e ir  n a tion a lism  as the key-stones#  The concept o f  
Pan-Africanism came t o  be a s so c ia te d  w ith  some o f  the lea d ers  
but a l l  of the lead ers  used th ese  concepts and the sen tim ents  
generated  from them as b u ild in g  b lock s fo r  t h e ir  ta sk  of  
nat ion -bu ild in g#  In th i s  process o f th e  m o b i l is a t io n  o f  id eas  
fo r  the p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  m o b il is a t io n  o f  A fr ica n  p e o p le s ,  
cu ltu r a l  elements which had been put in  abeyance or suppressed  
were summoned fo r th  from the c o l l e c t i v e  su b con sc iou s, as i t  
were# Whether or not the claims that were made about the  
h i s t o r i c a l  or l o g i c a l  v a l id i t y  o f some o f t h e s e / i s  not mat­
e r i a l .  What mattered was th a t  people responded to  the c a l l#
In  t h i s ,  i r o n ic a l ly  enough, c o lo n ia l is m  was the c h ie f  
i r r i t a n t .  The c o lo n ia l  exp erience* . o f  dom ination and a l l  
th a t  th is  im plied in  the arb itary  reord erin g  o f  p o lit ic a l
1# c f .  C olin  Legum, 'Pan Africanism ' (London) 1962
and s o c i a l  l i f e  o f  the A fr ican  had crea ted  what Georges
B a land ier  c a l l s  'a  s t a t e  of la te n t  c r i s i s 1, w ith  an in h eren t
tension# When the movements fo r  independence were unleashed,
th e r e fo r e ,  therevas a break of the te n s io n  ^italeasfcing the
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en er g ie s  of the masses# The A fr ican  p o l i t i c a l  movements 
must be seen  a g a in s t  th i s  background* The subsequent r e ­
a c t io n s ,  the search  fo r  new va lues and fo r  readjustm ent of  
p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  fo r c e s  must a l s o  be r e la t e d  to  t h i s  
background. I t  must not be supposed th a t  t h i s  readjustm ent  
in vo lved  a r e j e c t io n  o f a l l  th a t  was part of th e  c o lo n ia l  
exp er ien ce; t h i s  i s  indeed not p o s s ib le .  Even the most 
d ed ica ted  a p o s t le s  o f  negritude do not su g g es t  t h i s ,  as can 
be seen  in  Senghorf 3 dilemma, which i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  a l l  
A fr ica n  a f f a i r s .  Take a g a in  the example o f  Kwame Nkrumah, 
who developed the concept o f the A fr ica n  p e r s o n a l i ty  as a 
roughly fAnglophonicf eq u iv a len t  to  negritude* Nkrumah has 
w r it t e n  th a t:
w***the d e fe a t  of c o lo n ia lism  and even neo­
c o lo n ia lism  w i l l  not r e s u l t  in  the autom atic  
disappearance o f  the imported p a tter n s  o f  
thought and s o c ia l  organ isation*  For th ese  
p a ttern s  have taken ro o t ,  and are In varying
1* c f .  George B a lan d ier , fS o c io lo g ie  a c t u e l l e  de l ’Afrique  
n o ir e 1, (P ar is  1963, 2nd ed. 1963) pp. 3-38*
2* L est t h i s  should sound a gross over s im p l i f i c a t io n  o f  an 
experience which took  many yea -fcs to  mature and needed the 
h elp  o f  many good people o u ts id e  A fr ic a ,  i t  must be r e ­
corded th a t  the movement was a t  f i r s t  s lu g g is h  and p la in ­
t i v e ;  and th a t  there were in  B r i t a in  and France many 
people -  l i b e r a l s ,  p a c i f i c i s t s ,  s o c i a l i s t s ,  hum anists, 
C h ris t ia n s  and communists who helped  in  awakening the  
conscience of th e ir  peoples and governments* cf* Emerson 
and K Itson, o p . c i t .  p . 14.
degrees s o c i o lo g i c a l  fe a tu r e s  of our contempor­
ary so c ie ty *  Nor w i l l  a sim ple retu rn  t o  the  
communalistic s o c ie t y  o f  a n c ie n t  A fr ic a  o f fe r  a 
s o lu t io n  e ith er *  To advocate a re tu rn , as i t  
were, to  the rock from which we were hewn i s  a 
charming thought, but we are faced  w ith  contem­
porary problems, which have a r i s e n  from p o l i t i c a l  
su bjugation , economic e x p lo i t a t io n ,  ed u cation a l  
backwardness, in crea se  in  p o p u la tio n , f a m i l ia r i t y  
w ith  the methods and products o f  i n d u s t r i a l i ­
s a t io n ,  modern a g r ic u l tu r a l  tech n iq u es*M 1
The c o lo n ia l  exp erience  i s  thus a complex experience*
The ’ s t a t e  of la t e n t  c r i s i s 1 must be viewed in  dynamic terms
a c u ltu r a l  c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n  was tak ing  p lace  a l l  th e  tim e.
11 In s p i t e  of the g rea t apparent s t a b i l i t y  o f  
c o lo n ia l  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  s tr u c tu r e ,  and 
I t s  s im i la r i t y  th e  world over, there  are p o in ts  
a t which the two c u ltu r e s  in te r p e n e tr a te  and 
u lt im a te ly  d estro y  the ja n u s-fa ced  system . These 
d estroyers were in  the world o f  th in g s  -  the  
m a ter ia l item s brought by trade -  and in  th e  world  
o f  id e a s ,  th e  id eas  brought by m is s io n a r ie s  as 
w e l l  as by government o f f i c i a l s  and t r a d e r s .11 2
Among the most p oten t Ideas th a t  the n a t i o n a l i s t  lea d ers  
u sed  In t h e ir  claim  fo r  independence was th ose  o f  democracy. 
They invoked every p r in c ip le  th a t  i s  ch er ish ed  in  the p o l i ­
t i c s  of the m etrop olitan  world, in  order to  ach ieve  th e ir  
ends. This s ta r te d  a p rocess of p o l i t i c a l  ed u cation  among 
A fr ica n  p eo p les . “One man one v o te Tf was a companion of 
"'Qh.uru11^ "Nmo^a" and “i s t i q l a l 1* in  the p o l i t i c a l  vocabulary of  
th e  ordinary A fr ican , ju s t  as n egritu d e  and Pan-Africanism  
moved A fr ican  lea d ers  to  seek  a la r g e r  A fr ica n  u n ity  “tr a n s ­
i t  Kwame Nkrumah, 'A fr ica n  S o c ia l ism  R e v is i t e d * , A fr ica n  
Forum, V ol. 1 , No.3 (1966), p .3 -9  a t  p p .6 -7 .
2 .  Paul Bohannan, o p . c i t .  p. 30 .
cending e th n ic  and n a t io n a l  d i f f e r e n c e ” * The n a t io n a l i s t  
movements flow ered  in  the f o r t i e s  and e a r ly  f i f t i e s  and 
s ta r t e d  bearing f r u i t  -  the f r u i t  o f p o l i t i c a l  independence -  
in  the l a t e  f i f t i e s  and ea r ly  s i x t i e s *  Morocco, T un isia  and 
th e  Sudan had a l l  acceded to  independence by th e  m i d - f i f t i e s ,  
but the f lo o d -g a te  was opened in  1957 w ith  the b ir t h  o f  
independent Ghana.
5* New Legitim acy
The n a t io n a l i s t  movements had produced new p o l i t i c a l  
and o r g a n isa t io n a l forms* The form ation o f  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s ,  the campaign fo r  e l e c t i o n  to  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i ls ,  
the r a l ly s  and demonstrations were part o f  th e  experience  
of th e  l a t e s t  s tage  of the c o lo n ia l  r u le .  The new lea d ers  
who were swept to  power on the c r e s t  of n a t i o n a l i s t  waves
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e s ta b l is h e d  th e ir  a u th o r ity  in  a very  sh ort p er iod  o f t im e.
I t  a l l  happened so  rap id ly  that some members o f  the c o lo n ia l  
governments did not see the f u l l  s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  the e v e n ts ,  
and continued to  r e fe r  to  the lea d ers  as a band o f a g i t a t o r s .  
Those of them who r e a l i s e d  the ser io u sn e ss  o f  the s i t u a t io n ,  
however, had to  do a l l  they could to  hang on and tr y  to  steer*  
But even that in  many cases was not very su c c e ss fu l*  A new 
era had begun. The lead ers  were reco gn ised  a s  the l e g i t im a te
1* c f .  The preamble of the O.A.U* Charter.
2* By comparison w ith  Ghandi and Nehru whom i t  took decades. 
3*^B asil Druidsoh, ”which way A fr ic a ”, Penguin (1964) p*107.
su ccesso rs  to  the c o lo n ia l  governors and the s ta g e  was s e t  
fo r  n e g o t ia t io n s  fo r  s e l f - r u le *  And a l l  the w h ile  organ ised  
A fr ican  masses watched w ith  keen e x p e c ta t io n  -  a l l  eyes  
fo cu ssed  on the new lea d ers  who p e r s o n if ie d  new hopes, 
and who commanded the r e sp e c t  and adm iration  of t h e ir  p e o p le s ,  
which was tr a n s la te d  in to  a u th o r ity  when th e  C o lon ia l power 
(h ith e r to  the c e n tra l  and only a u th o r ity )  handed over power 
to  them* The f i n a l  phase of th is  a u th o r ity  was when the 
stamp o f  leg it im a cy  was put on i t  in  the e l e c t i o n  which put 
a new A fr ican  government in  o f f ic e *  The e l e c t io n  of th e  
government and la t e r  of the P resid en t (or Prime M in is ter , as 
the case may be) was an event of p a r t ic u la r  s ig n i f ic a n c e  
in  the making of the new le g i t im a te  A fr ican  authority*  A 
whole p eo p le1 s a t t e n t io n  was centred  on men who were exp ected  
to  lea d  the people to  a b e t t e r  future# I t  was no mere r i t u a l  
(a t  f i r s t ,  a t  any r a t e ) ;  i t  was an event in  which the people  
took p a r t ,  w ith  p ride and hope*
Such have been th e  ways in  which A fr ican  peoples have 
sprung in to  t h e ir  independent sta teh ood , and such were th e  
r o le s  played by the lea d ers  and t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  th a t  
in  many in sta n ces  the independent s t a t e  in  the ea r ly  days 
came to  be a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the party  and the leader#
Ideology
The new A fr ican  governments had in h e r ite d  the p o l i t i c a l  
stru c tu re  of the c o lo n ia l  s t a t e ,  w ith  l i t t l e  m od ifica tion s#
Many of them f e l t  the n e c e s s i ty  o f  s y s te m a t ic a l ly  developing  
p o l i t i c a l  s o c ia l  and economic systems th a t  would meet the  
urgent needs of th e ir  peoples in  the p o s t - c o lo n ia l  p er io d .
A number of A frican  lead ers  had indeed met t h i s  ch a llen ge  
in  th e o r e t ic a l  term s, o f fe r in g  p o s s ib le  answers. Most of  
th ese  expressed  an ideo logy  along s o c i a l i s t  l i n e s ,  some 
purporting to  show a r e la t io n  between s o c ia l i s m  and A fr ica n  
communal l i f e ,  and others w ith  Islam . The c h ie f  exponents o f  
!tA fr ica n  S o c ia lism 11 are Leopold Sedar Senghor, and J u liu s  
N yerere.
( i )  A fr ican  S oc ia lism
Senghor was probably the f i r s t  to u se  the term A fr ica n
s o c ia l i s m . Senghor had come in  touch w ith  Marxism and w ith
S o c ia l ism  as expounded by French s o c i a l i s t s ,  some of whom
l i k e  P ierre  T eilhard  de Chardin had sought to  r e c o n c i le
C h r is t ia n i ty  w ith  Marxism. Senghor in  turn developed h is
own id ea s  which attempted to r e c o n c ile  s o c ia l i s m  w ith  h is
conception  o f  f,the A fr ican  way o f l i f e . 11 In h is  trA fr ica n
S o c ia l ism 11 he w r ite s :
ff. . . i h  con trast to  the c l a s s i c  European, the  
Negro-African does not draw a l in e  between  
h im se lf  and the o b jec t;  he does n ot hold  i t  
a t  a d is ta n c e ,  nor does he merely look  a t  i t  
and ah.aj.yse i t .  A fter  h o ld ing  i t  a t  a d is ta n c e ,  
a f t e r  scanning i t  w ithout a n a ly s in g  i t ,  he tak es  
i t  v ib ran t in  h is  hands, c a r e fu l  not to  k i l l  or 
f i x  i t .  He touches i t ,  f e e l s  i t ,  sm ells  i t .
The Negro-African i s  l i k e  one o f  th ose  Third  
Worms, a pure f i e l d  o f  s e n s a t i o n s . • *Thus the  
Negro-African sym pathizes, abandons h is  person­
a l i t y  to  become i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  the Other, d ies  
to  be reborn in  the Other. He does not a s s im i la te
he i s  a ss im ila ted *  He l i v e s  a common l i f e  n 
w ith  the o ther; he U vea  in  a sym b iosis* fI
Nkrumah, who advocates 1 S c i e n t i f i c - S o c ia l i s m * , d ism isse s  
t h i s  passage and t h e . id e a s  o f Senghor in  one sh ort but de­
v a s ta t in g  sen ten ce :  " I t  i s  clear*1, he w r ite s  "that s o c ia l i s m
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cannot be founded on t h i s  kind o f  m etaphysics of knowledge*" 
But b efore  we c o n s id e r  Nkrumah's s c i e n t i f i c  s o c ia l is m  we must 
p resent the other view  of A fr ica n  S o c ia lism  -  N yereref s*
I f  Senghorf s approach to  "African Socialism " i s  frcm a 
p o e t ic  and p h ilo s o p h ic a l  angle Nyerere*s i s  from a s o c i o l o g i ­
ca l one. He w r it e s :
"The fou n dation  and the o b je c t iv e  o f  A fr ican  
s o c ia l is m  i s  the extended fa m ily .  The true  
A fr ica n  s o c i a l i s t  does not look  on one c la s s  
of men as h is  b reth ren , and another as h is  
n atu ra l enem ies. He regards a l l  men as h is  
brethren  -  as members of h is  extending fa m ily .
That i s  why the f i r s t  a r t i c l e  o f  TANU'S creed  
i s  'Binadamu wote n i  ndugu zangu, na A frika n i  
moja*. I f  t h i s  had been o r ig in a l ly  put in  E n g lish  
i t  could have been: *1 b e l i e v e  in  Human b ro th er­
hood and the u n ity  of A f r ic a 1. ..Ujama, th en , or 
'fam ilihood* d escr ib es  our s o c ia l i s m . I t  i s  opposed 
to  c a p ita l ism , which seeks to  b u i ld  a happy s o c ie t y  
on th e  b a s is  o f  the e x p lo i t a t io n  o f  man by man, and 
I t  i s  eq u a lly  opposed to  d octr in fla ire  s o c ia l i s m  which
o f in e v i ta b le  c o n f l i c t  bs^woou man auu j.uau.«. .
Nyerere i s  among the few A fr ica n  le a d e r s  who have worked
out plans and programmes o f  a c t io n  based on the Ideo logy
which they  proposed as the foundation  o f t h e ir  p o l i t i c a l ,
6   _________________________________________
1 .  L .S . Senghor, 'A fr ica n  S o c ia l is m 1 (London and New York, 19€4 
pp. 7 2 - 3 ) .  c f .  a l s o  h is  'The Hoad to  A fr ica n  S oc ia lism '  
A fr ica n  Forum, V o l .1 , No.3 (1966) pp. 10 -1 6 .
2 .  K. Nkrumah, o p . c i t .  p. 8 .
3 .  J u liu s  K. N yerere, 'Ujama* the b a s is  o f  A fr ican  S o c ia l is m ' ,  
(Dar-es-Salaam , 196 2 ), p . 3 .
seeks to  b u i ld  i t s  happy
s o c i a l  arid economic l i f e .  The Arusha D ec la ra tio n  shows 
the e x te n t  o f  the d eterm ination  to  th in k  through and carry  
out such^plans and programmes as we s h a l l  see  in  a l a t e r  
chapter* The o r g a n isa t io n  of the c o -o p e r a t iv e s  in  Tanzania 
r e f l e c t s  the economic a sp ec t  o f N yerere1s s o c ia l i s m , as a 
p r a c t ic a l  s te p  taken  to  r e a l i s e  the o b je c t iv e s  s e t  out in  
a s o c i a l i s t  p lan . In f a c t  the economics of N yerere?s s o c ia l is m  
does not appear t o  be d i f f e r e n t ,  in  p r a c t ic e ,  from one ad-8 
vocated  by Nkrumah, fo r  example. This i s  borne out by the  
l a t e s t  measure taken by th e  Government of Tanzania n a t io n a l i s in g  
p r iv a te  banks.
On th e  other hand another v a r ie t y  o f  "African Socialism "  
has appeared in  Kenya. The main fe a tu r e s  o f t h i s  v a r ie t y  
appear t o  b e: " p o l i t i c a l  democracy", mutual s o c i a l  respon­
s i b i l i t y ,  var iou s  forms of ownership, a range of co n tr o ls  to  
ensure th a t  property i s  used in  th e  mutual in t e r e s t s  of
s o c i e t y  and i t s  members, d i f f u s io n  o f  ownership and p ro g re ss iv e  
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ta x a t io n .  One of the authors of the document, Mr. Mwai 
K ibaki, had indeed d eclared  in  the Kenya Parliament as e a r ly  
as 1963 when he was Parliam entary S ecretary  to  th e  Treasury 
th a t  the Kenya Government had made i t  c le a r  th a t  i t  was 
working fo r  a mixed economy. He d efin ed  t h i s  a s :
"an economy in  which the Government w i l l  make i t s
c o n tr ib u t io n  in  th e  spheres where the p r iv a te
1 .  c f .  ChapteriEjtg&fcs
2  ^ ' A fr ican  S o c ia lism  and i t s  A p p lic a t io n  to  Planning in
Kenya, a monograph d is t r ib u te d  by th e  Kenya Government.
in v e s to r  may be h e s i ta n t  to  come in ,  in  spheres  
where the p ro je c t  ta l© s a lo n g , long time to  
mature and to  show p r o f i t * *.Those areas in  which  
s e r v ic e s  and goods are being provided by p r iv a te  
in d u stry  -  and being provided very e f f i c i e n t l y  -  
we are not going to  in t e r f e r e  with*••We in ten d  
to  have an economy where the government and the  
p r iv a te  in d u s tr ie s  co -o p era te , and an economy 
where an ordinary in d iv id u a l  person , i f  he has 
h is  money, i£  fr e e  to  move in  the d ir e c t io n  he 
wants to  move * * . This i s  not to  say*♦ , th a t we are
not aware th a t  the bulk  of t h e p e o p le  In t h i s  
country are poor and th at they lo o k  to  the ‘^overn-  
ment fo r  the p r o v is io n  of s o c i a l  s e r v ic e s  and i n ­
com es"which~theyare not' in  a positTon to  provide  
thems eIve s ( i t a l 1 cs s u p p l ie d )* * * But we are  eq u a lly  
aware• • • th a t  the way t o  h e lp  them i s  not to  grab 
what l i t t l e  e x i s t s ,  or what l i t t l e  has been de­
v e lo p ed , and to  d is t r ib u te  i t  to  th ese  people**^
that would be the h e ig h t  o f i r r e s p o n s ib i l i t y * n 1
P resid en t Senghor a ls o  j u s t i f i e s  the r o le  of the p r iv a te
s e c to r  on s im i la r  grounds, adding a caveat th a t  he had no
i l l u s i o n  about the m otives of the p r iv a te  in v e s to r ,  tfwho seeks  
Z
only  p r o f i t * fl He agrees th a t  the p r iv a te  in v e s to r  should draw
a reasonab le  p r o f i t  ,!as counterpart fo r  the r i s k  he takes and
fo r  h is  vo lu ntary  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  our development e f f o r t * tt
In  so doing, he goes on, a b e tr a y a l  o f  the s o c i a l i s t  m iss ion
i s  n ot in v o lv ed , because p r io r i t y  in  th e  p resent phase o f
b u ild in g  s o c ia l i s m *  goes to  economic growth*
,fThe e ssen ce  of our s o c ia l is m  i s  t h a t ,  w ith  the  
h elp  of s c ie n c e  and tech n o lo g y , a l l  the p o t e n t ia l -  *
i t i e s  of the country may be e x p lo i t e d  to th e  maximum.
1* Quoted by Martin K ilson , P o l i t i c s  of A fr ican  S o c ia l ism ’ , 
A fr ican  Forum, V o l . l ,  No*3 (1966) p .20* Mr* Kibaki who i s  
a graduate o f the London School of Economics has s in c e  been 
promoted to  the post of M in ister  of Commerce and In d u stry .
2# cf* L*S_*Senghor, ’The A fr ican  Hoad to  S o c ia l is m ’ , A fr ican  
Foru^>(l966) p .1 4 .
3 .  I b id .
What has been r a t io n a l i s e d  as 1A fr ica n  S o c ia l is m 1
in  Kenya may be found in  other A fr ica n  s t a t e s  such as the
Ivory C oast, though not o f f i c i a l l y  advocated, as such*
P res id en t F e l ix  Houphouet-Boigny i s  f a c t  ’p r e s id e s 1 over a
new c la s s  o f p la n te r s  who provided the ta k e -o f f  p o in t o f
1
h is  p o l i t i c a l  ca r eer .  The splendour and extravagance of
h is  p a lace  has been the source o f wonder t o  many a v i s i t o r  
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of Abijan* I t  has been d escr ib ed  as a measure of Houphouet-
B oigny1 s p e r s o n a l i ty  and a guide t o  th e  p o l ic y  and p lace  of
h is  government in  A fr ic a ,  which r e p r e se n ts  the other extreme
as compared w ith  Guinea and M ali, f o r  in s ta n c e .
nIndeed, i f  a b lock  of modern A fr ica n  s t a t e s  
e x i s t s ,  pro-Western and m aintain ing c lo s e  
p o l i t i c a l ’and economic l in k s  w ith  France 
Houphouet-Boigny i s  more than anyone e l s e  
responsib le*"^
( i i )  S c i e n t i f i c  S o c ia lism
A few months b efore  h is  f a l l ,  Kwame Nkrumah put "African
Socialism " in  a new p e r s p e c t iv e ,  d i s s o c ia t in g  h is  own■ - ■ 4
" s c i e n t i f i c  soc ia lism "  from i t*  According to  Nkrumah the
term "socia lism " u n ite s  A fr ican s in  an attempt t o  r e s to r e
what he c a l l s  A fr ic a ' s  humanist and e g a l i t a r ia n  p r in c ip le s
o f  so c ie ty *  But, as he had e a r l i e r  warned:
" so c ia l ism  in  A fr ica  today tends to  use i t s
1* c f .  Andre B lanchet in  'A frican  one-party  s t a t e s ' ,  Gwendolen 
M* Carter (e d ) ,  (New York 1962), p. 275*
2* c f .  West A fr ic a ,  26 th  August, 1961}^
3* Ronald S ega l, o p .c i t*  p. 280*
4* c f .  Kwame Nkrumah, 'A fr ican  S o c ia l ism  R e v i s i t e d ' , l o c . c i t *
o b je c t iv e  content in  flavour of a d is t r a c t in g  
term inology and in  favour o f  a gen era l con­
fu s io n .  D iscu ss io n  cen tres  more on the various  
con ce ivab le  typ es o f  s o c ia l i s m  than upon the  
need f o r  s o c i a l i s t  development"• ^
One of the q u estion s  which a r i s e s  in  con n ection  w ith
"African Socialism " -  or indeed with any such id eo logy  -  Is
i t s  p o s s ib le  m isuse by lea d ers  in  a ch arism atic  e f f o r t  to
r a l l y  support  fo r  u n d esira b le  ends. Nkrumah p o in ts  out th a t
some (unnamed) A fr ican  lea d ers  had found i t  necessary  to
invoke the concept in  a id  of p o l i c i e s  th a t  do not r e a l ly
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promote economic and s o c i a l  development. In h is  view ,
a lthough  A fr ican  lea d ers  and w r ite r s  have used the term
"African Socialism " in  order to  la b e l  the concrete  forms
th at s o c ia l i s m  might assume in  A fr ic a ,  the r e a l i t i e s  o f:
"the d iv erse  and ir r e c o n c i la b le  s o c i a l ,  
p o l i t i c a l  and economic p o l i c i e s  being pursued  
by A fr ican  S ta te s  had made the term m eaningless  
and Irr e lev a n t ." ^
Nkrumah advances " s c i e n t i f i c  s o c ia l i s m ” on the grounds 
th at i t  has ab id ing  p r in c ip le s  according to  which the means 
of production  and d i s t r ib u t io n  ought to  be s o c ia l i s e d  i f  
e x p lo i t a t io n  of the many by the few i s  t o  be prevented: i f ,
th a t i s  to  say , e g a l i ta r ia n is m  in  the economy i s  to  be pro­
t e c t e d .  For^ according to  h im ^ ega litar ian ism  i s  a c e n tra l  
p r in c ip le  of s o c ia l i s m .  H  was a l s o  a dominant fea tu re  o f  
t r a d i t io n a l  A fr ican  s o c i e t y ,  a lthough  Nkrumah su ggests  th at
1 . Kwame Nkrumah 'C onsciencism ' (London & New York 1964) p. 105.
2 .  'A fr ican  S o c ia lism  R ev is ited *  l o c .  c i t .  p. 4*
3 . I b id .
34.
in  i t s  a c tu a l  working i t  had variou s shortcom ings. He r e j e c t s  
the v iew  th a t  t r a d i t io n a l  A fr ican  s o c ie t y  was a c l a s s l e s s  
s o c i e t y ,  but admits th a t i t  had a "humanists im pulse” which  
he th inks i s  worthy o f  recap tu re . But i t  i s  not the s tru c tu re  
of t r a d i t io n a l  s o c ie t y  but i t s  s p i r i t  th a t s o c i a l i s t  thought 
in  A fr ic a  must recap tu re .
Nkrumah goes on:
nWe p o s tu la te  each man to  be an end in  h im self^  
not merely a means; and we accep t the n e c e s s i t y  
of guaranteeing each man equal o p p o r tu n it ie s  fo r  
h is  development. The im p lic a t io n s  o f  th is  fo r  
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  p r a c t ic e  have t o  be worked out 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ,  and the n ecessary  s o c ia l  and 
economic p o l i c i e s  pursued w ith  r e so lu t io n *  Any 
meangingful himanism must b eg in  from e g a l i ta r ia n ism  
and must lea d  to  o b j e c t iv e ly  chosen p o l i c i e s  fo r  
safeguard ing and su s ta in in g  e g a l i ta r ia n is m . Hence, 
s o c ia l i s m . Hence, a l s o ,  s c i e n t i f i c  s o c ia l i s m .”^
And i t  i s  not s c i e n t i f i c  to  suppose th a t  there are t r i b a l ,
n a t io n a l  or r a c ia l  s o c ia l i s m s .  I t  i s  ,fto  abandon o b j e c t iv i t y
2
in  favour of chauvinism . n
In Ghana the s o c i a l i s t  goa ls  were s e t ,  the p r in c ip le s  
propounded and some programmes worked o u t. The substance of 
the Republican c o n s t i t u t io n  was th at i t  provided a constitutionaHL 
framework fo r  a government whose ta sk  was conceived  in  terms 
o f the s o c i a l i s t  p r in c ip le s  and programmes. But an important 
asp ect o f  the p rep aration  had been n e g le c te d ,  as we s h a l l  see  
in  Chapter S ix ,  namely the mass o r g a n isa t io n  on which the
1 . O p .c i t .  p . 6 .
2• O p .c i t . p .9.
support of th e  p o l ic y  depended* Again one of the paradoxes 
in  the ffid e o lo g ic a l  b a t t l e ” i n  A fr ica  i s  th a t  Nkrumah1 s 
government, d e sp ite  the v igour w ith  which th e  p r in c ip le s  
were propounded, did n ot make much headway i n  implementing  
s o c i a l i s t  p o licy *  The ”b u rea u era tic” reg u la to ry  onslaught  
a g a in s t  e x p a tr ia te  concerns and c a p i t a l i s t s  has not been as 
great as in  Guinea or A lg e r ia ,  fo r  example* Some concerns  
were ”squeezed” by in crea sed  ta x e s ;  and the la rg e  commercial 
firm s l i k e  the U nited  A fr ic a  C o ., and the U nited  Trading Co* 
had to  fa ce  a reduced market owing to  a p a r t ia l  monopoly of  
r e t a i l  commerce (30$) carved out by the government’ s 
N ation a l Trading Corporation. But t h i s  f e l l  fa r  sh ort of the  
p o l ic y  advocated by Nkrumah.
( i i i )  Ideology  and Economic Development
Nkrumah reco g n ised  th a t  A fr ican  governments have had 
to  depend on the c a p i ta l  resou rces  of the in d u s t r ia l i s e d  
n a t io n s ^ e s p e c ia l ly  o f  Western Europe and America. He a ls o  
adm itted the dilemma th at t h i s  posed to  th ese  A fr ican  govern­
ments, th a t had d ec lared  war a g a in st  n e o -c o lo n ia l ism , such
2
as h is  own government* I t  i s  indeed a cru e l dilemma, par­
t i c u l a r l y  for  an id e o lo g ic a l  approach to  economic development* 
One o f the great advantages o f  such an approach i s  the d rive
1* Martin K ilso n , o p .c i t*  p* 19*
2 .  c f .  His speech to  the O.A.U., summit m eeting Addis Ababa, 
May 1963*
and concentrated  e f f o r t s  I t  produces along d efin ed  l i n e s  
o f  a c t io n  and p o in ts  o f  a p p l ic a t io n  over a s p e c i f i e d  p er iod  
and area . The appeal o f M arxist approach to  development, 
which Nkrumah, Sekou Toure~ and Modibtf K eita seemed to  fo l lo w ,  
stemmed p a r t ly  from I t s  singlem inded drive  fo r  i n d u s t r i a l i ­
s a t io n .  I n d u s t r ia l i s a t io n  i s  one sure way of g e t t in g  out of 
the poverty  in  which the underdeveloped n a tio n s  f in d  them­
se lv es*  And as no country wished t o  remain poor the appeal 
of I n d u s t r ia l i s a t io n  Is in  a sense u n iv e r s a l .  But in  the  
case of Nkrumah and Sekou T o u re , fo r  example, th ere  was t#fe 
t h i s  d i f fe r e n c e  th a t  in  t h e ir  view of in d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  
a g r ic u ltu r e  took  a secondary p lace  being con ceived  as a means 
to  stren gth en  in d u s tr ia l  development* To them the fou n dation  
fo r  a s o c i a l i s t  s o c ie t y  could  be l a id  only by crea tin g  a 
mechanised d iv e r s i f i e d  a g r ic u ltu r e  sewing as a base fo r  industry
Furthermore there  was a c le a r  im p lic a t io n  th a t  there
cannot be s o c ia l i s m  In the absence of in d u s tr ia l i s a t io n *
Nkrumah s ta te d  in  1962 th a t  Ghana was not y e t  a s o c i a l i s t
1
s ta te  as she was not y e t  com pletely  in d u s t r ia l i s e d .  His 
v i s io n  of an in d u s t r ia l i s e d  s o c i a l i s t  s o c i e t y  which was shared  
by S©kouToure" and o th e r s ,  envisaged  a r a d ic a l  r e c o n s tr u c t io n  
of e x i s t in g  A fr ican  s o c i e t y .
In t h i s  Herculean ta s k  the r o le  o f  th e  party i s  considered
1. Kwame Nkrumah, A f r i c a  Needs her Farmers1 (Accra, Ghana 
Government P r in tin g  Department 1962), p*l*
to  be c r u c ia l .  Here L enin1 s in f lu e n c e  i s  seen , fo r  the  
party organ ised  along L e n in is t  l i n e s  was adopted as the most 
e s s e n t i a l  agency fo r  economic and so c i a l  change. The r o le s  
of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) of Ghana, the P a r t i  
Democratique de Guinee (PDG) and the Union Soudgnaise o f Mali 
were m odelled on the L e n in is t  ty p e . The lea d ers  of a l l  three  
s t a t e s  s t r e s s e d  from the beginning the need of p o l i t i c a l  
o r g a n isa t io n  and the primacy of the party  to  co n tr o l  and 
d ir e c t  economic development in  the way Lenin d id .
The o rg a n isa t io n  o f  the p arty , and the in te g r a t io n  of 
the a c t i v i t i e s  of i t s  branches and a f f i l i a t e s  fo r  development 
purposes fo llo w ^  a c e r ta in  p a tte r n . We w i l l  c i t e  one a sp ec t  
of such a c t i v i t y  from the exp er ien ce  of M ali, in  order to  
drive home the p o in t about the importance g iv en  to  o rg a n isa t io n  
fo r  economic development. The Mali r u ra l  p o p u la tion  Is  or­
gan ised  in  c o -o p e r a t iv e s ,  and served  by an o r g a n isa t io n  c a l le d  
the ffS erv ice  de I 1 A ction  H urale” which c o n s i s t s  of two 
d i v i s i o n s : -
(a) D iv is io n  du Development H ural, and
(b) Centre N ation a l de l a  Co2?pera t i o n .
The f i r s t  i s  a te c h n ic a l  o rg a n isa t io n  charged w ith  the ex ­
e c u t io n  of programmes worked out in  the N ation a l Plan. I t  
a ls o  takes care of the tr a in in g  of the r u r a l  p o p u la tio n s , of  
e x te n s io n  s e r v ic e 5 and of the su p e rv is io n  and co n tro l o f the  
C entral Treasury of the A g r ic u ltu r a l  C red it which handles  
lo a n s  to  ru ra l groups and a g r ic u l tu r a l  c o -o p e r a t iv e s .
The second i s  the supreme organ of co jo p e ra t iv e i  in  M ali.
I t  c o n s is t s  of four s e c t io n s
( i )  S e c t io n  fo r  re sea rch  and l e g i s l a t i o n ,
( i i )  S e c t io n  fo r  tr a in in g  o f cadres and p sy ch o lo g ic a l  
a c t io n ,
( i i i )  Control s e c t io n ,  and
( i v )  Commercial s e c t io n .
The r o le  of the Centre N ational de la  C o-op eration  i s  m u lt ip le ,  
in  g en era l corresponding w ith  th e  type o f  work l i s t e d  under 
i t s  four s e c t io n s .  The c o -o p e ra t iv e  o rg a n isa t io n  o f  Mali 
which operates under the a e g is  of the Union Soudanaise, i s  
w e l l  s tru c tu r ed . Modibu K eita and h is  c o llea g u es  of the  
Party and government are among the lea d ers  in  A fr ica  who have 
succeeded in  reaching r ig h t  down the root of s o c i e t y ,  because  
of a c a r e fu l ly  organised  party which grew from the f,grass  
r o o t s 11 •
I t  i s  noteworthy th a t  d e sp ite  the m arxist approach to
o r g a n isa t io n  and development in  M ali, Modibu K eita invokes
the d o c tr in es  of Islam  to  b u t tr e s s  h is  id ea s:
”there  i s  no r e l i g i o n  more s o c i a l i s t  than the  
Moslem r e l i g i o n  because i t  teach es  th a t  the  
w ealthy must g iv e ,  share and a l l e v i a t e  the  
s u f fe r in g s  of o t h e r s .” *
1 . C f. R eport: P o l i t i c a l  S ecretary  6 th  Congress of the
Union Soudanaise, p p .1 3 -1 4 0 .
2 .  Quoted by Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter Morganthau,
”M ali” , P o l i t i c a l  P a r t ie s  and N ation a l In te g r a t io n  in  
T rop ica l A fr ica  (ed s) James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg Jr .  
(B erkley  and Los A n g eles , U.C. Pres3 , 1964), p .225 .
Turning to  ’Arab’ A fr ica  we f in d  th a t  the same sentim ents
as ex p ressed  by ModibtH K eita in  regard t o  Islam  have been used
by s o c i a l i s t  lea d ers  of North A fr ic a .  In  the U nited  Arab
Republic ’Arab s o c ia l i s m 1 or ’ democratic c o -o p e ra t iv e
s o c ia l i s m ’ as i t  has sometimes been c a l le d  has been preached.
P resid en t Nasser has a l s o  c a l l e d  h is  ’Arab s o c ia l i s m ’
’ s c i e n t i f i c *  but has always been a t pains to  d i s - a s s o c ia t e
h is  approach from the M arxist approach, p a r t ic u la r ly  from
i t s  a sp ect  of ’ c la s s  s t r u g g le * • Nasser has sa id :
" • • • s o c ia l i s m  to  me means the ending o f  e x p lo i t a ­
t i o n  by a l l  means. And in  f u l f i l l i n g  t h i s  o b jec t  
we must s t i c k  to  our b e l i e f .  We must not have a 
d ic ta to r s h ip  o f one c la s s  -  d ic ta to r s h ip  of the  
p r o le t a r ia t ,  fo r  in s ta n c e ,  because there  was th e  
d ic ta to r s h ip  o f  c a p ita l ism  and of feu d a lism . Now 
we have put an end to  th a t ,  we do not want t o  
change by d ic ta to r s h ip  o f the p r o le t a r ia t  but by 
the democracy of the whole p eo p le . Then we do 
not use  fo r c e  t o  f u l f i l  our s o c ia l i s m  -  and here  
s o c ia l i s m ,  as I s a id ,  means so c i a l  e q u a l i ty ,  the  
ending of the e x p lo i t a t io n  of corrupted c a p ita l ism  
and corrupted feud alism  which took  p la ce  in  the  
p a s t .  We have f u l f i l l e d  t h i s  s t e p .  The other  
s tep  i s  to  develop  the country, and the main th ing  
i s  the co n tro l of the means of p r o d u c t io n .«
I t  i s  claimed th a t  Arab s o c ia l i s m  in  the U.A.R. has 
l ib e r a t e d  the E gyptian  people and e s ta b l is h e d  a new economic 
and s o c ia l  s tr u c tu r e ,  the government having d is t r ib u te d  land  
and brought the peasants and urban workers t o  p a r t ic ip a te  in
1 .  Gamal Abdel Nasser answers to  q u e s t io n s  put t o  him in  an 
in terv iew  by Robert McKenzie and E rsk ine C h ild e rs .  The 
L is te n e r  (London May 19 , 1 9 6 6 ) .
the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  of the nation* Nasser has sa id :
flWe l im it e d  the ownership o f land to  one hundred 
a c r e s ,  we d is t r ib u te d  the r e s t  of the land to  the  
farmers: having c o -o p e r a t iv e s ;  c o l l e c t i v e  farm ing,
not c o l l e c t i v e  farms -  in d iv id u a l  property but 
farming to g e th e r ,  t o  g iv e  them machines, t o  g iv e  
them ex p er ie n c e , to  g iv e  them everything* Then v/e 
n a t io n a l i s e d  n in e ty  per cent of the industry  and 
we took the i n i t i a t i v e  in  I n d u s t r ia l i s a t io n ;  then  
we opened ed u cation  t o  everybody in  the country  
according to  h is  a b i l i t y :  th a t  i s  t o  say e q u a l i ty
fo r  everyone in  the country*”
The preamble of the C o n s t i tu t io n  of the TJ*A* R* con ta in s  
the d ir e c t iv e  p r in c ip le s  enunciated  under Nasser* s Arab 
s o c ia l i s m . The government i s  en jo in ed  by the C o n s t i tu t io n  to  
develop the country in  accordance w i th  th e se  p r in c ip le s .
C erta in  a sp e c ts  o f  M a rx is t -L en in is t  p r a c t ic e s  have been in ­
corporated in  E gyptian  so c ia lism *  In terms of o r g a n isa t io n ,  
in  p a r t ic u la r  t h i s  can be seen  in  the c r e a t io n  of the S o c i a l i s t  
Union -  an a ll-em b rac in g  but t i g h t l y  c o n tr o l le d  p arty , In­
c lud ing  in  I t s  membership the working p op u la tion  of p ea sa n ts ,  
workers, i n t e l l e c t u a l s  and army men. A l l  measures are d isc u sse d  
f i r s t  by the cadres of the S o c i a l i s t  Union, then a t  c lo s e d
m eetings of the E xecu tive  Committee and the C entral Committee,
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b efo re  they are adopted by the government*
'Arab socia lism * was in troduced  in  the Middle E ast by the
1* Ib id *; cf# a l s o  Peter M ansfield: 'N a s se r 's  Egypt* (Penguin  
A fr ica n  L ibrary, 196 5 ), pp*129-214; and Anouar Abde Malik: 
fE gypte, S o c i£ t£  m il i ta ir e *  (P ar is  1 9 6 2 ) ,  p*75*
2. Gamal Abdel Nasser, op*cit*
B a a th is t  Party o f  S y r ia , and t h i s  no doubt has been p a r t ly  a 
source of in s p ir a t io n  to  N a sser 's  brand o f soc ia lism *  In the 
r e s t  o f 'Arab' A fr ic a  a l s o  -  Libya excepted  -  th e  advent of  
s o c ia l i s m  has been o f long duration* Bourguiba's Neo-Destour  
party and the FLN of A lg er ia  each s ta r te d  w ith  s o c i a l i s t  aims*
In Morocco s o c i a l i s t s  have been and s t i l l  are in  the opposition*  
P artly  fo r  h i s t o r i c a l  r e a so n s , but p a r t ly  a l s o  due to  the geo­
p o l i t i c a l  b a rr ier  sep a ra tin g  the U.A.L* from the Maghreb s id e  
o f 'Arab' A fr ica  (the  Libyan d eser t  no l e s s  than the monarchy) 
N a sser 's  s o c ia l i s m  has not made much impact there*
In A lg e r ia  the FLN, because of the r e v o lu t io n a r y  nature 
o f i t s  o r ig in a l  role^was bound to  seek  a m i l i ta n t  id eo lo gy  
th a t  was commensurate w ith  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  s tru gg le*  
Long co n tac t o f some o f  the FLN's lea d ers  w ith  French s o c i a l i s t s  
had a l s o  con tr ib u ted  to  a s o c i a l i s t  o r ien ta t io n *  The FLN had
proclaim ed b efore  independence th a t the A lg er ia n  r e v o lu t io n  was
1
to  be rla p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and s o c ia l  r e v o lu t io n ” • This
was r e i t e r a t e d  a f t e r  independence by both  Ben B e l la  and ( l a t e r )
2
Boumedienne* 'La R ev o lu t io n  A lgeri^nne' has indeed acquired  
a mystique which A lg er ia n  lea d ers  f in d  n ecessa ry  to  invoke 
frcm time to  time* D ra st ic  economic measures have been taken
1* cf* E l Moujahid ( o f f i c i a l  organ of the FLN) Dec*21, 1961*
2* cf* Francois B o r e l la ,  'L * o rg a n isa t io n  a c t u e l l e  des p o u v o ir s ' ,  
Revue A lger iehne des s c ie n c e s  Ju r id lq u es , p o l i t iq u e s  e t  
Economiques, Dec* 1965 Nos* 3 -4 ,  pp*29-39*
in  i t s  name such as agrar ian  reform laws and n a t io n a l i s a t io n  
decrees* A l l  the p r in c ip a l  means of production  in c lu d in g  
mining concerns and farms form erly  owned by the French h a v e  
been taken over by the s ta te *
I t  w i l l  be seen from t h i s  b r i e f  account th a t  s o c i a l i s t  
id eo log y  in  A fr ic a  i s  t i e d  up w ith  the n a t io n a l  independence 
movement or w ith  the a s p ir a t io n s  fo r  a b e t te r  l i f e  of A fr ica n  
p e o p le s .  In  co u n tr ie s  where s o c ia l is m  has not been in t r o ­
duced the a l t e r n a t iv e  r a l ly in g  force i s  nationalism * But a l l  
lea d ers  appeal to  the p a t r io t i c  sen tim ents of t h e i r  countrymen 
fo r  more e f f o r t s  or fo r  c e r ta in  g o a ls .  In  th i s  th e  p r a c t ic e  
of d ev is in g  development plans has become u n iv ersa l*
'’A fr ica n  S ta te s  -  even th ose  w ith  d i s t i n c t l y  
c o n ser v a tiv e  governments -  see  n a t io n a l  s o c i a l  
and economic planning as a l o g i c a l  h i s t o r i c a l  
development from the n a t io n a l  independence 
e f f o r t ,  now to  be ch an n elled  in to  the rap id  
Improvement o f standards of l i f e  and o f  economic 
capacity*  The n a t io n a l  plan Is  a symbol o f  th a t  
e f f o r t  and a means o f b r in g in g  I t  about*" ^
S tu d ies  by economic exp erts  o f  the U n ited  Nations Economic 
Commission fo r  A fr ic a  (U*N*E.C.A*) r e v e a l  th a t w ith  the d i s ­
in te g r a t io n  o f c o lo n ia l  system s, p lanning in  former A fr ica n  
c o lo n ie s  and p r o te c to r a te s  has undergone a complete change*
"In some o f them the planning conception  approxi­
mates t o  the models o f c e n t r a l ly  planned economies; 
in  o thers i t  i s  in sp ir e d  by th e  techniques germinated  
in  the m ark et-or ien ted  ones* Yet in  both  cases
1* R eg in a l H* Green, "Four A fr ica n  Development P lans: Ghana,
Kenya, N ig er ia  and Tanzania". The Journal of Modern A fr ica n  
S tu d ies  Vol* 3 , No* 2 (1 9 65 ), p* 249*
th ere  i s  an attem pt to  re-examine the id e o lo g ic a l  
fou n dation s and economic concepts of planning in  
the l i g h t  of t h e ir  d i f f e r e n t  s ta g es  of development 
and s p e c i f i c  n a t io n a l  conditions*" ^
In many plans the Pan-A frican id e a l  i s  exp ressed , e i th e r  as an
a s p ir a t io n  or w ith  a con crete  economic co n ten t ,  w ith  a view to
p oo lin g  resou rces  and harmonising economic p o l i c i e s  thus
widening n a t io n a l  markets ensuring r a t io n a l  in d u s tr ia l  lo c a t io n ,
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and breaking "the b o tt le n e c k s  In c a p i t a l  and manpower*"
6* Common problems in  o u t l in e
( i )  Economic and p o l i t i c a l
The q u e st io n  o f planning i s  connected w ith  e conomic
problem s, which we w i l l  th e r e fo r e  o u t l in e  f i r s t *  P u ttin g  a s id e
11 id e o lo g ic a l"  d i f f e r e n c e s  i t  i s  true to  say th a t  rap id  economic
development i s  both  a n e c e s s i t y  and a problem In A fr ica  as in
3
a l l  under-developed  cou n tr ies#  I t  i s  a l s o  c le a r  th a t  such a 
development must be organised  and d ir e c te d  according to  a 
n a t io n a l  plan* The problems o f  p lanning are very much g re a ter  
in  underdeveloped n ation s  than in  developed ones. A l l  A fr ica n
t'# Abdelmalek Ben-Amor and F red erick  Clairm onte, 1 Planning in  
A f r ic a 1, The Journal o f Modern A frican  S tu d ie s ,  V o l. 3 No*4 
(1965) p*473# Dr* F* F* Clairmonte i s  a c t in g  Chief o f  th e  
Planning S e c t io n  in  the U*N*E*C*A., Addis Ababa* Mr* A bdel- ^  
malek Ben-Amor i s  an economic a f f a i r s  o f f i c e r  in  the E.C.A.
#ia# su b -reg io n a l o f f i c e  in  Tangier*
2* A* Ben-Amor and F* Clairm onte, o p .c i t#  p* 481#
3* The ei^phimism of "developing nations" has been s u b s t i tu te d  
fo r  under-developed  cou n tr ies  which term was introduced  in  
p la ce  o f "backward" cou n tr ies*  Cf* an in t e r e s t in g  d is c u s s io n
on the l a t t e r  term by H* Myint, !An I n te r p r e ta t io n  of Economic 
Backwardness1, Oxford Economic Papers (1 9 5 4 ), pp*132-163*
s t a t e s  have p lan s  hut the gap between in te n t io n s  and performance 
1
i s  w ide. The main a sp ec t  o f  economic development in  A fr ica
i s  th e  d i s in t e g r a t io n  of t r a d i t io n a l  economy and the d iv e r s io n
2
of i t s  r e so u rces  of land and labour to  the modern economy*
The main problems have been grouped a s:  c a p i ta l  form ation ,
in d u s tr ia l  and farm m odernisation* Shortage of dom estic
c a p ita l  lea d s  to  borrowing or in v i t in g  fo r e ig n  c a p i t a l  to  be
in v e s te d  or to  seek ing  aid* Now some w estern  econom ists hold
th a t the under-developed  n ation s should con centrate  on the
production  of primary commodities, which i s  not a ccep ta b le  to
3
many of the s t a t e s  who are determined on in d u s tr ia l i s a t io n *
One problem which the shortage of c a p i t a l  p resen ts  i s  th a t  th ose
who provide the funds may and do d ic ta t e  terms which l im i t
government co n tro l or choice  on the a l l o c a t i o n  of resou rces  in
t h e ir  planning*
There i s  a l s o  a genera l la ck  o f tr a in e d  people* This i s
nowhere f e l t  more keenly  than in  the planning o f f i c e s ;  most
co u n tr ies  have few people who are e i th e r  d ivorced  from e conomic
d ecis ion -m ak ing , or have not got adequate c o n tr o l  over super-
4
v i s i o n  and im plem entation of the plan* The impact o f d eve lop -
1* Cf* A* Ben-Amor and F* C lairm onte, o p * c i t .  pp*478-479*
2 . With the e x c e p t io n  of the U.A*R* (and of South A fr ica )  the  
la r g e r  s e c t io n  of the p op u la tio n  in  A fr ica  i s  engaged in  
t r a d i t io n a l  economy*
3* Cf* Dudley Seers ! The Role o f  Industry  in  Development : Some 
F a l l a c i e s 1, The Journal of Modern A fr ican  S tu d ie s ,  V o l* l No*4 
(1963) p p .461-5* The author advocates a balanced development 
of a g r ic u ltu r e  and industry*
4* A* Ben-Amor and F. C lairm onte, op*cit*  pp*494-5*
ment p lans on the g en era l p o p u la tion  i s  a l s o  very l i t t l e *  This
may be r e la t e d  to  la c k  of co -o rd in a ted  and concerted  e f f o r t
which may in  turn  stem from the la ck  of p o l i t i c a l  understanding*
1
In  some cases  i t  may a ls o  r e f l e c t  d ivergen t economic in te r e s t s *
The p lanners of the Cameroun have reapp ra ised  t h e i r  f i r s t  plan
in  a manner which can very w e l l  speak for  most A fr ican  s t a t e s :
nI t  must be acknowledged” they wrote,
”th a t  the adoption o f  the plan  has not been  
accompanied by propaganda and measures to  popu­
l a r i s e  i t  throughout the country* Since the plan  
was form ulated , lo c a l  and n a t io n a l  p lanning  
commissions have ceased t o  function*  There has 
been a f a i l u r e  to  1 in d octr in a te*  c i v i l  servants  
at every  l e v e l ,  as w e l l  as the t r a d i t io n a l  and 
modern cadres so th a t  they in  tu rn  have been unable  
to  spread the mystique o f the p lan  amongst the  
masses* The people have remained la r g e ly  unaware 
of the idea of a common o b je c t iv e  in  development 
and th e  e f f o r t s  n ecessary  to  a ch ieve  i t*  Thus the  
n a t io n a l  dynamism th a t could be s t i r r e d  up by the  
p lan  has fo r  too  long been n e g le c te d * ”2
Again the absence of a proper i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework i s
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regarded as a major o b s ta c le  in  development planning* In  t h i s  
con n ection , i t  has sometimes been su ggested  th a t  m ulti-purpose  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  should be organ ised , designed  to  promote s ev e ra l
1* I b id .
2* Ibid* qi o ted  from *Rapport g en era l sur l* e x e c u t io n  du  ^
premier p lan  quinquendal jusqu*au 30 ju in  1963* (Yaounde, 
1 9 6 4 ), p . 8 .
3* Cf* W* A* Lewis, * On A ssess in g  a Development Plan* in  
Economic B u l l e t in  (A ccra), June-July 1959*
government p o l i c i e s  a t  th e  same time in  order to  economise 
on e x p e r t i s e  and to  f a c i l i t a t e  co -ord in ation *  This v iew ,  
which la y s  emphasis on i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r e a t i v i t y ,  i s  commendable 
p a r t ic u la r ly  when i t  i s  remembered th a t the le a d e r s  of th ese  
s t a t e s  are r e sp o n s ib le  fo r  the i n i t i a t i o n ,  su p e r v is io n  and 
im plem entation of major p o l i c i e s ,  and th a t  they  w i l l  th er e fo re  
need co -o rd in a ted  and co -o rd in a tin g  I n s t i t u t io n s  a t  t h e i r  d i s ­
posal* In t h e ir  e f f o r t s  to  make a break-through out of the  
v ic io u s  c i r c l e  o f low grov/th ra te  and h igh  r a te  o f  popu lation  
growth, they  need d ev ices  which r e la t e  g o a ls ,  p o l i c i e s  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s tr u c tu r e s  w ith  the whole process of change* 
Im ita t io n  fo r  i t s  own sake w i l l  not do* I t  i s  l o g i c a l  th a t  the 
i n i t i a t i v e  of p o l ic y  in  the f i e l d  of development planning  
should be under the co n tro l of the C hief E xecu tive  or o f  a 
person in v es ted  w ith  power under h is  d ir e c t  au th ority*  Matters 
o f  ed u ca tio n , a g r ic u l tu r e ,  s t o c k - r a i s in g ,  in d u stry , p u b lic  works 
and tr a n sp o r t ,  fo r  example, should be d e a lt  w ith  in  the l i g h t  
of the needs o f the development plan* The a c t i v i t i e s  of the
a u t h o r i t i e s  s p e c ia l i s in g  in  th ese  m atters should th e r e fo r e  be
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co -ord in a ted  w ith  th a t  end in  view*
Some o f  t h i s  may crea te  problems o f  in e f f i c i e n c y  and abuse*
,1* Cf* R egin a ld  H* Green, 1 M ulti-purpose Economic I n s t i t u t io n s
in  Africa* in  The Journal of Modern A fr ica n  S tu d ie s ,  V o l* l I 
No* 2 (1963) pp*163-184*
2* Cf* Maurice G uernier, *La p la n i f i c a t io n ,  p e u t - e l l e  resoudre  
l e  probleme du sous-develcfeinent1 * Academie des sc ie n c e s  
d* Outre-mer de Paris  III*  March 1963, p* 145*
Some abuse may be made having immense economic im p lic a t io n s  o f
m is a l lo c a t io n  o f  resources* This i s  part o f  the r i s k  th a t
c e n tra l  d ir e c t io n  involves* The point here i s  th a t  g iv en  the
t o t a l  p ic tu re  of under-development and the p o l i t i c a l  system
of one-party s ta t e  with strong e x e c u t iv e ,  which i s  p o s it e d  as
an answer to  d isu n ity  as w e ll  as under-development, the l o g i c
of c e n tr a l is e d  d ir e c t io n  and con tro l fo l lo w s  i r r e s i s t i b l y *
This brings us to the p o l i t i c a l  problems involved*
Some w riters  on A frica  have warned th a t  in  order to
a ch ieve  p ea cefu l n a tion -b u ild in g  c e r ta in  co n d it io n s  must be
f u l f i l l e d *  David Apter* on§ of the p ioneers in  modern A fr ica n
s tu d ie s  has urged in  p a rticu la r  that p o l i t i c a l  lea d e r s  in  t h e ir
p o l i t i c a l  commitments need to  r e s t r i c t  t h e ir  o b je c t iv e s  mainly
on those changes in  so c ie ty  which do not req u ire  m assive
1
a l t e r a t io n  in  b e l i e f s  and customs* The e x is te n c e  of p o l i t i c a l  
and ad m in istra tive  in fra stru ctu re  such as s t a t e  or l o c a l  c o u n c ils  
d e c e n tr a l is e d  operation  of m in is tr ie s  and an A fr ica n  c i v i l  
s e r v ic e  system i s  advocated as a con d iti  on precedent fo r  the  
e x is t e n c e  and con tr ib u tion  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r tie s*  The h igher  
p o l i t i c a l  r o le s  such as those embodied in  a c a b in e t ,  a p a r l i a ­
ment or a c i v i l  serv ice  must them selves be supported by an
in fr a s tr u c tu r e  imbued with the va lu es  and mechanisms o f  rep -
2
r e s e n ta t iv e  government* Apter was w r it in g  about Uganda on
—  .
1 . David E. Apter, 'The p o l i t i c a l  kingdom in  Uganda*, / p . 3 92 -3 .
2 .  I h id .
the eve of her independence when ”c o n s t i t u t io n a l” formulae  
were being sought to  so lve  a complex p o l i t i c a l  problem* But 
h is  conclusions purport to  have u n iv e r sa l  v a l i d i t y .  The two 
a l t e r n a t iv e s  which he saw were: ( i )  a com p etit ive  party  system
which needed the p o l i t i c a l  and a d m in is tr a t iv e  in fr a - s t r u c tu r e  
mentioned, without which the p a r t ie s  would fragment and b e­
come v i r t u a l ly  powerless to  operate an e f f e c t i v e  government; 
or ( i i )  what he c a l led  Mthe m o b il isa t io n  approach” , in v o lv in g  
the use of the p o l i t i c a l  lea d ersh ip  as "an en tr e p r e n e u r ia l  
b a s is  fo r  changing the stru ctu re  of s o c i e t y ,  th a t  i s  fo r c in g  
the people to  be free.**
We have s ta te d  p rev iou sly  th a t  in  co u n tr ies  l i k e  Ghana 
(under Nkrumah) Guinea, H ali and Tanzania the second a l t e r ­
n a tiv e  was adopted. Indeed, wherever the one-party  system  
has been adopted the m o b il isa t io n  approach may be s a id  to  
have been chosen* And the lo g ic  of t h i s  ch o ice  d ic t a t e s  th a t  
the method chosen must be used to  good advantage* In  other  
words, once chosen, i t  must be seen  through; the lea d ers  
cannot be h a lf-h ea r ted  about the ”m o b il is a t io n ” w ith ou t a 
r i s k  of f a i lu r e .  T his, as we s h a l l  see  in  more d e t a i l ,  i s
one important reason why the one-party fu n c t io n s  in  s t a t e s
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as d if f e r e n t  as Tanzania and Malawi. And i t  i s  e a s i e r  to  
m o b ilise  than to  dem obilise , because s ta y in g  in  power seems
1* Ibid*
2* See Chapter SS&Wv Sl'X.
to  be an occupational hazard, and a sudden d e m o b il isa t io n  would 
mean undermining the b a sis  of p o l i t i c a l  power on which the  
lea d ers  rest*
On the other hand Apter* s p o in t about the need of in f r a ­
s tru ctu re  cannot be over-emphasised* Nor i s  i t  a q u e s t io n  
simply of s e t t in g  up lo c a l  organ isation s*  The new v a lu es  
which are im p lic i t  in  the ideas and id eo logy  which m otivate  
the m o b il isa t io n  must be understood and a ccep ted  by the  
gen era l population* This cannot be e f f e c t e d  by decrees and 
re g u la t io n s  a lon e , though th a t  helps to  s e t  the tone and 
provide a framework# The more arduous ta§k l i e s  in  p o l i t i c a l  
ed u cation , in  the day-to-day teach in g  by which new id ea s  and 
va lu es  are imparted* This i s  a d i f f i c u l t  and slow process*
The b es t  teaching i s  one g iven  by precept and example, and 
here the symbolic gestures (or exemplary conduct) o f . t h e
lea d ersh ip  i s  of the g r e a te s t  moment* Like j u s t i c e ,  i t  must
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not only be done, i t  mast be seen  to  be done*
Of course, too much could be p red icated  on the leader*  
There are obvious fu n ction a l (a d m in is tra t iv e )  and p o l i t i c a l  
problems, the l a t t e r  being the more c r u c ia l  and r e le v a n t  to  
the present inquiry* I t  i s  not simply the A ctonian  q u e s t io n  
of the tendency of a l l  power to  corrupt, though th a t  should  
not be ignored* I t  concerns the b a s is  of the o r g a n is a t io n
1* One i s  reminded of the example of Mahatma Ghandi1 s work 
and l i f e  in  the Indian v i l la g e *
o f  the p o l i t i c a l  system of a s t a t e .
We w i l l  f i r s t  tack le  the t h e o r e t i c a l  q u e s t io n  o f  "authority"
A uthority  has been advanced as a key-concept in  understanding
the nature and fu n ction  of the p o l i t i c a l  system  in  p referen ce
1
to  Max Weber* s concept of p h y s ic a l  compulsion* According  
to  th i s  approach authority  i s  e s ta b l ish e d  when a gen era l  
f e e l i n g  p rev a ils  that i t  must be obeyed* The q u e s t io n  how and 
why such au th ority  comes to  be e s ta b l is h e d  i s  gorybracpar a m®re 
e lu s iv e  one, and one perhaps which psychology more than p o l i t i c a l  
sc ie n c e  i s  grappling with*
I f  man i s  a socia l animal f i r s t  and a p o l i t i c a l  animal 
second then i t  would fo liow  th a t  those who have the monopoly 
of p o l i t i c a l  power should hot r e s t  u n t i l  they capture the  
o ld  s o c ia l  wcentres of authority" th a t can r e fr a c t  the l i g h t  
of th e ir  new ideas and va lu es which come fo r th  from the new 
p o l i t i c a l  system* I t  appears th a t  the monopoly and planned  
use of the media of communication (propaganda) can in  f a c t  
ach ieve  th is  over a short p er iod , provided th ere  i s  r e l a t i v e  
order and s t a b i l i t y *  But the o ld  s o c ia l  order p e r s i s t s  and 
w ith  i t  some of i t s  values* A dynamic view of p o l i t i c s  shows 
th a t the notion of s t a b i l i t y  does not r e s u l t  from the immuta-
1* Max Weber, * P o l i t i c s  as a v oca t io n * , in  Gerth and M il l s ,  
•From Max Weber, (New York 1946) p*7* Cf* t h i s  w ith  
D* Easton *The P o l i t i c a l  System : An in q u iry  in to  th e  S ta te  
of P o l i t i c a l  Science* (New York 1953) pp*130-133; both  are  
quoted and d iscu ssed  in  Almond and Coleman, o p * c i t .  p*5 and 
6 r e s p e c t iv e ly .
b i l i t y  of opposed or balanced forces^  Jut as Jean Buchmann
has w r it ten :
"dans la  capacite  d1 ab sorp tion , dont f a i t  
preuve l ’ ordre s o c ia l  garan ti par l e  regime 
p o l it iq u e  en v igeu r , a l 'e g a r d  des fo r c e s  
qui v is e n t  a le  transform er.11
A p o l i t i c a l l y  s ta b le  s o c ie ty  i s  one which  
enjoys s u f f i c i e n t  v i t a l i t y  to  adapt i t s  1 
stru ctu re  and become amenable to  change.
Where th ere  i s  in a d a p ta b il ity  or in c o m p a tib il i ty  of s tr u c tu r e s
and "the margin of tolerance" i s  passed, then  a sudden break or
2
r e v o lu t io n  ensues* In th is  regard the p o s i t io n  of t r a d i t io n a l
elem ents i s  of in t e r e s t .  They are sometimes to le r a te d  in
modern s o c i e t i e s  when they are harmless or h e lp f u l .  But i f
they  are g iven  rep resen ta tio n  In high l e v e l s ,  and e s p e c ia l ly
in  the person of the Head of S ta te ,  they can become the cen tres
round whom n e o -tr a d it io n a l  fo r ces  can c r y s t a l l i s e  and thus pose
a th re a t  to  a new order. The problem has been fa ced  in  two
ways: e i th e r  they are suppressed i n i t i a l l y  by th e  new p o l i t i c a l
fo r c e s ,  as happened in  Guinea, or they are to le r a te d  and even
g iv en  rep resen ta tio n  a t a h igh l e v e l  as in  Uganda and L esotho .
In  the second case the change comes when new fo r c e s  emerge
3
rendering the system an ach ron ist ic .
Normally a new p o l i t i c a l  lead ersh ip  e s t a b l i s h e s  i t s
1 .  J . Buchmann, , LtAfrique Noire Independante* (1961) p . l
2 .  I b id .
3 .  Cf« Buchmann, ib id .
a u th o r ity  over a t r a d it io n a l  s o c ie t y  not only through the
a s s e r t io n  of new p r in c ip le s  and the m anipulation  o f  symbols
and va lues but through the e f f e c t i v e  use of propaganda.
I n i t i a l l y ,  i f  the new p o l i t i c a l  power i s  acquired  by an a c t
o f  r e v o lu t io n  the physical fo rce  would be v i s i b l e  in  the f o r e -  
1
ground* But eventually  the m il i ta r y  withdraw to  the back­
ground, and p h ysica l "compulsion" i s  rep laced  by a psycho­
l o g i c a l  "compulsion" in  the d a i ly  l i f e  of the community*
The government exerts  in f lu e n c e  through a m assive pressure  
o f  inform ation  and persuasion  which never r e la x e s  I t s  hold  on 
the p opu la tion . In order t o  achieve maximum r e s u l t s  every  
medium is  used -  ora l, p r in ted , p i c t o r i a l ,  p l a s t i c ,  m usica l  
or dramatic. The propaganda of the deed i s  a l s o  u sed , con­
s i s t i n g ,  fo r  example, in  symbolic g estu res  of the le a d e r .  
E s s e n t ia l ly  propaganda i s  an a c t  of advocacy o f a d e l ib e r a t e ly  
o n e-s id ed  nature with c e r ta in  aims. This i s  n a tu r a l ly  
supplemented by in s tr u c t io n  and inform ation on a wide range  
o f  su b jec ts  u s e fu l  to th e ir  r e c ip i e n t s .  Such in s t r u c t io n  and 
in form ation , apart from I t s  in t r in s ic  worth, can o f te n  serve  
as an in cen tiv e  for more propaganda. The propaganda o f s o c i a l  
r e v o lu t io n  in  modern times has developed new tech n iq u es  o f
! •  The face of the law* would be helmefced s o ld ie r s  b earin g  arms, 
and placed a t  s tr a te g ic  p o s i t io n s ,  throughout the land* 
In e v ita b ly  th is  would be preceded or accompanied by the neu­
t r a l i s a t i o n  of p r in c ip a l lead ers of the old  order in  variou s  
ways. A show of force through m il i ta r y  parades and c i v i l i a n  
demonstrations of support i s  in v a r ia b ly  organised*
p ersu asion . The party and a u x i l l ia r y  o rg a n isa t io n s  are used
as w e l l  as the d irec t  media such as p r e s s ,  ra d io  and t e l e v i s i o n !
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and the l a t e s t  research in  psychology are drawn on.
A l l  propaganda acts  are in var iab ly  put forward in  the
2
name of higher p r in c ip le s ,  s o c ia l ism  for  example. In  p r a c t ic e ,  
however, p e r s o n a l i t ie s  and power p o l i t i c s  p lay  a la r g e  p a r t .  
E f f e c t iv e  use of propaganda machinery may sometimes req u ire  
glamour and the use of symbols. But too  freq u en t u se  o f  such  
methods tends to  draw a t te n t io n  away from p r in c ip le s  which may 
be rep laced  by or confused w ith  c u l t s .  When t h i s  happens ends 
and means get mixed up and the medium he comes the m essage.
This does not pose a th reat to  commercial a d v e r t is in g  -  the  
" t ig e r  In the tank1* approach has always the same end, I . e .  s a le s  
and more s a l e s .  The c r i t e r io n  i s  n ove lty  and i f  the " t ig e r ” 
i s  rep laced  by a "panther” there w i l l  be no p u b lic  o u tcr y .
But In p o l i t i c s  the means of s o c ia l  ends may be e le v a te d  to  
the realm of values d es ira b le  in  them selves and thus co m p lica tes  
the p ic tu r e .
What of the c i t i z e n s  part in  a l l  t h i s ?  To some p o l i t i c a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  the c i t i z e n  i s  an in d iv id u a l p a r t i c ip a t in g  in  s o c i a l
1 .  An en lightened  observation  of a d v e r t is in g  tech n iq u es  shows 
th a t commercial salesmanship owes much to  the le s s o n s  of  
p o l i t i c a l  propaganda and v ic e  v er sa . One s a l i e n t  fe a tu r e  
i s  r e p e t i t io n ,  another is  Im ita t io n .
2 .  Just as the b a t t le s  for p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts  were fou gh t in  the  
17th  and 18th century ag a in st  "divine r i g h t s ”, in  the name 
o f  natural law.
l i f e  through th e  medium of groups. He i s  a c i t i z e n  "much more 
through h is  productive a c t iv i t y  in  the economy and in  cu ltu re  
than through the expression  o f  h is  op in ion ."  The p o s i t i o n  
of the c i t i z e n  in  t r a n s i t io n a l  African s o c i e t i e s  today cannot 
be d efin ed  so e a s i l y .  There are tw o fo r c e s  o la im ing h is  l o y ­
a l t y :  on the one hand the t r a d i t io n a l  fo r c e s  o f  k in sh ip  groups
from which even the educated e l i t e  have not escaped com p lete ly ;  
on the other hand the modern s t a t e  w ith  a l l  i t s  new a t t r a c t io n s .
The modern s ta te  makes demands on the c i t i z e n  ju s t  as the
Lineage group did, so that h is  p lace re d e f in e d  in  a modern
s e t t i n g  ag a member of a group acquires a new s i g n i f i c a n c e .
Where the " m obilisation  approach" has been adopted the demands
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may be grea ter  and channelled fo r  productive e f f o r t s .  The 
in d iv id u a l plays the "rules of the game" -  o ld  and new -  fo r  
var iou s reasons: economic, s o c ia l ,  p s y c h o lo g ic a l .  The
in d iv id u a ls  making up the mass of the new A fr ica n  s o c i e t i e s
1 .  C f. J. W. Lapierre, 'Le pouvoir p o l i t iq u e ' ,  P aris  P resses  
U n iv e r s i ta ir e  de Prance, C o l l .  I n i t i a t i o n  P h ilo sop h iq u e , 1953
2 .  In  h is  t r a d i t io n a l  s e t t in g  the A frican  c i t i z e n  f i t s  in  very  
w e ll  w ith  the d e f in i t io n  which makes membership o f  a group 
the key fa c to r .  Cf. e .g .  I.M. Lewis, 'A P a sto r a l  Democracy1 
in  which he exp la ins the p ra c t ic e  o f c o l l e c t i v e  vengeance in  
Northern Somalia in  terms of s e l f  h elp  as " c a n a lised  by l i n e ­
age a f f i l i a t i o n  and given s tr u c tu r a l  d e f i n i t i o n  through the  
complementary p r in c ip le s  of c lan sh ip  and co n tra c t ."  This i s  
fu r th er  explained  by re ference  tof  "the e c o lo g ic a l  co n tex t  of 
acute com petition  for  sparse reso u rces , and in  the ab rogation  
of in d iv id u a l r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  through group l o y a l t i e s . "
I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, Oxford TJ.P. (1961) p .242.
3 .  In parts where there i s  a long h is to r y  of feuds and wars, 
l a t e n t  a g ress io n  can thus be u s e f u l ly  ch an nelled  fo r  p ro­
d uctive  purposes. Cf.I.M . Lewis, o p . c i t .  p p .2 4 2 -6 5 .
p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e ir  new r o le s  o fte n  w ith  enthusiasm . This
i s  a b le s s in g ,  in  that i t  i s  needed fo r  new c o u n tr ie s  in  the
p rocess of growth. But c e r ta in  of i t s  a sp ec ts  a l s o  pose a
dilemma connected w i t h  the q u estio n  of a u th o r ity  which in  the
newly formed s t a t e s ,  a s  a lready s ta te d ,  i s  h ie r a r c h ic a l ly
organ ised  and h ighly  concentrated cat the top* The q u est io n
can be viewed a t two l e v e l s .  F ir s t ly  from the p o in t  of v iew
of the c i t i z e n 1s crea tive  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  p o l i t i c s  the system
tends to  exclude large s e c t io n s  of the p o p u la tio n  from the
e x e r c is e  of p o l i t i c a l  power, because i t  i s  h ie r a r c h ic  and
concentrated# This bocomes th e  moBe s ig n i f i c a n t  in  v iew  o f
the genral absence or underdevelopment o f in fr a - s tr u c tu r e
( in c lu d in g  voluntary a s s o c ia t io n s )  a t  the l o c a l  l e v e l s  o u ts id e
the c i t i e s .  This, as Edward S h i ls  has a p t ly  put i t 9lfdeepens
the s i le n c e  in  the countryside in  matters of day to  day
1
p o l i t i c a l  concern.11 The p o l i t i c a l  party thus becomes an a l l ­
purpose organ isation  supplying the want o f absent in f r a ­
s tr u c tu r e .  But there the datt^er i s  th a t where disenchantm ent 
w ith  the centre se ts  in ,  the party a c t i v i s t s  may have to  dea l
w ith  the problem of apathy, s in c e  the centre  and the party
2
are id e n t i f i e d .  But more of t h i s  l a t e r .
Secondly the problem may be viewed from the p o in t  o f view  
of the abuse of power. The power o r ig in a l ly  h e ld  in  t r u s t  fo r
1# Edward Shils, op.cit. p. 28.
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a d e f in i t e  cause may be enjoyed fo r  i t s  own sake or h e ld  too
iht
long  and used for  tim e-serving panaceas in * fa ce  of u np leasan t  
s o c ia l  and economic r e a l i t i e s .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the one-  
party  s ta te  and the strong c e n tr a l is e d  e x e c u t iv e  which i t  
entrenches may lead  to the emergence of a s e l f - p e r p e tu a t in g  
o ligarch y  on whose memory the p e r q u is i te s  of o f f i c e  p lay  a 
t r i c k  as to  i t s  o r ig in a l  m iss ion . The o lig a rch y  may in  turn  
s t a r t  p lay ing  a s e r ie s  of 11 confidence t r i c k s ” on the p u b l ic ,  
excusing  or ju s t i fy in g  cer ta in  a c ts  or em issions, and, in  
g en era l,  not paying s u f f i c i e n t  a t te n t io n  to  the p u b lic  good. 
In such circumstances ideology* s o c ia l i s t  or o th erw ise , can 
be used as a smoke-screen to  conceal the r e a l i t y .  Nor i s  i t  
in con ce ivab le  that th is  may happen when th e  lea d er  and a few  
of h is  c lo s e s t  co lleagu es are honest and d ed ica ted  men con­
vinced  that the b est e f fo r t  i s  being made by a l l  concerned. 
For example, Colonel A fr ifa ,  one o f the authors of the m i l i ­
ta ry  coup who deposed President Nkrumah, has w r it te n :
"Nkrumah1 s new c la ss  promised to  a b o l is h  s o c ia l  
d if fe r e n c e s  but i t  in creased  them by acq u ir in g  
the products of the n a t io n 1 s workshops and by' 
granting p r iv i le g e s  to  i t s  ad heren ts . I t  pro­
mised loudly  that I t  was f u l f i l l i n g  the h i s t o r i c a l  
m ission  of the 1 f i n a l 1 l ib e r a t io n  o f  the Ghanaian 
from every misery, but in  r e a l i t y  I t  a c ted  e x a c t ly  
in  the opposite d ir e c t io n .  Nkrumah1 s new c la s s  
l e d  a l i f e  of opulence and extravagance in  con­
t r a s t  to  the growing misery to  which the r e s t  o f  
the country was being s u b je c te d .” ^
1 .  Colonel A. A. A fr i fa ,  !The Ghana Coup1 , (London Frank C ass,
1966), p p .84-5 .
But even A fr i f  a , a b i t t e r  opponent of Nkrumah, nowhere 
mentions anything h in tin g  th a t  Nkrumah h im se lf  .was g u i l t y  of  
tfa l i f e  of opulence and extravagance."
The truth  i s  that one-party regimes have an in h eren t  
tendency to  create a "new c lass"  in  which a handful o f  "palace” 
fa v o u r ite s  have con tro l over the access  t o  th e  e x e c u t iv e  C hief  
of S ta te  and over government p o l ic y  and a c t io n .  The concen­
tr a te d  and ce n tr a l ise d  power f a c i l i t a t e s  the emergence o f such  
a "palace regime" by la y in g  emphasis on th e  r o le  of the  
P resid en t as the centre of new lo y a l ty  and n a t io n a l  u n i ty  
which in  i t s e l f  i s  a d e s ir a b le  th in g . The very fa c to r  which  
g iv e s  dynamism to  such a system may a ls o  be the source o f  I t s  
w eakness. An important weakness a t  c r i t i c a l  tim es in  the l i f e  
o f  such a regime i s  th a t  i t  makes the o f f i c e  and the man 
vu ln erab le  fo r  removal and w ith  him the c o l la p s e  of the system .
1 .  The Ghana coup i s  d iscu ssed  in  Chapter B ig h t .  At t h i s  s ta g e  
i t  must be sa id  th at the gap between th e  new e l i t e  and the  
masses which A fr ifa  d escr ib es  i s  not p e c u l ia r  to  Ghana, 
and Nkrumah^ domestic economic and s o c i a l  p o l ic y  ( e . g .  
in d u s tr ia l i s a t io n )  and the g r e a t ly  augmented r o le  of the  
s t a t e  in  th is  a c t iv i t y  i s  worthy o f  a c lo s e r  and more 
ser io u s  a n a ly s is  by people who are fr e e  from a s u b j e c t iv e  
involvement l i k e  A f r i f a 1 s .  A fr ifa  who c la im s to  come from  
a long l in e  of Ashanti c h ie f s  ( o p . c i t .  p . 43) b e l i e v e s  
th a t  ch ie f ta in cy  should do e x a c t ly  what Nkrumah was tr y in g  
to  do:
. " . . . I t  ( c h ie f ta in c y )  i s  the embodiment of our 
s o u ls .  The c h ie fs  are t r a d i t io n a l  f o c a l  p o in ts  
of a peop le1 s c o l l e c t iv e  a c t i v i t y .  They are the  
r a l ly in g -p o in t  of our n a tio n a l endeavours. I t  Is  
in  these r o le s  th a t c h ie f ta in c y  provid es the  
momentum fo r  our p e o p le d  advancement.”
( o p . c i t .  p. 116).
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And thus may end a p o l i t i c a l  experiment w ithout being g iv en  
a chance of su cce ss .
That i t  may create  tem ptations fo r  m il i ta r y  adventures,
when th in gs  go wrong, can be seen  from the s e r ie s  o f  coups
which have taken p lace in  the l a s t  two y e a r s .  The ease  w ith
which a ce n tra l ise d  power-structure can be demolished may
be i l lu s t r a t e d  by these coups, as we s h a l l  s e e .  C olonel A fr i fa
adds poignancy to  th is  point when he w r ite s :
Tf0n my a r r iv a l  at the Accra A irp ort from the  
Congo in  1962, I was to  lead  the men to  Tamale, 
our d e s t in a t io n . I paused fo r  a moment and 
r e f le c te d #  Should I throw th is  troop of three
hundred men in to  F la g s ta f f  House and s to p  the r o t
from continuing? Should I not by m i l i ta r y  a c t io n  
stop  Kwame Nkrumah from lea d in g  t h i s  country t o ­
wards communism?. . . 11
He h e s i ta t e d ,h e  t e l l s ^ u s  and abandoned the id ea , because h is
It cca xstammunition supply was l im ited , and vh&lsr i f  he f a i l e d  he fea red
1
he would im p lica te  h is  commanding o f f i c e r .
I f  anything can be learn t from the recen t s e r ie s  o f  
m il i ta r y  coups, one imperative i s  the need to  in troduce some 
"safety  v a lv e s ” in to  the one-party s ta t e  w ith ou t a f f e c t in g  
i t s  dynamism. A fr ican  p o l i t ic ia n s  ( l ik e  a l l  p o l i t i c i a n s )  never  
t i r e  of making claims that a l l  i s  being done in  a democratic  
way. As an i l l u s t r a t i o n  we may c i t e  P resid en t Senghor1 s 
cla im  th a t the su ccess iv e  plans of economic and s o c i a l  d ev e lo p ­
ment in  Senegal were dem ocratically  prepared ”in  c o n s u lta t io n
1. Op.cit. pp. 85-6.
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v/ith  a l l  the c a te g o r ie s  in vo lved  and (were) voted  by the
1
e le c t e d  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of the n a t io n .11 I t  i s  o f in t e r e s t  
th a t  Senghor, ( l i k e  th e  Camerou/n p lan n ers)  la y s  due s t r e s s  
Vow the need t o  m otivate the v/orkers and " f i l l  them w ith  ai"—- —
2
mystique of development” ( i t a l i c s  s u p p l ie d ) .  But th ere  i s  no 
evidence t o  show th a t  "the c a te g o r ie s  in v o lved ” or the e le c t e d  
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of the n a tio n  have put much thought to  th e  ta sk  
of ev o lv in g  and r e f in in g  a system  o f in c e n t iv e s  conducive to  
change and g e n e r a lly  a c c e p ta b le .
L a s t ly  we must mention (or ra th er  r e i t e r a t e  -  though in  a 
d i f f e r e n t  form) the q u e s t io n  of mandate and c o n tr o l ,  and the  
r e la t io n  between th ese  two. When the emphasis i s  on e f f e c t i v e  
government the requirement as to  r e s p o n s ib le  government p a le s  
in to  in s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  i f  iar not com pletely  fo r g o tte n .  Formal 
p r o v is io n s  on t h i s  need t o  be backed by e x t r a - c o n s t i t u t io n a l  
f a c t o r s ,  i f  they are to  have meaning. R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  should  
not be conceived  in  terms of o p p o s it io n  or o b s tru c t io n , but 
ra th er  in  c r e a t iv e  and c o r r e c t iv e  term s. The need fo r  e f f i c i e n t  
government and a u n ited  n a t io n  has m otivated  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p re­
d i s p o s i t io n  in  favour o f  parliam ents working in  co -o p era t io n  
w ith  -  indeed dominated by -  the E x ec u t iv e . The White Paper on 
the d ra ft  Ghana C o n s t itu t io n  of 1960 put the m atter th u s:
1 .  Cf. L. S* Senghor, o p . c i t . ,  p . 12 .
2• Senghor, op.cit., p. 16.
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f,The d ra ft  constitu tion  . . .  has been designed to  
meet the p a r t ic u la r  needs o f  Ghana and to  express  
the r e a l i t i e s  o f  Ghana’ s c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p o s i t io n .
I t  i s  th er e fo re  propsed th a t  the a c tu a l  Head of  
the Government should be the P res id en t of the  
R ep u b lic* . • I t  i s  the G overnm ents v iew  th a t  i t  
i s  e s s e n t i a l  in  the in t e r e s t s  o f  strong  and e f f i c i e n t  
government th a t  the P res id en t and the Assembly should  
work as one and th a t  t h i s  can most e f f e c t i v e l y  be 
secured by c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p r o v is io n s  which l in k  the  
e l e c t i o n  of the P res id en t to the e l e c t i o n  o f the  
members o f the N ation a l Assembly and which provide  
th a t  i f  the N ation a l Assembly and the P resid en t d i s -  1 
agree the i s s u e  can be decided by a gen era l e l e c t io n ."
The chapter on E xecu tive  p r e s id e n c ie s  w i l l  demonstrate th a t  in  
n early  a l l  cases the p r e s id e n t ia l  mandate^ and power i s  so pro­
v id ed  fo r  th a t i t  overshadows su p erv isory  fu n ct io n s  o f  the  
l e g i s l a t u r e .  But only th ose  who are used  t o  view  p o l i t i c s  in  
s t a t i c  terms w i l l  d ism iss  the arrangement as au th or itar ian *
( i i )  S o c ia l  Problems
As a lread y  ex p la in ed  the main asp ect of economic d ev e lo p ­
ment in  t r a n s i t io n a l  s o c i e t i e s  i s  the d i s in t e g r a t io n  of the  
t r a d i t io n a l  economy* This process n e c e s s a r i ly  in v o lv e s  popu­
l a t i o n  movements from the t r a d i t io n a l  a g r ic u l tu r a l  area to  the  
modern urban a r e a s ,  and th a t  in  turn  b rin gs  s o c i a l  problems 
w ith  i t*  The p o l i t i c a l  system  as a mechanism of 1 adaptation  
and in t e g r a t io n 1 must of course take cognizance of t h i s  f a c t ,  
and part o f the u se  of p lanning must be (a ) to  a n t ic ip a te  the  
s o c ia l  problems th a t  go hand in  hand v/ith  economic development, 
and (b) to  d ev ise  the means fo r  s o lv in g  them*
1•  \J • P« No• 1 . 0 .  pp • 5 —6 .
The q u e st io n  i s  what does "so lv in g"  the problems mean,
and how can the new s t a t e s ,  who are a lread y  burdened w ith  the
problems of the p resen t cope w ith  fu tu r e  in ch oate  problems?
The answer to  the f i r s t  q u e s t io n  b r i e f l y  i s  th a t  w ith  g en era l
movement from a t r a d i t io n a l  s o c i a l  order there  can be a d e c l in e
in  c e r ta in  va lu es  w ithout an adequate s u b s t i t u t io n  of new ones
w ithout r e - in t e g r a t io n  to  a new system  o f  values*  This must be
1
provided fo r ;  o therw ise the s i t u a t i o n  can ga tou t of hand.
At a d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l ,  i t  has been argued by some observers  
th a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  trend  i s  a movement from a s t a t u s -
2
o r ien ted  s o c ie t y  to  one based on in d iv id u a l  m ater ia l b e n e f i t .  
This w i l l  be true of s o c i e t i e s  where the dominant economic 
system  i s  unplanned p r iv a te  e n te r p r is e  or inadequately  planned  
mixed economy w ithout the concom itant s o c i a l  p lann ing . This 
i s  not the p lace  to  pass a va lue judgment, but those  who have 
drawn co n c lu s io n s  th a t  the cash-nexus i s  going to  be the p re ­
dominant or the only v a lu e -o r ie n ta t in g  f a c t o r ,  must answer some 
q u estio n s  i f  they  are to  be spared the charge o f  making v a lu e  
judgments on the b a s is  of i n s u f f i c i e n t  e v id en ce . The q u e st io n ,
1* The r i s in g  ra te  o f  s c h o o l- le a v e r s  and of in f lu x  to  the towns 
and delinquency i s  one example * and a f o r e t a s t e  of th in g s  to  
come.* C f. A rchibald  Callaway 'Unemployment among A fr ican  
s c h o o l- le a v e r s '  . The Journal o f Modern A fr ica n  S tu d ie s ,
V ol. 1 , No. 4 (1 9 6 3 ) .
2* Martin Ki#son ' P o l i t i c a l  Change arid M od ern isa tion ', The
journal o f  Modern A fr ican  S tu d ie s ,  V o l. 1 No. 4 (1963) p . 425 
44 . Cf* a ls o  Guy Hunter 'C o n s t i tu t io n a l  and A d m in istra tive  
Systems of New S ta te s '  -  S o c ia l  A sp ec t ,  paper p resented  to  
the 33rd study s e s s io n  of the I n te r n a t io n a l  I n s t i t u t e  of 
D if fe r in g  C i v i l i s a t io n s  (Palermo, 7 -10  A p r il  1963)*
which i s  beyond the scope of t h i s  study t o  answer, i s  of gen era l  
i n t e r e s t  in  the debate about A fr ica n  s o c ia l i s m , and i t  i s  
whether the new systems in  A fr ica  can succeed  in  transform ing  
or recapturing  the p o s i t i v e  a sp e c ts  o f  t r a d i t io n a l  A fr ican  s o c i a l  
r e la t io n s h ip s*  One th in g  seems t o  be c e r ta in :  A fr ica  need not
go through the s o c i a l  nightmare o f  the in d u s tr ia l  r e v o lu t io n ,  
o f  what John Stuart H i l l s  has calle  d the Tfu n w illed  re s id u e  of  
the economic w i l l * ” In t h i s  f i e l d  the study on A fr ica n  c u s to ­
mary law undertaken by lawyers and s o c ia l  a n th r o p o lo g is ts  i s  
of v i t a l  importance in  h e lp in g  s o c i a l  p lann ing . I f  one may 
be fo r g iv e n  a temporary la p se  to  preach: the duty o f  th ese
sch o la rs  and others ha£« not ended, and c e r ta in ly  the i n t e r e s t  
and fa s c in a t io n  of the su b jec t  should be as absorbing as the  
problems invo lved  in  i t  are important fo r  the A fr ican  lead ers*
But here^as in  many f i e l d s ^ p o l i t i c a l  lea d ers  can only in sp ir e  
and guide; i t  i s  the lea d ers  o f  opinion in  variou s s e c t io n s  
o f  the p op u lation  and p a r t ic u la r ly  among th e  educated e l i t e  
who should th in k  more deeply about the su b je c t  and con tr ib u te  
to  i t s  so lu t io n *  I t  i s  a complex problem and g e n e r a l i s a t io n s  
on i t  can be dangerous*
1* The predicament o f lo n e ly  o ld  people in  New York l i v i n g  in
h o t e l  room by them selves i s  one Index which may h e lp  stren g th en  
the b e l i e f  th a t  some "new v a lu e s 11 are not n e c e s s a r i ly  good*
The cash-nexus cannot provide answers to  such p?oblems*
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
Those countries of A fr ica  which have been under
1
c o lo n ia l  ru le  are sa id  to  have a "dual past" which they  
have in h er ited  upon gain ing independence* Mention has been  
made in  the l a s t  chapter of the advent of some id eas  and 
a t t i t u d e s  in  r e la t io n  to  the c o lo n ia l  experience* Much of  
t h i s  development took place as a n egative  r e a c t io n  to  th a t  
ex p er ien ce , but there were a lso  p o s i t iv e  a sp ects*  S im ila r ly  
much of the p re -co lo n ia l  s o c ia l  s tru ctu re  has p e r s i s t e d ,  
a l b e i t  marked ivith the imprint of the c o lo n ia l  ru le*  Hence 
the n e c e s s i ty  of making reference to  t h i s  dual past* For 
our purpose i t  i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  make b r ie f  surveys o f  (1) 
the t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  system , and (2) the c o lo n ia l  
system . The c o n s t i tu t io n a l  form and fu n c t io n  of the  
c o lo n ia l  execu tive  i s  an archetype from which the indepen­
dence c o n s t i tu t io n s  were patterned . Therefore the survey  
of the c o lo n ia l  executive  w i l l  c o n s i s t  of a narrowed focus  
on the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  structure*
1 . Cf* e . g .  George B alandier, fLe con texte  s o c io lo g iq u e  de 
la  v ie  p o lit iq u e  en Afrique N oire1, Revue fran<jaise de 
sc ien ce  p o l i t iq u e ,  IX, 3 (1959), p p .598-609*
1 .  The T rad ition a l System
H is to r ic a l  and an th rop o log ica l s tu d ie s  have d is t in g u is h e d  
se v e r a l  types of s o c i e t i e s .  In  A fr ica  they have been roughly  
div id ed  in to  two c a te g o r ie s .  F ir s t  th ere  are the c e n tr a l is e d  
and h ie r a r c h ic a l ly  stru ctured  s o c i e t i e s  ex e m p lif ied  by the  
A shanti of Ghana, the Hausa-Fulani of N ig e r ia ,  the Amhara- 
T igre  of E th io p ia , the Baganda of Uganda and th e  Zulu o f  
South A fr ic a .  Then there are the d e c e n tr a l is e d  e g a l i t a r ia n  
s o c i e t i e s  to  which belong the Nuer of the Sudan, the L o g o li  
o f  Kenya and the Talfeensi o f Ghana. F ortes and Evans-  
P ritchard  have w r it te n  th a t the f i r s t  group are s o c i e t i e s  
which have
" c en tra l ised  a u th o r ity ,  a d m in is tr a t iv e  machinery 
and j u d ic ia l  in s t i t u t io n s  -  in  short a government -  
and in  which cleavages of w ealth , p r iv i l e g e  and 
s ta tu s  correspond to  the d i s t r ib u t io n  o f power 
and a u th or ity ,"
w h ile  the other group c o n s is t s  of s o c i e t i e s
"which la ck  c e n tr a l is e d  a u th o r ity ,  a d m in is tr a t iv e  
machinery and c o n s t i tu te d  j u d ic ia l  I n s t i t u t io n s  -  
in  short which la ck  government -  and in  which 
there are no sharp d iv is io n s  o f  rank, s ta tu s  and 
w ealth ."
They go on to  remark th at those who con sid er  th a t  a s t a t e  
should be d efin ed  by the presence of governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s  
w i l l  regard the f i r s t  group as p r im it iv e  s ta t e s  and the second
1 .  Cf. M. Fortes and E. E, E vans-Pritchard  ( e d s ) 1 A fr ica n  
P o l i t i c a l  Systemsl Oxford U n iv e r s ity  P ress , London (1 9 6 7 ) .
2. Op.cit., p.5.
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group as s t a t e l e s s  s o c ie t ie s *
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  in to  typ es does not o f  course rep resen t  
em p ir ica l r e a l i t y  with exact s c i e n t i f i c  p r e c is io n ,  as human 
s o c i e t i e s  cannot be c l a s s i f i e d  w ith  th at p rec is io n #  Two 
s o c i e t i e s  or two types may have s im ila r  fe a tu r e s  in  one r e sp e c t  
and may d i f f e r  in  another. ITor i s  the use of concepts l i k e  
’p r im it iv e 1 always h e lp fu l .  But c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  s o c i e t i e s  
w ith  reference to  more s p e c i f i c  asp ects  such as p o l i t i c a l  
o rg a n isa tio n  does y ie ld  u s e fu l  r e s u l t s .  There are c e r ta in  
dominant fea tu res  which make comparison and co n tr a st  meaning­
f u l .  Such i s ,  for example, the presence of a c h ie f  or king  
in  the f i r s t  group of African s o c i e t i e s  or h i s  absence in  
the second group which i s  the reason  for the use of the term  
’ aceph a lou s’ to  describe them.
In the f i r s t  group of s o c i e t i e s  there i s  a c h ie f  or king  
who a c ts  as the focus or centre of the whole system . He 
would in va r iab ly  have a council to  ad vise  him in  many m atters .  
An example of th is  i s  the Lukiko of the Kabaka o f  Buganda.
The Lukiko was form erly presided over by the K a tik iro , who 
was the c h ie f  J u st ice  and ’ Prime M in ister1 . There i s  a 
s t r ik in g  resemblance between the fu n ctio n  of th e  K atik iro  of
2
the Kabaka and that of the Afenegus of former E th io p ia n  k in g s .
1 .  I b id .
2 .  Cf. Margery Perham, ’The Government o f E th io p ia ’ (1948) 
p. 145 and David Apter, o p . c i t .  p. 44 .
The king normally presided  over h is  co u n c il  in  both c a se s ,  
and the same i s  true of the Asantehene of th e  A shanti as
of
w e l l  as /the Sultan of Morooco. But even In one p a r t ic u la r
fe a tu r e  of p o l i t i c a l  systems belonging to  the same category ,
comparisons sometimes break down owing to  d i f fe r e n c e s  in
h i s t o r y .  For example, the Is lam ic  r e l ig io u s  in f lu e n c e  in  the
case o f  Libya and Morocco marks o f f  the k ings o f th ese  two
cou n tr ies  in  some r e s p e c ts ,  notably  in  the degree of con- •
ce n tra t io n  of power. The spread of Islam  in  North, E ast
and West A frica  has introduced a d i s t i n c t  in f lu e n c e  which
can be seen in  the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  of peop le  converted  to  i t .
I t s  doctrine of one God and o f the paramountcy on earth  of
h i s  Messenger, acted as a u n ify in g  fa c to r  which transcended
the d iv is io n s  and c o n f l i c t s  among t r ib e s ,  though i t s  gosp el
2
was spread as much with p ro ia ly tis in g  as w ith  the sword.
The su ltans or ca lip hs have been noth heads o f  the s ta t e  
and o f the Maamounin (the community of b e l i e v e r s ) .  The 
C h r is t ia n  kings of E th io p ia , to o , p ro fe ssed  the orthodox 
C h r is t ia n  f a i t h  and as su p p liers  of temporal a id  t o  the  
Church exerc ised  an in fluence on the lea d ers  o f th e  church. 
But they we re not heads of the church.
In C h iefly  s o c i e t i e s  of sub-Sahara A fr ic a ,  where power
1 . For a short h is to ry  of the advent of Islam  in  A fr ic a ,  c f .  
Roland Oliver and J. D* Fage, !A Short H istory  of A fr ic a 1 
Penguin African Library (1966) p p .66-91,
2 . Cf. O liver and Page, o p .c i t .  p p .63-76 .
was c e n tr a l is e d ,  the Chief was a member o f  the most a n c ie n t ly  
e s ta b l is h e d  powerful fam ily , or a r e l ig io u s  le a d e r .  In­
v a r ia b ly  there were severa l such independent c h ie f s  w ith in  
the same ethn ic  group. Typical examples o f  t h i s  are the 
Yoruba C h ie f ta in c ie s  In Western N ig er ia .  The essen ce  o f  
the C h ie fta in cy  was that i t  was an extended fam ily  grouping  
c lu s te r e d  round a c h ie f .  One of the s a l i e n t  t r a i t s  o f  a 
C h ie fta in cy  was the presence of an eq u ilib r iu m  of a u th o r ity  
and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  The a u th o r ity  of the C hief was m odified  
by the in f lu en ce  of the extended fa m ily , p a r t ic u la r ly  the 
more powerful among them, and o ften  a l s o  by th a t  o f  other  
groups. This balance of au th o r ity  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  has 
deep s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  im p lic a t io n s .  The C h ief e x e r c is e d  
h is  fu n c t io n  on tr u st  on b eh a lf  o f  the community. Much o f  
A fr ica n  law bears th is  out. Perhaps the b e s t  i l l u s t r a t i o n  
of t h i s  i s  the ro le  of the C hief as the cu stod ian  o f r ig h ts  
in  land m atters . There was no q u estion  of a b so lu te  ownership  
o f  land and the Chief could not at any time a l ie n a te  land, 
even though i t  mi^fcbe held  in  h is  name. A N iger ian  C hief  
put th i s  matter in  a n u tsh e ll  when he sa id  to  the West A fr ica n  
Lands Committee in  1912:
"I conceive that land belongs t o  a v a s t  
fam ily  of which many are dead, few are 1 
l i v i n g ,  and cou n tless  members are unborn.M
1 . quoted by T.O. E lia3  in ,  ’The Nature o f  A fr ican
Customary Law’ , Manchester (1956), p. 162.
In the second group, there are no t r a d i t io n a l  r u le r s  or
courts s e t  up permanently. 7/henever a matter o f  importance
comes up the e lders  of the community would summon the whole
v i l l a g e  community to  a meeting and there decide  the matter*
Where an execution  of the decisionwfts requ ired  t h i s  would
he delegated  by the v i l la g e  council to  p ick ed  young men*
The v i l l a g e  council i s  not to  be understood, however, as a
permanent in s t i tu t io n #  I t  was s e t  up as o cca s io n  demanded,
as fo r  example/a crime d isru p tiv e  of s o c ia l  coh esion  such
as murder ha$, been committed* The mechanism o f  law s u i t
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and enforcement fo llow ed a common p a ttern . The 11 government”
in  such communities was conducted in  a more casual fa s h io n ,
w ith  l e s s  p r e c is io n  in  the d iv is io n  of fu n c t io n  than in
c h ie f ly  communities* There was l e s s  pomp and decorum, but
th ere  v/as an inner order and te n a c ity  to  immemorial custom.
Nor i s  there an absence of the equilibrium  we noted w ith
2
regard  to  c h ie f ly  communities.
There can be no q u estion  th a t even the most elem entary  
s o c i e t i e s  had th e ir  own systems of government and law* The 
o r ig in a l  view that in  a s t r i c t  sense the Nuer, fo r  example, 
had no law su ffered  from the narrowness of the A u st in ia n  view
1* Cf* Gunther Wagner, 1 The P o l i t i c a l  O rgan isation  of the
Bantu of Kavirondo1 in  II. Fortes and E*S* E van s-P ritch ard ,  
op. c i t .  pp* 217-222*
2* Ibid*
of law as a command of a p o l i t i c a l  su p er io r . Law as an
ex p ress io n  of desired conduct e x i s t s  in  a l l  th e se  s o c i e t i e s
and the value of , an th rop o log ica l s tu d ie s  has been in  probing
in to  the various fa c to rs  th a t  make people obey th e  decrees
o f  unw ritten  immemorial custom, p a r t ic u la r ly  In the absence
of a p h y s ic a l ly  id e n t i f ia b le  permanent a u th o r ity  and a
h ierarchy of organ isa tion  implementing ord ers . A clue to
th e  answer comes from an th rop o log ica l e n q u ir ie s .  R e l ig io u s
c u lt s  play an important r o le ,  and the presence of r e l i g i o u s
and r i t u a l  symbols more than made up for  the absence of the
governor and the police*
"Varied t i e s  of fr ien d sh ip  In p r im it iv e  s o c i e t i e s  
were expressed in  a l le g ia n c e  to  a common r i t u a l  
symbol. The people p a r t ic ip a te d  in  ceremonies  
to  secure the good th in gs  of s o c i a l  l i f e —4food ,  
ch ildren , h ea lth , su ccess  and peace over an 
areajf. The congregations which jo in ed  in  th e se  
ceremonies o fte n  e s ta b l is h e d  y e t  another s e t  o f  
link ages,;sin ce  they drew th e ir  members from 
d iverse  groups. Or* the ceremonies were so con­
stru cted  that every r e p r e se n ta t iv e  of a p o l i t i c a l  
group had r i t u a l  powers, but the^C powers were 
exerc ised  in  a cyc le  o f  ceremonies in  which every  
group1 s rep resen ta tiv e  took p a r t .  A l l  had to  a c t  
i f  each was to  be prosperous. The ceremonies 
a'imed to  achieve comroma 1 p r o s p e r i t y .11 i
These r e l ig io u s  cu lts  and r i t u a l s  in terp re ted  in  terms of a
gen era l theory of r e l ig io n  and the unw ritten  laws in te r p r e te d
in  terms of a general theory o f  law y i e l d  a f r u i t f u l  r e s u l t .
One common feature  to a l l  these s o c i e t i e s  i s  th a t they hre
1 .  M. Gluckman, " P o l i t ic a l  I n s t i tu t io n s '  , in  " I n s t i t u t io n s  
of P rim itive  S o c ie t ie s " ,  (ed . E v a n s-P r itch a rd ), 1963,
p p .72 -3 .
based on a family u n it  which i s  extended with a s tron g
emphasis ori descent from a common a n cesto r  c r e a t in g  a l in ea g e*
A uthority  depended on such l in e a g e ,  and the group i n t e r e s t
and s o l id a r i t y  which i t  needed.
As for  the h is to ry  o f th ese  s o c i e t i e s ,
"the v erd ic t  of modern sch o la rsh ip  i s  th a t  
the past o f A fr ica  i s  both long and in t e r e s t in g  
and contains the record of a continuous and 
in  some s ig n i f i c a n t  ways h ig h ly  s u c c e s s fu l   ^
development over s e v e r a l  thousand y ea rs ."
A f r ic a 1s p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  h is to r y  i s  o ld ,  and has in v o lv ed
the deployment of "a considerable  fund o f  common p o l i t i c a l  
2
id ea s ."
The debate on the o r ig in ,  movements and development o f  
A fr ica n  p eop les , the form ation of the variou s s t a t e s  and the  
adventure of ideas on p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n isa t io n  in  th e  co n tin en t  
Is  by no means c lo sed . Some t e n t a t iv e  co n c lu s io n s  have been  
drawn, n ev er th e le ss , and I t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  draw upon such  
co n c lu s io n s .  Oliver and Fage, for example, co n sid er  th a t  the  
adventure of the "common funds" of p o l i t i c a l  id eas has a p re -  
C h ris t ia n  and pre-Ivluslim o r ig in  and th a t  i t  can be tr a ced  to  
Meroe. According to  th is  view the movement has fo l lo w e d  
in t e r io r  l in e s  running out In tv/o long arms westwards and 
southwards from a common p o in t o f o r ig in  in  the Upper N ile
1 . B. Davidson, 'Which Y/ay A f r ic a ' ,  Penguin, London, 1964, p . 19.
2 .  R. O liver and J. D. Fage, 'A Short H istory  of A f r ic a 1, 
Penguin, London, 1966, p% 49 .
Valley# They c a l l  the source the "Sudanic" c i v i l i s a t i o n ,
and they b e l ie v e  that the ideas of a n c ien t  Egypt formed
1
part of th is  c i v i l i s a t i o n .  Meroe which was a t  th e  h e ig h t
o f  i t s  power d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  two c e n t u r i e s  o f  t h e  C h r i s t i a n
era was conquered by Axum^thus adding fu r th er  elem ents to
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the "Sudanic" c i v i l i s a t i o n .  On the nature and e x te n t  o f  the
in f lu e n c e  of th is  c i v i l i s a t i o n  on the form ation  o f A fr ica n
in s t i t u t io n s  O liver and Fage. have sa id  t h i s :
"Stretching r ig h t across sub-Saharan A fr ica  
from the Bed Sea to  the mouths of the S en ega l,  
and r ig h t  down the cen tra l h ighland sp ine o f  
Bantu A frica  from the N ile  sources to  Southern  
Rhodesia, we f in d  the a x is  of what we s h a l l  
c a l l  the Sudanic c i v i l i s a t i o n .  The c e n tr a l  
feature  of th is  c i v i l i s a t i o n  was the in co rp o ra tio n  
of the various A fr ican  peop les concerned in to  
s ta te s  whose in s t i t u t io n s  were so s im i la r  th a t  
they must have derived  from a common so u rce .
At the head of such s ta te s  th ere  were k in g s ,  to  
whom d iv ine honours were paid and t o  whom d iv in e  
powers were a t tr ib u te d .  The king le d  a l i f e  
Sedulously secluded from the common p eop le; he 
gave public audience from behind a cu r ta in ;  not 
even the most in tim ate of h is  c o u r t ie r s  might see  
hime eat or drink. Each year the king hoed the  
f i r s t  p lo t  of farming land and’sowed the f i r s t  
se e d s .  Upon h is  p h y s ic a l  w e l l -b e in g  depended 
the f e r t i l i t y  of the land and the re g u la r  f low  
of r a in .  • • • • • •  The g rea t  r i t u a l s  of th e se
d iv ine kingdoms ten d ed  to  be a s s o c ia te d  w ith  
the new moon, and sacred f i r e  was almost ev ery ­
where kept burning and c a r e fu l ly  guarded as  
the main symbol of the king' s l i f e  and a u th o r ity .  
The d iv ine k ing's su b jec ts  might number anyth ing  
from a few thousand to  a m i l l io n ,  or even more.
Such kingdoms tended in  f a c t  to  form In c l u s t e r s ,  
w ith  one or more la rg e  kingdoms a t  the centre  o f
1 . Cf. Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, o p . c i t .  p p .4 9 -5 0 .
2 .  Ib id .
the c lu s te r ,  and a h o st  of sm aller  ones s c a t t e r e d  
around the p e r ip h e r ie s .  But on however sm all  
and in e f f e c t iv e  a s c a le ,  such kingdoms would 
nearly always show a t  l e a s t  v e s t i g i a l  t r a c e s  of a 
strongly  c e n t r a l i s e d  p o l i t i c a l  s tr u c tu r e ,  con­
tr a s t in g  sharply w ith  the lo o s e  fa m ily  or l in e a g e  
in s t i t u t io n s  of th ose  s o c i e t i e s  which had never  
been organised  in  th i s  way# • • • Around the  
royal person c ir c le d  a galaxy of t i t l e d  o f f i c e ­
b earers, as numerous as the economic o r g a n isa t io n  
of each p a r t ic u la r  s ta t e  was ab le  to  support#
• • # At the head of the a d m in is tr a t io n  were a few 
high o f f i c i a l s ,  o f te n  four in  number# Forftom 
these depended a descending h ierarchy  o f  pro­
v in c ia l  c h ie f s ,  o f te n  r e c r u ite d  from th e  pages,  
sons, or nephews of the g r e a t ,  who had been educated  
at the roya l cou rt. The main concern of such ad­
m in is tr a t io n  was the r a is in g  o f  t r ib u te  fo r  the  
support o f the king and o f the s e m i -u rb an ised  
inhab itants of h i s  c a p i t a l .  • • • • • E x tern a l  
tr*ad§ wa& always id  some s e n s e  a r o y a l  monopoly# 
_ 4 rt is ts ,  craftsmen, and other s p e c i a l i s t s  were 
lo ca te d  a t  the ro y a l c a p i t a l .  . . • • In  a very  
r e a l  sen se , th e r e fo r e ,  the 1 Sudanic1 s t a t e  was 
a su perstructure erec ted  over v i l l a g e  communities 
of peasant' c u l t iv a to r s  rather  than a s o c ie t y  which  
Rad grown up n a tu ra lly  out of them# In  many ca ses  
such s ta t e s  are known to  have had t h e i r  o r ig in  in  
conquest; in  Almost a l l  other cases conquest must 
be su sp ected . " ( I t a l i c s  su p p lied ) ^
Early w riters  on A fr ican  h is t o r y ,  m ostly  Arab sc h o la rs
have recorded the e x is te n c e  o f 'Sudanic1 s t a t e s  in  a t  l e a s t
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three  geographically  w idely spread areas o f A f r ic a .  The
1 . O p .c it .  pp .44-46 .
2 .  O liver and Fage mention the record of the Moorish geographer  
A1 Bakri of Cordoba who d escr ib es  a pagan k in g sh ip  r i t u a l
of Ghana; and A l i  Yafluibi who mentions the Kingdom of Kanem, 
ly in g  to  the n o r th -ea st  of Lake Chad, w ith  i t s  Zaghawa r u le r s  
w hile  the ten th  century w r iter  A1 M uhattabi, made I t  c le a r  
that th is  was a d iv ine  kingdom of the 'Sudanic* ty p e . A lso  
A1 Masudi of Baghdad who journeyed t o  the E ast co a s t  o f  
A frica  to  S ofa la  in  tod a y 's  Mozambique in  or about 922 A.D. 
recorded the ex is ten ce  of a s u b s ta n t ia l  trade in  g o ld  and 
ivory , which was sen t from Sofa la  to  Oman and from there to  
China and In d ia . The authors presume Masudi was r e fe r r in g  
to the Zimbabwe s t a t e .  Cf. D liv er  and Fage, o p . c i t . p p . 4 6 -4 8 .
o r ig in s  o f the Hausa s t a t e s ,  o f  Soiaghai and o f many West- 
A fr ican  kingdoms are a t tr ib u te d  to  the 1 Sudanic1 sou rce .
The h is to r ia n s  indeed argue th a t there i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t r a d i ­
t io n a l  evidence that presume? th at w ith  th e  development o f  
Jron Age archaeology in A fr ic a , w ith  i t s  methods o f  a b so lu te  
d atin g , more fr e sh  evidence w i l l  come to  l i g h t ,  p o in t in g  to  
other centres of the S u d a n ic 1 c i v i l i s a t i o n .  They p o in t  out 
th a t  in  Uganda, Rwanda Burundi, and the Kivu^ province of the  
Congo where the formation and re-form ation  o f  S u d a n ic 1 
s t a t e s  can be traced through some f iv e  hundred years of 
t r a d i t io n a l  h is to r y ,  fresh  evidence has been d iscov ered  
showing the h is to r y  of the 3 ta te s  of th at re g io n  to  go back 
to  e a r l i e r  p er iod s, nearer to  the period  of Zimbabwe and 
Katanga. They further sp ecu la te  the p o s s ib le  d iscovery  o f  
comparative evidence from the South-w estern  r e g io n  of  
E th io p ia  notably Kaffa and Enarea. In  the whole horn of  
A fr ic a ,  p re-C h ristian  Axumjls presumed to  have had a p ro to ­
type o f  a s e r ie s  of S u d a n ic 1 s t a t e s  e s ta b l is h e d  t o  e x p lo i t  
the gold and ivory of the n orth -eastern  in t e r io r  and i t  was
probably from that d ir e c t io n  th at the f i r s t  miners and iv o ry -
1
trad ers reached the Lake reg io n s , Katanga and R hodesia .
In the process of s ta te -form at ion  and reform ation  some 
A frican  s o c i e t i e s  seem to  have escaped the impact of the
1 .  Ib id . p p .48-52*
74.
! Sudanic* c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  and remained a t  a sim ple stag e  of 
o rg a n isa t io n , while others moved in to  a complex p a ttern  o f  
b u reau cratic  au th ority . Many of the l a t t e r  grew in to  im­
p e r ia l  powers such as those o f  the Songhai, M ali, Ghana 
and Hausa^Fulani empires. As B a s i l  Davidson has w r i t te n ,  
t h i s  p ro cess ,
"began most c le a r ly  of a l l  in  th ose  reg ions  
where easy movement by man and horse made 
m ilita ry  and p o l i t i c a l  en closu re  p o s s ib le ,  
and worthwhile: in  North A fr ic a ,  in  the
wide grassland's of the Sudan, and, not long  
a f te r  (though seldom w ith  the h o r s e ) ,  in  the  
fo r e s t  fr inge of C-uinea and, l a t e r  aga in  (but 
never with the h o r se ) ,  in  the v a s t  woods and 
prairies of the centre and the s o u t h ." *
One common t r a i t  of A fr ican  k ingsh ips i s ,  as a lready  
s t a t e d ,  the idea of sa n c t ity  and the b e l i e f  th a t  the king 
or c h ie f  represents parenta l a u th o r ity  and i s  the l in k  
between the community and i t s  a n c e s to r s .  His a s s o c ia t io n  
w ith  the w e ll-b e in g  of the community had co n seq u en tia l  
sa n c t io n s .  When misfortune b e f g l l#  the community blames 
Wfcre a t tr ib u ta b le  to  him. Misfortune b e f a l l in g  him was 
thought to  a f f e c t  the crops or c a t t l e  or the r a in .  Such 
sentim ents are p sy ch o lo g ica lly  so deeply ro o ted  th a t  even  
when h ered ita ry  monarchs are rep laced  by e l e c t e d  p r e s id en ts  
some of the aura s t i l l  a ttaches to  them*
Apart from s a n c t i ty ,  another common t r a i t  i s  h iera rch y .  
But there are v a r ie t ie s  in  the type and degree of h ie r a r c h ic
1. Op.cit. p. 22.
o rg a n isa t io n . In some (e*g* the Yoruba) the a d m in is tr a t iv e
h ierarchy consisted  of men who rep resen t powerful l in e a g e
groups in  the s o c ie ty .  In others (most of Bantu kingdoms)
the hierarchy c o n s is ts  out almost e x c lu s iv e ly  r e l a t i v e s  of
the k ing. In the th ird  v a r ie t y ,  n commonersf!w£re chosen,
presumably because they lac& dthe independent b a s is  of power
1
which could make them p o te n t ia l  r i v a l s .
TiYhere there have been conquests and empires b u i l t  on the  
b a s is  of such conquests the em p ire -sta te s  comprised la rg e  
s c a le  p o l i t i c a l  u n i t s .  Within the em p ire -s ta te  were kingdoms 
based on ethnic homogeneity, while the c e n tr a l  p o l i t i c a l  
s tru ctu re  of the empire had a complex system of tech n iq ues  
of subjugating and adm inistering large and d isp a ra te  popu­
l a t i o n s .  There have been sev era l examples of such em pire-  
s t a t e s  in  A fr ica , The medieval period  from the n in th  to  the  
s ix te e n th  century produced three famous e m p ir e -s ta te s :
Ghana, Mali and Songhai, and the n in e teen th  century gave r i s e
to  two others in  West A fr ic a ,  le d  by El HadJ Omar and Samory 
2
Toure* Trade was one o f  the techniques used  by the r u l in g  
group of an em pire-state  to  accumulate the w ea lth  n ecessary
! •  C f. Lucy Mair, 1 P rim itive Government* Penguin Books (1966) 
pp.171-180 and gen era lly  Lloyd A. F a l le r s  1 Bantu Bureau­
cracy1, (Chicago and London 1965 ).
2* Cf* W illiam J. F o ltz ,  1 From French West A fr ic a  to  th e  Mali 
Federation1, New Haven and London (1965), pp*2-5*
fo r  peacefu l or enforced p reservation  and expansion of the  
empire. A lso certa in  v i t a l  commodities were used  as means 
of co n tro l.  For example the co n tro l of the d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  
s a l t  was used as a technique of imposing im perial w i l l  on 
r e c a lc i t r a n t  popu lations. The medieval empires owed a debt 
to  Islam for the Introduction  of such tech n iq u es . For example, 
in  the Ghana empire - s t a t e  the pagan Soninke r u le r s  u sed  
Muslim experts as co u n c il le r s  on commercial and a d m in is tr a t iv e  
m atters , and trade was dominated by Muslims. A lso ,  as a l ­
ready mentioned, Islam as a u n iv e rsa l  r e l i g i o n  f a c i l i t a t e d  
the adm inistration  o f d i f f e r e n t  eth n ic  groups, by sep ara tin g  
governmental p o l i t i c a l  r o le s  from t r ib a l  ( lo c a l )  r e l i g i o u s  
o f f i c e s .  The success of the medieval em p ir e -s ta te s  may a ls o  
be a ttr ib u te d  to  th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  create  a bureaucracy f o r  
t e r r i t o r i a l  ad m in istration  without in te r fe r in g  too  much with
the conduct of lo c a l  a f f a i r s  or attem pting f o r c ib le  s o c i a l
1
in tegra tio n #  A l l  th is  l im ite d  causes for  r e v o l t .
V ariety  in  the s tru ctu re  o f  A fr ican  k in gsh ip  i s  thus a 
f a c t  which cannot be ignored, and th i s  i s  e x p l ic a b le  in  terms 
o f  the advent of the system at a com paratively l a t e r  s ta g e  
in  A frican  h is to r y  and i t s  su p er-im p osit ion  over p r e - e x i s t in g  
n o n -h ier a rch ica lly  organised s o c i e t i e s .  Some o f the p re­
e x i s t in g  s o c i e t i e s  must have s u c c e s s fu l ly  absorbed i t  and 
in fused  i t  w ith  th e ir  own cu ltu re . This may e x p la in  the f a c t
L. Ib id .
th a t  in  some s ta te s  the gen era l s o c ia l  p a ttern  of the s o c ie t y  
i s  s o  c lo se ly  r e la te d  th a t the kingdom gave an appearance o f  
the v i l la g e  writ large* But the m ajority  o f  k ingsh ips were 
u n re la ted  to  the sm aller  s c a le  s o c ia l  p a tte r n .
The v a r ie ty  may a ls o  be seen in  the fu n c t io n  of the king  
or the ch ie f  and the ideas and sentim ents about h i s  respon­
s i b i l i t y *  In the Kingdom of Kanem as descr ib ed  by A1
M uhallabi, the King had ab so lu te  power over h is  su b je c ts  and
1
could take what he l ik e d  of t h e ir  b e lo n g in g s .  This c o n tr a s t s
w ith  A1 Masudi*s record of the s ta te  near the mouth o f the
Zambezi river, a state governed by an e lected  king, who could
2
be deposed i f  he abused h is  power or fs i  le d  to  use i t  w i s e ly .  
This i s  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of A fr ican  k in gsh ip s  or c h ie f ta in c y  
among a wide range of A fr ican  p eo p les . H attray has recorded  
a s im ila r  t r a d it io n  fo r  the Ashanti c h i e f s .  The words o f  
admonition which accompany the occasion  o f  enstoolm ent  
(a c c e s s io n  to the throne) are h igh ly  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  in  t h i s  
connection , and worth quoting  
T e ll  him th at
We do not wish fo r  g reed in ess
We do not w ish th at he should curse u s .
We do not wish that h is  ears should be harsh
o f  h ea r in g .
We do not w ish  that he should c a l l  people f o o l s
We do not wish that he should a c t  in  h i s  own
i n i t i a t i v e
1* Cf. O liver and Page* o p .c i t .  p. 47*
2 , C ited  by B* Davidson, o p . c i t .  p. 22.
We do not wish th in gs  done as in  Kumasi
We do not wish th a t  i t  should ever be s a id  ' I  have
no tim e. I have no t im e 1 
We do not wish personal abuse 1 
We do not wish personal v io le n c e .
The e t h ic s  behind these words are part of the fa b r ic  o f
t r a d i t io n a l  A frican  p o l i t i c a l  systems which cannot be ign ored .
I t  i s  a p a r t icu la r  answer to  the c e n tr a l  problem of power.
Even in  the extreme cases of a u to c r a t ic  r u le  p e c u l ia r
sa n ctio n s  have been devised as  a check on abuse o f  power,
though they ard honoured more fo r  t h e ir  breach than fo r  t h e i r
observance. A s tr ik in g  i l l u s t r a t i o n  i s  the r o le  o f  e c c l e s i a s t i c
i n  E th iop ian  h is to r y .  I n  a famous r e l ig io u s  work e n t i t l e d
nThe V is io n  of Mary11, Mary i s  taken by her son Jesus round a
h e l l i s h  p lace where she sees  p r ison ers  t i e d  up to  a tr e e  of
f i r e .  In answer to  her query about t h e ir  i d e n t i t y ,  C h r is t
t e l l s  her th at they are kings and noblemen who d isobeyed  h is
w i l l  on earth ; who robbed, abused, m altreated  or k i l l e d  
2
p eo p le .
In the r e la t iv e ly  simple 1 t r ib a l  l i f e 1 of c h i e f l e s s
s o c i e t i e s  the p articu lar  environment seems to have d ic ta te d
another type of response. The Uuer system  of s o c i e t y ,  fo r
example, i s  the product o f:
wa long and d i f f i c u l t  s e l f -a d ju s tm e n t  t o  a 
h ig h ly  s p e c ia l i s e d  land and c l im a te .  • • •
Lost in  th e ir  enormous swanps and sodden g r a ss la n d s ,  
dw elling in  sca ttered  homesteads, the Nuer and 
th e ir  neighbours have not been d iscou raged . They
1 . Cf • R attray , *Ashanti Law and C on stitu tion *  , Oxford, 
(192 9 ), p. 82.
2 .  C f. O rient. 1877, F o lio  549*
have found a point o f  balance between th e  waters  
and the scorching sun on one hand, and the demands 
of c a t t le  and a l i t t l e  c u l t iv a t io n  on the other#  
The trouble w ith  the Nuer, i f  i t  i s  a tr o u b le ,  
i s  th at they have succeeded so w e l l  in  a t ta in in g  
a s t a b i l i t y  which c a l l s  w ith in  i t s e l f  fo r  no 
change a t  a l l # 11
2# The C olon ia l System
European contact w ith  A fr ica  was not the f i r s t  o f i t s  
kind in  the h is to r y  of the continent# The whole o f  E ast  
A fr ica  was long involved in  trade w ith  the e a s te r n  world# 
North and West A fr ica  were a l s o  involved  in  a two-way t r a f f i c  
w ith  each other# The trade routes running from E ast (from  
Zula on the Red Sea coast of E th io p ia ,  through Axum and
da
Meroe) across the Sudan to  West A fricaatte a proof o f / e a r l i e r  
co n tin en ta l link# With the advent of Islam  in  th e  whole of  
E a st ,  North and West A fr ica  and the con vers ion  of many c h ie f s  
a new and important fa c to r  entered  the p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  
A frica# One r e s u l t  of th is  i s  a r a d ic a l  breakdown o f  t r i b a l  
b a rr ier s  and the formation of new type s t a t e s  through the  
r e l ig io u s  ideo logy  of Islam# An example i s  th e  H ausa-Fulani  
s ta te #  The read iness with which people a ccep ted  t h i s  cannot
1# B# Davidson, o p . c i t . ,  p# 26# The author goes on to  say  
that much of the story  of the A fr ican  Iron  Age had been  
one of perpetual movement through co n tra st in g  c l im a te ,  
s o i l ,  v e g e ta t io n  and th erefore  means o f  l iv e l ih o o d #  
" S ta b i l i ty  and change play an u nd erly in g  cou n terpoin t in  
the A frican  song#" p. 27# For a concentrated  study o f a 
group of Kingdoms of Africa., see Jan Vansona, * Kingdoms 
of the Savana1, London, 1966, e s p e c ia l ly  pp. 28, 37 , 41 
and 156-174#
be simply exp lained  by referen ce  only to  the r a d ic a l  methods 
o f  Islam  in  converting peoples* The acceptance o f the S u ltans  
as a b so lu te  r u le r s  by people of A fr ica  used to  more dem ocratic  
system s i s  a lso  remarkable. Some w r ite r s  o f A fr ican  h i s t o r y  
have argued th at the A frican i s  more agreeable t o  monarchy . 
w ith  absolutism  and sacredness attached  to  the ruler* But 
t h i s  i s  too naive an explanation* Is lam ic  in f lu e n c e  and i t s  
spread in  A frica  can best be e x p la in e d  by the absence of a gap 
between the ways of the conqueror and the conquered. Islam  
embraced w ith in  I t  a l l  who accepted  i t*
The Europe which conquered Africa was t e c h n ic a l ly  fa r  
su perior  to  the conquered con tin en t. This te c h n o lo g ic a l  gap 
had p o l i t i c a l  and cu ltu ra l im p lica tion s*  I t  proved crushing  
to  much of the t r a d it io n a l  s o c ie t y .  True, many p h ila n th ro p ic  
peop le  and organ isation s worked to  avoid  or minimise d i s ­
ru p tio n  of the s o c ia l  l i f e .  But the t o t a l  e f f e c t  of c o lo n ia l  
r u le  was one which undermined the b a s is  of the t r a d i t io n a l  
order. There i s  no question , in  a m ater ia l s e n se ,  about the  
by-product of modernisation which i t  brought to  the A fr ica n .  
And th is  i s  not l im ited  to  roads and r a ilw a y s . The e f f e c t  of  
the c o lo n ia l  ru le  i s  nowhere more s t r ik in g  than in  the f i e l d  
o f  government*
The le g a l  s ta tu s  of the conquered s ta te  was changed; i t  
became part of a c o lo n ia l  s t a t e .  Wherever there were
1 .  Cheik. Anta Diop. fL,Afrique noire  p reco lon ia le*  , p. 59#
t r a d it io n a l  ru lers  they were turned in to  agents  of the  
c o lo n ia l  s t a t e .  The B r i t i s h  c o lo n ia l  p o l ic y  known as in ­
d irec t  ru le  favoured the p reserv a tio n  o f  th eirsta tus d n ^ th eir  
t r a d i t io n a l  ju r is d ic t io n .  This meant the r e c o g n it io n  o f  a 
dichotomy of law, one (the E n g lish  introduced law) applying
to  the e x -p a tr ia te s  l iv in g  in  the area, and the o th er , (the
1
customary law) applying to  A fr ica n s . The French c o lo n ia l  „
n o l ic y  was a d ir e c t  rule w ith  the French law extending to
2
apply to  the Africans - a process of a s s im ila t io n *  The
B elg ian  p o lic y  sought to  make use of both methods, but tended
3
to  fo l lo w  the French method, except in Rwanda Burundi*
The d ifferen ce  between the d ir e c t  and in d ir e c t  method has 
sometimes been exaggerated. A French h i s t o r ia n  has r e c e n t ly  
w r it te n  that the French c o lo n ia l  ru le  in  A fr ica  did not 
r e a l ly  p ra ct ice  a system of ’ d irect* a d m in is tr a t io n .  They 
had recourse to the ch ie fs  as in term ed ia r ie s .  The main 
d iffe r e n c e  l i e s  in  the le g a l  s ta tu s  of the c h ie f s  which, in  
the French rule^took the form of complete su b o rd in a tio n . A lso
1* Cf. A. H. A l l o t t ,  ’Essays in  A frican  Law1, 1962.
2*ftGonidec, * Droit d’ Outre Her!, 195*9.
3* J. Buchmann, ’L’Afrique Noire independante’ , p . 74 . An 
in te r e s t in g  debate on t h i s  su b ject i s  found in  Hubert 
Deschamps1 a r t i c l e :  ’Et maintenant, Lord Lugard*, in  ’A f r ic a 1 
(London) XXXIII, 1963, pp .293-306 , and a r e p ly  by Michael 
Crowder, ’ In d irect  Rule -  French and B r i t i s h  S t y l e ’ • Ib id .  
XXXIV, 1964, pp. 197-205* Lord Lugard* s name i s  alm ost 
synonymous with in d ire c t  ru le  and 11 the da3U&L$f mandate”, 
which was adopted la rg e ly  as a r e s u l t  o f  h i s  i n i t i a t i v e  
in  N ig er ia .
th e ir  diminished ju r id ic a l  s ta tu s  had p o l i t i c a l  im p lica tio n s*
I t  paved the way for th e ir  eventual overthrow when a w e l l -  
organised  mass-party emerged, as the P.D.Co did in  Guinea.
I t  must a lso  be remembered th a t  the B r i t i s h  p r a c t ic e  of i n ­
d ir e c t  ru le  was not c o n s is t e n t ly  en forced .
The establishm ent of the c o lo n ia l  s t a t e  marked the  
beginning of p o l i t i c a l  changes of c r u c ia l  importance. The 
t r a d i t io n a l  holders of a u th o r ity  were req u ired  by the c o lo n ia l  
s t a t e  to  maintain law and order and gen era l s t a b i l i t y  among 
the A frican  population* For th i s  task  they were r e in fo r c e d  
in  th e ir  traditional posit ion  w ith  tha backing o f  an in v in ­
c ib le  power. At a time when there were as y e t  no m odern-3tyle  
p o l i t i c a l  leaders to  cha llenge th e ir  a u th o r ity ,  the t r a d i t io n a l  
r u le r s  gradually developed an element of a b so lu tism  In t h e i r  
r u le ,  though In the eyes of some the fa c t  of t h e ir  su b serv ien ce
to  a fo re ig n  and more powerful au th o r ity  derogated from t h e ir
1
own a u th o r ity .  The estab lishm ent of c o lo n ia l  ru le  was not 
always achieved without r e s i s t a n c e .  The A shanti Wars, the  
Zulu Wars and the h ero ic  r e s is ta n c e  of Samory Toure, to  mention  
the more outstanding, are w e l l  known in  the annal3 o f  c o lo n ia l  
h is t o r y  (or rather a n t i - c o lo n ia l  h i s t o r y ) .
Yifriere d ir e c t  a d m in istra tion  Wl3 introduced the p o s i t i o n
1 .  Cf. P .J .  Idenbourg, "Les nouveaux e t a t s  a f r ic a in s  e t  
l e s  norm.es democratiques o cc id a n ta le s" , Revue ju r id iq u e  
e t  p o l it iq u e  d! outre mer, 1961, no. 2 , p .198.
o f t r a d i t io n a l  ru ler s  was much weakened* Even th e r e ,  however, 
the r u lin g  c la ss  of the p r e -c o lo n ia l  days had not d isappeared  
in  a l l  cases* The p o licy  o f  d ir e c t  ru le  fo llo w ed  by the French 
did  not mean the complete a b o l i t io n  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  r u le r s  who 
were used as points  of contact w ith  the indigenous p op u la tio n  
whenever occasion  demanded* But they were d iv e s te d  of t h e ir  
l e g a l  s ta tu s  as fculers.
In the e x -B r it is h  t e r r i t o r i e s  the 1 n a t iv e  a u t h o r i t i e s 1 
were g iven  le g a l  power to adm inister customary law to  A fr ic a n s .  
This l e g a l  reco g n it io n  of th e ir  t r a d i t io n a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  in  
customary law gave them su f f ic ie n t  incentive to  co -op era te  
as ad m in istra tive  “transm ission  c e n tres11 and a g en c ie s  of s o c i a l  
c o n tr o l .  This fu n ctio n  was prim arily  p o l i t i c a l  (m aintainance  
o f  order and s t a b i l i t y ) ,  and was c r u c ia l  during the p eriod  o f  
p a c i f i c a t io n  which may be sa id  to  have l a s t e d  roughly  up to  
1920. The mode of inducing t r a d i t io n a l  r u le r s  to  a d ju st  them­
s e lv e s  to  the new c o lo n ia l  s t a t e  by r e h a b i l i t a t in g  them in  
a new form as agencies of law and order rep resen ted  a d e c i s iv e  
fe a tu r e  of p o l i t i c a l  change in  A fr ic a .  Law and order are  
means of ach ieving ce r ta in  d es ired  conduct and p a tter n s  o f  
r e la t io n s h ip .  But they are not always con sid ered  merely as 
means. They may be transformed in  the minds o f  t h e i r  bene­
f i c i a r i e s  in to  the realm of v a lu e s .  When th a t  happens those  
who hold  p o s it io n s  of au th ority  wtlllW when the time comes seek  
to  j o in  the centre of law-making. That, in  the c o lo n ia l
s i t u a t io n ,  was the Governor, and h is  c h ie f  instrum ent o f  
policy-making - the L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, and l a t e r  the  
E xecutive Council*
The E xecutive Under C olon ia l Buie
There has been a good deal of sc h o la r ly  w r it in g  on the
h is to r y  of the L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, and i t s  o f fs p r in g  the
E xecutive Council in  e x -B r it is h  A fr ic a ,  The same i s  a l s o
2
true of the Executive In ex-French A frica* y/e w i l l  now 
g iv e  b r ie f  accounts of the two#
( a )  j x - B r i t i s h  A f r i c a n  t e r r i t o r i e s
In the e x -B r it ish  t e r r i t o r i e s  of A fr ica  the development 
of the E xecutive fo llow ed the p a ttern  of what was c a l le d  
“ c o n s t i tu t io n s  of Crown Colony”, in  c o n t r a - d is t in c t io n  from 
the o r ig in a l  co lon ies  ( i . e #  North America, Bermuda and the  
West In d ies )  and the old dominions ( i# e ,  A u s tr a l ia ,  Canada, 
New Zealand and South A fr ic a ) ,  although th e  l a t t e r  were a l s o  
co lo n ie s  a t the beginning.
1* Cf# Martin Wight, ! The Development of the L e g i s la t iv e  C o u n c il1 
1606-1945 (London, 1945); S ir  Alan Burns (ed );  P a r l ia m e n t  
as Export] (London 1966); H#V*Wiseman, 1 The Cabinet in  the  
Commonwealth1 (London, 1958); S.A. de Smith, 1 The New Common­
w ealth  and i t s  C o n st itu t io n s1, (London, 1964), p p ,38-76*
2# Cf, P*F# Conidec, Droit df outre-mer, V o l . l ,  p p ,143-150;  
and pp# 453-465, And F. Berge, rfLe S o u s -se c r ^ ta r ia t  e t  l e s  
s o u s - s e c r e ta r ia t s  d! e ta t  aux c o lo n ie s :  h is to r l ie  de I 1 eman­
c ip a t io n  de I 1adm inistration  c o lo n ia le ,  (P a r is ,  1 9 6 2 ) ,
W illiam J, F o ltz ,  Prom French West A fr ica  t o  the Mali 
F ederation1, (New Haven and London, Y ale  U,P* 1965)*
In the government of the Crown C olon ies there was 
the L e g is la t iv e  Council, a unicameral body whose members 
were o r ig in a l ly  appointed by the Crown, the m ajority  being  
c i v i l  servants known as o f f i c i a l  members. The o f f i c i a l  members 
were bound to  support the p o l ic y  of the Governor, as rep resen ­
t in g  the Crown* The Governor who was the E xecu tive  in  the  
c o lo n ia l  t e r r i to r y  could thus con tro l the L e g is la t iv e  Council*
The composition of the L e g is la t iv e  Council was a l t e r e d ,  
grad u a lly  leading to  a m ajority  of u n o f f i c i a l  ( i . e .  non- 
c i v i l  servant) members. The Governor1a c o n tr o l  wa  ^ n ev er th e­
l e s s ,  preserved by Investing  him with  "reserve powers" which  
allow ed  him to  override the L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, and to  
enact l e g i s l a t i o n  without the consent of i t s  members* This  
was in  a d d itio n  to  h is  power to  ve to  l e g i s l a t i o n  proposed by 
the c o u n c il .
The u n o f f i c ia l  members of the cou n cil in  some t e r r i t o r i e s  
included  members of the European community as w e l l  as A fricans*  
The former were appointed to  represen t var iou s economic i n ­
t e r e s t s  -  banking, mining, p la n t in g ,  sh ipp ing  or trade -  
sometimes on the nomination o f  the Chambers of Commerce and 
s im i la r  organisations* A fricans were not always in c lu d ed  in
1* The c o n s t itu t io n s  of the f i r s t  E n g lish  c o lo n ie s  o f  s e t t l e ­
ment* provided fo r  re p r e se n ta t iv e  government, fo l lo w in g  
the E n g lish  model, w ith  a r e s t r i c t e d  fr a n c h is e ,  cf*
S ir  Alan Burns, o p * c it .  p* 1 4 .
1
the L e g is la t iv e  Councils*
An important stage in  the ev o lu t io n  of the L e g i s la t iv e  , 
Council (o$* Crown Colony) system w^s reached when some 
members of the council en tered  th at body on the b a s is  o f  
e le c t io n *  Prom there the next l o g i c a l  s ta g e ,  w ith  more 
demands fo r  rep resen ta tio n , was when the e l e c t e d  members 
outnumbered the other members of the c o u n c i l .  At f i r s t  
e l e c t io n  was held  on a l im ite d  fr a n c h ise  and g e n e r a lly  only  
the p r in c ip a l  m u n ic ip a lit ie s  were represented  in  each colony*
Eor example the four A fricans e le c te d  to  the L e g i s la t iv e  
Council of N igeria  in 1926 (the f i r s t  t o  be e le c t e d  in
2
t r o p ic a l  A fr ica )  represented the towns of Lagos and Calabar. . 
The u lt im a te  phase of the e v o lu t io n  of the L e g i s la t iv e  Council 
was reached when a l l  i t s  members were e l e c t e d  r e p r e se n ta t iv e s*  
At that stage the stru cture  and o r ie n ta t io n  o f the E xecu tive  
C ouncil, i t s  o ffsp r in g , begins t o  emerge, markedly d i f f e r e n t  
from i t s  e a r l i e r  form*
The E xecutive Council o f  the older dominions was an 
outgrowth of the L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil. I t  was a t  f i r s t  com­
posed o f the Governor and the o f f i c i a l  members ( c i v i l  servan ts)*  
The p attern  of development was s im ila r  to  th a t  o f  the L e g is ­
l a t i v e  Council* U n o f f ic ia l  members were added l a t e r ,  from 
the L e g is la t iv e  Council. This enabled the Governor to  bridge
1 .  In Kenya, fo r  example, there were no A fr ican  members 
u n t i l  1944. Ib id . p. 35.
2* Ibid* p* 35*
the gap between h is  o f f i c e  and the L e g i s la t iv e  C ouncil, and
a t  the same time provided the ttAssembly men^/a measure o f  share
in  the form ulation  o f general p o l ic y .  But th e  E xecu tive
1
Council remained a purely advisory body.
In the m ajority of A frican  t e r r i t o r i e s  the E xecu tive
Council co n s is ted  at f i r s t  of o f f i c i a l  members on ly , then
of these  plus u n o f f ic ia l  members whom th e  Governor, in  h is
d is c r e t io n ,  could appoint i f  ” su ita b le  can d id a tes” e x i s t e d
2
among non-European p op u la tion s . Towards the end of the  
Crown Colony system, before in te r n a l  se lf-gov ern m en t, e le c t e d  
members of tho Legislative Council in c lud ed  in  the
E xecutive Council and made resp o n s ib le  fo r  c e r ta in  departments 
o f  government with two or three o f f i c i a l s  serv in g  w ith  them 
as advisors to  the Governor, who presid ed  over th e  E xecu tive  
Council m eetings. This was a turning p o in t  from the p o in t  ofyiew 
^ tr a n s fe r  of execu tive  power to  A fr ica n s , Some of the A fr ican  
lead ers  were, for  the f i r s t  tim e, l e t  in  to  the inner cou n cil  
o f  the E xecutive with access to  and p a r t ia l  fion tro l o f  govern­
ment departments. I t  showed them the problems as w e l l  as the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of Executive a u th o r ity .  But even a t  th a t  stage  
the E xecutive Council s t i l l  had advisory fu n c t io n  o n ly .
As regards the procedure of the E xecu tive  Council a t  a
1 .  Um Wight, o p . c i t ,  p, 126; Wiseman, o p ,c i t#  pp ,1 6 -2 0 ,
2 .  Kenya was an exception  to  t h i s .  U n o f f i c ia l  members 
there were appointed fo r  a f ix e d  p er iod  up to  1954, 
c f ,  Wiseman, o p .c i t ,  p. 19.
s ta g e  when i t s  fu n ction  was purely a d v iso ry , normally
q u estion s  were explained by the departmental head concerned;
there would then be a general d isc u ss io n ;  th e  Governor would
ask  each member for  advice in  turn* No v o te  was taken , and
1
members could not them selves bring questions*
The u ltim ate stage in  the e v o lu t io n  of the E xecu tive  
Council and i t s  transform ation  to  a cab in et system i s  g e n e r a l ly  
reached when a l l  the members o f the L e g is la t iv e  body are  
e lec ted *  By that time there would have been a crescendo o f  
growing demands fo r  more r ig h ts  fo r  s e l f - r u l e ,  for  complete  
tr a n s fe r  of power -  demands made under the pressure  o f  organ­
i s e d  movements for  independence* Every measure o f  t r a n s fe r  
of power only helped to  s t im u la te  more demands fo llo w ed  by 
more concessions in  a s e r ie s  of arrangements, which fo llo w ed  
a s im ila r  pattern in  a l l  the c o lo n ia l  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  w ith  minor 
v a r ia t io n s .  A ty p ic a l  example i s  th a t o f Ghana (th e  Gold 
Coast as i t  then was) which was the f i r s t  t o  g a in  in te r n a l  
self-governm ent and, la t e r ,  complete independence*
In 1952, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), Dr* Kwame 
Nkrumah1 s party, won a c lear  m ajority  In the e l e c t i o n  to  the  
L e g is la t iv e  Assembly. The Governor then co n su lted  w ith  
Dr. Nkrumah in  the choice o f  r e p r e se n ta t iv e  members fo r  the  
E xecu tive  C ouncil. The Coussey Committee had recommended th a t
1. I b i d . ,  p. 21.
the L e g is la t iv e  Assembly should e l e c t  a lea d er  and th a t
members of the Executive Council should be appointed  by the
1
Governor in  con su lta tion  with the lea d er . The C o lo n ia l
S ecretary  f e l t  that i t  would be p referab le  fo r  the members
of the Executive Council to  e l e c t  a lead er  of government
b u s in ess  in  the L e g is la t iv e  Assembly on the grounds th a t
2
th ere  was no developed party system# But the c le a r  m ajority  
obta ined  by the CPP convinced the Governor th a t i t  was more 
appropriate to  take the course he took, which approximated
3
to  United Kingdom conventions* An amending O rder-in-C ouncil
v/as soon passed to  recognise tho factapand Dr# Nkrumah was
4
appointed Prime M inister.
The composition of the E xecutive  Council con tin ued  
u n t i l  1954 with o f f i c i a l  members present# In 1954, the  
E xecu tive  Council was rep laced  by a cab inet which became, 
as in  a l l  cabinet systems, the p r in c ip a l  instrum ent o f  
p o licy*  I t  was the f i r s t  cab inet in  b lack  A fr ic a ,  and i t s  
b ir th  was no doubt welcome by a l l  s id e s ,  but not cheered  
by Dr* Nkrumah and h is  c o l le a g u e s .  I t  f e l l  sh o rt  of a proper 
cab in et in  th a t ,  contrary to the demands of th e  CPP le a d e r s ,  
the cab inet was made resp o n sib le  not to  the L e g i s la t iv e  
Assembly (which the CPP co n tr o lled )  but to  the Governor*
1 . Coussey Report, paras# 382 and 411.
2 , S .I*  1950, No. 2094, S#15j c f .  a l s o  Nfiseman* s comments, 
o p .c i t .  pp. 29-30.
3 .1 .  1952 I!o . 455, S•5•
4. Cf* de Smith, o p .c i t .  p p .55-63, fo r  a d i s c u s s io n  on the  
s ta g es  of  i n t e r n a l  government and the g rad ation s  th ereof*
The d es ire  o f  W hitehall to  see  E nglish  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  con­
v en tio n s  implanted in  Ghana i s  none the l e s s  c le a r .  This was 
made c le a r  s p e c i f i c a l ly  in  re sp ec t  of the appointment and
r e s ig n a t io n  of the Prime m in is ter  and the acceptance of h is
1
advice  on other m in is te r ia l  appointments.
Ex-French A fr ican  t e r r i t o r i e s  
The French co lon ies  in  A fr ica  were grouped in  two 
fe d e r a t io n s :  the Afrique O ccidentale F rancaise  (1895) and
the Afrique Equatorial^Francaise (1910)# The o r g a n isa t io n  
o f  the l a t t e r  was modelled on that of the former group which  
was i t s e l f  modelled on that of French Indochina (1887).
Each adm inistrative  grouping was p laced  under a Governor- 
General who acted  as intermediary between the cen tra l govern­
ment in  France and the co lon ies  coming under h is  grouping.
He took over a su b sta n t ia l  part of the fu n c t io n  form erly  
e x e r c is e d  by the Governors of each colony thus c e n t r a l i s in g  
the whole ad m in istra tive  system of the c o lo n ie s .  A lg e r ia  was 
kept as a separate ad m in istra tive  u n it  from the s t a r t  (1834) 
w ith  the appointment o f  a c i v i l i a n  Governor-General a f t e r  a
s e r ie s  o f c r is e s  involv ing  s tru g g le s  between c i v i l i a n  o f f i c i a l s
2
and m il i ta r y  commanders, la s t in g  some s i x t y  years*
1 .  C1GD. 9169, para 31; and S .I*  1954 Ho* 551*
2* Cf* Gonidee, o p .c it*  V ol*II , pp. 180-192 . French West A fr ic a  
at the end of the n inteenth  century c o n s is te d  o f fou r  c o a s ta l  
se tt lem en ts  - Senegal, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey. 
They were separated one from another and the p r in c ip a l  l in k  
was a c o a s ta l  steamer. Behind them in  the in t e r io r  la y  a 
v a s t  h in ter la n d  i n i t i a l l y  under m i l i ta r y  command*
The (c o a s ta l)  co lo n ies  were governed by c i v i l i a n  
adm inistrators reporting d ir e c t ly  to  P aris  and a s s i s t e d  in  
th e ir  decision.-: by an informal cou n cil o f  subordinate admin­
i s t r a t o r s ,  rep resen ta tiv es  of the l c c a j  Chamber o f  Commerce
(which had rrreat in flu en ce  in  the government’ s c o lo n ia l  p o l ic y )
1
and lo c a l  notables v;hon the governor saw f i t  to  include* The
f i r s t  change came in  1895 when a G overnor-general was appointed
to  oversee the org an isa tion  and a d m in istra tio n  of a l l  the
French West A frican  p o s s e s s io n s .  Given the d i f f i c u l t y  o f
communications h is  presence was not f e l t  a t  the s t a r t .  Then
the Constitution of French West Africa (AOF) was promulgated
g iv in g  the Governor-general the power to  r a i s e  money f o r  the
Federal Government by tax in g  the imports and exp orts  of the
2
in d iv id u a l t e r r i t o r i e s .
The 1904 C o n st itu t io n  and decrees is su e d  on March 30 and 
A p ril  20, 1925 e s ta b lish e d  the b a s ic  form o f  French c o lo n ia l  
government. Under t h i s  system each in d iv id u a l  colony was 
governed by a Lieutenant-Governor who adm inistered  i t  according  
to  general ad m in istra tive  r u le s  a p p lica b le  to  a l l  the other  
c o lo n ie s  under the “high a u th o r ity ” of the G overnor-general,
1 • W* F o ltz ,  o p . c i t .  p. 16 .
2* Decree of October 18, 1904. This decree and subsequent 
decrees e s ta b lish e d  the t e r r i to r y  o f  French West A fr ica  
includ ing  the in t e r io r  which became known as French Soudan. 
Sim ilar measures for  French E qu ator ia l A fr ica  were s ta r t e d  
in  1910.
l o c a l  circumstances being taken in to  account* The L ieu ten a n t-  
governor (who became f u l l - f l e d g e d  governor a f t e r  1937) was 
ad vised  by a council known as the Conaeil d1 A d m in is tra tio n , 
excep t in  Senegal* This cou n cil  was composed o f  appointed  
se n io r  c i v i l  servan ts , and, in  the Ivory C oast, Dahomey,
Guinea and Soudan included u n o f f i c i a l  members chosen by the  
c o lo n y ^  Chamber of Commerce and by a r e s t r i c t e d  A fr ica n  
e le c to r a te  con sist in g  o f  c h ie f s ,  l i c e n s e d  tr a d e r s ,  property  
owners and adm inistrative  o f f i c e r s  of f i v e  years standing*
I t  i s  considered that d esp ite  the r e s t r i c t e d  power o f the  
Council i t  drew some o f the s ig n i f i c a n t  elem ents in  the  
A fr ican  communities who were most l i k e l y  to  e x e r c i s e  in ­
f lu en ce  In a modern s e t t in g  in to  some s o r t  o f r e g u la r is e d
2
r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  the government a t  the t e r r i t o r i a l  l e v e l*
Some w r ite r s  have expressed the view th a t  the e l e c t o r a t e  was
more e x ten s iv e  than that of the lo c a l  government co u n c ils  in
the B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  although the l a t t e r  enjoyed  more
3
r e a l  power of decision*
In Mauritania and Niger the Council was composed e n t i r e ly  
of o f f i c i a l  members, while in  Senegal the p o s i t io n  was unique*
1* In 1939 th is  was extended to  in clud e v e tera n s  o f  the  
c o lo n ia l  army and holders o f c e r ta in  l i c e n s e s *
2 .  I b id .
3* Cf* Cowan, Local G o v ern m en t ,  p p .52-53, q u o t e d  by w*J* P o lt z ,  
o p . c i t *  a t  p .  1 2 .
In  Senegal, the four c o a s ta l  regions had "been granted s e l f -  
government in  the 1870*s .  The cou n cil in  th ese  reg io n s  
c o n s is te d  of popularly e le c t e d  r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  and of members 
chosen by the ad m in istration -app oin ted  c h ie f s  of the in t e r io r  
p o p u la tio n s . The council had q u a s i - l e g i s l a t i v e  powers over 
f in a n c ia l  m atters, s im ila r  t o  the C on se il General o f a 
department in  France. The Governor had v e to  powers. The 
c o lo n ie s ,  w ith  the excep tion  o f Senegal, were in  no sen se  
s e l f -g o v e r n in g .  Their government, l ik e  the French c e r c le a , 
was part and parcel of the French a d m in is tr a t iv e  system w ith  
i t s  headquarters in Paria.
Coming immediately above the L ieutenant-governor in  the
c o lo n ia l  hierarchy were the G overnors-general of the F ed eration .
Both the Governors-general and the L ieutenant-governor o f  each
colony were appointed by the French head of s t a t e .  They had
th e  s ta tu s  of hauts fo n c t io n n a ires  (eq u iv a len t  to  sen io r  c i v i l
s e r v a n ts ) ,  and were s t r i c t l y  subordinated to  the cen tra l  
1
government. The Governors-general alone rep resen ted  the  
French Republic - and had the r ig h t  to correspond w ith  P a r is .  
The power exercised  in  the t e r r i t o r i a l  a d m in is tra tio n  was 
th e r e fo r e  by d elegation  of th e ir  powers. They a ccord in g ly  
had the r ig h t  to  in tervene a t  any le v e l  th ey  saw f i t .  The
1 .  The co lo n ies  came under the M inister fo r  the C olon ies  and 
A lg er ia  came under the M in ister  of I n t e r io r ,  under the  
th ir d  Republic.
p r e s t ig e  of the Governor-general counted fo r  much in  p r a c t ic e  
g iv in g  him e f f e c t iv e  power. The competent m in is te r  in  Paris  
i s su e d  orders and in stru c t io n s  to  the ^ overnor-general in  the  
form o f  c ir c u la r s .  But no m in is t e r ia l  decree could  he put in to  
e f f e c t  in  the co lo n ies  without the G overnor-general1s promul­
g a t io n  o f an arrete^d1 a p p lic a t io n  e x p la in in g  the circum stances
in  which i t  was applicab le  and in d ic a t in g  how i t  was to  be
W itk
put in to  e f f e c t .  Again, a l l  c o lo n ia l  budgets had to  m e e t /h is
approval before being submitted to  P a r is .  The power of the
G overnor-general was further extended v i s - a - v i s  the co lo n ie s
in  f i s c a l  matters by a system o f  ta x a t io n  which c e n tr a l is e d
revenues and enhanced h is  con tro l over the c o lo n ie s .  His
power v i s - a - v i s  Paris was extended in  th a t  he could d eclare
1
a s t a t e  o f emergency, as occasion  demanded.
There was a Governor-general’ s co u n c il  c a l l e d  the  
C o n se il  de Gouverrfcient, which functioned  u n t i l  1939. I t  con­
s i s t e d  of a m ajority of c i v i l  servants who were m ostly  
European. This C ouncil’ s functionw  as purely  advisory  and 
in  f a c t  i t s  work was done by i t s  permanent commission com­
posed e n t ir e ly  of the Governor-general1 s own chosen men.
Above the Governor-general was the C o lo n ia l  M in ister  
who could ru le  by decree and who v/as a l s o  a s s i s t e d  by a
1 .  Cf. Gonidec, o p . c i t .  pp!86-192; and W. J . F o l t z ,  o p . c i t .
p . 18 .
95.
su p erior  cou n cil,  the C onseil Superieur des C olon ies  ( a f t e r
1937, the Conseil Superiejr de la  France d’ Outre-Her), w ith
the same advisory powers as th e  Governor1 s C ou n cil.  This
co u n c il  was composed of r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  e l e c t e d  by the French
c i t i z e n s  and a few "native11 n o ta b le s  from each colony, the
d ep u ties  and senators of th ese  c o lo n ie s  which had parliam entary
re p r e se n ta t io n  in  P aris , and sev e ra l  nominated members re p r e -
1
se n t in g  m etropolitan  and c o lo n ia l  i n t e r e s t s .  Commercial
in t e r e s t s  dominated the Superior C ouncil, s in c e  most of the
c o lo n ia l  rep resen ta tiv es  were l in k ed  to  the major commercial
i n t e r e s t s ,  and the Governor-general was th e  only man w ith  the
p r e s t ig e  and access to  the m in is ter  to  c o u n ter -p o ise  th e ir
in f lu e n c e ,  i f  only in  the i n t e r e s t s  of a d m in is tr a t iv e  e f f i c i -  
2
en ce . The ex ten t of the in f lu e n c e  of commercial in t e r e s t s  
ex er ted  i t s e l f  even more a t tim es of m in i s t e r ia l  instsb  i l i t y  
during the Third Republic*
The French attempt to  impose a uniform and e f f i c i e n t  
a d m in is tra t iv e  structure weakened and in  many cases destroyed  
t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  a u th o r ity .  France’ s m iss io n  c i v i l i s a t r i c e  
im plied  th a t A frican  cu ltu res  and p o l i t i c a l  system s were i n ­
f e r i o r  and th at they must be rep la ced  by a "higher c i v i l i s a t io n "  
which would make Frenchmen out of A fr ica n s .  The Governors-
1 • W * J» Foltz, op*cit. p* 19.
2. Ibid.
general and the co lo n ia l a d m in is tra tio n  over which they p r e ­
s id ed , did not therefore f e e l  concerned to  p reserve  t r a d i t io n a l  
systems o f  p o l i t i c a l  au thority#  There was l i t t l e  p rep aration  
o f a modern A frican  p o l i t i c a l  order to take the p lace  o f  the  
t r a d i t io n a l  system. As F o ltz  has pointed  out:
"where t r ib a l  or v i l l a g e  a l le g ia n c e  remained  
strong, i t  rep resen ted  p rim arily  a l l e g ia n c e  
to a s o c ia l ,  not a p o l i t i c a l ,  order# I f  a 
focus for p o l i t i c a l  l o y a l t i e s  was open to  the  
A frican s, i t  was th a t  of a ’Greater France’ , 
a d is ta n t ,  vague idea  u n l ik e ly  to  su rv ive  the  
shock of the Increased d ir e c t  A fr ic a n  p a r t i c i ­
pation  in  the p o l i t i c a l  p rocess ."
Host A fricans had, l i t t l e  or no chano§ to  p a r t ic ip a t e  in
government of the colony which operated w ith ou t re feren ce  to
t h e ir  wishes or needs. But w ith  the o p p o r tu n it ie s  opened f o r
tr a in in g  (though l im ite d )  a new A fr ican  n a t i o n a l i s t  e l i t e
2
was in  the making.
By the end of World War I I  the p o l i t i c a l  c lim a te  was 
changing; the growth of a hard-core of educated A fr ican s  
and the a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t  euphoria of the p o s t -A t # la n t ic  and 
IT.IT. Charter period gave impetus to n a t io n a l i s t  demands fo r
1 .  O p .c it .  p. 20.
2 .  F o ltz  g ives  the f ig u re  of 71 ,000  stu d en ts  who were in  sc h o o ls  
of some sort in  French West A fr ica  by 1938, which rep resen ted  
a mere 3*2$ of p o te n t ia l  s tu d en ts . But the s tu d en ts  were 
concentrated in  the urban areas where they  were ab le  to  
acquire new s k i l l s .  Very few attended u n iv e r s i t y  in  France 
before World War I I ,  but many attended th e  fe d e r a l  E co le  
Normals W illiam-Ponty, near Dakar. P$nty granted about 
2 ,000  degrees between 1918 and 1945. o p . c i t .  p p .2 0 -2 1 .
se lf-govern m en t. But there was l i t t l e  change in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
and e s p e c ia l ly  executive s tru ctu re  a f t e r  the war, except in  
nomenclature -  the co lon ies  being re-named "t e r r i t o i r e s  d1 Outre-  
Mer", a f te r  1946. The fe d e ra t io n s  of A.O .F. and A .E .F . con­
tin u ed  without any change in  th e  o rg a n isa t io n  and fu n c t io n  of  
the execu tive  in  both. The conference o f  c o lo n ia l  a dm ini- 
3 t r a to r s  and e xperts held  in  B r a z a v i l le  In  1944 s e t  a tone  
fo r  the granting of p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts  th a t was to come, during  
the fo llow in g  decade.
In the debate on the c o n s t i tu t io n  of the Fourth R ep u b lic ,  
th ere  was much t a lk  of radical changes in  French c o lo n ia l  
p o l ic y ,  but the outcome did not match the hopes arounsed by 
th ose  debates* The 1946 C o n st itu t io n  r e f l e c t e d  some (but not 
marked) changes. ;~A11 the overseas t e r r i t o r i e s ,  as they  were 
now c a l l e d ,  were given r e p r e se n ta t io n  in  the French r e p r e se n ta ­
t i v e  assem b lies , as w e ll  as a t  the i n t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l  and t e r r i -
2
t o r i a l  l e v e l s .  The r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  to  the French N ational  
Assembly:and to the t e r r i t o r i a l  assembly were e l e c t e d  d i r e c t l y .  
There were separate rotAs and sep arate  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  In e l ­
e c t io n s  to  the National Assembly (with the e x c e p t io n  o f th e  
e ig h t  t e r r i t o r i e s  of A.O.F. and French Togoland), t o  t e r r i t o r i a l  
assem b lies  (with the excep tion  of -Senegal), and to  p r o v in c ia l
1 .  c f .  La Conference A fr ica in e -F ra n ca ise ,  B r a z a v i l l e ,  30 Janvier  
-  8 F evrier  1944.
2 . c f .  A r ts .7 7  and 78 of the 1946 C o n s t i tu t io n .  c f .  a l s o  P.F* 
Gonidec, o p .c i t .  p p .143-7.
1
assem b lies  in  Madagascar. The separate r o l l s  c o n s is te d  o f
c i t i z e n s  of m etropolitan  and of lo c a l  s t a t u s ,  the former being
in  p r a c t ic e  almost e n t ir e ly  European; the l a t t e r  e n t i r e ly  
2
A fr ica n . This arrangement was b i t t e r l y  a tta ck ed  by the members 
of the second co n stitu en t assembly e le c t e d  by " n a tiv e” e l e c t o r ­
a t e s .  For t a c t i c a l  as w e ll  as i d e o l o g i c a l 1 reasons overt  
c r i t i c i s m  concentrated on 1 second class* c i t i z e n s h i p .  This in  
turn added more fu e l  to  the f i r e  of growing n a t i o n a l i s t  a s p i ­
r a t io n s .  The very concept of the French R epublic  -  one and
3
i n d i v i s i b l e  -  was attacked  as a h y p ocr isy . T e r r i t o r ia l  assem­
b l i e s  could a l s o  choose members (sen a teu rs)  t o  the C ouncil o f  
the Republic and co u n c illors  t o  the Assembly o f  the French Union.
In the fed era tion s  of the A.O.F. and A .E .F . there were 
e s ta b l i s h e d  Grand Councils whose members were chosen by each  
t e r r i t o r i a l  assembly. This i n t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l  c o u n c il  had
powers and fu n ction s  s im ilar  to  those of the t e r r i t o r i a l  
4
a s se m b lie s .  H either the t e r r i t o r i a l  a ssem b lies  (and the  
Malgache p ro v in c ia l  a ssem b lies) nor the i n t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l  
a ssem b lies  had any general l e g i s l a t i v e  power. The m eetings o f
1* In  Madagascar the p ro v in c ia l  assem b lies  corresponded to  the  
t e r r i t o r i a l  assem blies elsewhere in  t r o p ic a l  A fr ic a .
2 .  In the tr u s t  t e r r i t o r ie s  o f the Camerouns and in  Togoland* 
the in h ab itan ts  were not French c i t i z e n s  but French-adm ini­
s te r e d  persons. In the r e s t  a l l  were t e c h n ic a l ly  Frenchwomen, 
and t h e ir  t e r r i t o r i e s  were part of the French R ep u b lic . ~
3* c f .  e . g .  Leopold S.Senghor *LfAvenir de la  France dans 1 ! outre  
mer* , P o lit iq u e  Etrangere, Uo.4 (O c t .1954) p p .4 19 -426 .
4 .  In Madagascar the rep resen ta tiv e  assembly was s im i la r ly  chosen  
by the p ro v in c ia l  assem b lies .
the t e r r i t o r i a l  assem b lies  had to  be a ttend ed  by the  
commissaire du gouvernement (u su a lly  the se c r e ta r y  g en era l  
of the te r r ito r y )  to  exp la in  the point o f  v iew  of the adm ini­
s t r a t io n ,  but he was not a member of the assembly which con-
1
ta in e d  no rep resen ta tiv es  of the e x e cu tiv e  as such# The
assem b lies  were consu lted  on many m atters in c lu d in g  the d r a ft
o f  l o c a l  regu la tion s  (arrfetes)* Their fu n ct io n s  centred  on
the d isc u ss io n  of f in a n c ia l  m atters, but l ik e  m e tro p o lita n
c o u n c ils  (on which they were modelled) they were req u ired  to
2
make p ro v is ion  for  1 o b lig a to ryexp en aes*  • The Grand Council 
had s im ila r  fu n ction s over i n t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l  f in a n c e s ,  but 
a l l  general p o l i t i c a l  power s t i l l  emanated from P aris  and was 
ex e r c ise d  by the governor-general (and a t  the t e r r i t o r i a l  l e v e l  
by the governors)*
D esp ite  the continued r e te n t io n  of p o l i t i c a l  power in  French
1* This contrasting  p o s it io n  as compared t o  the B r i t i s h  Colon­
i a l  system of the L e g is la t iv e  Council can be p a r t ly  exp la in ed  
by the underlying c e n t r a l i s a t io n  in  the French c o lo n ia l  
p o licy*  cf* g e n er a lly  Kenneth Robinson, •C o n s t i tu t io n a l  
Reform in  French Tropical A fr ic a 1, P o l i t i c a l  S tu d ie s ,  Vol*
V i, No*l (1958), pp .45-69# i r m  wfcVfrh some frf
2m cf* Km Robinson, op*cit* p*45*
3* On the t e r r i t o r i a l  a ssem b lie s ,  cf* P*F. Gonidec, * Les 
assemblees lo c a le s  des t e r r i t o i r e s  d1 outre mer1, Revue 
jurid ique e t  p o l i t iq u e  de l sUnion F ra n ca ise , 6 (1 9 5 2 ),  
pp*3l7-55 and 6 (1953), pp» 443-91 ,
100.
hands, the a s so c ia t io n  of A fr ican s w ith  the government a t  th e  three  
l e v e l s ,  ( lo c a l ,  i n t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l  and "national*1) brought .sev era l  
consequences* One important consequence was the emphasis g iv en
|
to  l o c a l  or t e r r i t o r i a l  p o l i t i c s *  This r e s u l t e d  from the d i s -  ' 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  with the government-general or i t s  " le g i s la t iv e "  
p a rt, the Grand Council, which had n e ith e r  power or p r e s t ig e  j
of the French Parliament nor the d ir e c t  con tact w ith  the  
A frican  masses a t  the lo c a l  le v e l*  The t e r r i t o r i a l  a ssem b lie s  
had the contact w ith the lo c a l  people and the French Parliam ent 
was the source of u ltim ate  docision* The p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  
of A fricans was thus concentrated in  the t e r r i t o r i e s  and in  
Paris* Their p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the l i f e  of the t e r r i t o r i a l  
assem b lies  afforded a tra in in g  ground fo r  most of th e  emerging 
p o l i t i c a l  le a d e r s .  And in  Paris some of the more p r e s t ig io u s  
lea d ers  who were sent as d e leg a te s  c a p i t a l i s e d  on t h e ir  presence
tAei/
there and/connection  with sympathetic French p o l i t i c i a n s .  Their  
membership of the French assembly a ls o  gave them an opportunity  
fo r  d ir e c t  contr ibution  to an * open house* o f  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  
of a l l  France, thus helping to  create  a c lim ate  o f  op in ion  r e ­
cep tiv e  to  future changes* Indeed those of the A fr ican  le a d e r s  
who were present at the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  conventions in  framing 
the 1946 co n stitu tio n ^  had^by t h e ir  d ir e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' s -  
cured some s ig n i f ic a n t  con cession s fo r  A fr ica n  p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts*  
One such concession , fo r  example, was th a t  the/requirem ent  
for  the A frican  populations should be l e f t  to  an e l e c t o r a l  law
1
and not entrenched in  the co n s t itu t io n *
On the whole only minor changes were made during 1946-55 ,
a lthough there was further ex ten sio n  of the fr a n c h ise  t o  th e
A fr ica n  populations* In 1947 a new categpry of l o c a l  c i t i z e n s
e n t i t l e d  to  vote  was added; anyone l i t e r a t e  in  French or
2
Arabic could vote* In 1951 three other c a te g o r ie s  were added,
v iz*  (1 )  heads of households ( chefs du menage) who had p aid
tax  or were exempted from i t ;  (2) mothers o f  two ch ild r e n
(v iv a n ts  ou morts pour la  France) and (3 ) c i v i l  or m i l i t a r y
pensioners*  There w as a l s o  an in crease  o f  the number o f
d ep u ties  returned by A fricans from 31 to  37* 21 out o f  37 o f
the d ep uties  were e le c te d  on the common r o l l  ( i n  A*0*F* and
Togoland) while in  the remaining t r o p ic a l  A fr ica n  t e r r i t o r i e s
5 were e le c te d  by e le c to r a te s  of m etrop o litan  c i t i z e n s  and 11
3
by those of lo c a l  c i t iz e n s *
Meanwhile the pressure fo r  changes in  French C o lo n ia l  
p o l ic y  was mounting. In T u n is ia , M* Hendes-France i n i t i a t e d  
a new p o l ic y  aiming a t  Tunisian  independence; and the 1 p o l ic y
1* cf* T i t l e  VIII a r t i c l e  77. cf* a l s o  W*J. F o l t z ,  op*cit*  p*24
2* Law 47 -  1606 of 27 Aug* 1947 (J*0* L o is  e t  D e c r f t s ,  28 Aug* 
1947, p. 8534)*
3* Law 51-536 of 23 May 1951 ( ib id ,  24 May 1951, pp*5323-4 -
quoted by K* Kobinson, o p .c it*  p*46* K* Robinson a l s o  
g iv e s  the f ig u res  of the e le c to r a te  which had been 1 ,3 6 2 ,7 6 3  
in  1946, which rose to  5 ,06 1 ,0 25  fo r  th e  n a t io n a l  assem bly  
e l e c t io n s  of 1951*
of strength* tr ie d  in  Morocco which had culm inated in  the  
e x i l e  o f the Moroccan King had proved to  be f u t i l e *  Then 
there  was the hum iliating d e fe a t  in  Indo-china and the o u t­
break of the A lgerian war of l ib e r a t io n *  I t  was o f f i c i a l l y  
adm itted by the Government th a t  major c o n s t i t u t io n a l  changes 
must be made in  overseas Prance* But in  t r o p ic a l  A fr ic a  
reforms came at f i r s t  only in  Togoland, where the powers o f  
the assembly were increased  and a co u n c il  of government 
( c o n s e i l  de gouvernement) was e s ta b l is h e d ,  c o n s i s t in g  o f  an 
equal number of members e le c te d  by the assembly and o th ers  
appointed by the governor* Each member of the c o u n c il  o f  
government was to  be ass ign ed  a p a r t icu la r  branch o f  th e  
a d m in istra tion  by the governor, but he had only a d r o it  d* 
in form ation  e t  d*ehquete and was not charged w ith  e x e c u t iv e  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty *  The assembly was empowered to  d ec id e  the
2
d e ta i l e d  a p p lica t io n  of laws and d ecrees , on c e r ta in  m atters*  
Although th is  change was l im ite d  to  Togoland i t  had an 
in d ir e c t  e f f e c t  in  ga lv an is in g  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t e s  a t  th e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  and m etropolitan l e v e l .  One of the e f f e c t s  cou ld  
be seen  in  the gradual weakening of the p o s i t io n  o f  the
1* cf* speech by the M inister of Overseas Prance, 9 Apr* 1954 
(J#0 . Debats parlem entaires, Assemblee N a t io n a ls ,  10 Apr* 
1955, pp.2-24-8)*
2* cf* Law 55-426 of 16 Apr. 1955 (J*0. L ois e t  De^crets, 17 
Apr* 1955, p* 3832*)
governm ent-general, which was r e f l e c t e d  in  the f i n a n c i a l  sphere*  
N everth eless  the government-general remained the f o c a l  p o in t  fo r  
co -o rd in a tion  of centra l p o l i c i e s ,  and a cted  a s  th e  primary 
r e d is tr ib u t iv e  agency fo r  major exp en d iture , p a r t ic u la r ly  in  
the case of development a id  o ffe red  by France through the
^ sFonds d* InvestiMffifcissement pour l e  Developfcnmement Eoonomique 
e t  s o c ia l  (FID3S) . The Grand Council was g iv en  th e  r ig h t  to  
decide the d is tr ib u t io n s  of FIDES a id  among the t e r r i t o r i e s ,  
su b ject  to  advice given  to  i t  from the M in istry  fo r  Overseas 
France and the t e r r i t o r i a l  assem blies*
At the Executive l e v e l  the governor-genera l r e ta in e d  most 
o f  h is  powers, and was advised  by h is  C o n se il  de Gouvernement 
as w e ll  as by the Grand C ouncil. The a d m in is tr a t iv e  p r in c ip le
*
on which h is  o f f i c e  was e s ta b l i s h e d  was to  d i r e c t ,  co -o rd in a te
and supervise  a bureaucratic s tru ctu re  s tr e tc h in g  a cr o ss  a v a s t
t e r r i t o r y ,  and in  th is  i t  had served  i t s  purpose. Now, however,
2
i t s  p o l i t i c a l  b a s is  was being Q uestioned from a l l  quarters*
1* S t a t i s t i c a l  stu d ies  made fo r  the period  1946-53 show th a t  
there was a growing trend for  t e r r i t o r i a l  expenditure a t  
the expense of the f e d e r a l ,  c f .  W*I. F o l t z ,  op*cit*  pp. 
2 5 -3 0 .
2* The r e d is tr ib u t iv e  p r in c ip le  which was the r a iso n  d’ e t r e  
o f  the fed era l s tru c tu r e , i i e .  spreading the w ea lth  o f  the  
c o a s ta l  regions to  the l e s s  favoured in t e r io r  re g io n s  was 
questioned  by those who contributed  most, e s p e c i a l l y  the  
Ivory Coast. This proved to  be the a x is  o f  d iv i s io n  l a t e r  
between Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor on the su b je c t  o f  
A frican  u n ity .
C uriously enough the t e r r i t o r i a l  a s s e r t io n  fo r  autonomy v i s - a -
v i s  the fe d e ra l governm ent-general, d id  not meet w ith  a s much
o p p o s it io n  from Paris as w e might have exp ected  g iv en  the
c e n t r a l i s t  p o licy  on which th e  whole system  was b u i l t .
Gonidec remarks th at what he c a l le d  the ” conjoncture p o l i t iq u e
1
d ic ta te d  the adoption of the a n t i - f e d e r a l i s t  l i n e .
When the e le c t io n s  to  the PVench N ation a l Assembly in  
January 1956 brought in  i t s  wake a chain o f  demands fo r  tr a n s ­
f e r  of power, the stage was s e t  for the next major c o n s t i tu ­
t io n a l  reform, and th at came in  the form of the L oi-C adre.
The Loi-Cadro
2
The Loi-cadre was passed in  June 1956* I t  in troduced  
changes of a social^ economic^admini3tr&tive and p o l i t i c a l  
nature. In the p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d  i t  in troduced  u n iv e r sa l  
su ffra g e  which had fa r -rea ch in g  consequences, as t h i s  enabled  
A frican s to  choose what kind o f government they could  have, 
when the time came. I t  a ls o  au th or ised  the estab lish m en t  
in  each te r r i to r y  of a cou n cil of government to  adm inister  
t e r r i t o r i a l  s e r v ic e s .  The t e r r i t o r i a l  a ssem b lies  were granted  
power p a r t ic u la r ly  over the o rg a n isa t io n  and management of  
ad m in istra tiv e  s e r v ic e s  of the t e r r i to r y  and over the change 
o f  e x i s t in g  regu la tio n s  (but not s ta tu te  laws) in  th at r e sp e c t
1 . O p .c it .  p. 435. Expediency might be another word for i t .
2* Law 56-619 of 23 June, 1956. (J.O. Lois e t  D ecrets 24 June 
1956, pp. 5782-4 .)
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The Law a lso  introduced changes in  the fu n c t io n s  and powers o f  
the governments-general ( in c lu d in g  the Grand C ou n cils)  o f the  
A.O.F. and A .B .F ., and in  those o f government and r e p r e se n ta t iv e  
assembly in  Madagascar. F in a lly  i t  au th or ised  the e stab lish m en t  
of d i s t r i c t  and other l o c a l  c o u n c ils  in  ru ra l areas*
The beginning of an A frican  E xecutive
The lo i-c a d r e  made s p e c ia l  p ro v is io n s  for Togoland and 
the Cameroons, in  view of t h e ir  d i f f e r e n t  h is to r y  and d i f f e r e n t  
l e g a l  s ta tu s .  In Togo the new arrangements culminated in  the  
S ta tu te  of 1957 which established  an internal government 
w ith in  the French union, w ith  an assembly and a co u n c il  of  
m in isters*  The Council of M in isters  was changed to  a nTogo-
1
lo s e  government” at the in s is ta n c e  of the T ogolese  Assembly*
The proposal or ig in ated  in  P aris  w ith  amendments proposed by 
the Togolese Assembly which were duly accepted by the French 
government. F in a lly  the whole q u estion  was approved by a 
referendum held  on 28 October 1956*
Under th is  arrangement the T ogolese government was p re­
s id ed  by the French High Commissioner, and composed o f a 
Prime M in ister , nominated by the High Commissioner a f t e r  con­
s u l t a t io n  w ith  the Assembly, to g e th e r  w ith  not more than nine  
m in is ter s  appointed the Prime M in is ter , a f t e r  s im ila r  con­
1 ,  c f .  K* Robinson,  o p . c i t *  p* 49*
s u l t a t io n .  The Prime M in ister  and the other m in is te r s  were to  
vacate  o f f i c e  i f  the Assembly passed a motion o f  censure by an 
ab so lu te  majority of a l l  i t s  members. L e g is la t io n  r e la t in g  t>0 
to  c r i t i c a l  matters such as d efence, fo r e ig n  a f f a i r s ,  currency  
and fo r e ig n  exchange, ex te r n a l  trade and customs, W&s r e ­
served  to  the m etropolitan parliament# Then in  March 1957 
the Assembly requested and secured an amendment which s tr e n g ­
thened the powers of the Prime M in ister . The power o f  the
High Commissioner to  d is so lv e  the Assembly was transferred to
1
the Prime M inister.
The s ituation  was d ifferen t in  the Cameroons, and the  
d if fe r e n c e  i s  d eep ly  r e v e a l in g fth e  m o tiv a t io n  behind c o lo n ia l  
con stitu tion -m ak in g . In e f f e c t ,  the French government chose to  
submit the q u estion  of the future of the Cameroons not to  a 
popular referendum as i t  did in  Togo, but to  th e  T e r r i t o r ia l  
Assembly a f te r  that body was e le c t e d .  The e l e c t i o n  was boy­
co tted  by the rad ica l n a t io n a l i s t  party (th e  Union des 
populations du Cameroun) which stood fo r  immediate and f u l l  
Independence and which questioned  the good f a i t h  of the French 
government. The e le c t io n  returned an assembly in  which a 
s u b s ta n t ia l  m ajority of the s e a ts  were h e ld  by "moderates” who 
favoured a continuation  of the tru steesh ip *  This was g iv e n
1 . c f .  Decree 57-359 of 22 Mar* 19 57. IC* Robinson su g g es ts  
w ith  good reason, th a t th ese  changes in  Togo had been  
f a c i l i t a t e d  by the B r i t i s h  d e c is io n  to> confer on the Gold 
Coast independence w ithin  the Commonwealth, and by the maj­
o r i ty  vote in  favour of in te g r a t io n  w ith  Ghana in  the r e f e r -  
endum of B r i t i s h  Togolsnd; o p . c i t .  p . 50.
e f f e c t  by a S tatute  which provide^ among other th in g s ,  th a t  
the French High Commissioner remained, l i k e  any c o lo n ia l  g over­
nor, "d ep osita ire  des pouvoirs de la  B epublique"* The Assembly 
was granted l e g i s l a t i v e  power in  a l im ite d  f i e l d  s im ila r  t o  th a t  
of Togo. The appointment o f  the Prime M in ister  and m in is te r s  
and the formation of the "Cameroons government", under the  
Chairmanship of the High Commissioner was the same as in  Togo*
But the d ism issa l o f the Prime. M in ister by a censure m otion  
i n i t i a t e d  by the Assembly could only take p lace i f  itvdb-s passed  
by a tw o-thirds m ajority , though a simple m ajority  was enough  
when ho himself put the question of con fid en ce . The powers 
o f  the High Commissioners were s p e c i f i c a l l y  d efin ed ; they  
extended to  defence, s e c u r ity  and ex tern a l r e la t io n s .  The 
r e la t io n s  between the Cameroons government and th e  French 
government were a l s o  s p e c i f i c a l l y  defined; in  p a r t ic u la r  
the High Commissioner was empowered to  su p erv ise  the Cameroons 
in s t i t u t io n s  in  order to  provide the French government w ith  
the con tro l require^ for the e x e r c is e  o f i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
as an Administering Authority o f  a Trust T e r r ito r y .  A l l  laws  
and regu la tio n s  must be subm itted to  him before  being put in to  
e f f e c t ,  and. he could , w ith in  ten  days, req u ire  th e ir  recon ­
s id e r a t io n  by the Assembly or tbe government. The S ta tu te  
a l s o  provided for th e  crea tio n  of prov inces and p r o v in c ia l  
a ssem b lie s .
1 . Decree 57-501 of 16 Apr. 1.957 (J. 0* L ois e t  D ecrets ,  18 
Apr. 1957, pp. 3153-64).
Unlike the new c o n s t i tu t io n s  o f the Trust T e r r i t o r ie s  o f
Togo and the Cameroons which had been granted by sep arate  decrees
those of the Overseas T e r r ito r ie s  of A.O.F# and A.E .F. were
d e a lt  w ith c o l l e c t iv e l y  in  a s e r ie s  of d ecrees and th a t  o f
1
Madagascar in  other se r ie s#  A fu rth er  s e r i e s  of decrees  
covering a l l  the Overseas T e r r ito r ie s  d ea lt  w ith  th e  d e f i n i ­
t io n  of S tate  s e r v ic e s ,  reorgan is in g  the c i v i l  s e r v ic e s#  A l l  
th ese  decrees were re ferred  not to  the T e r r i t o r ia l  A ssem blies  
but to  the French Parliament, and to  the Assembly of th e  French 
Union as prescribed  in  the lo i-ca d re#  This was s e v e r e ly  c r i t i ­
c ise d  by Senghof who was deputy for  Senegal in  the French  
N ation a l Assembly# The a tta c k  was made on the grounds th a t  
c o n su lta t io n  w ith  the t e r r i t o r i a l  a ssem b lies  was req u ired  
under a r t i c l e  74 of the 1946 c o n s t i tu t io n .  The f a i l u r e  to  
co n su lt  was defended on the grounds th a t  a r t i c l e  74 a p p lie d  only
to  decrees in  the normal course, not t o  th ose  e x p r e ss ly  autho-
2
r i s e d  by a S ta tu te  and submitted to  Parliament i t s e l f #
The underlying p r in c ip le  of the lo i - c a d r e  was to  grant  
autonomy to  each member of the Overseas T e r r i t o r i e s .  The l o i -  
cadre in  the making had involved  lengthy debates on the A fr ica n  
r e p r esen ta t io n , in  p a r t ic u la r  th e ir  r e p r e se n ta t io n  in  the  
co u n cil  of government* Among the f i n a l  co n cess io n s  made w o n e .
1 .  K# Hobinson, o p .c i t .  pp#51-53#
2 . Ib id .
<X^\A IOlHhJ
/ t h a t  the A fricans in  the co u n c il  of government should  be more
1
than the o f f i c i a l  members* The most important debates centred  
on the composition and fu n ctio n  of the co u n c il  o f government, 
in c lu d in g  th e ir  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to the T e r r i t o r ia l  Assem blies*  
Attempts had been made during the e a r l i e r  debates to  argue 
th a t  Overseas T e rr ito r ie s  (u n lik e  the Trust T e r r i t o r ie s )  formed 
part of the French Republic which was one and in d iv i s ib le *
I t  was proposed to  e s ta b l is h  a mixed E xecu tive  composed eq u a lly  
of asoniinees of the governor and members e l e c t e d  by the  
Assembly vested  with c e r ta in  s p e c i f i c  r ig h t s  in  the E xecu tive  
f i e l d ,  on the model of Togo* Later con cess io n s  were made pro­
v id in g  fo r  a majority o f  e le c t e d  members in  the Council and 
a f t e r  fu rth er  debate and study a l l  the members were to  be 
e le c t e d  rep resen ta tiv es  bearing the t i t l e  o f  M in ister , w ith  
a V ice -P res id en t. There the accomplished f a c t  of a T ogolese  
s i t u a t io n  appears to have in flu en ced  t h i s  f i n a l  outcome -  the
A fr ican s from the Overseas T e r r ito r ie s  could not accep t any-
w a s
th in g  l e s s  than what/obtained in  Togo*
On the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f  the cou n cil of government i t  was 
provided th a t i t  could r e s ig n  " i f  i t  considered  th a t i t  no 
lon ger  enjoyed the assembly’ s confidence", and in d iv id u a l  
m in is te r s  were obliged to  answer q u estion s  or req u ests  fo r
1* This compares in t e r e s t in g ly  w ith  the l a t t e r  phase of the  
E xecutive Council in  the B r i t i s h  ^ d e n i a l  system*
exp la n ation s  from members of the Assembly r e l a t i n g  to  the  
m atters w ith in  th e ir  competence* Each m in is ter  would be charged  
w ith  the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the management o f  one or more 
t e r r i t o r i a l  ser v ic e  by d e leg a t io n  from the governor who would 
a c t  in  the advice (sur a v is )  o f the v ic e - p r e s id e n t  o f the CounciJ, 
The governor had a lso  to  obta in  the s ign atu re  o f  the v i c e -  
p res id en t  to  g ive  e f f e c t  to the arrete  d e f in in g  the Minister* s 
fu n c t io n .  A m in ister  would be r e sp o n s ib le  to  the Council o f  
Government for  adm inistration , and was to  be d is m is s ib le  by 
the governor on the proposal of the v ic e -p r e s id e n t*  The 
Council would be presided by the governor$ and, in  h is  ab­
sen ce , by the v ice-p resid en t#  The v ic e - p r e s id e n t  would sub­
mit to  the council an annual r e p o r t  on the government’ s a c t i v i t i e s  
and the t e r r i t o r i a l  serv ices  which he would then submit to  the  
Assembly. But the governor r e ta in e d  reserve powers in  the  
l e g i s l a t i v e  a s w e l l  as in  the E xecutive f i e ld *  I f  he co n s id ­
ered th a t  any d ec is io n  of the Council exceeded i t s  power or 
was l i k e l y  to  prejudice n a tion a l defence, p u b lic  order, secu ­
r i t y ,  or c i v i l  l ib e r t y  he could report i t  to  th e  M in is ter , who, 
a f t e r  co n su lta t io n  with the C on seil d’E ta t ,  could  annul the  
d e c is io n  by cabinet w ith in  th ree  months of the governor’ s report*  
This tr a n s fe r  of more E xecutive power was accompanied by 
p ro v is io n s  fo r  more autonomy and A fr ic a n is a t io n  of the c i v i l  
ser v ic e*
The G a u ll is t  C on stitu tion
The f in a l  stage in  French c o lo n ia l  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  reform  
came in  1958, with the promulgation of General Charles de 
G au lle ’ s c o n s t i tu t io n  of the F i f t h  R epublic . This o f fe red  the  
Overseas T e rr ito r ie s  an option  o f  complete independence ou t­
s id e  the French Communaute' or membership th e r e o f .  Only Guinea 
opted fo r  independence ou ts id e  the corarrcunaute thus becoming 
the f i r s t  independent rep u b lic  to  e f f e c t  a complete break from  
French r u le .  The r e s t  chose the s ta tu s  o f member s t a t e s .
This meant that while they were p o l i t i c a l l y  independent they  
were econom ically , culturally  and m i l i t a r i l y  l in k e d  w ith  France. 
The P resident of the French Republic was the head of the  
oommunaute, and he presided over a Council composed o f  a l l  the  
c h ie f  ex ecu tiv es  of the new A fr ican  s t a t e s  whose c o n s t i tu t io n s  
were s u b s ta n t ia l ly  modelled on the G a u l l i s t  c o n s t i t u t io n .
Under th ese  c o n st itu t io n s  the E xecu tive , in  a l l  the new s t a t e s ,  
except in  Madagascar, was rnonocephalous, and the parliam ent  
c o n s is te d  of a unicameral body. In Madagascar the t i t l e  of 
the c h ie f  execu tive  was g iven  as p resid en t from the s t a r t ,  
whereas in  the other s ta te s  he was c a l le d  a prime m in is te r  or 
p res id en t of the Council of M in is ters . But there  was no 
d if fe r e n c e  in  fu n ction . I t  was a parliam entary regim e w ith  
the E xecutive holding power on the strength  o f  a parliam entary  
v o te .
The fu n ction s  and powers of the E xecu tive  under the new
c o n s t i tu t io n s  were those of an independent government w ith
the E xecu tive  power v est in g  in  the new c h ie f  e x e c u t iv e .  His
power was l im ite d  in  certa in  m atters (notab ly  m i l i ta r y )  which
1
were su b jec t  to  conditions s e t  by the communaute. As regards  
h is  r e la t io n  to the head of the communaute Gonidec made an 
in t e r e s t in g  comparison with the p o s i t io n  in  the commonwealth, 
n o tin g  the
" e s s e n t ia l  d if feren ce  th a t in  the case of th e  l a t t e r  
the E nglish  monarch i s  a t th e  csame time Queen of  
Great B r ita in  and o f each monarchy (Canada, e t c )*
The governor-general who r ep resen ts  her p la y s  the r o le  
of a parliamentary head of s t a t e ,  e x e r c is in g  a l l  
the t r a d it io n a l  fu n ctio n s  such as appointment o f  
m in is te r s ,  promulgating law s, gran tin g  pardon, etc*
The president of Prance, on the other hand, i s  only  
the head of the communaute, and not the head of a 
s ta te  common to  a l l  the member s ta te s*  He i s  in  the  
same p o s it io n  as the E n g lish  monarch in  r e la t io n  to  
the repu b lics  in  the commonwealth (In d ia , P ak istan )
« 2•  * *
A more apt p a r a l le l  i s  the p o s i t io n  of the new A fr ica n  
[executives p a r t ic u la r ly  as provided for  by the l a t e r  c o n s t i t u -
L  3t io n s  in  r e la t io n  to the c o lo n ia l  execu tive*  Indeed, as a lready  
ex p la in ed  one primary reason fo r  a h i s t o r i c a l  account o f  the  
c o lo n ia l  execu tive  i s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  th a t the p resen t p o s i t io n  of 
the e x e c u t iv e  has evolved nut of the c o lo n ia l  prototype* I t  i s  
c le a r ,  fo r  example, that the power of the c o lo n ia l  governors  
in  both the former B r it is h  and French t e r r i t o r i e s  was bound to
1* c f .  P*P. Gonidec, op .c it*  p p .407-8*
2 .  c f .  P.P. Gonidec, ib id .  at p. 183* 
3* c f .  Chapter 5 in fr a .
be a u to cr a t ic  by the very nature of the fu n c t io n s  which i t  v/as 
e s ta b lis h e d  to  d ischarge. The c o lo n ia l  e x e c u t iv e  was e s s e n t i ­
a l l y  an in s t i t u t io n  which was se t  up to  secure the b a s ic  need  
of law and order and to  co-ord inate  a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  connected  
w ith  th at end as w e ll  as other a c t i v i t i e s  which provided the  
n ecessary  adm inistrative  in fr a -s tr u c tu r e  fo r  the supply o f  
e s s e n t ia l  s e r v ic e s .  The background of a l l  the c o lo n ia l  admin­
i s t r a t i v e  (and p o l i t i c a l )  s tru cture  was the o r ig in a l  aim of 
co lo n ia lism : the a c q u is i t io n ,  maintenance and e x p lo i t a t io n  of
the c o lo n ia l  t e r r i t o r i e s .  This e x p la in s ,  fo r  example, the
t a r d i n e s s  i n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s  f o r  A f r i c a n s  s u c h
1
as education , and in  the tra n sfer  of p o l i t i c a l  power*
I f  the co lo n ia l  execu tive  held  a u to c r a t ic  powers on b eh a lf  
and in  the in te r e s t  of a m etropolitan  power, i t ^ s  not un­
natura l fo r  those A frican  lead ers who grew up under such a system 
to  demand the same kind of power fo r  what they con sid ered  to  
be the advancement of a d if fe r e n t  i n t e r e s t ,  the i n t e r e s t  o f  
th e ir  p eo p le . The experience under the c o lo n ia l  e x e c u t iv e  no 
l e s s  than some of the t r a d it io n a l  h er ita g e  must account for  
much of the p articu lar  forms A fr ican  e x e c u t iv e s  have taken .
The c o lo n ia l  executive  was a u to cr a t ic  even in  i t s  l a s t  phase; 
the cou n cil merely carried  out the d e c is io n s  or p rop osa ls  of
1 . There i s  an iron ic  tw is t  in  the fa c t  th a t  the m issionary  
fa c to r  in  the c o lo n ia l  experience , (which provided the main 
ed u cation a l serv ice  In the ear ly  period  and up to  1939) 
contributed  la rg e ly  to  the A fr ican  p o l i t i c a l  awakening by 
u n w itt in g ly  preparing most of the le a d e r s .
the governor. But h is  p o s it io n  and power in  r e la t io n  t o  the  
" co lon ised  people may be more ap tly  compared w ith  th a t  of an 
a b so lu te  monarch. Comparisons with the p o s i t i o n  of the  
e x e c u t iv e  p resid en c ies  stop short a f t e r  a c e r ta in  p o in t ,  
p r in c ip a l ly  because the p residents in  the new A fr ica n  s t a t e s  
owe t h e ir  p o s it io n  to a d if fe r e n t  mandate, th a t  of an A fr ica n  
e l e c t o r a t e •
The Various Forms of the Executive
No study of forms outside the context of substance (o f  
p o l ic y  and purpose) can make much sens©. The p a r t ic u la r  form 
which a government takes must r e f l e c t  the r e a l i t y  o f power 
r e la t io n s h ip s .  But th is  may not always he the c a se .  Some 
governments have tr a d it io n a l  forms and p ro g r e ss iv e  a s p ir a t io n s .  
The reason , as s ta ted  b efore , Is th at th ose  who w ie ld  the power 
of the s ta te  found th at some use could be made o f  some t r a d i ­
t i o n a l  forms. But where the tr a d i t io n a l  form rep resen ts  
t r a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  (as i t  did in  Uganda) then th ere  
would be c o n f l i c t  between progressive  a s p ir a t io n s  and t r a d i ­
t i o n a l  in t e r e s t s ,  or simply between two power b lo c s .  This 
q u e st io n  i s  d iscussed  in  Chapter Pour. In  t h i s  con n ection  we 
may mention the view often  advanced th a t a b icep h alou s execu­
t i v e  i s  d es ira b le  because i t  makes fo r  v a r ie d  in s t i t u t io n a l  
ff^ms and accommodates more shades of p o l i t i c a l  o p in io n s . I t  
i s  a s so c ia te d  w ith  a parliamentary form of government \7h ic h
i s  a ls o  g en era lly  b e liev ed  to  be d e s ir a b le  on the grounds th a t  
i t  in v o lv e s  d iscu ss ion s  and c r i t ic i s m s .  I t  i s  fu r th e r  claim ed  
th a t  such a system i s  a sign of p o l i t i c a l  m a tu r ity ,  and th a t  
a mature p o l i t i c a l  system i s  one in  which one can f e e l  dafe  
in  d iv e r s i t y ,  in  which there Is  maximum p a r t i c ip a t io n  of a l l  
the d i f f e r e n t  sec t io n s  of the p op u la tion .
The major fa l la c y  of such argument i s  th a t  i t  proceeds on 
©n assumption that there i s  no form of government o u ts id e  the  
c l a s s i c a l  parliamentary form which can guarantee f u l l  p a r t i c i ­
p a tio n  and p ro tec tio n  of r ig h t s .  In  fa c t  any form of govern­
ment which encourages and f a c i l i t a t e s  mechanisms fo r  th rash ing  
out problems should s a t i s f y  the fu n c t io n a l  t e s t  of good 
government. The parliamentary form can do t h i s ,  but i t  can 
a ls o  be o b stru ctive  and d i v i s i v e .
The case for  the execu tive  p r e s id e n c ie s  can be made on 
the grounds th a t they are b e t te r  su ite d  to  the p resen t  needs  
o f  A frican  countries at a c r u c ia l  t r a n s i t io n a l  p er io d  of th e ir  
h is t o r y ,  when u n ity  and more e f f e c t i v e  and dynamic s t a t e  a c t io n  
i s  req u ired . No one can q u estion  the need fo r  u n ity  in  a 
n a tio n . And, while i t  i s  not in im ic a l  to  u n ity  and progress  
to  wish to  preserve cu ltu ra l d iv e r s i t y ,  a u n ite d  n a t io n  under 
a strong government w i l l  be b e t te r  p laced  to  guarantee the  
p rese rv a tio n  and development of c u ltu r a l  h e r i ta g e s  than a 
d iv id ed  n a tion  under an in e f f e c tu a l  government.
In A fr ica  the m ajority of the s ta t e s  adopted a u n ita ry
(monocephalous) executive p resid en cy , many of them having moved 
from a c l a s s i c a l  parliamentary form of government w ith  a dual 
(b icep h a lou s) ex ecu tiv e . This i s  a h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t ,  and i t  i s  
in  t h i s  sense that in  the spectrum of "progress" we have p laced  
the S ta te s  w ith  a dual ex ecu tive  system midway between the  
monarchies (Chapter Three) and the e x e cu tiv e  p r e s id e n c ie s  
(Chapter F iv e ) .
H is to r ic a l ly  there has been a tendency fo r  parliam ents
to  g a in  an ascendency over ab so lu te  monarchs u s u a l ly  by a
1
gradual process of w h it t l in g  away of ro y a l p rero g a tiv es*
Another tendency has been for rep u b lic s  to  be e s ta b l i s h e d  on 
the ru in s of e i th e r  absolute monarchies or moribund p a r l ia ­
mentary regim es. France provides the b e s t  example o f t h i s .
The French experience i s  in s t r u c t iv e ,  s in c e  in  France there  
has been every type of government under d i f f e r e n t  forms s in c e  
1789. The a t t i tu d e  of people to  the d i f f e r e n t  forms has tended  
t o  hinged' on th e ir  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e s ,  p a r t ic u la r  forms 
being a s so c ia te d  w ith  ce r ta in  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s .  I t  w i l l ,  
th e r e fo r e ,  be h e lp fu l  to o u tl in e  th ese  a t t i t u d e s  in  r e la t io n  
to  the execu tive  form advocated.
There have been four a t t i t u d e s  to  p r e s id e n t ia l is m  in  
France. F ir s t  there was the t r a d i t io n a l  extreme l e f t  wing view  
th a t  the President in  ad dition  to  the prime m in is te r  was an
1 . e . g .  the B r i t i s h  parliam ent.
unnecessary d u p lica tio n  and a con servative  d ev ice  to  r e s t r a in
the democratic process# Then there  was the t r a d i t io n a l
extreme B ight wing (B on ap artis t) view th a t  th ere  should  be a
s in g le  c h ie f  executive* This curious u n ity  o f  L e ft  and Right
wing a t t i t u d e s  i s  explained f i r s t l y  by the f a c t  th a t  th e  Right
wing view stems from the c o n v ic t io n  o f  the need o f  stron g  and
e f f i c i e n t  execu tive  machinery to  implement the d i c t a t e s  of the
ru ler*  As fo r  the L e ft ,  there has been a strong s t a t i s t
lea n in g  in  s o c i a l i s t  th in k in g , and as s o c ia l i s m  rep la ced
l ib e r a l i s m  as the ideology of the L e f t ,  the idea  ga in ed  ground
that the L eft, once in o f f ic e ,  should be in  a p o s it io n  to  wield
stron g  governmental power in  order to  carry out i t s  p o l ic ie s *
T hird ly , the ra d ica l  L e ft -c e n tr e  g e n e r a lly  p re ferred  a
dual ex ecu tiv e  in  which an in d ir e c t ly  e l e c t e d  p res id en t  would
be head of s t a t e ,  but in  a weaker p o s i t io n  than a prime
m in is te r  who would be the c h ie f  o f  government* The system
under the Third and Fourth Republics rep resen ted  t h i s  a t t i t u d e .
I t  was so d e fe c t iv e ,  however, th a t some L eft  wing s o c i a l i s t
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  lawyers l i k e  P rofessors  Duverger and Vedel
a tta ck ed  i t ,  advocating in  i t s  p lace  a system under which a
u n iv e r s a l ly  and d ir e c t ly  e le c te d  p res id en t would be the s o le
2
head of the executive*
L a st ly  there was the con servative  r ig h t  of centre which
1* c f .  J .E .S . Hayward, Parliamentary A f f a ir s ,  Winter 1 9 6 4 /6 5 , 
p* 23*
2* Ib id .
t r a d i t i o n a l ly  wanted to  preserve a dual e x e c u t iv e  in  which the
p res id en t  was more powerful than the prime m in is t e r .  The
e x e c u t iv e  of the F if th  Republic o f  P res id en t de G aulle i s  based
on t h i s  idea w ith  an important n o v e lty , namely the f a c t  th a t
a f t e r  1962 the p r e s id e n t ia l  mandate was based on u n iv e r s a l
s u f fr a g e .  This l a s t  fa c to r  has given the system  under the
F i f t h  Republic a d e f in i te  p r e s id e n t ia l  o r ie n ta t io n ,  in  which
th ere  has been a s h i f t  o f emphasis from parliam entary debates
to  p r e s id e n t ia l  tours and p er io d ic  pronouncements as th e  focus
o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y .  T his , as we s h a l l  see  in  Chapter Five
1
h a s  h a d  a d e f i n i t e  im p a c t  on A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m .
This leaves  us with the monarchies and the m i l i ta r y  
e x e c u t iv e s .  A l l  that need be done here i s  to  p o in t  out c e r ta in  
anom alies from the point o f  view of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ;  the r e s t  
must be l e f t  to the appropriate ch ap ters . I f  we conceive  con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  law in dynamic terms -  in  terms o f change -  from 
a b so lu te  monarchy through d i f fe r e n t  forms o f parliam entary  
government, to  p r e s id e n t ia l ism  -  we come up a g a in s t  two r e ­
markable f a c t s :  (a) the adaptation  o f  some A fr ica n  m onarchies,
some of which ( e .g .  in  E th iop ia ) assumed a modern parliam entary  
g u is e ,  w hile  in  r e a l i t y  t r a d i t io n a l  a u th o r ity  h o ld s  sway; and
1 . The impact of the W estm inister (c a b in e t)  model i s  seen  in  
dual execu tive  parliamentary systems which are  d isc u sse d  
in  Chapter Four. S u f f ic ie n t  account w i l l  be made o f  i t s  
s a l i e n t  fea tu res  in  an in trod uctory  s e c t io n  o f  th a t  
chapter .
(b) the re v ersa l  of A frican  p r e s id e n t ia l is m  through m i l i ta r y  
coups, which takes us back to  square one, as i t  were. From 
the p o in t o f view o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  the m i l i ta r y  regim es may 
be d ism issed  as u n c o n s t itu t io n a l ,  but they remain part o f  the  
r e a l i t y .  To the ex ten t th at they do not carry the stamp of  
le g it im a c y  th e ir  ”c o n s t i tu t io n a l” stru ctu re  does not m erit  
any d e ta i le d  study in  an inquiry such as t h i s .  But, th e  ad­
vent o f m il i ta r y  r u le ,  such as i t  i s  and the fa c to r s  which  
g iv e  r i s e  to  i t  cannot be ignored even by c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p u r is t s  
N e v e r th e le s s ,  th ese  two types -  monarchy and ”m il i ta r y  execu­
t i v e s ” -  must be treated under d if f e r e n t  ch ap ters, sep a r a te ly  
from the r e s t .
PART TWO






The monarchies which are the su b ject  of t h i s  chapter are
1
those o f E th iop ia , Libya and Morocco# The character  of the
ex e cu tiv e  in  each monarchy has been determined by the p e c u l ia r
h is t o r y  o f  each state#  Islam i s  a fa c to r  common to  Libya and
Morocco; i t  i s  a lso  a fa c to r  which has h i s t o r i c a l l y  a f f e c t e d
2
the development of Ethiopian p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  structure of the two monarchies in  Libya and 
Morocco has been marked by th e  in f lu e n c e  of Islam# Thus, in  
s p i t e  of th e ir  11 c o n s t i tu t io n a l” p o s i t io n  t h e ir  character  i s  
au to cra tic#  S im ilar ly  in  E th io p ia , the monarchy became au to ­
c r a t ic  and h ie r a r c h ic a l ly  organised  p r in c ip a l ly  as a response  
to  continued threat of ex tern a l forces  c h ie f ly  under th e  im- 
petus o f Islam ic s ta te s#
The E thiopian monarchy bases i t s  le g it im a c y  on a cla im  o f
1# The study s e t  out w ith  four before  the coup d ie ta t  in  
Burundi abolished  the monarchy, see Chapter Eight#
2 . cf# Margery Perham, The Government o f E th io p ia , 1948,
Faber and Faber, pp. 35-6; 69-70#
3# I t  i s  r e a l i s e d  that i t  i s  not p o s s ib le  to  tr a c e  th e  o r ig in  
of such t r a i t s  in  a p o l i t i c a l  system to  one cause on ly .
The point here i s  th at Islam has been the constant factor#
an uninterrupted  l in e  of descent from a union  between King
Solomon of Jerusalem and the Queen of Sheba* Some w r ite r s
have argued that th is  has been a key fa c to r  in  the maintenance
1
and su r v iv a l  of the Ethiopian em pire-atate* The r e v is e d
E th iop ian  C on stitu tion  of 1955, a l s o  makes s p e c i f i c  re fere n c e
to  Solomonic descent as the source of le g it im a c y  o f  the present  
2
dynasty* But the relevance o f  the cla im  i s  not n e c e s s a r i ly  
dependent on i t s  h i s t o r ic a l  v a l id i t y ,  though everyth ing  p o ss ­
i b le  i s  dene , to  demonstrate t h i s .  The main p o in t  about the  
c la im  i s  the r e l ig io u s  Ideology im p l ic i t  in  i t  which i s
3
supposed to  in v e s t  i t s  su c c e ss fu l  claim ants w ith  some sa n c t ity *
The p resent re v ise d  con d itu tion  (1955) i s  based on th e  f i r s t
c o n s t i t u t io n  o f  1931* They have both emanated from the top ,
being  granted by the Emperor*
The monarchy in  Libya i s  of recen t o r ig in ,  as a (n a t io n a l)
Kingdom, although there have been em irates in  Libya over a long
4
p er io d  o f  time* The present monarchy -  in  the U nited  Kingdom 
o f  Libya -  came in to  ex is te n c e  on December 2 7 th , 1951, when the
1* M* Perham, op*clt« ; c f .  a l s o  Donald L ev in e , f,L egitim acy in  
E th io p ia 11, paper presented a t  the annual meeting of the  
American P o l i t i c a l  Science A s so c ia t io n ,  Chicago, I l l i n o i s ,  
September 9 -12 , 1964.
2 .  Art* 2*
3. c f .  The Kibre' Nagast, (Glory o f K ings), c f .  a l s o ,  art*  2 
of the Kevised C onstitution*
4* c f .  O liver and Fage, o p .c i t * ,  pp. 66-85*
Emir o f  Cyrenaica became King of Libya as I d r is  I* The Libyan  
S ta te  of modern times was formed on January 1 s t ,  1934 by th e  
union o f Cyrenaica and T r ip o lita n ia  under I t a l i a n  r u le .  With 
the d efea t of I t a ly  in  1942-43, Cyrenaica and T r ip o l i ta n ia  
passed under separate B r i t i s h  M ilita ry  a d m in is tr a t io n  and 
Fezzan under French. On November 2 1 s t ,  1949, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations decided th a t  an independent and 
so v ere ig n  s ta t e  of Libya should be c o n s t i tu te d  by January 1 s t ,  
1952: the in h a b ita n ts , in  a N ation al Assembly were to  determine
i t s  form of government and c o n s t i tu t io n .  The N a tio n a l Aas©mt,iy  
o f  in h a b ita n ts ,  comprising r e p r esen ta t iv e s  in  equal numbers 
from Cyrenaica, T r ip o lita n ia  and Fezzan met in  T r ip o l i  on 
December 2nd, 1950 and decided th at Libya should  be a c o n s t i ­
t u t io n a l  monarchy under Mohammed I d r is  A s-S an u ssi whose em irate  
o f  Cyrenaica had been recogn ised  by the B r i t i s h  s in c e  1946.
The f i r s t  c o n s t i tu t io n  which gave ex p ress io n  to  t h i s  d e c is io n
1
came in to  force  on October 7 th , 19 51. The p rea m b le  to  t h i s
C o n st itu t io n  shows the C onstituent Assembly d e c la r in g :
” • • .Having agreed and determined t o  form a union  
between us ( i . e .  the people of C yrenaica, T r i p o l i ­
ta n ia  and Fezzan) under the Crov/n of King Mohammed 
I d r is  e l  Mahdi e l  Sanussi (A s -3 a n u ss i) ,  to  whom 
the nation  has o ffered  the crown and who was de­
c lared  g o n s t itu t io n a l  King o f  Libya by t h i s ,  the  
n ation a l c o n s t i tu e n t; Assembly . . . ,f2
1 .  Some amendments were made on December 8 th ,  1962 and 
A pril 25 th , 1963.
2 . Preamble to  the Libyan C o n st itu t io n .
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In Morocco, the present A law ite dynasty was e s ta b l i s h e d  
by Mawlay Rashid in 1660# When Prance e s ta b l is h e d  a pro­
te c to r a te  in  Morocco in  1912, the i n s t i t u t i o n  of the monarchy 
was preserved# I t  provided the centre of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  
Moroccan n a t io n a l is t  a s p ir a t io n s ,  and In the in ter-w ar p er iod  
and a f t e r  the war;up to  1955^King Mohammed V provided the  
dominant n ation a l image. Although he was l e s s  a b so lu te  than  
might be expected, owing to  the emergence of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  
in  Morocco since the 1930*3, he became the c e n tr e  o f p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  and controversy -  so much so that the French e x i l e d  him* 
in  1953. Upon hig return from e x i l e  on November 18th , 1955, 
he re -a ff irm ed  h is  pledge to  E s t a b l i s h  democratic i n s t i t u ­
t io n s  which w i l l  spring out o f  free  e l e c t io n s  • . .w ith in  the
1
framework o f a c o n s t i tu t io n a l  monarchy •** Once in  power aga in ,
th e  monarch was re lu ctan t to  f u l f i l  the pledge too  soon,
c h ie f ly  because power would pass from h is  hand to  a dominant
p o l i t i c a l  party -  the I s t i q l a l  -  d e sp ite  the f a c t  th a t t h i s
2
party supported the monarchy.
A fter  the death of King Mohammed V (on February 28th ,
1961) h is  son, the new King Hassan 11^s e t  out to  introduce  
changes which purported to g iv e  h is  ru le  a broader b a s is  o f
1 .  c f .  Ziadeh N icola  A, "wither North Africa?" A liga rh  Muslim 
U n iv e r s ity ,  I n s t i tu te  of Is lam ic  S tu d ie s ,  A ligarh , In d ia ,  
1957, p .7 2 , quoted in  W illard A. B e lU n g  1 Some Im p lica t io n s  
of the New C on stitu tio n a l Monarchy in  Morocco* , The Middle 
East ¥ournal, p. 163. V ol. 1 8 /6 4 .
2. cf. Beling, op.cit.
power. On December 7th, 1962 Morocco went to  th e  p o l l s  to
v o te  in  i t s  f i r s t  w r itten  c o n s t i tu t io n  in  a G a u l l i s t  s t y l e  of
referendum. The question  put to  the people was a sim ple
acceptance or r e je c t io n  of the c o n s t i tu t io n  (as  in  France)
p resen ted  to  them from above by King Hassan I I .  The r e s u l t s
show-^a la n d s l id e  in  favour of the c o n s t i t u t io n .  This has
been exp la ined  (1) in  terms o f  I s t i q l a l 1s p o s i t io n  (a Yes
v o te )  and i t s  rural organ isa tion  of r e l i g io u s  co n ser v a tiv e
fo r c e s ;  and (2) because King Hassan was ab le  to  choose the
t e r r a in ,  and had the monopoly of rad io  and T.V. and had the
i n i t i a t i v e  of timing over the L eft wing o p p o s it io n  p a r ty .
When he announced the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  referendum the o p p o s it io n
was caught by surprise before they had time t o  develop  a
1
p r a c t ic a b le  campaign s tra teg y .
I t  w i l l  be seen from the forego in g  th a t the c o n s t i t u t io n  
o f  each s ta te  has been given in  three  d i f f e r e n t  ways: th e
E th io p ia n  c o n s t i tu t io n  was ngranted11 by the Emperor and pro­
mulgated a f t e r  i t  was passed by the l e g i s l a t i v e  body; the  
Libyan c o n s t i tu t io n  was enacted by a c o n s t itu e n t  assem bly  
rep resen tin g  the people; the Moroccan c o n s t i t u t io n  was p re­
1 .  B e l in g ,  o p . c i t .  The o p p o s it io n  was the U .N .F .P . (union nat  
ional^des forces  p opu la ires) led  by the l a t e  Mehdi Ben
Barka. The opposition  put up a f ig h t  by c la im in g  th a t  
the Palace had chosen the referendum because i t  cou ld  not  
t r u s t  an e le c te d  co n stitu en t assembly made up o f  Moroccans 
to  d raft a c o n st itu t io n ;  and they q u estion ed  the r ig h t  
of the king to  arrogate t h i s  power to  impose a c o n d it io n  
from the top . Ib id .
pared by the King and voted a t  a referendum. This d iv e r s i t y  in  
the method of w or king out of the c o n s t i tu t io n s  may g iv e  an idea  
on the nature of p ow er-rela tion s between the king and other  
p o l i t i c a l ,  forces , in  .the. c.ountry .concerned* But . i t  i s  not in  
i t s e l f  a s u f f i c i e n t  guide as to  whether ofr nrofc the monarchy i s  
11 c o n s t i tu t io n a l” or not. Nor i s  the system n e c e s s a r i ly  Tlcon­
s t i t u t i o n a l ” because i t  i s  declared to  be so by the c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n .  In Libya the words of the preamble quoted above and 
in  Morocco under a r t i c l e  cxvie o f the c o n s t i tu t io n  the kings are  
declared  to  be c o n s t i tu t io n a l  monarchs. And w hile  i t  i s  true  
th a t  th is  may tend to  impose a cer ta in  amount o f  r e s t r a in t  i t  
does not render the monarch one who r e ig n s  ra th er  than one who 
r u le s .  N o n eth e le ss , by v ir tu e  of the f a c t  th a t  the Libyan  
and Moroccan monarchies are sa id  to  be " c o n s t i t u t io n a l” under 
t h e ir  r e sp e c t iv e  c o n s t i tu t io n s  i t  would be in accu rate  to  
c l a s s i f y  them, along with  t h e i r  E th iop ian  counterpart, as  
ab so lu te  monarchies. Perhaps a b e t te r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  would 
be to  c a l l  them q u a s i - c o n s t i tu t io n a l .  I t  should be remembered 
th a t  a lthough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  are h e lp fu l  as t o o l s  of a n a ly s i s ,  
in  a comparative study of th is  kind, they could g e t  out o f  
hand and m islead . A ccordingly , while bearing the two d i f f e r ­
ent ca teg o r ie s  in  mind I propose to examine the th ree  mon­
a rch ies  together  through some o f th e ir  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a tu r e s ,  
and then draw some con c lu sion s .
1 .  Source of Sovereign Power
In E th iop ia  sovereignty  i s  v e s te d  in  the Emperor, who
e x e r c is e s  supreme authority  o v e r  a l l  the a f f a i r s  o f  h is  
1
em pire. His person i s  declared to  he sacred , h is  d ig n i ty
in v io la b le  and h is  powers in d isp u ta b le  -  a l l  by v ir tu e  of
"His Im perial blood as w e ll  as by the a n o in tin g  which He has 
2
r e ce iv ed " •
In Libya sovereignty  "belongs to  God a lo n e ,  and i s  g iven
by His w i l l  as a sacred tr u s t  to the State" which i s  to  be
3
the source o f  power. Saving th i s  p r o v is io n  so v er e ig n ty  i s
4
v e s te d  in  the King.
In  Morocco sovereingty  i s  d eclared  to  belong to  the
N ation  which i s  to ex e rc ise  i t  d i r e c t ly  by referendum and
in d ir e c t ly  through the in s t i t u t io n s  e s ta b l i s h e d  by the  
5
c o n s t i tu t io n .
2 .  Succession  to  the Throne
A common feature  of a l l  th ree  of the monarchies under 
rev iew , in  regard to  su ccess io n  to  the throne i s  th e  h ere ­
d ita ry  p r in c ip le ,  together w ith  the d o ctr in e  o f  prim ogen iture ,
6
only male succeeding male.
1 . Cons. a r t .  26. 2 .  Cons. a r t .  4 .
3 . Cons. a r t .  40* 4 .  Cons. a r t .  44.
5. Cons. a r t .  2 .
6 . Cons. E th iop ia  a r t .  5; Libya a r t .4 4 ;  Morocco art* 20.
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But d if fe r e n c e s  appear e s p e c ia l ly  concern ing  p ro v is io n s
about s i tu a t io n s  where there i s  no l e g i t im a te  h e ir  to  the
Throne- The E th iopian  C on stitu tio n  having provided th a t
su c c e ss io n  s h a l l  remain p erp etua lly  a tta ch ed  to  the l i n e  o f
the p resent Emperor leav es  i t  to a fu tu re  s p e c ia l  law to
determine the order o f  and q u a l i f i c a t io n s  fo r  the su c c e ss io n -  .
No such law has been given in  the e lev en  years th a t  have
f o l l o w e d  t h e  p r o m u l g a t i o n  o f  t h e  B e v i s e d  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n
November 4 th , 1955* Furthermore, in  the absence of a male
descendant or one such not capable of meeting the requirem ents
o f  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  t h e  Throne t h e  E m p e r o r ) a f t e r  c o n s u l t i n g  t h e
Crown Council .can designate a an Heir Presumptive from among
1
h is  n ea rest  male r e la t iv e s ,  in  the l in e  o f  su c c e ss io n ,  m eeting  
the necessary  requirements* And the Emperor determines as to  
the quaLifi c a t io n s  fo r  su ccess io n  to  the Throne, a f t e r  con- 
s u l t a t io n  w ith  the Crown C ouncil.
The Crown Prince, e ld e s t  son of the Emperor and su ccesso r  
to  the Throne, has l iv e d  as such in  the shadov/ of h is  fa th e r  
fo r  th ir ty - s e v e n  y ea r s .  The p ro v is ion s  which lea v e  to  a 
us p e c ia l  law11 of the future and to  the Emperor t o  decide on 
the q u a l i f i c a t io n s  fo r  su ccess ion  had g iv en  r i s e  to  a wave of 
sp ecu la t io n s  on the su ccessor  of the p resent Emperor. These 
sp ecu la t io n s  came to  an abrupt end w ith  the death, in  1957, 
of the Duke of Harar, the second (and favoured) son o f  the
1• A rt. 13 ( a )•
2 . Cons. a r t .  13 ( b ) #
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Emperor. The question of su ccess io n  appears to  be s e t t l e d  
now, making the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p o s i t io n  of the Crown Prince  
more secure.
The Libyan C on stitu tion  requ ires th a t  i f  the throne
remains vacant a f te r  the King* s death, owing to  the la c k  o f
a su ccesso r , the two Chambers of Parliament must hold  a jo in t
meeting to  appoint a successor  w ith in  te n  days. There must
be a t  l e a s t  three-quarters of the members o f  the two Chambers,
v o t in g  openly by a m ajority of not le s 3  than tw o -th ird s  o f the
members p resen t. I f  the choice cannot take p la ce  w ith in  the
time spec if ied ,  the two chambers must jo in t ly  proceed to make
the choice on the e leventh  day, in  the presence o f  an a b so lu te
m ajority  of the members of each of the two chambers and by a
p rop ortion ate  m ajority . I f  the House of R e p r e se n ta t iv e s  has
been d isso lv e d  the old House must meet u n t i l  the King i s  
1
chosen.
During the period when the Throne i s  v a ca n t , the Council
iso f  M in isters  are empowered to e x e r c is e  the c o n s t i t u t io n a l
2
fu n ctio n s  of the King in  the name of the Libyan p eo p le .  I f  
the King i s  a minor or i f  any circum stance p reven ts  or d e lays
1 . A rt . 45. A rt. 45 a ls o  makes re feren ce  to  ro y a l decrees o f  
22 Safar 1374 and 25 Rabie e l  Tuni 1376. H ., each of which  
s h a l l  rpgT^ate, have the same force  as an a r t i c l e  o f  the  
c o n s t i tu t io n  in  regu la tin g  su c c e ss io n  to  th e  Throne.
2 . A rt. 52.
him from the performance of h is  fu n c t io n s ,  the co u n c il  o f
M in isters  must, with the consent of Parliam ent, appoint a
1
Regent or a Gouncil of Regency to  take h is  p la c e .
The ageing King Id r i3 ,b e in g  c h i ld le s s ,  was to  be succeeded
by h is  brother, Mohammed ar-Rida who d ied  in  1954, le a v in g
h is  son Hassan ar-Rida as Sanussi, next in  l in e  as Crown
Prince of Libya. Hassan has married a daughter of the
governor o f  T ripolitan ia^thus strengthen ing  ro y a l t i e s  w ith
the most populous se c t io n  o f  the country. A& A c lo s e
observer has w r itten :
’’u n lik e  Hassan II  of Morocco or Crown Prince  
Wossen of E th iop ia , he i s  only the second in  
a dynasty that is  new and unassayed, d e sp ite  
i t s  tr a d it io n a l  ch a r a c te r .”2
Be th a t  as i t  may, the Crown Prince o f  Libya enjoys the
confidence of h is  u n c le , the King, a3 may be borne out by
h is  appearance a t a cru c ia l event ( i . e .  the f i r s t  ’‘summit*1
meeting o f  the O.A.U.) representing  Libya in  Addis Ababa, in  
3
May 1963.
In Morocco there are no d e ta i le d  p r o v is io n s ,  covering
X. A rt. 50.
2 . w il l ia m  Zartman, 1 P o l i t i c s  in  North A fr ic a 1, (1964 ), p . 90 .
3 .  There are t h ir ty - e ig h t  princes in L ibya, o f  whom s i x  are  
from the King’ s fam ily branch. In 1954, a l l  p r in ces  
except th ese  in  d irec t  su cce ss io n  were d iv e s te d  of t h e ir  
t i t l e s  and th e ir  r igh t to  hold government o f f i c e ,  fo l lo w in g  
the a s s a s s in a t io n  of a tru sted  a d v iser  and c o n tr o l le r  o f  
the Royal Household by a member of a r i v a l  branch o f  the  
Royal fa m ily . c f .  Zartmin, ib id .
s i tu a t io n s  where the Throne i s  vacant. At th e  time when the
c o n s t i tu t io n  was given  in  1962 the p resent King Hassan had
only ju s t  acceded to the Throne when he was in  h i s  ea r ly
t h i r t i e s .  This may exp la in  the absence o f  a p reoccu pation
w ith  su ccess io n  problems. But cu r io u sly  enough th ere  i s  a
p r o v is io n  on Regency. While the King i s  a m inor, a,Regency
Council i s  empowered to e x e r c ise  the c o n s i t u t io n a l  powers
and r ig h ts  of the Crown during h is  m in o r ity . The Regency
Council would be presided by the King1 s n e a r e s t  male r e l a t i v e
in  the c o l la t e r a l  male l in e  who i s  over tw enty-one years of
age . The other members s h a l l  be the P resid en t of the Supreme
Court, the Dean of Rectors o f the U n iv e r s i ty ,  and the P r e s i -
1
dent o f  the Chamber of C ounsellors .
3 .  Nature and Scope of Function
(a) Head of S tate
Functions commonly entrusted  to  Heads o f S ta te s  in  other  
systems are performed, n eed less  to  say, by the three  A fr ican  
monarchs. Such functions are , fo r  example, the a c c r e d it in g  
and r e c e iv in g  of diplom atic r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s ,  con ferr in g  honours 
and t i t l e s ,  rem ittin g  p e n a lt ie s ,  promulgating law s, opening 
and c lo s in g  parliamentary s e s s io n s ,  and so f o r t h .  Each has
1 .  A rt. 21 . The age of m inority i s  s e t  as below 18 years in  
a l l  three c o n s t i tu t io n s ,  and comparable p r o v is io n s  e x i s t  
on re g en cy  in  E th iopia  ana Libya
the duty, as Head of S ta te ,  to  defend the u n ity  and in t e g r i t y  
of h is  Nation and to  ensure the p r o te c t io n  and w e lfa re  o f  h is  
s u b j e c t s .
(b) Chief Executive
The c o n s t itu t io n s  of a l l  Stonge co u n tr ies  under exam ination
en tru st  execu tive  power to  the monarchs whose tr a d it io n a l ,  , . ,
p o s i t io n  i s  thus reaffirm ed in  a modern g u is e ,  a l b e i t  w ith
m o d if ica tio n  and with  varying degrees o f  l i m i t a t io n  and en-  
1
trenchment.
Power o f Appointment* To s ta r t  w ith  the l e a s t  l im it e d  
monarchy -  E th iopia  -  we fin d  th a t  the power o f  appointment 
o f  the emperor i s  u n lim ited . He can appoint and d ism iss  the  
Prime M inister and other M inisters and Vice M in is ters  on h is  
own i n i t i a t i v e .  He a ls o  appoints on h is  own i n i t i a t i v e  the  
members of the Senate as w e ll  as th e ir  P res id en t and two v ic e  
p r e s id e n ts ,  governors, judges, mayors, d ip lom atic  r e p r e se n ta ­
t i v e s ,  o f f i c e r s  of the m ilita ry  and the p o l i c e ,  managers and 
board d irec to rs  of s ta te  undertakings. This power o f  a p p o in t­
ment which has been used s k i l l f u l l y  to  advantage over the  
y e a r s ,  ca r r ie s  with i t  the power to  determine and co n tr o l
th e  progress w ith in  and term ination  of o f f i c e  o f  government
2
o f f i c i a l s  includ ing  junior c i v i l  s e r v a n ts .  The emperor
1 .  c f .  Cons. E th io p ia , a r t s .  26, 27; Libya, a r t s .  42, 44; 
Morocco, a r t s .  24, 25 and 29.
2 .  The d iv is io n  between the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  and " p o l i t i c a l 1* 
s e r v ic e  i s  th e o r e t ic a l .
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determines the organ isa tion , powers and d u t ie s  o f  a l l  M ini­
s t r i e s  and Executive departments, and a d m in is ters  the whole  
1
Government. Under th is  power he can a l s o  e s t a b l i s h  new
departments and make f in a n c ia l  p ro v is io n s  fo r  such departments,
which has o ften  been done by Im perial Decrees under the
tfemergency l e g i s l a t i o n ” p rov is ion  of a r t i c l e  92 of t h e ................
C o n s t i tu t io n . Last but not l e a s t ,  he approves th e  e l e c t i o n
and appointment of the Archbishop and Bishops o f  the E th iop ian
2
Orthodox Church.
Curiously enough, Morocco and not Libya comes next in  
a descending order o f  l im ita t io n  o f ap p o in tiv e  power in  
re sp e c t  o f  M in isters . For, in  Morocco, the King appoints  
the Prime M inister and other M in isters on h i s  own i n i t i a t i v e  
and can terminate th e ir  o f f i c e  or accept t h e ir  r e s ig n a t io n .
3
Furthermore the King p resid es  over the C ouncil o f  M in is te r s .
Judges are appointed by roya l decrees upon th e  proposal o f
the High Council of the Judic iary  over which the King p re -  
4
s id e s ,  and c i v i l  and m il i ta r y  appointments are made by him
5
though he may d elegate  His power. On the o th er  hand, the
6
members o f  the Senate (Chamber of C ou n se llo rs)  are e le c t e d .
I t  Cons. a r t .  27.
2 .  Cons. a r t .  127; c f .  a lso  a r t .  126.
3 .  c f .  Cons. a r t s .  24 and 25 r e s p e c t iv e ly .
4 .  Cons. a r t .  84.
5. A rt. 30 . 6 . A rt. 4 5 .
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In Libya, by contrast the King appoints and removes th e  
Prime M in ister , but the appointment or d is m is s a l  o f o ther
1
M in isters  i s  made by him at the proposal of the Prime M inister*
Again d iplom atic rep r esen ta t iv e s  are appointed  by him a t the
2
proposal of the M inister of Foreign A ffa ir s*  He has th e
r ig h t  to  e s ta b l i s h  the pub lic  s e r v ic e s  and to  appoint and
d ism iss  sen ior  o f f i c i a l s  but “in  accordance w ith  the p ro -
3
v is io n s  of the law11* He appoints the members o f  th e  Senate
and th e ir  presid en t but not the two v ic e  p r e s id e n ts  who are
4
e le c t e d  though subject to  h is  approval* Judges are appointed
5
by roya l decree*
( c) L e g is la t iv e  Power
The power to  l e g i s l a t e  i s  one o f  the c r u c ia l  t e s t s  by 
which the nature and scope of p o l i t i c a l  power may be a ssessed *  
The p o in t a t  which c o n s t itu t io n a lism  ends and ab so lu tism  beg ins  
may not be easy to  f in d ,  but where plenary power i s  enjoyed  
by a Head of S ta te  th is  i s  hardly a problem, whether the Head 
o f  S ta te  i s  an Imperial au tocrat or a m i l i t a r y  d ic ta to r*
In A fr ican  monarchies some c o n s t i t u t io n a l  l i m i t  appears  
to  have been placed on the t r a d i t io n a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  power but 
the primacy of the ex ecu tiv e  can s t i l l  be a s s e r t e d  by variou s
1 . Cons* art* 72.
2* Art* 73*
3 . A rt. 74,
4* Arts* 94 and 97* 
5* A rt. 141*
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devices*  F ir s t ly  there i s  the r ig h t  to  i n i t i a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n
and introduce re so lu t io n s  in  Parliaments and th e  r ig h t  to
address Parliament in  person, or through messages* Then there .
i s  the power to  veto  l e g i s l a t i o n  passed  by Parliam ent; and
here the d if fer en ce  in the p ro v is io n s  o f the var iou s three
c o n s t i tu t io n s  i s  s tr ik in g .  In E th iop ia  the Emperor can send
back the b i l l  w ith h is  observations or w ith  an a l t e r n a t iv e  
1
proposal* No provision  i s  made to  deal w ith  th e  event where 
Parliament p ersist#  in  i t s  o r ig in a l  p o s it io n *  In Libya b i l l s  
are approved by the King, who a ls o  makes the n ecessary  regu­
la t io n s  fo r  carrying out the laws w ithout modifying or s u s -
2
pending them or d ispensing w ith  th e ir  execution* He may r e fe r  
the b i l l  back to  Parliament for  recon sid era tion *  I f  the propo­
s a l  i s  passed again by a tw o-th ird s  m ajority  o f  the members 
composing each of the two chambers he s h a l l  a s se n t  to  i t  and 
promulgate i t  as law* Even i f  the tw o -th ird s  m ajor ity  i s  not  
secured, i f  Parliament in  another s e s s io n  can pass the b i l l  
aga in  by a simple m ajority o f  al 1 the members composing each
o f  the two chambers the King must g iv e  h is  a s se n t  and promul- 
3
ga te  i t*
An in te r e s t in g  innovation  i s  found in  t h i s  r e sp e c t  in  the  
Moroccan c o n s t i tu t io n  which in troduces a “p r e s id e n t ia l11 p ra ct ice




o f referendum. The King may e ith e r  g iv e  h is  a s se n t  to  a b i l l
or send i t  back to  Parliament for a second reading in  a
1
message countersigned by the Prime M in is ter . Or he may 
submit i t  to  a referendum, the r e s u l t  of which w i l l  be binding  
on a l l*  And i f  a government b i l l  that had been r e je c te d  by 
Parliament i s  approved by a referendum the chamber of rep re-
2
s e n ta t iv e s  i s  d isso lved  and a new one e l e c t e d ,  in  i t s  p la c e .  
This shows the hand of the Moroccan King much stronger in  th is  
f i e l d  than the Libyan King. I t  w i l l  be seen  in  l a t e r  chapters  
th a t  the p ractice  of r e so r t in g  to  referendum g iv e s  the execu­
t i v e  g r e a t  a d v a n t a g e  t e  m a n i p u l a t e  i n  case of a deadlock.
But the d is s o lu t io n  of Parliament as a consequence of an 
approval of a referendum, i s  a fea tu re  p e c u lia r  t o  the  
Moroccan C on stitu tion , and has no eq u iva len t p lace  in  A fr ican  
P r e s id e n t ia l  regimes*
Another feature of l e g i s l a t i v e  power i s  th e  r ig h t  to  
l e g i s l a t e  in  emergency s i t u a t io n s ,  in  two types o f  s i t u a t io n s .  
F ir s t  in  case of national emergency when the c o n s t i tu t io n a l
b a s is  of the s ta te  i s  threatened  in  which event the Head o f
S ta te  takes f u l l  powers. But t h i s  i s  not p e c u l ia r  to th ese  
3
system s. Secondly, there i s  the r ig h t  to  l e g i s l a t e  by decree  
when Parliament i s  not In s e s s io n .  The frequency o f  r e so r t  to  
t h i s  type o f l e g i s la t io n  by decree may g iv e  a c lu e  to  the r e a l
1 .  Arts* 26, 70, 71, 72.
2* A r ts .  74, 75.
3 . This w i l l  be d iscussed  in  d e t a i l  in  Chapter F iv e .
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powers of the Head of S ta te .  In E th io p ia  t h i s  r ig h t  has been
e x e r c ise d  a l l  too freq uently  covering m ostly  f in a n c ia l  m atters
and in  s i tu a t io n s  which can be d efin ed  as “emergency" only
1
by a great s tr e tc h  of the im agin ation . A s im i la r  p r o v is io n
2
e x i s t s  in  the Libyan c o n s t i tu t io n ,  and in  both  ca ses  the  
decree must be submitted to  Parliament a t  i t s  f i r s t  m eeting  
fo llo w in g  the r e c e s s .  In Morocco, Parliam ent must a u th o r ise  
the government for  a s p e c i f ie d  period  and purpose, to  take  
by decree a f te r  d e l ib e r a t io n  in  the Council o f M in is te r s ,  
measures which normally f a l l  w ith in  the domain o f  law , su b jec t  
to  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by Parliament a t  the end of the time l i m i t .
The v a r ia t io n  which i s  noteworthy here i s  th a t  i t  i s  the  
Council of M inisters and not the King in  person i s
empowered to  l e g i s l a t e  by d ecree . The ex p la n a tio n  may be th a t  
the King p res id es  over the c o u n c i l .
Again there i s  the r ig h t  in  connection  w ith  in te r n a t io n a l  
agreements and d ec laration  o f  war, which i s  su b je c t  to  ex ­
press p ro v is io n  in  a l l  three c o n s t i tu t io n s .  But some v a r i ­
a t io n s  must be noted. In E th iop ia  the emperor who e x e r c i s e s  
supreme d ir e c t io n  over fo re ig n  r e la t io n s ,  has the r ig h t  to  
s e t t l e  d isp u tes  with fo re ig n  powers. He a lon e  has th e  r ig h t  
to  r a t i f y  t r e a t i e s  and to determine which t r e a t i e s  and other
1 . c f .  Bereket,r Habte Sela
2 .  Art. 64.
i s s i e , / o p .  <Wb • ,  p . 1A 2 .
International, agreements s h a l l  be su b jec t  to  r a t i f i c a t i o n
1
b efore  becoming binding upon the N ation .
But Parliament must approve a l l  agreements which in vo lve
the m o d if ica tio n  of E thiopian t e r r i t o r y  or so v e r e ig n ty  or
j u r i s d ic t io n  over such t e r r i t o r y ;  or which la y  a burden on
E th iop ian  su b jec ts ,  modify e x is t in g  l e g i s l a t i o n . r e q u i r e  e x -
x 2
penditures of s ta te  funds or Involve loan s or m onopolies. 
D eclara tion  of war can be made only on th e  advice  and consent  
of Parliam ent.
In Libya the King has the r ig h t  to  d ec lare  war and con­
clude peace and ra t ify  tre a t ie s  a fter  the approval o f  
3
Parliam ent. In Morocco, the King s ig n s  and r a t i f i e s  t r e a t i e s .  
However, t r e a t i e s  which imply commitment fo r  the f in a n c e s  of  
the s t a t e  may not be r a t i f i e d  without p r io r  approval by 
Parliam ent.
This paradoxica lly  enough appears to  p lace l e s s  l im i t  on
the power of the King of Morocco than th e  eq u iv a le n t  p r o v is io n
in  the E thiopian  c o n s t i tu t io n .  On the other hand th ere  i s  no
p r o v is io n  enabling the King of Morocco t o  d e c la r e  war or to
4
conclude peace, which i s  no l e s s  p a ra d o x ica l .
1 .  A rt. 30 .
2 .  A rt. 30 p rov iso .
3 .  A rt. 69.
4 .  c f .  a r t .  35 which gives him power to  d eclare  m a rtia l  
law.
(d) J u d ic ia l  Pov/er
Among the African monarchy, only the Emperor o f  E th io p ia
e x e r c is e s  j u d ic ia l  power* His t r a d i t io n a l  court (Yezufan
C h i l lo t )  continues to  fu n ctio n , d esp ite  the f a c t  th a t  th e
c o n s t i tu t io n  v e s ts  ju d ic ia l  power in  the Supreme Im perial
Court and "such other Courts as may be e s ta b l i s h e d  by law"*
The law in  question  e s ta b lish e d  the High Court and other
Courts of in fe r io r  j u r i s d ic t io n ,  without making mention o f
the j u r i s d ic t io n  of the Im perial C h illo t*  Unwritten t r a d i t i o n
has th ere fo re  been allowed to  p r e v a i l  over the exp ress
p ro v is io n  of the c o n s t i tu t io n ,  though the m atter has never
1
been d isputed* in  court*
4* R e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of the Iionarchs- - - *■- - **-—-■ — —
The doctr ine of B r it is h  C o n s t i tu t io n a l  law th a t  the  
^ueen can do no wrong finds a rough eq u iv a len t  in  a t  l e a s t  
one A fr ica n  monarchy* A r t ic le  62 (a) of the E th iop ian  
C o n st itu t io n  p ro v id es ;-  " In accordance w ith  t r a d i t io n  and 
the p ro v is io n s  of A r t ic le  4 of th is  c o n s t i t u t io n ,  no one
2
s h a l l  have the r ig h t  to  bring s u it  a g a in st  the Emperor"*
1 .  c f .  a controversy on t h i s :  (1) 11.A. Sed ler "The C h i l lo t
j u r i s d ic t io n  of the Emperor o f  E th io p ia ,  a l e g a l  a n a ly s i s  
in  H is to r ic a l  and Comparative P erspective"  (1964) J.A.L*
59 and (2) Bereket* Habte S e la s s i e ,  o p .c i t * ,  pp. 87-8*
fb-
2 . A rt. 4 provides that/em peror1 s person i s  sacred  by v ir tu e  
of h is  im perial blood and the annointment which he has 
received*
This immunity from l e g a l  s u i t  which i s  provided, in  general terms 
may be g iven  the w idest p o ss ib le  scope covering cr im inal and 
c i v i l  l i a b i l i t y ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  view of the re feren ce  to  
t r a d i t io n .  Personal immunity from le g a l  s u i t  i s  not s p e c i f i ­
c a l ly  made the subject o f c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro v is io n  in  Libya^
and Morocco, although in  both co u n tr ies , as in  E th io p ia , the
1
c o n s t i tu t io n s  provide th a t the Monarch s h a l l  be in v io la b le .
The p o s i t io n  of the Libyan Monarch ep proximates to  th a t  o f h is  
E th iop ian  counterpart in  th i s  resp ect as i t  i s  provided th a t  
he s h a l l  be exempt from a l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  In  another r e s ­
p ect the p o s it io n  of the King of Morocco resem bles that of
the Emperor o f E th iop ia , in  that both t h e i r  persons are de-
3
c lared  to  be sacred .
The personal immunity under a r t i c l e  6 2 (a ) of the
E th iop ian  c o n s t i tu t io n  does not extend to  the p ro p er t ie s  h e ld
in  the name of the Emperor which are d ec lared  to  be under th e
same regime as i s  a p p lica b le  to  a l l  p r o p e r t ie s  o f  E th iop ian  
4
n a t io n a ls .  Ho mention i s  made in  t h i s  r e s p e c t  in  the con­
s t i t u t i o n s  of the other monarchies.
In these systems i t  i s  not always p o s s ib le  to  d ise n ta n g le  
the personal r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  (or i t s  absence) from the p o l i t i ­
c a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  Thus in  E thiopia the person o f the
1 . Cons. Libya a r t .  59; Morocco a r t .  2 2 .
2 .  A rt . 59.
3 .  Cons. E th iop ia  art 4; Morocco a r t .  22 .
4 . c f .  a r t .  1 9 (d ) .
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Emperor i s  h e ld  to  be sacred . His d ig n ity  in v io la b le  and 
h is  power in d is p u ta b le ,  a l l  in  one b reath ; and t h i s  pro­
v i s i o n ,  apart from t r a d i t io n ,  i s  the b a s is  o f  the immunity 
from l e g a l  s u i t ,  noted above. In such a system where the  
M in isters  are r e sp o n s ib le  to  the Emperor as we s h a l l  see  
below , the im p lic a t io n s  of t h i s  d octr in e  are immense -  no one 
can c r i t i c i s e  the government, as t h i s  would be d isp u tin g  
in d isp u ta b le  power.
P o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in  Libya i s  more d is t r ib u te d .
There, the King e x e r c is e s  h is  power through h is  M in isters  and
1
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  r e s t s  w ith  them. In  Morocco, on the other
hand, th ere  i s  no such d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The
Korrocean King p lays a wide r o le  p r e s id in g  over the Council
o f  M in is te r s ,  the High Council o f N a tio n a l Promotion and 
2
the P lan, and other b o d ie s ,  which means l e s s  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  
power and th ere fo re  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  This may ex p la in  the  
absence o f an express p r o v is io n  exempting him from a l l  r e ­
s p o n s i b i l i t y .
P o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  does not r e s t  on c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
p r in c ip le s  a lo n e ,  even where th ese  may be enshrined in  the  
a r t i c l e s  of the c o n s t i t u t io n .  I t  in v o lv e s  a v a r ie ty  of other  
f a c t o r s ,  in c lu d in g  the p o l i t i c a l  experience  of the n a t io n  
concerned and of i t s  a c t iv e  s o c ia l  e lem en ts , and the in h e r ite d
1 . A rt. 60.
2 . A r ts .  32 and 97.
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s o c ia l  p o s i t io n  of the c e n tr a l  fo rce  ( i . e .  the monarch) which 
p red ates  the formal r e la t io n s h ip s  f ix e d  in  the C o n s t i tu t io n ,  
and breaks fo r th  in  the dynamics o f power#
I I  -  The M in isters
We have a lread y  seen how the M in isters  in  the three  
monarchies are appointed; but we saw t h i s  in  connection  w ith  
the powers of the monarchs. -We must now s h i f t  our focus to  
the M in is te r s .  
a . E th io p ia
In E th io p ia ,  th ere  i s  a Council o f M in is te r s ,  f i r s t  s e t  
up in  1943 under order no. 1 , which was l a t e r  incorporated  
by the R ev ised  Constitution o f 1955. The Council o f M in isters  
has an ad v isory  fu n c t io n , and i s  r e sp o n s ib le  to  the Emperor 
fo r  a l l  ad v ice  and recommendation. I t  i s  composed of a l l  the  
M in isters  and i s  p res id ed  over by the Prime M in ister  who sub­
m its to  the Emperor, fo r  approval, a l l  m atters d isc u sse d  at  
the C ou n cil,  in c lu d in g  any change in  the r u le s  o f procedure.
The Prime M in ister  a c t s  as a go-betw een, p resen tin g  to
Parliament d ra ft  l e g i s l a t i o n  made by the Council and approved
by the Emperor; and p resen tin g  to  the Emperor proposals of
1
l e g i s l a t i o n  passed  by Parliam ent. According to  the C o n st itu ­
t io n  each M in ister  i s  a l s o  in d iv id u a l ly  r e sp o n s ib le  to  th e  
Emperor fo r  the d ischarge of the d u t ie s  in  h is  r e s p e c t iv e
1. Cons. arts. 71 and 72.
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1
M in istry , a p rov is ion *  no doubt designed to  ensure the
Emperor’ s complete contro l over the machinery of government*
The M in isters have the r ig h t  of access to  Parliament and may
be in d iv id u a l ly  summoned by the l a t t e r  to  answer q u e s t io n s .
M in isters  may not fo r  remuneration, compensation or b e n e f i t
engage in  a c t i v i t i e s  in  which there i s  no governmental
2
p a r t ic ip a t io n .  In case of o ffen ces  committed by them, in c lu d in g  
the Prime M inister , in  connection  w ith  th e ir  o f f i c i a l  fu n ctio n s  
they may be t r ie d  before the Supreme Im perial Court, upon the  
i n i t i a t i v e  of a m ajority vote  of both Houses o f  Parliament or 
by order of the Emperor. A s p e c ia l  p rosecu tor  must be appointed  
by the Emperor for  eithefevent. This c l e a r ly  does not amount to  
an impeachment r ig h t as far as the i n i t i a t i v e  of Parliament 
i s  concerned, s ince i t s  enforcement depends upon im peria l con­
sen t to  appoint the s p e c ia l  p rosecu tor , which may be postponed  
in d e f i n i t e ly .
Early in  1961, soon a f t e r  the ab o rtiv e  coup d’ e t a t  o f  
December 1960 a committee fo r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  amendment was 
s e t  up, and in  November 1961 i t  recommended th at the con­
s t i t u t i o n  be amended to provide fo r  the appointment, by the  
Smperor, o f the Prime M in ister , and fo r  the s e l e c t io n  by the  
Prime M in ister  of h is  own cabinet o f  M in isters  who would then  
be presented  to  the Emperor for  formal i n s t a l l a t i o n .  The
1 . A rt. 63.
2 .  A rt. 74.
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same report a ls o  suggested  a sep aration  o f the p o s i t io n  and 
fu n c t io n  of the Head of S ta te  from th a t  o f  the Head o f  Govern­
ment, w ith  a corresponding tr a n sfe r  o f  e x e cu tiv e  a u th o r ity  to  
the Prime M inister and h is  ca b in e t . A m in or ity  op in io n  was in
favour of making the Prime M in ister  r e sp o n s ib le  t o  Parliam ent.
The report was shelved  for f i v e  y e a r s .  Then 6n March 22 , 1966, 
the Emperor announced that he would appoint a Prime M in ister  
who would s e l e c t  M in isters and present them fo r  appointment
by the Emperor. The fo llo w in g  day a lav/ (Order No. 44 o f
1966) appeared on the N egarit  G azette . The only r e a l  change 
t h i s  law introduced i s  that i t  g ives  th e  Prime M in is ter  a r ig h t  
to  propose the other M in isters fo r  appointment by the Emperor. 
The stru ctu re  and fu n ction  o f the Council of M in is ters  remains 
the same, and no change was made in  r e sp e c t  o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  -  
c o l l e c t iv e  or in d iv id u a l .  Vifhile the Prime M in is ter  i s  appointed  
and d ism issed  by the Emperor, the q u e s t io n  of the d ism issa l  o f  
M in isters  i s  omitted by the new law. In th e  absence o f  an 
amendment of the c o n s t i tu t io n  they must be presumed to  be 
d ism issab le  by the Emperor. S im ilar ly  i t  may be presumed 
th a t the Emperor can invoke the concept o f  in d iv id u a l  r e s ­
p o n s ib i l i t y  of each M in ister to him in  order to  r e t a in  the  
s e r v ic e s  of M in isters in  case of a r e s ig n a t io n  o f  the Prime 
M in is ter .
The o f f i c e  o f the Prime M inister has ga in ed  b e t t e r  s ta tu s
1 • Art. 4.
in  recen t years with the gradual e c l ip s e  of the a n c ien t  
o f f i c e  of the Tsahafe Tezaz (Privy S ea l)*  The p resen t Prime 
M in ister  combines h is  o f f ic e  w ith  th a t o f the Tsahafe Tezaz; 
and s in ce  h is  re^appointment under the new law he has a ls o  
taken over the Ministry of In ter ior*  But, as E th io p ia n  h i s ­
tory  amply demonstrates^such c o n so lid a t io n  o f p erson a l power
i s  n ot n e c e s sa r i ly  accompanied by a corresponding growth of
1
the I n s t i t u t io n s  in  question* One fa c to r  which has in h ib i t e d  
the growth of the cabinet as an independent i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  the  
p o l ic y  of concentration  of power i t s e l f  and the dual respon­
s i b i l i t y  o f Ministers. A strong Prime M in ister  seek in g  to  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e  the cabinet by crea tin g  a d e fa c to  s in g le  
M in is te r ia l  lo y a l ty  to  him, could not l a s t  long* The con­
c lu s io n  i s  inescapable; the cab inet w i l l  remain e s s e n t i a l l y  
what i t  has been -  an advisory body which can be used as an 
im p eria l l ig h ten in g -r o d  in  the event of a stormbreak* 
b* L ibya*
In Libya there i s  a cou n cil o f M in isters  c o n s is t in g  of the
Prime M in ister (who p resid es)  and the o ther  M in isters*  The
© ouncil o f  M inisters i s  respon sib le  for the d ir e c t io n  o f  a l l
2
in te r n a l  and ex tern a l a f fa ir s  of the s t a t e ,  and they are 
c o l l e c t i v e l y  resp on sib le  to the House o f  Representatives for
1 . cf* Bereket, Habte S e la s s ie ,  on the f a l l  o f the former 
Tsahafe Tezaz. o p . c i t . ,  pp*82-3*
2* Cons* art* 84*
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the gen era l p o licy  of the s t a t e .  Each M in ister  i s  a ls o
1
in d iv id u a l ly  resp on sib le  fo r  the a c t i v i t i e s  of h is  M inistry*  
Any s ign atu re  of the King concerning the a f f a i r s  o f  the s t a t e  
must have the countersignature of the Prime M in ister  and o f  
the competent Minister*
The House o f  R ep resen ta tives  may by a m ajority  of a l l  i t s  
members pass a vote  of no confidence in  the co u n c il  o f M ini­
s te r s*  I f  th is  happens, the council of M in isters  must resign*  
A vote  of no confidence may concern one o f the M in is te r s ,  in
which case he alone resigns*  The motion o f censure must be
2
p resented  by no l e s s  than f i f t e e n  deputies* M in isters  have 
a r ig h t  to  attend  Parliam ent, but can vote  only  i f  they  are
3
members o f  Parliam ent. They may a ls o  be req u ired  to  attend*
In the event of the d ism issa l  or r e s ig n a t io n  o f the Prime
M in ister  the M in isters are considered thereby to  have been
4
d ism issed  or to  have resigned*
The c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p o s i t io n  of the Prime M in is ter  and 
h is  cab inet in  Libya v i3 - a - v i s  the King i s  s tro n g er  than in  
E th io p ia .  But palace p o l i t i c s  s t i l l  holds sway in  th e  govern­
ment, which has been caught in  a p o l i t i c a l  tug o f war between  
two fo r c e s  -  the King and Parliament* A d ism is sa l  o f  the 
Prime M in ister  by the King on the one hand, and a vo te  o f  no
1. Art* 86*
3* Art. 88.
2* A rt. 87. 
4. Art. 89.
confidence by the House of R ep resen ta tiv es  on the other has 
the same r e s u l t  -  r e s ig n a t io n  of the cab inet*  The dilemma 
of the cabinet has been h ig h l ig h te d  by the i s s u e  o f l e g i s l a t i o n  
by royal decree which has caused the r e s ig n a t io n  of the cab inet  
at l e a s t  three tim es. Then in  1960 occurred the f i r s t  vote  of 
no con fid en ce , bringing down the government of Abdulmajid Kubar, 
over a road con stru ction  scan d a l. I r o n ic a l ly  enough, Kubar 
had been President of the House of R ep resen ta tiv es  s in c e  
Independence up to the time of h is  appointment afi Prime M ini­
s t e r  in  May 1957. Nor did h i s  su ccessor  fa r e  any b e t t e r .  He 
res ig n ed  in  March 1963, two and a half years a f t e r  he took  
o f f i c e .  His government^like a l l  the p rev iou s governments^was 
r e s h u f f le d  a t  l e a s t  once a y ea r . This crea ted  m in is t e r ia l  
i n s t a b i l i t y  w ith  the co n seq u en tia l d isr u p tio n  of government 
b u s in e s s .  Owing to t h i s  s t a t e  o f a f f a i r s ,  the King and 
Parliament have begun to  show l a t e l y  s ig n s  o f  r e s t r a in t  and
o f  growing more se n s ib le  to  each others r o l e s ,  which has
1
meant a more s ta b le  cabinet*  
c» Morocco.
In Morocco the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p o s i t io n  of the cab inet  
rep resen ts  an in te r e s t in g  combination o f  the p r e s id e n t ia l  and 
parliam entary system of government, in  which the King p lays  
an a c t iv e  r o le .  There i s  a government c o n s is t in g  of the Prime
1 . Zartman, o p . c i t .
M in ister  and the other M in isters who are a l l  members of the
Council of M inisters* But the Council o f  M in isters  i s  pre-
1
s id e d  over by the King# and the government i s  r e sp o n s ib le  to
2
the King and to the Chamber of R ep resen tatives*
The Chamber of R epresentatives may cuiestion  the r e s ­
p o n s i b i l i t y  of the government by a motion of censure, which 
may be in i t i a t e d  by a t l e a s t  one te n th  o f the members o f the  
Chamber* The adoption of such a motion o f  censure by an 
a b so lu te  m ajority  of the members o f  the Chamber*- must r e s u l t  
in  the c o l l e c t iv e  re s ig n a t io n  of the government; but no 
other motion of censure may be adopted f o r  a year a f t e r  such'3o>1 
event# The Prime M in ister .,a fter  d e l ib e r a t io n  w ith  the  
C ouncil of M in isters , may pledge the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the  
government to  the Chamber of R ep resen ta t iv es  w ith  regard to  
a d e c la r a t io n  of general p o l ic y  or to  a v o te  on the t e x t  o f  
p a r t ic u la r  b i l l s *  In th is  p ledging the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the  
government he may seek a vote of confidence which, i f  r e je c t e d
by an ab so lu te  m ajority of the members o f the chamber, must
4
r e s u l t  in  the res ig n a tio n  of the government#
The p ecu lia r  p o s it io n  o f  the cab inet e s p e c ia l ly  in  r e ­
l a t i o n  to  the King ig  an ingen ius p iece  o f  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  
in n ovation  and the h is to ry  behind i t  i s  e q u a l ly  remarkable#
1# Cons* a r t s .  64, 25* 
3# Art* 81.
2* A r t .  65# 
4 . Art* 80 .
Indeed I t  cannot be properly understood without a b r ie f  review  
of the development of the p o s it io n  of the monarchy, over the  
l a s t  decade. This period  i s  marked by a r e a s s e r t io n  o f  the  
King1 s personal r o le  in  government, a g a in s t  a background o f  
a complex p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  U n t i l  1956, the King m aintained  
an a r b i t r a l  -  almost a p o l i t i c a l  -  p o s it io n *  Leaders o f  
various n ational o rg an isa tion s  such as p a r t i e s ,  trades unions  
and r e s is ta n c e  groups e x e r c ise d  cr u c ia l  in f lu e n c e  over the  
King in  a l l  important governmental appointments* The cab inet  
i t s e l f  was se lec ted  from a l i s t  of p o l i t i c a l  f ig u r e s  and techno­
crats  submitted by a f r e n i ie r -e le c t ,  after  long co n su lta t io n s  
w ith  various groups. There was n a t io n a l  consensus over p u b lic  
go a ls  in  post-independence Morocco, up to  1956* And t h i s  f a c t  
plus the King* s p o lic y  of n o n - in te r f  erence in  m atters o f  d e t a i l  
avoided f r i c t i o n  in  p a r t icu la r  between him and h is  cabinet*
Any th re a ts  of major c lash  were immediately nipped in  the bud 
by abandonment of the is su e  or measure which c o n s t i tu te d  the  
threat* The r e s u l t  was a p o lic y  of compromise w ith  moderate 
programmes; carried  out p a r t ia l ly  by agovernment which s u f f e r ­
ed from m in is te r ia l  in s t a b i l i t y *
A fter  October 1956, the government which r e f l e c t e d  t h i s  
n a tio n a l  consensus -  (The Government of n a t io n a l  U n ity ) was 
reorgan ised  w ith  I s t i q l a l  -  the dominant p o l i t i c a l  party  -  
holding a m ajority of the M in istr ies*  Then, demands were 
made for f u l l  powers of the government, but were compounded by
p a r t isa n  b i t te r n e s s  and r e s u lte d  in  the r e s ig n a t io n  of the  
M inisters#  The party causing the major c r i s i s  -  the I s t i q l a l  -  
next formed a government in  May 1958, but in c ip ie n t  r i v a l r i e s  
reduced i t s  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  and shortened i t s  l i f e ,  when in  
December, 1958, soon a f t e r  I t s  f a l l ,  new M in is ter s  were chosen  
in  a p erson a l capacity# But the p o l i t i c a l  s ta g n a t io n  continued  
u n t i l  1960 when pressures coming from d i f f e r e n t  d ir e c t io n s  
converged to  change the s itu a t io n #  The Crown Prince was young 
and im patien t; the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  were f r u s t r a t e d  by the 
sta lem ate  and im patient to  use s ta te  power fo r  programmes 
along p a r t isa n  lin o s#  An attempt made to  form a government 
w ith  the Crown Prince as Prime M in ister , was r e s i s t e d  by the  
p a r t ie s#  The King overcame th is  r e s is ta n c e  by assuming 
lea d ersh ip  o f  the government, w ith  the Crown Prince as deputy 
Prime M inister* His f a i l i n g  h ea lth  and the d r ive  fo r  le a d e r ­
sh ip  m anifested  by the Crown Prince combined to  tr a n s fe r  
a c tu a l  ex ecu tive  power from the King to  the Prince# The 
M in isters  were again  appointed not on a p arty  b a s is  but on a 
personal capacity#
On February 26th  1961, the King (Mohammed V) d ied  and the 
Crown Prince (Hassan I I )  ascended the throne# The young Kin£*s 
id eas on government and lea d ersh ip  may h e lp  p a r t ly  to  ex p la in  
the o r ig in  and nature of the present p o s i t io n  of th e  cabinet#  
The ca b in e t , according to him, i s  to  be "a team o f  r e sp o n s ib le  
men grouped together about a c h ie f ,  capable o f  g iv in g  the
powerful impetus necessary to  lea d  the people in  t h e i r  f ig h t
1
fo r  progress and against poverty
This view of p erson a lised  power in  government i s  cry­
s t a l l i s e d  in  the con stitu tion ^ as we have seen . The King*s 
p resid en cy  of the cabinet and h is  r ig h t  to  appeal to the  
people through the mechanism o f  referendum g iv e s  h is  ru le  a 
modern gu ise  as w e l l  as an e f f e c t i v e  co n tro l  over government, 
as was shown in  the referendum of December 7 th , 1962• I t  a lso  
g iv e s  him an advantage on which government su cc e sse s  rebound 
to  h i s  c r e d it  whereas f a i lu r e s  can be used to  weaken p a r t ie s  
th a t  may happen to predominate in  his c a b in e t .  As fo r  the
fu tu r e ,  the King has sa id : " I cannot, a t the present time
2
make the e x e r c ise  of power l e s s  d i r e c t . . . ”
His crea tio n  in  May 17th , 1963 of a Palace Party -  the  
Front de Defense des in s t i t u t io n s  c o n s t i t u t io n n e l le s  (FDIC), 
the Hasani(feequivalent of the G a u ll is t  UNR -  was an attempt 
to  co n so lid a te  th is  personal power. ttis p resent cab inet i s  
drawn mainly from th is  party . The r e s u l t  o f  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
referendum had not only provided him w ith  a s t a t e  apparatus 
as he wished i t ,  but had a ls o  g iven  him a sense of s e l f -  
assu ran ce . In order to  o f f s e t  the in f lu e n c e  o f  the I s t i q l a l  
p a rty , which^while s t i l l  lo y a l  to the i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the
1 .  Zartman, o p . c i t . ,  pp. 2 2 -5 .
2 .  I b id .
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a
monarchy, was be com in g /b itter  c r i t i c  of the government (which  
was h i s )  he created  the FDIC* This party was e s s e n t i a l l y  a 
c o a l i t i o n  of the Popular Movement Party and the L ib e ra l  Inde­
pendents -  "the King1 s men” * King Hassan worsted the oppo-
\U
s i t  ion  o f/H ight but, as the tragedy of the Ben Barka a f f a i r /  
dem onstrate, he did not sh a tte r  the o p p o s it io n  o f  the Left*
CONCLUSION
The h is to r y  o f  monarchies In Europe has been ch a ra c ter ­
is e d  by a s h i f t  of power from the person o f the King to  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as Parliament and a cab in et of m in is ters#
T h is , o f  course, i s  the r e s u l t  o f a long period  o f  evo lu tion *
I t  i s  open to  q uestion  whether t h i s  i s  p o s s ib le  in  co u n tr ies  
w ith  the h is to r y  and p resent r e a l i t y / a s  those o f  our th ree  
s ta te s *  On the other hand i t  i s  doubtful whether p e r s o n i f ie d  
t r a d i t io n a l  power can continue to  r e s i s t  the onslaught o f  
change without d ire  consequences* I t  must be re co g n ise d , how­
e v e r , that the monarchies have so  far demonstrated an in n o v a tin g  
ca p a c ity  which seems to  have helped  th e ir  su rv iva l*  -jfer 
The in s t i tu t io n *  of parliam ent and cabinet have been in troduced  
in  a l l  th r e e ,  w ith  varying degrees of tr a n s fe r  of power to  
th ese  in s t i tu t io n s *  But in  no case i s  the supremacy o f  the  
monarch over the cab in et s e r io u s ly  q u estion ed . Even in  the  
two q u a s i - c o n s t i tu t io n a l  monarchies of Libya and Morocco the  
balance of power i s  d e c i s iv e ly  on the s id e  o f  the monarch*
T rad ition a l authority  w ith  w hich  monarchs are in v e s te d  
does not simply slough o f f ,  even in  the presence o f  a modern 
c o n s t i tu t io n .  A l l  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  d ev ices  which re q u ir e  
the a c t s  of the King to  conform to  c e r ta in  requirem ents  
may appear to  be r e s t r i c t i v e  of the King1 s power and in d ic a ­
t i v e  o f  m in is t e r ia l  or parliamentary supremacy. But i t  i s  
f a i r  to  g e n e r a l i s e ,  that while they tend to  reduce a r b i t r a r i ­
ness by su b jectin g  the ex e rc ise  of power to  a re g u la te d  p a ttern ,  
in  r e a l i t y  they cannot be expected to  r e s t r a in  t r a d i t io n a l  
power. For, u n less  abolished  or em asculated (co m p le te ly  
c o n s t i t u t io n a l i s e d ) , t r a d it io n a l  power tends to  g e t  the b e t t e r  
o f  modern dev ices by sh e lte r in g  behind modernity and m ain ta in ­
ing the r e a l i t y  of i t s  power. The King can use h is  m in is te r s  
as a smoke-screen fo r  the ex e r c ise  of h is  a u th o r ity ,  s h i f t i n g  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  them* when the going g e t s  rough.
I t  may be pointed  out that th is  i s  not n e c e s s a r i ly  p ecu lia r  
to  Kings, and th at execu tive  p res id en ts  can do the same th in g  
in  re sp e c t  o f  th e ir  m in is te r s .  N onetheless  the e l e c t i v e  b a s is  
o f  ex ecu tiv e  p res id en ts  as opposed to  ro y a l s u c c e s s io n  i n t r o ­
duced a p o in t of variance, in  th e ir  r e s p e c t iv e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  
s tr u c tu r e .  Again in  id e o lo g ic a l  terms the monarchs depend 
on r e l i g i o u s  sentim ents which are in h eren t in  t h e i r  id e o lo g ie s .  
Indeed the Kings are Intim ately  connected w ith  r e l ig io u s  in ­
s t i t u t i o n s .  The Islam ic Kings have t r a d i t i o n a l ly  h e ld  
p o s it io n s  of r e l ig io u s  primacy as Imams which flowed from the
d o c t r i n e  o f  one God and th e  p a ra m o u n tcy  on e a r t h  o f  h i s  
1
m e s s e n g e r .  T h i s  h as  b ee n  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
M orocco ,  f o r  exam ple ,  where t h e  King i s  s t y l e d  a s  K h a l i f a l
2
Amir  a l - m u - m i n i n e  ( t h e  head  o f  t h e  community o f  b e l i e v e r s ) .
I n  a  c o u n t r y  where  c o n s e r v a t i v e  and  r e l i g i o u s  s e n t i m e n t s  a r e  
s t r o n g  t h i s  h a s  deep i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  as  c o u l d  be  s e e n  d u r i n g  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f e r e n d u m  o f  1962 .  A p e a s a n t  w as  i n t e r ­
v i e w e d  on t e l e v i s i o n  on t h e  r e f e r e n d u m ,  j u s t  b e f o r e  i t  Y/as
h e l d ,  and  he  i s  r e p o r t e d  t o  hav e  r e p l i e d :  11I I  n ! y  a q u ’A l l a h ,
3
l e  r o i ,  e t  o u i” (there i s  only God, the King and y e s ) .  Thus 
the s o c i a l  p o s i t i o n  of the King a3 inhering  i n  Is lam ic  i n -
pO&tt»0M
s t i t u t i o n s  im p in g es  on h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l / a s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  a
4
frm o d e rn ,f c o n s t i t u t i o n .
1 .  La i £ a h a  i l l 1 A l l a h ,  Muhammadum r a s u l 1 i l l a h :  ’ t h e r e  i s  no
god  b u t  God/ Muhammad i s  t h e  m e s s e n g e r  o f  God1 • 1 Imam’
i s  t h e  name of  t h e  h ea d  o f  a Moslem com munity  whose d u t y
i s  t o  be t h e  K h a l i f  ( s u c c e s s o r )  o f  t h e  p r o p h e t ,  an d  a s  s u c h ,  
t o  g u a r d  t h e  f a i t h  and  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  Abu 
B e k r ,  t h e  f i r s t  s u c c e s s o r  o f  Huhammad a d o p t e d  t h e  t i t l e  
K h a l i f a t  r a s u l - i l l a h  ( s u c c e s s o r  of  t h e  m e s s e n g e r  o f  G od) ,  
whence t h e  te rm  K h a l i f .  S u c c e e d in g  g e n e r a t i o n s  o f  S u l t a n s  
h a v e  c l a im e d  d i r e c t  d e s c e n t  f rom  t h e  p r o p h e t ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
l e g i t i m i s e  t h e i r  r u l e .
2 .  c f .  a r t .  1 9 .
3 .  c f .  J e u n e  A f r i q u e ,  Dec. 1 7 - 2 3 ,  1 9 6 2 .  The f,o u i ri r e f e r s  t o  
t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e  v o te  t o  be g i v e n  t o  t h e  p r o p o s e d  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n .
4 .  The e q u i v a l e n t  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  E m p e ro r  i n  t h e  E t h i o p i a n  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s i t u a t i o n *  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  n o t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  
Two •
The p r e s i d e n t s ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  have  t r a d i t i o n  a n d  i n e r t i a  
a g a i n s t  them , th o u g h  th e y  h av e  th e  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  h i s t o r y  i s  on 
t h e i r  s i d e ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e i r  o f f i c e s  a r e  b a s e d  on i d e a s  
o f  p r o g r e s s  w h ic h  have  l a r g e l y  come o u t  o f  t h e  d e m o l i t i o n  o f  
t r a d i t i o n .  To o v e r s i m p l i f y  t h e  i s s u e s ' p r o g r e s s  s t o o d  f o r  
e q u a l i t y  and  p o p u l a r  m a n d a te ,  among; o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  w h i l e  
t r a d i t i o n  s to o d  f o r  p r i v i l e g e  and h e a v e n l y  ( o r  i n s p i r e d )  
m a n d a te .  Now t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  m o n a rc h ie s  t o  s u r v i v e  h a s  b e e n  
d e m o n s t r a t e d  i n  t h e i r  c a p a c i t i e s  t o  i n n o v a t e ,  a s  we h a v e  s e e n ,  
a n d  t h i s  g i v e s  the:;; t h e  a u r a  o f  m o d e r n i t y  o r  e v e n  * p r o g r e s s i v e ­
n e s s 1 • M o reo v e r ,  A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
by a u t h o r i t y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t .  And 
t h e  d e v i c e s  u s e d  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  o f f i c e  and  l e a d e r ,  e s s e n t i a l  
a s  t h e y  a r e  f o r  n a t i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  l e a d  one t o  s u s p e c t  t h a t  
a t  b o t t o m  t h e y  r e f l e c t  t h e  same a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  power 
a s  i s  i m p l i c i t  i n  m o n a r c h i e s .  In  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  a t t e m p t s  t o  
i n c a r n a t e  d o c t r i n e s  and s e n t i m e n t s  i n  p e r s o n a l i t i e s ^  c o n t a i n  i n  
them  t h e  s e e d s  o f  c r e a t i n g  new p r i v i l e g e s ,  i f  n o t  ' ( a l w a y s )  new 
d y n a s t i e s .  A f t e r  a l l ,  Abu Bekr  s u c c e e d e d  Muhammad a f t e r  a 
d i s p u t e  on t h e  s u c c e s s i o n ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  c a r r y  o u t  h i s  w o rk .  But 
t h e  s u c c e e d i n g  K h a l i f s  have  c r e a t e d  d y n a s t i e s  c l a i m i n g  d e s c e n t  
f ro m  t h e  p r o p h e t  . T i g r i s  i s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  c h a r i s m a t i c  l e a d e r s  
who h a v e  d e p a r t e d *  p o s e s  a r e a l  p ro b le m ^  i n  e l e c t i v e  s y s t e m s .
I s  n o t  t h i s ,  t h e  main  r e a s o n  why d y n a s t i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  th e m -
156.
s e l v e s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ?  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  
a s s e r t e d  by no l e s s  an a u t h o r i t y  t h a n  Tom P a i n e  t h a t  t h e r e
h a d  b e e n  more w ars  caused  by d y n a s t i c  f e u d s  t h a n  by any o t h e r  
1
r e a s o n .
1* ’ The l i g h t s  o f  Plan1, C h a p t e r  One.
CHAPTER FOUR
DUAL EXECUTIVE -  WITH A 
FIGURE-HEAD OF STATE
INTRODUCTORY
The c o u n t r i e s  w h ich  a r e  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  a r e  
t h o s e  w h ich  have  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  fo rm  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  w i t h  a 
d u a l  ( o r  b i c e p h a l o u s )  e x e c u t i v e .  S i n c e  t h e  coup  d ’ e t a t  I n  
S i e r r a  L eone ,  t h e r e  r e m a in  o n ly  t h r e e :  t h e  Gambia,  L e s o t h o
an d  S o m a l i a .  But a l t h o u g h  t h e  m a in  body o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  
i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  i n  t h e s e  
t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s  i t  i s  fo u n d  n e c e s s a r y  t o  r e f e r  t o  c a s e s  
w here  s u c h  fo rm  o f  governm en t  h as  b e e n  a b o l i s h e d ,  a n d  I n  
p a r t i c u l a r  t o  N i g e r i a  and U ganda .  In  t h e  f a c e  o f  a  g e n e r a l  
movement to w ard s  a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  i n  
A f r i c a  w i t h  ( i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y )  a  m o n o c e p h a lo u s  e x e c u t i v e ,  t h e  
p e r s i s t e n c e  of  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  fo rm  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  w i t h  a  
d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  r a i s e s  some p e r t i n e n t  q u e s t i o n s .  Why was t h i s  
t r e n d  n o t  f o l l o w e d  i n  some s t a t e s ?  7/hat w e re  t h e  f a c t o r s  
t h a t  l e d  t o  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  fr\om i n  t h e  
f i r s t  p l a c e ;  an d  why h as  t h i s  fo rm  b e e n  k e p t  i n  some?
On© an sw er  w h ic h  r e a d i l y  s u g g e s t s  i t s e l f  i s  t h a t ,  g i v e n  
t h e  r i g h t  a t m o s p h e r e ,  t h e  e m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  ways o f  t h e  r u l e r  
by t h e  r u l e d  i s  a commonplace f a c t  o f  h i s t o r y  an d  p s y c h o lo g y *
An e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  a  random  sa m p le  o f  A f r i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s
a n d  c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e s e  w i t h  one a n o t h e r  a n d  w i t h  t h o s e  o f
t h e  c o u n t r i e s  w h ic h  h a d  a c t e d  a s  t h e i r  m e n t o r s  w o u ld  show
t h i s  f a c t o r  t o  be  p r e s e n t  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t s  The s o u r c e  o f
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  s t a t e s  c a n  be  t r a c e d
m a i n l y  t o  G-reat B r i t a i n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  Gambia a n d  L e s o t h o
a n d  t o  I t a l y  i n  t h a t  o f  S o m a l i a .
I m i t a t i o n  by i t s e l f ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  n o t  a  s u f f i c i e n t
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  a s  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f a c t  o f  t h e  W e s t m i n s t e r
m o d e l  by Kwame Nkrumah a n d  t h e  l a t e r  by o t h e r s  sh o w s .
More t h a n  m e re  i m i t a t i o n  p e r h a p s  may b e  t h e  r e s p e c t  p a i d
t o  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o t h e r  p e o p l e s  w i t h  t h e  r e a l i s a t i o n
t h a t  m an’ s  r e s p o n s e  t o  p r o b l e m s  i s  b a s i c a l l y  t h e  same
a n d  t h a t  i t  i s  w i s e  t o  a d o p t  w ha t  h a s  b e e n  t r i e d  by  o t h e r s . ' * ’
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n f e r e n c e s  w h ic h  p r e c e d e d  t h e
f i n a l  a c t  o f  b i r t h  o f  t h e s e  new s t a t e s  m u s t  h a v e  i m p r e s s e d
t h e  e v e n t  w i t h  a  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  w h a t  h a s  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d
a s  " t h e  e x p o r t  m o d e l " .  I t  h a s  o f t e n  b e e n  o p e n l y  a s s e r t e d
2t h a t  t h a t  m o d e l  was im p o s e d  by t h e  m e t r o p o l i t a n  p o w e r .
1 .  c f .  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n g o l e s e  l e a d e r s  a t  t h e  t a b l e  
r o n d e  c o n f e r e n c e  h e l d  i n  B r u s s e l s .
2 .  c f .  K. Nkrumah, ’A f r i c a  m u s t  U n i t e '  ( 1 ^ 6 2 )  p . 59*
A t t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n f e r e n c e s  h e l d  t o  n e g o t i a t e  t h e
in d e p e n d e n c e  o f  many A f r i c a n  s t a t e s ,  one i s  i m p r e s s e d  w i t h  t h e
t e n a c i t y  w i t h  w h ich  c o l o n i a l  s e c r e t a r i e s  r,a r g u e ff t h e  c a s e  f o r
t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .
” P r o t e c t ! o n  o f  m i n o r i t y  r i g h t s ” and  " f u n d a m e n t a l  g u a r a n t e e s ”
w ere  t h e  u s u a l  a rg u m e n ts  u s e d  t o  g iv e  a form o f  g o v e rn m e n t  i n
w h ic h  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  and  c e n t r a l  gov ern m en t  i n  g e n e r a l  a r e
l e f t  w e a k e r  t h a n  u n d e r  th e  c o l o n i a l  e x e c u t i v e .  And t h i s  h a s
1
n o t  b e e n  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  A f r i c a n s .
"Form o f  g o v e rn m e n t” i s  a t e rm  w h ich  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  
f u n c t i o n a l  arrangement of th e  p r i n c i p a l  s t a t e  o r g a n s ,  an d  
i t  i m p l i e s  t h e  power r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  t h e s e  o r g a n s  -  b e  
i t  c o - o r d i n a t e ,  s u b o r d i n a t e  o r  s u p e r - o r d i n a t e .  A p a r l i a ­
m e n ta r y  form  of  governm en t  w i t h  a d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  n o r m a l l y  
i m p l i e s  e x e c u t i v e  power w i e l d e d  by a c a b i n e t  w h ic h  n o n e t h e l e s s  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  c o n t in u o u s  s u p p o r t  o f  a m a j o r i t y  p a r t y  o r  a  
c o a l i t i o n  o f  p a r t i e s ,  ' ihe f i g u r e - h e a d  o f  s t a t e  ( i . e .  t h e  
s e c o n d  e x e c u t i v e )  i s  t h e r e  t o  w a tc h  o v e r  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
a n d  t o  a r b i t r a t e  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  of  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  power c o n ­
f l i c t s ,  w h ich  may r e s u l t  f rom  s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y .  
I n  A f r i c a ,  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  have  i n  some s t a t e s  b e e n  c r u c i a l  
i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  form  o f  governm en t  a r e  o f  two v a r i e t i e s ,
1 .  e . g .  The Kenya l e a d e r s  o f  KAOT were f o r c e d  by c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
t o  a c c e p t  an  a r r a n g e m e n t  i n  w h ich  t h e r e  was s t r o n g  r e g i o n a l  
gov ern m en t  u n d e r  t h e  1962. L a n c a s t e r  House C o n s t i t u t i o n .
They t h e n  p r o c e e d e d  t o  d i s m a n t l e  t h i s  once t h e y  g o t  U h u ru .
t h o u g h  t h e y  may be r e l a t e d *  F i r s t  t h e r e  i s  t h e  f a c t o r  o f  
t r a d i t i o n a l  h o l d e r s  o f  a u t h o r i t y ,  where  t h e s e  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  
w ea k en ed .  Then t h e r e  i s  t h e  e t h n i c  a n d / o r  r e l i g i o u s  e l e m e n t .
A new e l e m e n t  i s  ad ded  to  t h e s e ,  namely p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  
w h ic h  som etim es  have an e t h n i c  o r  a  r e l i g i o u s  b a s e  a n d  some­
t i m e s  l e a n  on t r a d i t i o n a l  f o r c e s .  I t  may be n o t e d  a t  t h i s  
p o i n t  t h a t  t h e  d u a l i t y  i n  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  i s  o n l y  one a s p e c t  
o f  t h e  fo rm  o f  governm ent  w h ic h  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  o f  d i v e r s i t y  
may p r o d u c e .  There  i s  a l s o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  f e d e r a l  s t r u c t u r e  
an d  o f  a b i c a m e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  a l l  o f  w h ic h  a r e  d e v i c e s  p u t  
f o r w a r d  w h e re v e r  t h e  p rob lem s p e r t a i n i n g  t o  d i v e r s i t y  e x i s t .
The s t a t e s  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  h e r e  w ere  n o t  t h e  o n ly  ones
t o  s t a r t  w i t h  a d u a l  e x e c u t i v e .  The m a j o r i t y  w e re  l a u n c h e d  i n
1
a s i m i l a r  way. F o r  our  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e  N i g e r i a  an d  Uganda 
p r o v i d e  t h e  b e s t  example o f  t h e  p ro b le m  w h ic h  may be b e s t  
e l u c i d a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  th em .  The f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  
i n  t h e s e  two s t a t e s  i s  c a u s e d  by a number o f  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  
c o u l d  n o t  be  d e a l t  w i t h  h e r e  i n  any  d e t a i l ;  n o r  i s  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  d u a l i t y  i n  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  c r u c i a l  
f a c t o r .  But  i t  i s  one o f  t h e  f a c t o r s ,  an d  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
i t  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w h ic h  i t  h a s  f a i l e d  
g i v e s  p o ig n a n c y  to  th e  s t u d y  o f  c a s e s  where  i t  h a s  n o t  f a i l e d .
1 .  Only Botsw ana and  Zambia became r e p u b l i c s  u p o n  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
By c o n t r a s t  t o  t h o s e  i n  N i g e r i a  an d  U ganda ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  r u l e r s  i n  t h e  Gambia an d  S i e r r a  Leone i s  
r e l a t i v e l y  weak.  W hatever  p o t e n t i a l  t h r e a t  t h e y  may hav e  
c o n s t i t u t e d  a t  t h e  t i n e  o f  in d e p e n d e n c e  o r  b e f o r e *  was 
n e u t r a l i s e d  by s u c c e s s f u l  p o l i t i c a l  m a n o e u v r e s .  I n  S i e r r a  
Leone a l s o  t h e  c h i e f s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  i n t e r i o r  r e g i o n  known 
a s  t h e  P r o t e c t o r a t e  were made p a r t  o f  t h e  new p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  
by t h e  l a t e  M i l t o n  Margai t h r o u g h  an  a s t u t e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r a t e g y  
f o r m a l i s e d  i n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  v h i c h  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  a s  
many a s  tw e lv e  c h i e f s  must be  members o f  t h e  u n i - c a m e r a l  
l e g i s l a t i v e  body .  They were t h u s  I n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  t h e  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e  a s se m b ly  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  M commoners11 • The p a r t y  
i n  p o w e r ,  i n  any c a s e ,  s t a r t e d  a s  a  champil ion o f  t h e  ca u se  
o f  t h e  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  t h e  P r o t e c t o r a t e ,  a s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  c r e o l e - d o m i n a t e d  e l i t e  o f  t h e  c o a s t a l  r e g i o n .  
E v en  t h e r e ,  how ever ,  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  M i l t o n  Marga 
was n o t  s u c h  a s  t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a t h r e a t  o f  e x t i n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
c h i e f s ,  u n l i k e  t h e  PDG o f  n e i g h b o u r i n g  G u i n e a .  A g a i n ,  i n  
L e s o t h o  th e y  were c a u g h t  I n  t h e  wave o f  m odern  p o l i t i c a l  
m ovem en ts .  Thus C h i e f  Leabua J o n a t h a n ,  t h e  P r im e  M i n i s t e r ^  
h e a d s  one o f  t h e  l a r g e s t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  w h i l e  t h e  p a r a ­
mount c h i e f  (King) was made c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  h e a d  o f  t h e  s t a t e .  
Bu t  u n l i k e  t h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  S i e r r a  L eo n e ,  b i c a m e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  
was e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  L e s o t h o ,  w i t h  t h e  s e n a t e  c o m p r i s i n g  o f  
t h i r t y - t h r e e  members of  whom tw e n t y - tw o  a r e  c h i e f s  an d  t h e
r e m a i n i n g  e l e v e n  a r e  a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  K in g .  They owe t h i s
p o s i t i o n  to  th e ir  t r a d i t io n a l  p lace  in  s o c i e t y .  This may not
become a n  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  a s
l o n g  a 3 t h e  p r im e  m i n i s t e r  h a s  h i m s e l f  some c l o s e  t i e s  w i t h
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  r u l i n g  g ro u p s  a s  C h i e f  J o n a t h a n  seems t o  h a v e .
B u t  i f  t h i s  s h o u l d  change t h e n  t h e  i s s u e  w ould  assum e a d i f f e r -
1
e n t  a s p e c t  and  p e rh a p s  p r e c i p i t a t e  c r i s i s .  The i d e a  o f  a n  
”u p p e r  h o u s e ” c o m p o s e d  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  e l e m e n t s  h e l p s  t o  e n ­
t r e n c h  t h e s e  f o r c e s  and  e n c o u ra g e  them t o  f o s t e r  t h e  s e n t i m e n t s  
on w h ic h  n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l  p a r t i e s  l i k e  t h e  Kabaka Yekka a r e  
n u r t u r e d .  I t  would be a m e e t i n g  g ro u n d  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  r u l e r s  
t o  f o r g e  a  new u n i t y  and p e r h a p s  c o n s t i t u t e  an  o p p o s i t i o n  t o
2
a  s t r o n g  g overnm en t  whose programmes a f f e c t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .
I n  S o m a l i a ,  th e  f a c t o r  o f  ” c h i e f t a i n c y ” i s  n o t  o f  much 
s i g n i f i c a n c e ;  and  i n  th e  a b s e n c e  o f  an  e t h n i c  d i v e r s i t y ,  t h e  
p r o b l e m  t h e r e *  was r e l a t e d  t o  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
a n d  f a c t i o n s  and  s e c t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  w h ic h  h ad  d e v e l o p e d  d u r i i g g  
t h e  l a s t  few  y e a r s  b e f o r e  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
1 .  Seepp.-j73 '-^below> f o r  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  King o f  L e s o t h o ,  
a n d  f o r  t h e  c r i s i s  o f  December 22nd ,  1 9 6 6 .
2 .  I n  Ghana t h e  House o f  C h i e f s  was a d o p t e d  by t h e  CPP o n ly  
a s  a t e m p o r a r y  compromise f o r  t a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s ,  and  a t  
n o t  t i m e  d i d  th e  CPP l o s e  i t s  g r i p  and  a l l o w  t h e  C h i e f s  t o  
c o n t r o l  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s .  The same i s  t r u e  i n  T a n ­
z a n i a  a n d  M alawi.  I n  N i g e r i a  t h e  s i z e  a n d  power o f  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  and  c o n s e r v a t i v e  n o r t h  was a  f a c t o r ,  among 
o t h e r s ,  t h a t  d e t e r m in e d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  b i - c a m e r a l  
l e g i s l a t u r e  and  a d u a l  e x e c u t i v e .
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As e x p l a i n e d  a l r e a d y ,  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  f u l l  s i g n i f i ­
can ce  o f  t h e  f a c t o r  o f  d i v e r s i t y  a s  b r i n g i n g  an  i n f l u e n c e  t o  
b e a r  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and  fo rm  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  a s t a t e ^ i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  g i v e  a b r i e f  a c c o u n t  o f  c a s e s  w here  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  
was m arked  by f a i l u r e .  The ch an g es  w h ic h  h a v e  r o c k e d  N i g e r i a  
an d  Uganda have some i m p l i c a t i o n  t o  many o t h e r  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  
w h e re  t h e  c o n f l i c t  i n v o l v e d  has  n o t  b e e n  r e s o l v e d ,  c a n a l i s e d  
o r  r a t i o n a l i s e d .
The Uganda c a s e  h as  s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  i n q u i r y  f o r  a number o f  r e a s o n s *  F i r s t l y ,  i t  
p r o v i d e s  an  o b j e c t  l e s s o n  on what  can  h a p p e n  when t h e  e l e m e n t s  
o f  c o n f l i c t  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  i d e a  o f  a  d i v i d e d  e x e c u t i v e  a r e  
p r e s e n t  i n  an  ex t rem e form  and  b u i l t  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .
N o t  o n ly  was th e  s t a t u s  &-nd r o l e  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  h o l d e r s  
o f  pow er  f u l l y  r e c o g n i s e d  i n  t h e  1963 U ganda  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
b u t  t h e  Uganda p a r l i a m e n t  was g i v e n  no  pow er  t o  make any  lav/ 
a f f e c t i n g  any  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  Kabaka an d  h i s  
g o v e rn m e n t  i n  Buganda.  The s e e d  o f  c o n f l i c t  was t h u s  embedded 
i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  c r e a t e d  a s h a r p  a n d  m u t u a l l y  c o n t r a ­
d i c t o r y  a l i g n m e n t  o f  f o r c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  I n  r e a l i t y  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e  Kabaka as  P r e s i d e n t  o f  Uganda and  
o f  t h e  P r im e M i n i s t e r  was n o t  one b e t w e e n  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  h e a d
o f  s t a t e  and  an e x e c u t i v e  p r im e  m i n i s t e r  i n  a l l  r e s p e c t s .  I t
1
i s  t r u e r  t o  say  t h a t  t h e r e  were two p r im e  m i n i s t e r s .  I n  s u c h
1 .  c f .  M o r r i s  and h e a d , 1 Uganda ,  The D ev e lo p m e n t  o f  i t s  Laws 
and C o n s t i t u t i o n 1 (1966)  p p .  87-2 01 .
a s i t u a t i o n  d i s p u t e s  i n e v i t a b l y  a r i s e  s e t t i n g  t h e  two e x e c u ­
t i v e  ’ heads* on a c o l l i s i o n  c o u r s e ,  a n d  one e v e n t u a l l y  endsl>y 
a b o l i s h i n g  t h e  o t h e r  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  a u n i t a r y  e x e c u t i v e .
S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  Uganda e x p e r i e n c e  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  where  
t h e r e  a r e  two e x e c u t i v e s  b e n t  on m u tu a l  d e s t r u c t i o n ,  o r  compet 
i n g  f o r  suprem acy o r  even p a r i t y  w i t h i n  one c o n s t i t u t u t i o n a l  
$7  s t e m ;  and  e s p e c i a l l y  w here  t h e y  r e p r e s e n t  o p p o s in g  v ie w s  on 
f u n d a m e n ta l  i s s u e s ,  i n  th e  e n s u i n g  c o n f l i c t  and  a t t e m p t s  a t  
g a i n i n g  a s c e n d a n c y  t r a d i t i o n a l  f o r c e s  c a n  be q u i t e  a d e p t  a t  
m o b i l i s i n g  h i g h l y  e f f e c t i v e  s u p p o r t  f ro m  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n .  I n  Uganda t h i s  hap p en ed  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  s p e c i a l  
p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  Kabaka i n  t h e  Buganda s o c i e t y ,  w h ic h  was e n ­
t r e n c h e d  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  The c o n f l i c t  t o o k  a t u r n  f o r  
t h e  w o rs e  b e c a u s e  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  was a c t i v a t e d  and  p r o j e c t e d  
on t o  Uganda n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  by t h e  e m erg en ce  o f  n e o -  
t r a d i t i o n a l  p a r t y  c a l l e d  th e  Kabaka Y ekka  ( t h e  Kabaka o n l y ) .  
T h i s  p a r t y  w h ich  was an  a l l y  o f  Obote* s  b e g a n  t o  c h a l l e n g e  
a n d  a t t a c k  t h e  c e n t r a l  governm en t  o f  K l l t o n  O b o te ,  o v e r  some 
i s s u e s .  I n  Buganda i t s e l f  t h e r e  was a g o v e rn m e n t  o f  t h e  
Kabaka w h ic h  c o n s t i t u t e d  a c e n t r e  o f  l o y a l t y  an d  o p p o s i t i o n ,  
a t t r a c t i n g  t o  i t  some young e d u c a t e d  E a g a n d a .  I r o n i c a l l y  
t h e r e  was a n  a l l i a n c e  b e tw e en  O bote1 s p a r t y  and  t h e  Kabaka 
Y ekka ,  e n t e r e d  p r e v i o u s l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e f e a t  a n o t h e r  p a r t y .  
Once O b o te1s UPS was i n  pow er ,  t h e  K abaka1 s p a r t y  g r a d u a l l y
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  m ost  v o c a l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  O b o te ’ s g o v e r n m e n t .
The h i s t o r y  o f  t h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  however  b r i e f , h a s  many s i d e s  
t o  i t ,  a n d  one can o v e r s i m p l i f y .  But t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  g o v e r n ­
ment an d  o p p o s i t i o n ,  and  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  b e tw e e n  Obote  a n d  t h e  
Kabaka became s t r a i n e d  when O b o te1 s p a r t y  was j o i n e d  by r e ­
c r u i t s  f ro m  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t y  -  r e c r u i t s  whom he s u s p e c t e d  t o  
be  Kabaka men w i t h  a d i s g u i s e d  a im  to  d e s t r o y  h im  a n d  h i s  
p a r t y  a n d  t a k e  o v e r  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t .  S u s p i c i s o n s  o f  a ’’p a l a c e
coup” l e d  by p e o p l e  f rom  h i s  own p a r t y  a d d e d  f u r t h e r  f u e l  t o
1
t h e  f i r e  t h a t  was s m o u l d e r i n g .  Then on F e b r u a r y  4 ,  1 9 6 6 ,  
t h e  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  Kabaka Y ekka ,  U r .  D audi  O c h e n g ^ a c c u s e d  
Obote  an d  h i s  d e f e n c e  and  i n f o r m a t i o n  m i n i s t e r s  o f  r e c e i v i n g  
l o o t e d  g o l d  and  i v o r y  w o r t h  £ 2 5 ,0 0 0 *  From t h e n  on  i t  was a 
m a t t e r  o f  t i m e ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  b e i n g  who w ou ld  s t r i k e  f i r s t ,  
an d  how* The r e s t  i s  h i s t o r y .
T h i r d l y ,  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  why a d u a l  
e x e c u t i v e  i s  k e p t  o r  a b o l i s h e d ,  i t  i s  w o r t h  r e m e m b er in g  i n  
t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h a t  i n  t h e  H o b b e s i a n  
s i t u a t i o n  o f  "w ar  o f  e a c h  a g a i n s t  a l l ” w i t h  a v a r i e t y  o f  
c o n f l i c t i n g  c l a i m s  and  t h r e a t s  o f  d i v i s i o n ,  t h e  e f f o r t  t o  
k ee p  law  an d  o rde r* -  and  t o  kee p  t h e  n a t i o n  g o i n g  becom es a 
m a jo r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  no;fcinew$ b u t  what  
makes i t  new t o  A f r i c a  i s  t h a t  p e o p l e  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  a p p a r a t u s  
o f  n ew ly  fo rm e d  s t a t e s  a r e  t r y i n g  t o  b u i l d  n a t i o n s  o u t  o f
1 .  U r .  G ra c e  X b i n g i r a ,  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  o f  O b o te ’ s p a r t y
and  a  m i n i s t e r  i n  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t . a n d  o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s  werel a t e r  a r r e s t e d .  ?
s t a t e s #  w h ich  a r e  a t  t h e  moment f r a g i l e .  T h i s  p o i n t  c a n n o t  
be o v e r - e m p h a s i s e d .  The m a i n t a i n a n c e  o f  u n i t y  i s  a  s i n e  qua 
non o f  a l l  o t h e r  e f f o r t s ,  t h e r e f o r e  when t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o f  
t h e  s t a t e  a p p a r a t u s  i s  t h r e a t e n e d  t h e  f o r c e s  who w i e l d  w eapons  
o f  v i o l e n c e  must be  c a l l e d  upon  t o  p l a y  a r o l e *  A t  t h a t  s t a g e ,  
t h e  arm ed f o r c e s  become d e c i s i v e  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  b i d  f o r  
su p rem a cy ,  j u s t  a s  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a r e  c r u c i a l  a t  t h e  
" c am p a ig n ” l e v e l  o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t ,  ^ h i s  becomes r e l e v a n t  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  power b e tw e e n  t h e  h e a d  o f  
s t a t e  an d  t h e  c h i e f  o f  g o v e rn m e n t ,  and  e s p e c i a l l y  a s  r e g a r d s  
t h e  c o n t r o l  of  th e  armed f o r c e s .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  Uganda t h e  
r o l e  o f  t h e  Kabaka a s  P r e s 5.d e n t  o f  Uganda a n d  King  o f  h i s  own 
Buganda compounded by h i s  p e r s o n a l  p r o p e n s i t i e s  f o r  l e a d e r ­
s h i p  made th e  f i n a l  showdown i n e v i t a b l e .  Bu t  a f t e r  Obote 
s t r u c k  t h e  d e c i s i v e  blow he c o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  law  a n d  o r d e r  
and  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  h a d  t o  be m a i n t a i n e d ;  an d  t h a t  t h e  
Kabaka who, as  P r e s i d e n t ,  was a  symbol o f  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y ,  
b e t r a y e d  h i s  t r u s t  i n  a d v a n c in g  p o l i t i c a l  c l a i m s  w h i c h  w ere  
d i s r u p t i v e  o f  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y .  T h i s  a rg u m e n t  seems t o  h a v e  won 
t h e  day j u d g in g  by t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  r e b e l l i o n  i n  B u g a n d a .  One 
o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a  s i t u a t i o n  where  a t h r e a t  t o  u n i t y  becom es 
imminent  b u t  i s  met e f f e c t i v e l y  i s  t h a t  i t  s t i m u l a t e s  c e n t r a l ­
i s i n g  t e n d e n c i e s  w i t h  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t i a l  a b o l i t i o n  o f  d u a l i t y
1 .  I n  C h a p t e r  S ix  t h i s  w i l l  be t a k e n  up  a s  t h e  p o i n t  o f  r e f e r ­
ence  o f  A f r i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  (and  p o l i t i c a l )  d e v e lo p m e n t .
I n  t h e  e x e c u t i v e ,  as  w e l l  as  p e r h a p s  d u a l i t y  i n  t h e  l e g i s ­
l a t u r e  and  i n  p a r t i e s .
The N i g e r i a n  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  more i n v o l v e d ,  b u t  t h e  im ­
p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  th e  same. T h e re  a g a i n  -  t o  o v e r s i m p l i f y  -  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  o f  th e  N o r t h e r n  R e g i o n ^ t h e  
l a t e  Ahmadu B e l l o ,  c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e rn m e n t  a s  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  p a r t y  (NgC) w i t h  a m a j o r i t y  o f  s e a t s  i n  
p a r l i a m e n t  t h r o u g h  t h e  F e d e r a l  Prime M i n i s t e r  who was h i s  
d e p u t y  a s  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  NPC. Though t h e  p o s i t i o n  was t h u s  
d i f f e r e n t ,  i n  b o th  c o u n t r i e s  t h e  s e e d  o f  c o n f l i c t  was p r e s e n t  
when t h e y  were l a u n c h e d  upon  in d e p e n d e n c e .
The a b o l i t i o n  of  a d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  t h r o u g h  t h e  o v e r t h r o w  
o f  a go v e rn m e n t  o r  d i s m i s s a l  o f  some o f  i t s  members i s  n o t  
l i m i t e d  t o  A ng lophon ic  A f r i c a .  I n  S e n e g a l  S e n g h o r  d i s m i s s e d  
( a n d  i m p r i s o n e d )  Mamadou D ia ,  and  l a t e r  d e c l a r e d  a u n i t a r y  
e x e c u t i v e .  I n  th e  Congo (K in s )  a b o u t  a y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  coup of  November 1 965 ,  Kobutu  a b o l i s h e d  t h e  o f f i c e  
o f  P r im e M i n i s t e r .  The c r i s i s  w h ich  l e d  t o  a  m i l i t a r y  t a k e  
o v e r  i n  Dahomey i n  December 1965 was c e n t r e d  p a r t l y  on  t h e  
c o n f l i c t  b e tw e e n  P r e s i d e n t  A p i t h y  and  Prim e M i n i s t e r  Ahoma- 
d e g b e .  The c r i s i s  i n  S e n e g a l  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  a t  l e a s t  one 
i m p o r t a n t  r e s p e c t .  The d u a l  s t r u c t u r e  i n  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  b e f o r e  
t h e  c r i s i s ^ r e f l e c t e d  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  p e r s o n a l  power r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p s  b e tw e e n  P r e s i d e n t  S enghor  and  Prime M i n i s t e r  Mamadou D ia ,
was a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  i n  o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Mamadou Dia  
h a d  a m a j o r i t y  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  B u r e a u  o f  t h e  p a r t y  
( t h e  UPS),  w h e rea s  Senghor  h ad  a m a j o r i t y  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly .  llama clou D ia  c l a im e d  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  
t h e  B u rea u  s h o u ld  p r e v a i l  o v e r  t h a t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly .  
T h i s  S en g h o r  d i d  n o t  a c c e p t .  D ia  t r i e d  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A ssem b ly  by f o r c e  from p a s s i n g  a  v o t e  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  on h i s  
g o v e r n m e n t .  The c o n f l i c t  was r e s o l v e d  by  t h e  m i l i t a r y  o v e r  
w h ic h  S en g h o r  had  c o n t r o l ,  n o t  o n ly  by v i r t u e  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n  
o f  b e i n g  t h e  Head o f  S t a t e  and  t h e  C0m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , b u t  
a l s o  t h r o u g h  s p e c i a l  r e l a t i o n s .
W i th  t h e s e  i n t r o d u c t o r y  r e m a rk s  we t u r n  now t o  a c o n ­
s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  
i n  t h o s e  s t a t e s  where i t  s t i l l  e x i s t s  i n  a d u a l  fo rm  -  Gambia ,  
L e s o t h o  and  S o m a l ia .
SECTION I  -  THE HEAD OF STATE 
T h e re  a r e  two ty p e s  o f  h e a d s  o f  s t a t e  i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s :  
m onarchy  (The Gambia and L e s o t h o )  an d  p r e s i d e n c y  ( i n  S o m a l i a ) .
A .  MONARCHIES
1 .  The Gambia
I n  t h e  Gambia t h e  head  o f  s t a t e  i s  t h e  Queen o f  G r e a t  
B r i t a i n .  The Gambia i s  i n  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  t h r o u g h  
w h ic h  a l l  f o rm e r  B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  A f r i c a  ( a n d  e l s e w h e r e )  
h a v e  p a s s e d  im m e d ia te ly  a f t e r  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  The Queen i s  r e -
p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  Gambia by a G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  who a c t s  on 
h e r  b e h a l f .  T h e r e f o r e  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  Head o f  
S t a t e  o f  t h e  Gambia must f o c u s  on t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  G o v e r n o r -  
g e n e r a l ,  who was s t y l e d  t h u s  a f t e r  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
The s t a t u s  and powers o f  t h e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  i n  t h e  
Gambia u n d e r  t h e  p r e s e n t  a r r a n g e m e n t  i s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  
t h o s e  o f  o t h e r  fo rm er  E r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  A f r i c a  a t  a 
s i m i l a r  s t a g e  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a d v a n c e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  
t h a t  a c c e d e d  t o  in d e p en d en c e  a f t e r  1 9 5 7 .  The same i s  a l s o  
t r u e  o f  t h e  s t a g e s  b e f o r e  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  An a c c o u n t  o f  t h e s e  
q u e s t i o n s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to /G a m b ia  h a s  t h e r e f o r e  some g e n e r a l  
r e l e v a n c e .  I n  a s  much as t h e r e  h as  b ee n  an  Im p a c t  o f  t h e  
c o l o n i a l  s y s t e m  on p r e s e n t  A f r i c a n  s y s te m s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  i t  
w o u ld  be o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  l o o k  i n t o  t h e  s t a t u s  a n d  p o w ers  o f  
t h e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l .  The o f f i c e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  I n  t h e  
r e p u b l i c s  h a s  b een  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  C o l o n i a l  
G o v e rn o r  i n  no l e s s  m easure  t h a n  t h e  c a b i n e t  h a s  by  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  c o u n c i l .
A p p o in tm e n t
A l th o u g h  t h e  a p p o in tm e n t  was f o r m a l l y  made by  H er  M a j e s t y ,  
and  t h e  ^ o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  h e l d  o f f i c e  " d u r i n g  H er  M a j e s t y ’ s 
p l e a s u r e . , i t  was t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  C o l o n i e s  ( l a t e r  c h a n g e d  t o  
Commonwealth R e l a t i o n s )  who h a d  t h e  r e a l  power o f  a p p o i n t m e n t .
I n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  th e  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n  was t a k e n  by t h e  
g o v e rn m en t  and t h e  ( f i n a l )  l e g a l  a c t  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  was made 
by t h e  Queen* The G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  l e g a l l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  
Queen and  e x e r c i s e d  h i s  f u n c t i o n s  i n  h e r  name* B u t  t h i s  i s  
a  l e g a l  f i c t i o n ;  p o l i t i c a l l y  i t  i s  th e  C a n b i a h P a r l i a m e n t  w h ic h  
h a s  t a k e n  o v e r  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t *  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  
o f  S t a t e *
T h ere  a r e  no p r o v i s i o n s  on t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  a
G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  i n  t h e  Gambia r e q u i r i n g  him t o  be  a  c i t i z e n
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o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y ,  and t h i s  h a s  b een  t y p i c a l  i n  A f r i c a *  The
q u e s t i o n  o f  h i s  rem ova l  b e f o r e  I n d e p e n d e n c e  was a m a t t e r  between
t h e  l o c a l  governm en t  and  Her ’m a je s ty #  The s t a t u s  o f  t h e
G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  has  som etim es  b een  e q u a t e d  i n  a l l  e s s e n t i a l
2
r e s p e c t s  w i t h  t h a t  of  t h e  s o v e r e i g n  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom*
F u n c t i o ns o f  t h e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l
H i s t o r i c a l l y  th e  powers o f  t h e  Gover n o r  i n  t h e  c o l o n i e s  hard!
am oun ted  t o  v i r t u a l  a u to c r a c y *  The G o v e r n o r ,  d u r i n g  t h e  p h a s e
3
o f  Crown C olony^has  b een  l i k e n e d  t o  a  T u d o r  Monarch* W h a tev e r  
h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  -  a n d  t h a t  may 
h a v e  v a r i e d  f rom  p e r s o n  t o  p e r s o n  an d  f ro m  one s i t u a t i o n  t o  
a n o t h e r  -  h i s  p o s i t i o n  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  c o l o n y  was u n c h a l l e n g e d *
1 ,  e#g* i n  M alaya ,  t h e  G overnor  was r e q u i r e d  t o  be  one b o r n  
i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y ,  c f .  de S m i th ,  o p * c i t . ,  pp* 9 1 -9 2 *
2* de S m i th ,  i b id *
3 .  cf* Wiseman, op#c i t* ,  p* 15 .
He e n j o y e d  a lm o s t  a b s o l u t e  p o w e rs ;  h i s  d e c i s i o n  was f i n a l  
an d  h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f c l a j  o n ly  t o  t h e  "home g o v e r n m e n t ” w h ic h ,  
t o  t h e  A f r i c a n ,  was as  r e m o te  a s  " t h e  h e a v e n l y  m a n d a te "  o f  a n  
a b s o l u t e  monarch* I n  r e a l i t y ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  p o s t u ­
l a t e s  o f  c o l o n i a l  p o l i c y  and t h e  p e r s o n a l  q u a l i t i e s  o f  t h e  i n ­
d i v i d u a l  g o v e r n o r  m e e t in g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  n e c e s s i t i e s  q u a l i f i e d  
t h e  a p p a r e n t  a b s o l u t e n e s s  o f  t h e  r u l e *
We h av e  s e e n  how th e  g r o w th  o f  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o u n c i l
was acco m p a n ied  by a p r o p o r t i o n a t e  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  pow ers  ~
©o f  t h e  g o v e r n o r .  I n  t h e  p e r i o d  im m e d i a t e l y  b e f o r e  i n d e -  
p e n d e n c e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i3  marked by a com plex  s e t  o f  a r r a n g e ­
m e n ts  i n  w h ich  th e  g o v e r n o r  h a s  g r a d u a l l y  w i th d r a w n  a l m o s t  
t o  t h e  b a c k g ro u n d  b u t  s t i l l  e x e r c i s e s  r e s e r v e  p ow ers  a n d  
r e s i d u a r y  p e r s o n a l  d i s c r e t i o n *  I n  t h e  p r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e  c o n ­
s t i t u t i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  t h e  Gambia as  l a t e  a s  1962 u n d e r  
t h e  Gambia ( C o n s t i t u t i o n )  O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l  (1962)  t h e  
g o v e r n o r  i s  g iv e n  powers "•  • . u n d e r  t h e  o r d e r  o r  an y  o t h e r  
lav/ an d  s u c h  o t h e r  powers an d  d u t i e s  as  H er  M a j e s t y  may f ro m  
t im e  t o  t im e  be p l e a s e d  t o  a s s i g n  t o  him*" M o reo v e r  he  was 
r e q u i r e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  such  f u n c t i o n  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  otfd. w i t h  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  as  Her M a je s ty  may f ro m  t im e  t o  t im e  s e e  f i t  t o  
g i v e  h im , s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  O rd e r  an d  any  o t h e r  law  by w h ic h  t h e  
p ow ers  an d  d u t i e s  were c o n f e r r e d  on him* The q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  
he  h a d  i n  any  m a t t e r  com plied  w i t h  su c h  i n s t r u c t i o n s  was n o t
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t o  be  e n q u i r e d  i n t o  by any c o u r t  o f  lav / .
W i th  t h e  emergence o f  r e s p o n s i b l e  g o v e rn m e n t  i n  t h e  
Gambia ( a s  elsewhere a t  a s i m i l a r  s t a g e )  t h e  power o f  t h e  
g o v e r n o r  was c u r t a i l e d ,  and  t h i s  i s  now here  s e e n  more c l e a r l y  
t h a n  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  a p p o in tm e n t  t o  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e  o f  
t h e  governm ent#  Under t h e  I n d e p e n d e n c e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1966 
t h e  g o v e r n o r  became a G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l ,  who e x e r c i s e s  e x e c u ­
t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  i n  t h e  name o f  t h e  Ciueen, b u t  v/hom p a r l i a m e n t  
can  d i v e s t  o f  powers# The G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  a p p o i n t s  a s  P r im e 
M i n i s t e r  a v o t i n g  member o f  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  who
a o o e a r s  t o  h im  ’’most l i k e l y ’* t o  command t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e
2
m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  v o t i n g  members o f  t h e  House# T h i s  f o r m u l a  
a n d  t h e  a b s e n c e  of  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a p a r t y  w i t h  a  m a j o r i t y ,  seems 
t o  t a k e  c a r e  of  a s i t u a t i o n  w here  t h e r e  i s  no  b i - p a r t y  o r  
m u l t i - p a r t y  system# The m i n i s t e r s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  P r im e  l l i n i -  
s t e r  a r e  a p p o i n t e d  by th e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  a c t i n g  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i t h  t h e  a d v i c e  of  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r #  The m i n i s t e r s  a r e
3
a p p o i n t e d  from among t h e  members o f  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
1# S ec t#  5#
2# S ec t#  6 2 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) .  T h is  fo  r r ^ l a  i j ^ ^ n  a c c o r d  w i t h  t h o s e  
u s e d  i n  most o t h e r  Afr ican j5non§r : i  t u t  i o n s . The f o r m u l a  
u s e d  by th e  1963 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  docum ent  o f  t h e  Gambia 
w a s : " t h e - e l e c t e d  member o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  who a p p e a r s
t o  him t o  be t h e  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  p a r t y  w h ic h  commands t h e  
s u p p o r t  o f  th e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  H o u se ” , w h ic h  h a s  b e e n  
c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be  l e s s  s a t i s f a c t o r y #  c f .  S . I . I i o *  1629 
1 9 6 3 .  S . 1 3 ( 1 ) ;  and de S m ith ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  9 5 .
3. Sect# 63(4)#
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I f  o c c a s i o n  a r i s e s  f o r  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  t o  t h e  
o f f i c e  o f  t h e  P r im e  M i n i s t e r  o r  any  o t h e r  m i n i s t e r  w h i l e  
t h e  H ouse  i s  d i s s o l v e d  p r o v i s i o n  i s  made f o r  t h e  G o v e r n o r -  
g e n e r a l  t o  a p p o i n t  a  p e r s o n  who was a  member o f  t h e  H o u se ,  
i m m e d i a t e l y  b e f o r e  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n , 1 F o r  s u c h  a n  e v e n t u a l i t y  
t h e  c i r c l e  o f  c h o i c e  i s  n a r r o w e d  down e x c l u d i n g  p e o p l e  whohad 
n o t  b e e n  e l e c t e d  t o  p a r l i a m e n t .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e  
a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  P r im e  M i n i s t e r  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  G o v e r n o r -  
g e n e r a l ' s  d i s c r e t i o n  b e c o m e s  v e r y  w id e  w h ere  t h e r e  a p p e a r s  t o  
b e  d i s p u t e d  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  t h e  r a n k s  o f  t h e  e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e s .  A n o th e r  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h ic h  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  t h e  
G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  may b e  e x e r c i s e d  i s  i n  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  
P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  w h ic h  may t a k e  p l a c e  i f  a  v o t e  o f  no c o n f i d e n c e  
i n  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  o f  t h e  Gambia i s  p a s s e d  by  t h e  H o u s e ;  o r  
i f  a t  any  t i m e  b e t w e e n  t h e  h o l d i n g  o f  a  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  a n d  
t h e  f i r s t  s i t t i n g  o f  t h e  House t h e r e a f t e r  t h e  G o v e r n o r  c o n s i d e r s  
t h a t ,  i n  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  c h a n g e s  ixi t h e  m e m b e rs h ip  o f  t h e  H ouse  
r e s u l t i n g  f ro m  t h a t  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  P r im e  M i n i s t e r  w i l l n o t  be
a b l e  t o  command t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  m em bers  o f  
2t h e  H o u s e .  Such  v a c a n c y  o f  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  d e p r i v e s  t h e  o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e i r  o f f i c e s .
Any m i n i s t e r  may c e a s e  t o  h o l d  h i s  o f f i c e  i f  he  c e a s e d  t o  be
1 .  S e c t .  6 3 (b ) .  
2 . S e c t . 6 3 ( 6 ) .
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a member o f  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o t h e r w i s e  t h a n  by
1
d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t .  A m i n i s t e r  may a l s o  v a c a t e  h i s
o f f i c e  i f  t h e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  a c t i n g  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e
a d v i c e  o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  so  d i r e c t s ;  o r  i n  c a s e  o f  t h e
2
a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  any p e r so n  t o  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  P r im e  M i n i s t e r .
The f o r e g o i n g  a c c o r d s  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The t e n u r e  o f  t h e  P r im e  M i n i s t e r  i s  b a s e d  
on t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e  o f  B r i t a i n .  The f u n c t i o n s  o f  
t h e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  i n c l u d i n g  powers  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  a r e  
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  a d v i c e  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  o r  a  
m i n i s t e r  a c t i n g  u n d e r  t h e  g e n e r a l  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  
e x c e p t  i n  c a s e s  where he i s  r e q u i r e d  by  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  
o t h e r  laws t o  a c t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  any  p e r s o n
o r  a u t h o r i t y  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c a b i n e t  o r  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  h i s
3
own d e l i b e r a t e  ju d g m e n t .  He a c t s  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a p a c i t y  i n  
t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t ,  i n  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  a n d  r e m o v a l  
o f  t h e  P r im e M i n i s t e r  o r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t e m ­
p o r a r y  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r ’ s f u n c t i o n s  d u r i n g  s h o r t  
a b s e n c e  o r  i l l n e s s ;  and  i n  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  h i s  p e r s o n a l  s t a f f .  
The Pr im e M i n i s t e r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  k e e p  t h e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  
f u l l y  i n f o rm e d  on t h e  g e n e r a l  c o n d u c t  o f  t h e  g o v e rn m en t  o f  t h e  
Gambia,  and  t o  f u r n i s h  i n f o r m a t i o n  he  may r e q u i r e  w i t h  r e s p e c t
1 .  S ec t*  6 3 (7 )*  
2* ° e c t . 6 3 ( B ) .  
3 .  S e c t .  6 9 .
4. P ro v is o  to  S e c t .  69.
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to  any p a r t icu la r  matter r e la t in g  to  the government of the  
1
Gambia. The reserve powers or s p e c ia l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
e x e r c i s e d  or carried out by the Governor under the p re ­
independence arrangements do not appear i n  the independence
c o n s t i tu t io n *  A s ta te  of emergency i s  declared  by the  Prime 
2
m in is t e r .  The prerogative of mercy i s  e x e r c i s e d  by the
Governor-general in  the name of the Queen, on the adv ice  of
an advisory  committee on prerogative of  n ercy ,  c o n s i s t i n g  of
the Prime Minister (who acts  as chairman), the  A tto rn ey -
rreneral and not l e s s  than two or more than four, o ther  members
3
appointed by him.
The r e la t io n s h ip  between the Governor-general and the  
Prime M in ister  as f ix ed  in  the c o n s t i t u t i o n  seems to  f a l l  
n e a t ly  in  the t r a d i t io n  of B r i t i s h  cab inet  government.Bub  
ftt that t r a d i t io n  i s  a con stan t ly  changing one,  
as we s h a l l  see in  a l a t e r  s e c t io n  of t h i s  chapter ,  and cannot 
be permanently frozen in  a w r i t te n  c o n s t i t u t i o n  which would 
take care of a l l  problems of power c o n f l i c t s .  Secondly even  
i f  th a t  were p o s s ib le  in  B r i ta in ,  i t  does not n e c e s s a r i l y  
fo l lo w  th a t  i t  can in  a d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e  w ith  a d i f f e r e n t  
background. There have been no power c o n f l i c t s  in v o lv in g  the  
two ex e c u t iv e s  in  the Gambia, but the l e s s o n s  o f  S ierra  Leone
1 .  S ec t .  70.
2. S e c t .
3. S e c t s .  77 and 78.
are i n s t r u c t i v e ,  and v/orth pointing  to  by way o f  example*
There the dual executive did not help  to  con ta in  c o n f l i c t  or 
h elp  r e s o lv e  them c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ly .  On March 17th  a genera l  
e l e c t i o n  was held  in  which the two major p a r t i e s  c o n te s t in g  
were the  Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) l e d  by S ir  A lbert  
Kargai, the incumbent Prime m in is te r ,  and the A l l  Peoples  
Congress (APC) le d  by Mr. Siaka Stevens.  The r e s u l t s  showed 
an in d e c i s iv e  outcome, (the SLPP 31 s e a t s ;  the APC 28 s e a t s  
and two independents).  The APC claimed v i c t o r y ,  winning four  
of  the f i v e  outstanding s e a t s .  On March 2 1 s t ,  w ith  one r e ­
s u l t  to  come, the state 6f the papt i e s  was g iven  as f o l l o w s • 
SLPP 32; APC 31; Independents 2 .  The SLPP t o t a l ,  however, 
in c lud ed  f i v e  IT.Pis who had o f f i c i a l l y  s tood  as independents ,  
and Mr* Siaka Stevens claimed to  have won the e l e c t i o n .  The 
e l e c t i o n  had been held in  an atmosphere of  widespread c r i t i ­
cism of  S ir  Albert Margaif s government, because of  i t s  
(u n su c ces s fu l )  attempt to  introduce a one-party s t a t e .  On 
March 20th ,  the Governor-general, S ir  Henry Light f o o t  -Boston
asked S ir  Albert and Hr. Stevens to  agree t o  form a c o a l i t i o n
on
government. Mr. Stevens re fused  to  a g ree / th e  grounds th at  
t h i s  would c o n s t i tu te  a b etrayal  of the people because o f  the  
strong op p o s it io n  shown to the government1s e a r l i e r  p ro p o sa ls .  
The Governor-general then asked Mr. Stevens to  form a govern­
ment, and, on March 2 1 s t ,  Mr. Stevens was sworn i n  as Prime 
M in is ter ,  for  what must surely  be the s h o r te s t  term of  o f f i c e
ever h e ld .  For, a few minutes l a t e r  he as w e l l  as the  
Governor-general were surrounded by the arrny and detained*  
B rigad ier  Latasana, the army ch ief)  declared  a s t a t e  o f  emer­
gency* “ilhere was a counter coup which took p lace  soon i n ­
s t a l l i n g  another m i l i ta ry  government in  Africa*
A Governor-general caught in  such s i t u a t i o n s  has obviously  
c r u c ia l  powers* The d i s c r e t io n  becomes power* I t  i s  q u i te  
c lea r  th a t  had S ir  Henry asked S ir  A lbert margai to  form a 
government on the argument that  there  was no one c l e a r ly  
commanding a majority in  the House, there would have been  
an outcry from the APC which would probably have led  to  an 
army coup led  by the o f f i c e r s  who e f f e c t e d  the counter coup*
The e s s e n t i a l  point here i s  th at  in  such circumstances^which­
ever way the power of the Governor-general i s  e x e r c i s e d ,  i t  
i s  not l i k e l y  that i t  would n e c e s s a r i ly  avoid  c r i s e s .  So the  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  of a d ivided o f f i c e  w ith  i t s  c o r o l la r y  
of assumption of those o f f i c e s  by people re p r esen t in g  d i f f e r ­
ent views or in t e r e s t s  does not appear to  s o lv e  problems.
2 .  Lesotho
Lesotho i s  a country s ty le d  by i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n  as  a
1
"sovere ign  democratic kingdom." The b ir th  of  t h i s  kingdom in  
October 4 th ,  1966 brought to  A fr ica  the f i r s t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
1 .  S e c t .  1 ( 1 ) .
monarchy modelled on the B r i t i s h  monarchy but w ith  an A fr ican
King as the Head of S ta te .  In a c e r ta in  sense we f ind  in  i t
the p o s i t i o n  of the B r i t i sh  monarch projected  to  A fr ic a ,  but
r e v is e d  and regulated  by a w r i t ten  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  The King o f
Lesotho i s  enjoined to  do a l l  th ings 'that belong to  h i s  o f f i c e
in  accordance with  the provis ions  of the present c o n s t i t u t i o n
2
and a l l  other laws for the tirne being in  f o r c e . T h e  f i r s t
person to  be recognised as the holder of the o f f i c e  of King o f
Lesotho i s  the person formerly holding the o f f i c e  of the
Paramount Chief ( c a l l e d  M o tle t leh i)  under the Basutoland Order, 
3
1965.
On the abdication  or death of the King, h i s  su cce sso r
must be designated  by the College of C h ie fs ,  in  accordance
w ith  the customary law of Lesotho, from amongst persons who
are e n t i t l e d  to  succeed him; u n le ss  a su cce sso r  ha<ff been
des ignated  previous to  the event of death or a b d ic a t io n ,  in
4
which case that  person succeeds the King. I f  any such d e s i g ­
n a t io n  fo r  su ccess ion  i s  disputed by a r i v a l  c la im ant,  and an 
a p p l i c a t io n  i s  made to the Court of Appeal w i th in  s i x  months 
of the p u b l ica t io n  of the des ignat ion  in  the G azette ,  the  
Court of  Appeal i s  given j u r i s d ic t io n  to  hear the m atter .  But
1. S e c t .  3 2 (1 ) .  S t r i c t l y  speaking the f i r s t  was i n  Zanzibar,  
but the  powers of the Sultan were greater th e r e .
2 .  S e c t .  3 2 (2 ) .
3. S e c t .  3 2 (3 ) .
4 .  S e c t .  33(1)
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such claim must be that the claimant i s  a b e t t e r  candidate.? not
simply that  the designated su ccessor  was not e n t i t l e d  to  be so
d es ignated .  The College of Chiefs  may a l s o  d es ig n a te  a person
to  e x e r c i s e  the functions of the King, in  case o f  h i s  tempor-
2
ary absence or i l l n e s s .  Every d es ig n a t io n  must be pub lished
3
in  the G azette .  The College of  Chiefs  has a l s o  power to
appoint a regent in case o f  the monarch i s  a minor ( i . e .
under 21) or in  the event of permanent absence or d i s a b i l i t y .
F a i l in g  t h i s  the Court of Appeal has power, on the a p p l i c a t io n
of  any person, to  appoint a regent in  accordance with the
4
customary law of Lesotho#
The College of Chiefs i s  composed of the twenty-two
p r in c ip a l  ch ie fs  and ward c h ie f s  and other members co -opted  
5
by them.
Functions of the King
The c o n s t i tu t io n  makers of Lesotho have shown them­
s e l v e s  anxious to  model the r o le  of the King upon th a t  of  
the B r i t i s h  monarch. Thi3 i s  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  i n  r e s p e c t  
of the matters on which the King may e x e r c i s e  h i s  fu n c t io n s  
w ith  h i s  own d e l ibera te  judgment under a r t i c l e  76(2)  o f  the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  The executive au th o r ity  i s  vested  in  him i n
1 .  S e c t .  3 3 (5 ) .  5 .  S e c t .  89.
2 .  S ec t .  3 3 (3 ) .
3.  S e c t .  3 3 (4 ) .
4 .  S ec t .  3 4 ( 1 ) ( 3 ) .
the same manner as i t  i s  v e s te d  in  the Governor-general in
the Gambia or the Queen in  B r i ta in .  In other words, u l t im ate
execu t ive  power l i e s  with the cabinet and the Prime M inister
1
In accordance w ith  the provis ions  of the c o n s t i t u t i o n .  As
in  the case of the Governor-general of the Gambia, the King
of Lesotho a c ts  in accordance with the advice  g iven  to  him by
tfcie cab inet ,  or a m in ister  ac t in g  under the gen era l  a u th or ity
of the cab inet ,  or a person or author ity  o ther  than the cabinet
in  cases where he i s  required s o to act  by the c o n s t i t u t i o n
2
or any other law.
However, the King may act  in  accordance w ith  h i s  d e l i b e r ­
a te  judgment in  some cases* Under s e c t io n  76(2)  he ac ts  thus 
in  the e x e rc ise  of the power to  appoint or remove the Prime 
M in is ter ,  and in  r e la t io n  to  the performance of the Prime 
M in is ter1s function ,  in  the event of the l a t t e r 1s absence or 
i l l n e s s .  The same i s  true in  r e l a t i o n  to  the appointment of 
the nominated members of the senate whom he ap p o in ts ,  in  
r e l a t i o n  t o  h is  Privy Council and in  r e l a t i o n  to  the d i s s o ­
l u t i o n  of parliament; in  the appointment o f  the members of  
the N ational  Planning Board, as w e l l  as h is  o?m s t a f f ;  and
l a s t l y  in  the exerc ise  of d i sc ip l in a r y  c o n tr o l  over c h ie f s ,
3
3ave as parliament may otherwise provide. The p rov iso  to
1 .  S e c t .  71(1) and (2 ) .
2 .  S ec t .  7 6 ( 1 ) .
3 . S ec t .  7 6 ( 2 ) ( a - j ) .
t h i s  su b se c t io n  noted above, s t a t e s  th a t  the  King s h a l l  r e f e r
to  United Kingdom conventions in  re sp ec t  of the d i s s o l u t i o n  o f
parl iam ent,  the appointment and removal o f  the Prime M in ister
and the e x e r c i s e  of h is  fu n ct io n  in  case  o f  absence or i l l n e s s .
In a l l  the r e s t  he sh a l l  act  with h i s  a b so lu te  d i s c r e t io n .
In case of neg lect  or d e fa u lt  of duty by the King, the
Prime M in ister  may inform the Ming th at  he w i l l  perform the
act h im se l f  a f t e r  the ex p ira t io n  of a period  which he may
s p e c i f y .  I f ,  at the end of that  period ,  the King has not
done th at  act  the Prime Minister may do th a t  a c t  h im se l f  and
report  the matter to uarliament. And t h i s  i s  not a J u s t i c i -  
1
able i s s u e .  On the other hand the King has the r ig h t  to
be con su lted  by the Prime Minister and other m in is te r s  on
the government of Lesotho; and the Prime M in ister  i s  required
2
to  keep him f i i l l y  informed. A lso  there i s  a Privy Council
which a s s i s t s  the King in  the d ischarge of h i s  fu n c t io n s ;
i t  c o n s i s t s  of the Prime M inister ,  one person nominated by
the King and another person appointed by him on the advice of
the Prime M inister .  The funct ion  of  the Privy Council i s
3
advisory  on ly .  There i s  a lso  a Pardon3 Committee which 
a d v ise s  the King; i t  co n s is ts  of persons appointed by the
1 .  S e c t .  76(4 ) ( 6 ) .
2 .  S e c t .  77.
3 .  S e c t .  8 0 ( 1 ) ( 4 ) .
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1
King on the advice of the J u d ic ia l  Serv ice  Commission#
F in a l ly  i t  may he said th a t  the person who f i l l s  the  
o f f i c e  of the King may w el l  f in d  h is  p o s i t i o n  r e s t r i c t e d  
and may as a re su l t  he tempted to  abandon r e s t r a i n t  and 
make vigorous interventions  in  government* l i e cent events  
have shown that  th i s  i s  a l i k e l y  course#
The King of Lesotho (King I.lo shoe shoe. I I )  announced 
Lec^mtrer that he would d e l iv e r  a speech a t  a mass
meeting on December 27th at Thaba-Bosigo, a small v i l l a g e  
some twenty kilometres from Maseru, the cap ita l*  The Prime 
M in ister  thereupon invoked h is  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  powers to  
fo r b id  the King from proceeding to  d e l i v e r  the p ub l ic  speech.  
I t  should be re c a l le d  that there had been a c o n f l i c t  going  
back to  pre-independence days. The King (then  the Paramount 
Chief of  the Basutos) refused to take part in  the c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  conference held in  London in  July 1966, presumably 
because he had come to r e a l i s e  that h i s  powers under the  
proposed c o n s t i tu t io n  would be l i m i t e d .  He had i n  f a c t  
demanded for  h im se lf  the control over the armed fo r c e s  and 
over fo re ig n  a f f a i r s ;  the leader o f  the m ajority  party  
however, opposed these demands and the B r i t i s h  government 
supported the majority party, and Basutoland became inde­
pendent on October 4th, 1966 as Lesotho*
1 .  S e c t .  86
The mas sea cane to the appointed p lace  at  the appointed
date t o  hear the King. Po lice  used tear  gas t o  d isp e r se  them,
but they would not go. JL f i g h t  ensued in  which e ig h t  c i v i l i a n s
and one policeman were k i l l e d ,  ^he Prime M in ister  announced
th a t  there  had been plans to overthrow h is  government and
he ordered the King* s palace to  be put under armed s u r v e i l -
1
lan ce  and the King put under T,housen a rres t*  The a l l e ­
g a t io n  to£ a planned coup has not been pursued or s u b s t a n t i ­
ated* But some people o f  South A fr ican  o r i g i n  were expelled*  
The Prime M inister  had made re feren ce  to  the support g iven  
to  the King by the opposit ion  party ,  the Basutoland Congress 
Party (BCP)* The BCP did not accept the e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  
o f  1965 which gave a weak majority to  C hief  Jonathan^
N ation a l  Party. I t  i s  a l s o  true th at  the  BCP condemned the  
a c t io n  of  the government which, under the p r e te x t  o f  r e a l i sm ,  
had co-operated  with the government o f  South A fr ic a .  As i t  
happens the King a lso  condemned such co-operation* This 
common h o s t i l i t y  may have created a temporary a l l i a n c e  
between the BCP and the King1 s party ,  the Marema TTlo u  
Freedom Party (IITFF). fhus a d e c i s io n  by a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
king to  address a public meeting would e a s i l y  arouse the  
fe a r s  of the government which had a small m ajority  i n  i t s  
parliament which could be undermined by a t r a in  of  events
1* He was l a t e r  allowed to  leave Lesotho to  complete h i s  
s tu d ie s  abroad*
184.
s e t  i n  m o t io n  by su c h  a s p e e c h .  T h is  t h e  P r im e M i n i s t e r
was n o t  p r e p a r e d  to  h a v e ,  ^ e n c e  h i s  r e f u s a l  t o  p e r m i t  t h e
a d d r e s s  and  h i s  d r a s t i c  a c t i o n  w h ich  c o u ld  h a v e  e a s i l y
hoa
d e t e r i o r a t e d  i n t o  a chaos  h a d  t h e  P rim e M i n i s t e r  n o t / t h e
1
s u p p o r t  o f  i n t e r e s t e d  " p o n e r s ” , i n c l u d i n g  S o u th  A f r i c a .
B. PRESIDENCY
3 .  Som alia
E l e c t i o n  o f  th e  P r e s i d e n t
The P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  S o m a l i a  i s  e l e c t e d
by t h e  National Assembly i n  a secrot vote by a  t w o - t h i r d s
m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  members on t h e  f i r s t  and  s e c o n d  b a l l e t s .
I n  s u b s e q u e n t  b a l l o t s  he may be e l e c t e d  by an  a b s o l u t e  
2
m a j o r i t y .
E v e r y  c i t i z e n  o f  S o m a l ia  who i s  a Moslem; whose
p a r e n t s  were  o r i g i n a l  c i t i z e n s  o f  S o m a l i a ;  who i s  n o t  l e s s
t h a n  f o r t y - f i v e  y e a r s  o f  age  an d  who e n j o y s  v o t i n g  r i g h t s
3
i s  e l i g i b l e  t o  be P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c *  The r e q u i r e ­
m ent  a s  t o  r e l i g i o u s  p r o f e s s i o n  i s  n o t  p e c u l i a r  t o  S o m a l i a  
t h e  same i s  t h e  ca se  i n  t h e  M a u r i t a n i a n  a n d  T u n i s i a n  R e p u b ­
l i c s  a s  w e l l  as  i n  t h e  E t h i o p i a n ,  L i b y a n  a n d  M oroccan
1 .  c f .  L ! o b s e r v a t e u r  du Iloyen O r i e n t  e t  de l ’A f r i q u e ,  6 J a n .  
1 9 6 6 ,  p p .  1 7 -1 8 .
2 .  C o n s • a r t  7 0 ( 2 ) •
3 .  A r t .  7 1 (1 ) .
185.
m o n a r c h i e s ,  w i t h  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  E t h i o p i a  t h a t
t h e  E m p e ro r  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  p r o f e s s  t h e  E t h i o p i a n  O r th o d o x  
1
f a i t h .  What n eed s  f u r t h e r  comment i s  t h e  c i t i z e n s h i p  o f  
a c a n d i d a t e 1 s p a r e n t s  who m ust  be " o r i g i n a l  c i t i z e n s  o f  
S o m a l i a . "
The S o m a l i  R e p u b l i c  came i n t o  b e i n g  on J u l y  1 s t ,
I 9 6 0  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  an a c t  o f  u n i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  
S o m a l i a  ( f o r m e r l y  a U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  T r u s t  t e r r i t o r y  u n d e r  
I t a l i a n  a d m in is t r a t io n ^ )  and S o m a l i l a n d  ( f o r m e r l y  t h e  
B r i t i s h  P r o t e c t o r a t e  o f  S o m a l i l a n d ) .  The r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  c i t i z e n s h i p  of a candidate’ s parents m u s t ,  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  mean c i t i z e n s h i p  o f  e i t h e r  one o f  t h e  u n i f i e d  s t a t e s
2
b e f o r e  t h e  a c t  o f  u n i o n .
The P r e s i d e n t  may s t a n d  f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n  b u t  c o n s e -
3
c u t i v e  r e - e l e c t i o n  i s  p e r m i s s i b l e  o n ly  o n c e .  D u r in g  t h e
p r e s i d e n t i a l  t e rm  o f  o f f i c e ,  m a r r i a g e  w i t h  a p e r s o n  who i s
a n o n - c i t i z e n  by o r i g i n  i s  n o t  a l l o w e d .  The e x e r c i s e  o f
o t h e r  p u b l i c  f u n c t i o n s  e x c e p t  t h e  r i g h t  t o  v o t e  i s  a l s o
n o t  a l l o w e d ;  n o r  i s  any p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  c o m m e r c i a l ,  i n d u s t r i a l
4
o r  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y .
1 .  Y e t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  s o l e m n ly  
d e c l a r e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l i t y  o f  c i t i z e n s  b e f o r e  t h e  
law*
2 .  c f .  Law No. 2 o f  1 s t  December 1960 a n d  Law No. 9 o f  1 2 t h  
F e b r u a r y ,  I 9 6 0 .
3 .  A r t .  7 1 ( 1 )
4 .  A r t .  7 1 ( 2 ) ( 3 ) •
186.
The e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t a k e s  p l a c e  d u r i n g  t h e
l a s t  t h i r t y  days  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  m a n d a te  w h ic h  i s  s i x
1
y e a r s  f ro m  t h e  d a t e  of t a k i n g  t h e  o a t h .  The e l e c t i o n  i s
e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly .  Upon
a s s u m in g  h i s  f u n c t i o n s  th e  P r e s i d e n t  t a k e s  a n  o a t h  o f  l o y a l t y
2
t o  t h e  s t a t e  b e f o r e  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly .
As t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  r e s t s  on t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A s s e m b ly ,  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  a P r e s i d e n t  m u s t  t a k e  p l a c e  w hen­
e v e r  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly i s  d i s s o l v e d ,  o r  when l e s s  t h a n  
t h r e e  m on ths  r e m a in  b e f o r e  i t s  t e r m i n a t i o n .  The e l e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t a k e s  p la c e  w i t h i n  t h i r t y  d ay s  o f  t h e  f i r s t
m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  new N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly ,  and  d u r i n g  t h e  i n t e r -
3
v a l  t h e  powers  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i n  o f f i c e  a r e  e x t e n d e d .  I t  
i s  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  m e n t io n  th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A ssem bly  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  as  i t  a f f e c t s  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t .  The P r e s i d e n t  of  t h e  R e p u b l i c  may d i s s o l v e  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  b e f o r e  th e  end  o f  i t s  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e .
He may do t h i s ,  how eve r ,  only  a f t e r  h e a r i n g  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  Assembly,  t h a t  t h e  A ssem bly  c a n n o t
1 .  A r t .  7 2 .
2 .  The fo rm  o f  o a t h  i s  th e  f o l l o w i n g :  r,I  s w e a r  i n  t h e  name
o f  God f a i t h f u l l y  t o  d i s c h a r g e  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  P r e s i d e n t
o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  and t o  d e f e n d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  w i t h  a l l
my s t r e n g t h  f o r  t h e  good o f  t h e  f a t h e r l a n d  a n d  t h e  n a t i o n . 11
A r t .  7 1 ( 3 ) .
3.  A r t .  7 2 ( 3 ) .
d i s c h a r g e  i t s  f u n c t i o  %  o r  t h a t  i t  d i s c h a r g e s  them  i n  a  way 
w h ic h  i s  p r e j u d i c i a l  t o  t h e  n o rm a l  e x e r c i s e ,  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  
a c t i v i t y *  The d i s s o l u t i o n  i s  done "by a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  d e c r e e ,  
a n n o u n c in g  t h e  new e l e c t i o n s  w h ic h  m ust  t a k e  p l a c e  w i t h i n  
s i x t y  days  o f  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n *  The r e t i r i n g  a s s e m b l y  r e ­
t a i n s  i t s  pow ers  u n t i l  th e  e l e c t o r a l  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  new 
a s s e m b l y  a r e  p ro c la im e d *  But d i s s o l u t i o n  may n o t  t a k e  
p l a c e  w i t h i n  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  i n  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  a s s e m b l y  an d
d u r i n g  t h e  l a s t  y e a r  i n  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  
1
R e p u b l i c *
Functions of the Pfegicl.ant
The c o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  t h e  
C h i e f  o f  S t a t e ,  t h a t  he  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  u n i t y  o f  t h e  n a t i o n  
a n d  t h a t  he  e x e r c i s e s  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  c o n f e r r e d  u p o n  h im  by  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and by law*
D r a f t  lav/s o r i g i n a t i n g  f rom  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  
t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b l ie s  t h r o u g h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  who a l s o  
s i g n s  b i l l s  and  p ro m u lg a t e s  them i n t o  l a w .  The P r e s i d e n t  
may a l s o  i s s u e  d e c r e e s  i n  c a s e  o f  u r g e n t  n e c e s s i t y *  B ut  he  
ca n  o n l y  do t h i s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  p r o p o s a l s  t o  t h a t  e f f e c t  
a p p r o v e d  by t h e  C o u n c i l  of  M i n i s t e r s ,  a n d  t h e  d e c r e e  m us t  
b e  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  v j i t h i n  f i v e  d a y s  o f
1* A r t*  53*
2 .  A r t s*  70(1)  and 75*
188*
1
i t s  p u b l i c a t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y  a l l  m e a su re s  d e l e g a t i n g  power
t o  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  a r e  i s s u e d  by p r e s i d e n t i a l  d e c r e e ,  on t h e
2
b a s i s  o f  p r o p o s a l s  ap p ro v ed  by t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  i l i n i s t e r s .
The P r e s i d e n t  may a d d re s s  m e ssag e s  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  
a n d  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  o f  con v en in g  t h e  A ssem bly  f o r  e x t r a ­
o r d i n a r y  s e s s i o n s .
The P r e s i d e n t  i s  th e  C o m m a n d e r - in -C h ie f  o f  t h e  a rm ed  
f o r c e s ,  he  r a t i f i e s  t r e a t i e s  an d  d e c l a r e s  war a n d  p e a c e  a f t e r  
p r e v i o u s  a u t h o r i s a t i o n  by t b o  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly .  He i s  t h e  
f o u n t  o f  h o n o u r ,  has  t h e  . r i g h t  o f  p a r d o n ,  an d  a c c r e d i t s  a n d  
r e c e i v e s  a m b a s s a d o r s .  The p r e r o g a t i v e  o f  p a r d o n  can  be  
e x e r c i s e d  o n ly  a f t e r  a law h a s  b e e n  p a s s e d  by a  t w o - t h i r d s
m ajority  o f  the members of the National Assembly a u th o r is in g
4
t o  g r a n t  t h e  p a rd o n .
T h e s e  a r e  some of  t h e  n o rm a l  f u n c t i o n s  o f  a Head o f
S t a t e ,  w h ic h  a l s o  form  a p a r t  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  a n
5
e x e c u t i v e  Head o f  S t a t e .  B u t*  t h e r e *  endsf t h e  power* o f  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  Somali  R e p u b l i c .  T h ese  p o w ers  h a v e  n o t  
b e e n  e x t e n d e d  o r  m o d i f ie d  i n  any way. The law  on t h e
1* A r t s *  63 ,  75 .
2* A r t .  6 2 .
3 .  A r t .  7 5 .
4 .  A r t . 6 4 .





o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  th e  governm en t  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
o f  t h e  g overnm en t ,  i . e .  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  an d  t h e  o t h e r  
m i n i s t e r s •
As f o r  th e  P r e s id e n t*  s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  he  i s  n o t  
a n s w e r a b l e  f o r  a c t s  p e r fo rm e d  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  h i s  f u n c t i o n ,  
e x c e p t  f o r  c r im es  of  h i g h  t r e a s o n  o r  a t t e m p t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r d e r  a s  p r o v i d e d  by l a w .  I n  ca se  o f  s u c h  
c r im e s  h e  would be t r i e d  b e f o r e  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  c o n s t i t u t e d  
a s  a H ig h  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e .  The d e c i s i o n  t o  t r y  h im  i s  
t a k e n  by t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly upon t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  a t  
l e a s t  one f i f t h  of  i t e  members an d  a p p r o v e d  i n  a s e c r e t  
v o t e  by  a m a j o r i t y  o f  t v / o - t h i r d s  o f  t h e  mem bers .  The 
N a t i o n a l  Assembly has  a r i g h t  t o  a u t h o r i s e  t h e  t r i a l  o f  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  o f f e n c e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  ones  m e n t i o n e d  
a b o v e .  Such a u t h o r i s a t i o n  must  a l s o  be p a s s e d  by a tw o -  
t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y .  Any a u t h o r i s a t i o n  f o r  t r i a l  h a s  t h e  e f f e c t
2
o f  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s u s p e n d in g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f rom  h i s  f u n c t i o n s .
I n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  s u s p e n s i o n  from d u t i e s  o r  o f  d i s ­
a b i l i t y ,  r e s i g n a t i o n  o r  d e a t h  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  a n d  i n  a l l  
c a s e s  o f  t e m p o ra ry  ab s e n c e  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
a r e  t e m p o r a r i l y  e x e r c i s e d ,  w i t h  f u l l  l e g a l  f o r c e ,  by  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly ,  o r  i n  h i s  a b s e n c e ,  by 
t h e  e l d e s t  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t .  I n  c a se  o f  r e s i g n a t i o n ,  t h e
1 .  Law o f  June 3 ,  1962. N o .14* O f f i c i a l  B u l l e t i n  o f  t h e  
S o m a l i  R e p u b l ic  No* 3 to  No. 6 ,  1 9 6 2 .
2. A rt .  7 6 ( 1 ) ( 3 ) ( 5 ) .
1 9 0 .
P r e s i d e n t  i n f o r m s  th e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly .  The v a c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  o f f i c e ,  how ever  caused.,  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e
e l e c t i o n  o f  a new P r e s i d e n t  by t h e  n a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly ,  w i t h i n
1
t h i r t y  days  o f  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  t h a t  e v e n t .
I t  w i l l  be  s e e n  from t h i s  b r i e f  a c c o u n t  t h a t  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  S o m al ia  i s  u n d o u b t e d l y  t h a t  
o f  a  f i g u r e - h e a d  P r e s i d e n t .  I t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  
a r b i t r a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  o f f i c e .
In  f i l l  t h e  t h r e e  s t a t e s  e f f e c t i v e  e x e c u t i v e  power 
r e s i d e s  i n  t h e  c a b i n e t  w hich  i s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  i n s t r u m e n t  
o f  p o l i c y .  The v a r i a t i o n s  i l l  f o n t  arid i n  t h e  m anner  o f  
a c c e s s i o n  t o  o f f i c e  of th e  h e a d  o f  S t a t e  d o es  n o t  a l t e r  
t h e  f a c t  b f  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  t h e  r o l e .  The 
e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  i n  L e s o t h o  and t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  o f  h i s  f u n c t i o n  by a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A f r i c a n  
King may, o f  c o u r s e ,  e n t a i l  c e r t a i n  v a r i e t i e s  o f  a p p r o a c h ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  where  th e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  i s  a n o n - A f r i c a n .  
T h i s  t o u c h e s  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  l e g a l  s o v e r e i g n t y ;  Gambia 
i s  p o l i t i c a l l y  a s o v e r e i g n  s t a t e ,  b u t  l e g a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  
i s  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  Queen o f  G r e a t  B r i t a i n .  T h i s  means t h e r e  
i s  s t i l l  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i n k  b e tw e e n  t h e  two c o u n t r i e s ,  
w h e r e a s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  be tw een  G r e a t  B r i t a i n  a n d  L e s o t h o  h as  
t o  be  f o u n d  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ( n o t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l )  l a w .  The 
c r e a t i o n  o f  a n  A f r i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m o n a rch  i n  p o s t ­
1 .  A r t .  7 4 .
i n d e p e n d e n c e  A f r i c a  i s  i t s e l f  o f  some i n t e r e s t  i n  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n *  T h i s  p r e s e n t s  a  p o i n t  o f  c o n t r a s t  
t o  t h e  o t h e r  a t t e m p t  made i n  Uganda ,  w here  t h e  Kabaka was 
P r e s i d e n t  o f  th e  n a t i o n  as  w e l l  as  a b s o l u t e  King o f  B uganda .
No one dare p ro p h e s y .  So much i s  h a p p e n i n g  so  q u i c k l y .
The young King o f  L e so th o  a p p e a r s  t o  h av e  f o u n d  h i s  c o n -  
s t l t u t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  r e s t r i c t e d  a s  r e c e n t  e v e n t s  h a v e  shown. 
The e v e n t s  have  shown t h a t  t h e  t e m p t a t i o n s  t o  make a t t e m p t s  
a t  v i g o r o u s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  governm en t  a r e  t h e r e  t o  b r e a k  
t h e  r e s t r a i n t i m p o s e d  by t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  But i t  i s  a l s o  
t r u e  t h a t  when t h o s e  who h o l d  r e a l  power command t h e  s u p p o r t  
o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y ,  r e p e a t e d  a t t e m p t s  a t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  w o u ld  
p r e c i p i t a t e  a s e r i o u s  c r i s i s  an d  p o s s i b l y  mean th e  end  o f  
t h e  r eg im e *
A s t u d y  o f  Somali  s o c i a l  l i f e  h as  shown t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  v i l l a g e  e l d e r s  and h e a d s  o f  c lan s 'b e  come i m p o r t a n t  a t  
t i m e s  when t h e  dynamics o f  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  c r e a t e  t e n s i o n  
an d  c o n f l i c t .  A t su ch  t im es  t h ^ r e  a r e  e l d e r s  whose w o rd s  a r e  
h e e d e d  by t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  d i s p u t e .  I t  w ou ld  n o t  be f a r ­
f e t c h e d  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  S o m a l i  P r e s i d e n t  
i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  c l a n  e l d e r  w r i t  l a r g e .  O b v io u s ly  t h e  s t r e s s e s  
a n d  s t r a i n s  i n v o l v e d  i n  modern p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  a r e  more com­
p l e x  t h a n  v i l l a g e  c o n f l i c t s ,  b u t  t h e  s o c i a l  a t t i t u d e  i n b o r n
i n  t h o s e  who p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  p e r h a p s  p r o v i d e s  
a n e c e s s a r y  p r e - c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n  o f  a  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  e x e c u t i v e  s y s te m  i n  w h ich  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  s e e n  
a s  a f a t h e r  f i g u r e  f a m i l i a r  i n  th e  v i l l a g e  s o c i a l  l i f e  o f  
a l l  i n v o l v e d  i n  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t s .  T h i s  p o i n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  
s h o u l d  n o t  be  d r i v e n  to o  f a r .  Not e v e ry b o d y  c o n c e i v e s  t h e  
r o l e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  I n  t h e s e  t e r r a s ,  m o r e o v e r ,  t h e  p e r s o n  
who h o l d s  t h e  o f f i c e  a l s o  makes a d i f f e r e n c e .
The p o s i t i o n  of t h e  Head o f  S t a t e  i n  S o m a l i a  an d  h i s  
r o l e  a s  a r b i t e r  be tw een  r i v a l  f a c t i o n s  n a y  be  a s s e s s e d  by 
t h e  r e c o r d  o f  t h e  f i r s t  P r e s i d e n t ,  who p l a y e d  no mean p a r t  
i n  r e s o l v i n g  a number o f  m i n i s t e r i a l  cr ise>s  d u r i n g  h i s  f i r s t  
t e r m  o f  o f f i c e  be tw een  1960 and  1966 .  The f u t u r e  o f  h i s  o f f i c e  
s h o u l d  be w a tc h e d  w i th  i n t e r e s t .
SECTION I I  -  THE CABINET 
A. Some G e n e r a l  Comments
1* The B r i t i s h  C a b in e t
The Gambia dndXesotho have a d o p te d  C a b i n e t  s y s t e m s  o f  
g o v e rn m e n t  b a s e d  on th e  B r i t i s h ,  w h i l e  S o m a l i a  h a s  f o l l o w e d  
a s y s t e m  e s s e n t i a l l y  on th e  same l i n e s  w i t h  a 11 c o n t i n e n t a l ” 
v a r i a t i o n .  I t  w ou ld ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p r o v i d e  a c o n t e x t u a l  s e t t i n g  
t o  make a few g e n e r a l  o b s e r v a t i o n s  w i t h  a  f o c u s  on t h e  
B r i t i s h  C a b i n e t  sy s tem .
I t  h a s  b e e n  s a i d  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h a t  i t s
o e c u l i a r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e  i s  n o t  so  much
1
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  government a s  r e s p o n s i b l e  g o v e rn m e n t*  The 
c a r d i n a l  p ro b lem  o f  p o l i t i c s  h as  c o n c e r n e d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  a  r e s p o n s i b l e  e x e c u t i v e *  The di lemma i s ,  on t h e  one 
h a n d ,  I f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  i s  n o t  r e s p o n s i b l e  i t s  a c t s  w i l l  
r e g i s t e r  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  m as te r^  n o t  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  
g o v e rn ed *  *^ts a c t s  must be t e s t e d  t h e n  by c o n t i n u a l  s u b ­
m i s s i o n  t o  c r i t i c a l  e x a m in a t io n *  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  I f  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  i s  c o n t i n u a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t s  a c t s ,  i t  may 
l a c k  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  t o  g o v e r n  -  t o  g e t  t h i n g s  done* The 
B r i t i s h  s o l u t i o n  has  been  t o  p l a c e  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  a d m i n i ­
s t r a t i o n  i n  th e  hands  of  p o l i t i c i a n - m i n i s t e r s  who a r e  
members o f  t h e  House of Commons ( a n  e l e c t e d  a s s e m b l y )  o r  
a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e r e  by p o l i t i c a l  s u b o r d i n a t e s *  The 
m i n i s t e r s  t a k e  i m p o r t a n t  d e c i s i o n s  e i t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l l y  o r  
a s  members o f  a c o l l e c t i v e  body o f  m i n i s t e r s  c a l l e d  t h e  
C a b i n e t .  O th e r  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  t a k e n  by c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  on 
b e h a l f  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  and  u n d e r  t h e i r  c o n t r o l *  One o f  
t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  s y s te m  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  t h a t  
c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  must be i m p a r t i a l  t o  p a r t y  p o l i t i c s ,  a n d ,  
a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  anonymous. A m i n i s t e r  c a n n o t  s h e l t e r  
b e h i n d  a c i v i l  s e r v a n t ; *  he  i s  a n s w e r a b l e  b e f o r e  t h e  House 
o f  Commons f o r  th e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  i n  h i s
1* Jenning*, * The B r i t i s h  C o n s t i t u t i o n 1, 4 t h  e d .  p .  1 4 3 .
d e p a r t m e n t .  O r i g i n a l l y ,  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  w ere  e x c l u d e d  f ro m
m e m b ersh ip  o f  th e  House o f  Commons ( i . e .  f ro m  p o l i t i c a l
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ) ,  as p a r t  o f  t h e  s t r u g g l e  t o  e x c l u d e  r o y a l
i n t e r f e r e n c e  o r  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  H ouse .  B o th  k i n g  a n d  c i v i l
s e r v a n t s  a r e  now r e q u i r e d  t o  be  i m p a r t i a l .  P o l i t i c a l
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  h a s  s h i f t e d  t o  t h e  e l e c t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
and  t h r o u g h  them, u l t i m a t e l y ,  t o  t h e  p e o p l e .  A l l  t h i s  i s ,
o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  outcome o f  a  l o n g  h i s t o r i c a l  p r o c e s s .  I t  h a s
b e e n  t r a n s p l a n t e d  i n  i t s  l a t e s t  fo rm  t o  a p p l y  t o  t h e
A f r i c a n  s i t u a t i o n  i n  n e a r l y  a l l  i t s  a s p e c t s  i n  t h e  t h r e e
s t a t e s  c o n s i d e r e d  under th is  Chapter, and i n  s e v e r a l  o t h e r
s t a t e s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  th e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  a s  a p o l i t i c a l l y  
1
n e u t r a l  z o n e .
H e s p o n s i b l e  g o vernm en t ,  w h ic h  means above  a l l  c o l l e c ­
t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  a l l  m i n i s t e r s  t o g e t h e r  a s  a  c a b i n e t  
f o r  t h e  w ho le  p o l i c y  of  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t^ i s  c l o s e l y  l i n k e d  
w i t h  t h e  g ro w th  o f  p a r t y  p o l i t i c s  i n  1 8 t h  c e n t u r y  E n g l a n d ,  
on t h e  one h a n d ,  and th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  e x e c u t i v e  power  from 
t h e  crown t o  t h e  c a b i n e t  on t h e  o t h e r .  The c a b i n e t  i s  
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  p a r l i a m e n t  b u t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  t h e  House o f  
Commons. T hrough  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  power t o  t h e  c a b i n e t  a n d  
t h e  l a t t e r 1 s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  p a r l i a m e n t  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  
c o n t i n u o u s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  was e s t a b l i s h e d .
1 .  W h e th e r  t h i s  can work i s  a q u e s t i o n  t h a t  w i l l  b e  d i s ­
c u s s e d  i n  a  l a t e r  c h a p t e r  -  C h a p t e r  S ig h t . .  S '-evetl.
Under  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m s ,  e x e c u t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  s u s ­
p e n d e d ,  a s  i t  w e re ,  f o r  a c e r t a i n  number o f  y e a r s .  The 
A m er ic an  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  f o r  ex a m p le ,  makes t h e  e x e c u t i v e  
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  p e o p le  t h r o u g h  t h e  m echan ism  o f  p r e s i ­
d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  e v e ry  f o u r  y e a r s .  I n  o t h e r  w ords  t h e  
m e e t i n g  p o i n t  be tw een  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
i s  f i x e d  by  t h e  c a l e n d a r .  U nder  t h e  c a b i n e t  s y s t e m  i n  
B r i t a i n y t h e r e  b e i n g  no S u s p e n s i o n 11 o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
i n  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  s e p a r a t e  t h e  
n o t i o n s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  The B r i t i s h  
c a b i n e t  a n d  A m erican  p r e s i d e n t i a l  System s a r e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
p e c u l i a r  h i s t o r i c a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  I n  B r i t a i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
o f  power was (and  l e g a l l y  s t i l l  i s )  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h e  Crown. 
T h e re  n e v e r  c o u ld  be a power vacuum -  ” t h e  k i n g  n e v e r  d i e s ” . 
A f t e r  p a r l i a m e n t  won i t s  b a t t l e  f o r  su p rem acy  a n d  w i t h  t h e  
g r o w th  o f  p a r t y  governm en t ,  t h e  c a b i n e t  ( g r a d u a l l y  a t  f i r s t )  
a s su m ed  e x e c u t i v e  power .  But t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  was p a r t  o f  
p a r l i a m e n t  and  owed i t s  s u p p o r t  t o  p a r l i a m e n t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
i t  h a d  t o  be  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  p a r l i a m e n t .
I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  one o f  t h e  c r u c i a l  p r o b le m s  
f a c i n g  t h e  fo u n d in g  f a t h e r s  was c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  power vacuum 
a t  t h e  t o p .  W ith  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Crown, a s t r o n g  
e x e c u t i v e  power a t  t h e  t o p  was n e e d e d .  The c o n v e n t i o n  com­
p o s e d  o f  t h e  l e a d e r s  coming f rom  a l l  t h e  S t a t e s  was a 
t e m p o r a r y  body w hich  was no s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  a  u n i f i e d  s t r o n g
e x e c u t i v e  t o  g u id e  and h o l d  t o g e t h e r  a new n a t i o n *  The 
A m e r ic a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n  t h u s  c r e a t e d  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  a n  e x e ­
c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n t  s e p a r a t e  from t h e  e l e c t e d  body  a n d  n o t  
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  i t .  I t  s e t  c e r t a i n  l i m i t s  t o  h i s  p o w e r ,  b u t  
i n  t h e o r y  he i s  n o t  ■ r e s p o n s i b l e 1 d u r i n g  h i s  f o u r  y e a r s  o f  
o f f i c e .
What g i v e s  t h e  B r i t i s h  t y p e  a d i s t i n c t i v e  f e a t u r e  t h e n  
i s  t h e  m em bersh ip  and c o n t i n u a l  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  i n  
p a r l i a m e n t  t o  answ er  q u e s t i o n s  and  t o  d e b a t e  i s s u e s *  The 
c a b i n e t  i s ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  a n s w e r a b le  f o r  any  d e c i s i o n  o f  a  
m i n i s t e r  o r  f o r1 any d e f e c t i v e  administration u n d e r  h i s  c o n ­
t r o l ,  u n l e s s  i t  chooses  t o  d isow n  t h e  m i n i s t e r  f o r  r e a s o n s
1
o f  p o l i t i c a l  ex ped iency*  I f  t h e  c a b i n e t  does  n o t  d i s o w n  
t h e  m i n i s t e r  c o n c e rn e d ,  i t  t r e a t s  t h e  m a t t e r  a s  one o f  
c o n f i d e n c e  on i t s e l f .  To do t h i s  i t  w ou ld  d e p e n d  on i t s  
m a j o r i t y  and  p a r t y  d i s c i p l i n e  i n  t h e  House o f  Commons. The 
c o n c e p t  o f  c a b i n e t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  c h a i n  
o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  m i n i s t e r s ,  members o f  p a r l i a m e n t  
a n d  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s .  A p o l i t i c a l  l i n k  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  w i t h  
t h e  p u b l i c  t h r o u g h  th e  House o f  Commons an d  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
l i n k  t h r o u g h  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  The r u l e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
i m p a r t i a l i t y  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  s t a r t i n g  h i s t o r i c a l l y  
f o r  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n s ,  h a s  become a  m echan ism  f o r  e n s u r i n g  
a  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  -  ” t h e  q u e e n 1 s g o v e rn m e n t
1 .  T h i s  h a p p e n e d  f o r  example t o  S i r  Sam uel  H o a re  i n  1935 
o v e r  t h e  n o t o r i o u s  H o a r e - L a v a l  p a c t  on E t h i o p i a ;  an d  i n  
t h e  C r i c h e l  Down c a s e .
must go  o n " .  The l o g i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  c a b i n e t  r e s p o n s i b i l ­
i t y  w o u ld  be a v o t e  o f  c e n s u r e  o r  o f  n o - c o n f i d e n c e  p r o p o s e d  
i n  t h e  House o f  Commons a g a i n s t  t h e  g o v ernm en t , .  I f  t h i s  
p a s s e s  (by  a s im p le  m a j o r i t y )  i t  means t h e  end  o f  t h e  
g o v e rn m e n t  i n  o f f i c e  and may mean d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t  
f o l l o w e d  by a g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n *
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  a l l  t h a t  m a t t e r s  i s  f o r  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  
t o  h a v e  a c o m f o r t a b l e  m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  House o f  Commons a n d  
t o  m a i n t a i n  p a r t y  d i s c i p l i n e *  And, a s  J e n n i n g s  h a s  w r i t t e n ,
"The d e c i s i o n  of t h e  c a b i n e t  t o  s u p p o r t  a 
m i n i s t e r  i s  r e a l l y  b a s e d  n o t  on p o s s i b l e  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o n s e q u e n c e s , b u t  on t h e  e f f e c t  
w h ic h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  may have  on p u b l i c  o p i n i o n ”
an d  a g a i n ;
'■ M i n i s t e r i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  House o f  
Commons I s  th u s  t h e  means o f  a s s u r i n g  t h a t  
t h e  governm ent  i s  i n  t u n e  w i t h  p o p u l a r  
o p i n i o n . ” 1
The c a b i n e t  h as  changed s i n c e  t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  t h e  
n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  The most i m p o r t a n t  chan g e  h a s  b e e n  i n  
t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  power of  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r .  Some a u t h o r i ­
t i e s  on t h e  s u b j e c t  even b e l i e v e  t h a t  now t h e  c o u n t r y  i s  
g o v e r n e d  by t h e  Prime A,Ai n i s t e r  who " l e a d s ,  c o - o r d i n a t e s  a n d
m a i n t a i n s  a s e r i e s  o f  m i n i s t e r s ,  a l l  o f  whom a r e  a d v i s e d  a n d
2
b a c k e d  by t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e . ” The m ost  r e c e n t  v ie w  e x p r e s s e d
1 .  O p . c i t . ,  p .  146 .
2 .  c f .  J . P .  M a ck in to s h ,  T The B r i t i s h  C a b i n e t 1, 1 9 6 2 ,  p .  4 5 1 .
198.
on t h e  s u b j e c t  (and p e rh ap s  th e  most a u t h o r i t a t i v e )  i s  one 
by  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r .  hr* W i l s o n  s a i d ,  i n  a r e c e n t  i n t e r ­
v i e w :
" t h e  power l i e s ,  a s  i t  a lw ays  d i d ,  I  t h i n k ,  
i n  th e  c a b in e t*  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  p r im e  
M i n i s t e r  a p p o i n t s  t h e  c a b i n e t  o b v i o u s l y  he 
h a s  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount o f  p o w e r ,  b u t  he  i s  
n o t  a c o m p le te ly  f r e e  a g e n t . "
Ur* W i l s o n 1 3 v iew a g r e e s  w i t h  J e n n i n g s Ts v i e w  t h a t  t h e  o f f i c e  
o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  w hat  t h e  h o l d e r  c h o o s e s  
t o  make i t ,  s n d  what th e  o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s  a l l o w  h im  t o  make 
o f  i t *  The e x t e n t  o f  h i s  power -  an d  t h i s  h a s  g rown c o n ­
s i d e r a b l y  -  i s  q u a l i f i e d  by th e  need  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  c o l l a b o r ­
a t i o n  of  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  h i s  power o f  
a p p o i n t m e n t ,  h i s  power of  d i s m i s s a l  and  r e s h u f f l e  p l a c e s  
i n  h i s  h an d  a p o t e n t  weapon* But a good  P rim e M i n i s t e r  
i s  one who depends f o r  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  n o t  on f r w q u e n t  u s e  
o f  t h i s  ( u n l e s s  t h e r e  was a g en u in e  c a s e  f o r  i t ) ,  b u t  on 
b e i n g  "on  t o p  o f  h i 3 j o b " ,  a l l  t h e  t ime* As t h e  s u r v i v a l  
o f  t h e  governm en t  v e ry  much depends  on t h i s ,  ample s u p p o r t  
an d  r e a d y  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  be w a n t i n g  i n  t h e  r a n k s  o f  
h i s  c o l l e a g u e s .  I n  a w ord ,  t h e r e  i s  a m u t u a l  d e p e n d en c e  
b e t w e e n  a Prime M i n i s t e r  and  o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s *  But t h i s  
o p e r a t e s  a g a i n s t  a g e n e r a l  f ram ew ork  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n ­
1* c f .  The L i s t e n e r ,  "Where th e  Power L i e s " ,  F e b r u a r y  9 t h ,  
1 9 6 7 .
v o l v i n g  c o n f i d e n c e .  The c a b i n e t  must  hav e  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  
o f  t h e  House o f  Commons ( r e a l l y ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e y  n e e d  t h e  
s u p p o r t  o f  t h e i r  p a r t y  i n  p a r l i a m e n t ) .  The m i n i s t e r  m ust  
hav e  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  of  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r ,  a s  t h e  Prime M i n i ­
s t e r  a l s o  n e e d s  t h e  c o n f id e n c e  of  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s .  And t h e  
c i v i l  s e r v a n t  m ust  have  th e  c o n f i d e n c e  o f  h i s  m i n i s t e r .  Of 
these^the f i r s t  v i z *  t h e  c o n f id e n c e  w hich  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  m u s t  
h av e  i n  t h e  House o f  Commons, h as  become a t e r m  o f  a r t  -  o r  
r a t h e r  o f  ( p o l i t i c a l )  s c i e n c e .  I f  t h e  H o u se ,  by a m a j o r i t y  
o f  o n e ,  ca n  p a s s  a  v o t e  o f  f,no  c o n f id e n c e "  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  
m us t  r e s i g n ,  a s  a l r e a d y  e x p la in e d #  T h is  i s  th e  h a l l m a r k  o f  
a c l a s s i c a l  c a b i n e t  s y s t e m ,  and  i t  has  b e e n  a d o p t e d  i n  
Hurop9 a n d  e l s e w h e r e .  I t  I s  t h e  sword o f  Damocles h a n g i n g  
o v e r  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  w h ich  must he a v e r t e d *  The most m o d e s t  
c l a i m  t h a t  may be  made f o r  t h e  s y s te m  i s  t h a t  i n  c o n s e q u e n c e  
o f  a c o n t i n u a l  e f f o r t  t o  a v o i d  t h a t  f a t e ,  g o v e rn m e n ts  do 
l e s s  e v i l  t h a n  good and  p r o b a b ly  do some g o o d .
2# The C a b i n e t  i n  A f r i c a .
I n  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  s t a g e  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g  t h e r e  
i s  a t e n d e n c y  t o  p u r s u e  an i d e a l  t y p e .  O n ly ,  t h e r e  i s  no  
s u c h  t h i n g .  TThen t h e  c a b i n e t  s y s tem  was t r a n s p l a n t e d  i n  
t h e  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s ,  i t  was f e l t ,  p r o b a b l y  by m o s t ,  t h a t  
t h e  B r i t i s h  i n s t i t u t i o n  cou ld  meet A f r i c a n  n e e d s  a d e q u a t e l y .  
Some o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  had  p ro d u c e d  t h e  c a b i n e t  i n  B r i t a i n
were e s s e n t i a l l y  p r e s e n t  i n  A f r i c a ,  v i z * ,  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
and  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n s t i u t i o n s .  T h i s  v i e w  was n o t  t o  he  
j u s t i f i e d *  i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  s t a t e s  w h ic h  c h o s e  a p r e s i ­
d e n t i a l  s y s t e m .  A s e p a r a t e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  i n  
some s t a t e s  an d  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  i n  o t h e r s  w i l l  be 
o f  v e r y  g r e a t  i n t e r e s t .  No c o n c l u s i v e  a n s w e rs  a r e  p o s s i b l e
a t  t h i s  s t a g e .  We can on ly  d e s c r i b e  t h e  s y s t e m  a s  g i v e n
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an d  o f f e r  comments on some o f  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s .
3 .  The C a b i n e t  i n  t h e  Gambia, L e s o t h o  a n d  S o m a l ia  
1 •  The c o m p o s I t io h  o f  t h e  C a b i n e t
The c a b i n e t  i n  a l l  t h r e e  s t a t e s  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  F r im e
2
m i n i s t e r  and  o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s .  T h e re  a r e  no  p r o v i s i o n s  
s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  c a b i n e t  o r  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  who may 
he  i t s  members.  The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  shows 
t h a t  i t  i s  w i s e r  t o  l e a v e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  s i z e  t o  t h e  d i s ­
c r e t i o n  o f  t h e  Prim e M i n i s t e r  t o  d e t e r m i n e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
a c t u a l  n e e d .  On t h e  o t h e r  h an d  a minimum o f  t h e  c a b i n e t 1 a 
m em b ersh ip  i s  sometim es f i x e d  p r e s u m a b ly  t o  a v o i d  c o n c e n ­
t r a t i o n  o f  power i n  a fev; h a n d s .  I n  L e s o t h o ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  
a minimum o f  s e v e n  i s  f i x e d  a s  t h e  num ber  o f  o f f i c e  o f  
m i n i s t e r s  t h a t  may be e s t a b l i s h e d  which i n c l u d e s  t h e  o f f i c e
1 .  F o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of th e  c a b i n e t  u n d e r  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m s  
s e e  pp*3o*~l4, i n f r a .
2* C o n s ,  t h e  Gambia, S e c t . 65^ L e s o t h o ,  S e c t .  7 3 ( l ) j  
S o m a l i a ,  a r t .  7 8 ( 2 ) .
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o f  t h e  d ep u ty  Prime M i n i s t e r .  A g a in  i n  S o m a l i a ,  m i n i s t e r i a l
a s s i s t a n t s  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  c o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r
i n  a n  a d v i s o r y  c a p a c i t y .  I t  i s  a l s o  e x p l i c i t l y  p r o v i d e d
t h a t  o f f i c e r s  and e x p e r t s  may be c a l l e d  upon  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e
2
w i t h o u t  v o t i n g  r i g h t s .
2• Appointment and ten u re
The power t o  a p p o i n t  m i n i s t e r s  l i e s  w i t h  t h e  Prime 
M i n i s t e r .  The Prime M i n i s t e r  i n  a l l  t h r e e  s t a t e s ,  a s  i n  
t h e  m e t r o p o l i t a n  m a t r i c e s ,  i s  c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n ,  
l i f e  an d  d e a t h  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t .  S o m a l ia  d i f f e r s  f rom  t h e  
o t h e r  two states in regard to the Q ualif ication  f o r  member­
s h i p  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t .  The c a b i n e t  w h ich  i s  s t y l e d  c o u n c i l  
o f  m i n i s t e r s  a f t e r  t h e  I t a l i a n  11 c o u s i g l i o  d e i  m i n i s t r i ” ,  i s  
made u p  o f  th e  Prime M i n i s t e r  and  m i n i s t e r s  who mu3t p o s s e s s
t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t o  be e l e c t e d  as  d e p u t i e s .  Th i3  means
3
th a t  they need not be e le c te d  members. The p o l i t i c a l  ex ­
p er ien ce  of Somalia during the U.iT. t r u s t e e s h ip  period  
and p a r t ic u la r ly  in the l a s t  years before independence, was 
one o f  vigorous and m u lt i far iou s  party a c t i v i t i e s .  The 
opening made in  the c o n s t i tu t io n  for non d ep u t ie s  as members 
o f  the cabinet may very w e l l  be a s a fe ty  valve to  include
1 .  S ec t .  7 2 (2 ) .
2 .  Law of June 3, 1962 -  a r t .  4 ( 2 ) .  
3 • c f .  Cons. a r t .  8 0 (1 ) .
d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  government*  W i th  t h e  f l u i d i t y  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  A f r i c a  g e n e r a l l y ,  a r i g i d l y . e x c l u s i v e  
m echan ism  o f  r e c r u i t m e n t  t o  an  e x e c u t i v e  may t e n d  t o  l e a d  
t o  more a n i m o s i t y .  A p e r m i s s i v e  m echan ism  a s  t h a t  o f  
S o m a l i a  may in d u c e  more c o n s e n s u s .
I n  t h e  Gambia and L e s o t h o ,  a s  we h a v e  a l r e a d y  s e e n ,  
t h e  P r im e  m i n i s t e r  and o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s  m ust  be  a p p o i n t e d  
f rom  among t h e  members o f  p a r l i a m e n t .  I n  L e s o t h o  m i n i s ­
t e r i a l  a p p o in tm e n t  may be made from among members^ o f  t h e
n a t i o n a l  a s sem b ly  o r  s e n a t o r s  who a r e  n o m i n a t e d  a s  s e n a t o r s
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by t h e  King ( i . e .  f rom  among s e n a t o r s  who a r e  n o t  c h i e f s ) .
B e f o r e  a s su m in g  o f f i c e ,  m i n i s t e r s  t a k e  a n  o a t h  o f  l o y a l t y .
I n  S o m a l i a  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  t a k e  t h e  o a t h  b e f o r e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c ,  and  th e  m i n i s t e r i a l  a s s i s t a n t s  known a s
U n d e r - S e c r e t a r i e s  o f  S t a t e  t a k e  t h e  o a t h  b e f o r e  t h e  P r im e  
2
m i n i s t e r *
The t e n u r e  o f  m i n i s t e r i a l  o f f i c e  i n  a l l  t h r e e  s t a t e s  
h a s  t h e  same d u r a t i o n  as t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
p a r l i a m e n t s .  T e r m i n a t i o n  o f  m i n i s t e r i a l  t e n u r e  may t a k e  
p l a c e  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  a d i s m i s s a l ,  o r  s u s p e n s i o n  f o l l o w i n g  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  impeachment p r o c e e d i n g s  o r  a s  a r e s u l t  
o f  c o l l e c t i v e  r e s i g n a t i o n  f o l l o w i n g  a  v o t e  o f  n o  c o n f i d e n c e
1 .  c f .  C ons .  The Gambia, s e c t .  63(4  ) j  L e s o t h o ,  s e c t .  7 2 ( 3 ) ;  
t h e  a p p o in tm e n t*  o f  m i n i s t e r i a l  a s s i s t a n t s  f o l l o w s  on  
t h e  same l i n e s  i n  a l l  t h r e e  s t a t e s *
2 .  A r t .  7 8 ( 5 ) .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s  t h e r e  i s  no  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  n o n ­
b e l i e v e r s  .
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p a s s e d  by p a r l i a m e n t .  As r e g a r d s  d i s m i s s a l ,  i n  S o m a l i a  
u h e re  a r e  no d e t a i l e d  p r o v i s i o n s  s p e c i f y i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  
u n d e r  which, t h e  P r e s i d e n t  may remove m i n i s t e r s ,  a s  f o u n d  
i n  bhe c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  Gambia and  L e s o t h o .  R e c e n t  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  c a b i n e t  g o v e rn m e n t  e l s e w h e r e  i n  A f r i c a  h a s  
shown t h a t ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  e x p l i c i t  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  t h e  
r e m o v a l  o f  m i n i s t e r s  an d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  o f  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  
by t h e  Head o f  S t a t e ,  t h e  s u b j e c t  c a n  be a  s o u r c e  o f  c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  c r i s i s .  I1 he r e s o r t  t o  c o n v e n t i o n s  o f  m e t r o p o l i t a n  
s y s t e m s  a s  a  s o l u t i o n  where  t h e r e  had  b e e n  no i n c o r p o r a t i o n  
o f  c o n v e n t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  b e e n  d e b a t e d  r i g h t  up 
t o  t h e  J u d i c i a l  C om m it tee  o f  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l .  The c a s e  w h ic h  
h a s  become a  c a u s e  c e l e b r e  i s  t h e  N i g e r i a n  c a s e  o f  A n i n t o l a  v .  
Go v e r n o r  o f  W e s te rn  N i g e r i a  w h ich  was h e a r d  by t h e  f e d e r a l  
Supreme C o u r t ,  and  on a p p e a l  t o  t h e  p r i v y  c o u n c i l  a s  
A d e g b e n ro  v A k i n t o l a .^
The f a c t s  w ere  b r i e f l y  a s  f o l l o w s .  The t h e n  p r e m i e r  
o f  W e s te rn  N i g e r i a ,  t h e  l a t e  C h i e f  A k i n t o l a ,  h a d  b e e n  rem oved  
f ro m  o f f i c e  by t h e  G o v e r n o r .  A k i n t o l a  b r o u g h t  a n  a c t i o n  
s e e k i n g  a  d e c l a r a t o r y  judgm ent  a g a i n s t  t h e  G o v e r n o r  a n d  t h e  
n e w ly  a p p o i n t e d  P r e m i e r ,  A l h a j i  A d eg b e n ro ,  t h a t  h i s  d i s m i s s a l  
was i n v a l i d .  The G o v e rn o r  was empowered u n d e r  t h e  c o n s t i -
1 .  F .3 .C .  187/1962; and (1563) 3 W.L.K. 63.
t u t io n  of  the Western Region to  dism iss a Premier i f  i t  
appeared to  him that the Premier no lon ger  commanded the  
support of a majority of the members o f  the  House o f  Assembly# 
A kinto la  was deputy leader of the A ct ion  Group, the party in  
o p p o s it ion  a t  the federal parliament, and led  by Chief Awolowo# 
There had been disagreements between Awolowo and A k in to la ,  and 
Akinto la  had been asked by the party’ s f e d e r a l  e x e c u t iv e  on 
May 2 0 th ,  1962 to resign h is  premiership and h i s  party o f f i c e *  
He immediately asked the Governor fo r  a d i s s o l u t i o n  of the  
re g io n a l  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  but the Governor re fu sed  t o  do t h i s .
The speaker of the House of Assembly a l s o  r e fu se d  Akintola* s 
request  fo r  the convening of an emergency s e s s i o n  of  th e  
House to  consider a motion of confidence* The Governor 
r e ce iv ed  a l e t t e r  signed by a majority of members of the  
House o f  Assembly (including the speaker) ask ing  him to  
remove the Premier. He dismissed Akinto la  on May 2 1st  and 
appointed Adegbenro (a supporter of Awolowo) i n  h i s  p la c e .
This created  a e o n s t i tu t io n a l  c r i s i s #  When the House met 
on May 25th ,  a f t e r  Adegbenro’ s appointment, d isorder  broke 
out,  and a few days la te r  the fed era l  parliament declared  
a s t a t e  o f  emergency, and the fed era l  government suspended 
the new government of the Western Region, p la c in g  i t  in  the 
hands of an administration#
The fe d e r a l  Supreme Court of N iger ia  h e ld ,  by a m ajor ity ,  
th at  the governor’ s act was in v a l id  on the grounds th a t  h i s
power of  d ism issa l  was to  be e x e r c is a b le  only when the House 
of Assembly had formally s i g n i f i e d  i t s  la ck  o f  confidence  
in  the Premier. The Court reached t h i s  co n c lu s io n  on the  
b a s i s  o f  what i t  understood to be a convention in  B r i t a in  
a p p l ica b le  in  l i k e  s i t u a t io n s .  The d i s s e n t in g  judgment 
of B r e t t ,  P . J . ,  held that in  the absence of an express  pro­
v i s i o n  in  the co n s t i tu t io n  l im i t in g  the sources of  a 
Governor1 s information-about the s tren g th  of a Premier’ s 
backing to  votes  of confidence. in  the House o f  Assembly,  
the Governor was e n t i t l e d  t o  obtain h i s  in form ation  from 
any other sourco that was ppima f a c i e  r e l i a b l e .  The 
J u d ic ia l  Committee of the Privy Council p re ferred  t h i s  
d i s s e n t in g  opinion and accordingly reversed  the  d e c i s i o n  
of the Federal Supreme Court, in  Hay 1963. The Privy
C ou n ci l ’ s d ec is io n  caused a new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s i s  which
1
need not b e .descr ibed  here.
The Administrator of the Western Degion d e lega ted  
s p e c i a l  powers to Akintola to  enable him*, to  a d v ise  Her 
Majesty to  remove the Governor of the Western Kegion. This 
he did and the Governor was removed in  December 1962 and a 
member of NC1TC appointed in  h i s  p la c e .  In the meantime
1 .  For a d isc u ss io n  of the case -  c f .  S .G ,Davis ,  "Nigeria  -  
Some recent d ec is ion s  in. the co n s t i tu t io n "  (1 9 6 2 ) .  11,
I .C .L .Q .919j 0 .1 .  Odumosu, "The N iger ian  C o n s t i t u t i o n :
H istory  and Development", Chap. 9; J .P .  Mackintosh,  
" P o l i t i c s  in  Nigeria  : The Action Group C r i s i s  of 1962"
(1963),  11, BLit ica l  S tudies ,  126 at pp. 1 3 7 - 1 5 5 *
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Awolowo and others had been arres ted  on charges of t r e a so n .  
A kinto la  formed a new party and In c o a l i t i o n  w ith  the NCNC 
formed a government. Now the e f f e c t  of the Privy Council  
d e c i s io n  was to render the formation of A k in to la 1 s govern­
ment i l l e g a l ;  Adegbenro was the Premier de jure .  The 
whole a f f a i r  has been regarded as "an i l lu m in a t in g  episode  
in  N iger ian  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  h i s t o r y  in  which a p o l i t i c a l
1
s tr u g g le  was temporarily transferred  to  a j u d i c i a l  forum." 
The e s s e n t i a l  point about tho whole case for  our purpose i s  
that  the p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  of each s i t u a t i o n  d ic ta te ^  the  
course o f  events .  In the absence of s p e c i f i c  in corp o ra t io n  
of c o n s t i t u t io n a l  conventions of other co u n tr ie s ,  t h e i r  In ­
v o ca t io n  would not help to  r e s i s t  the w i l l  o f  p a r t ie s  or 
groups determined to fo l low  a course of  a c t io n  contrary to  
such conventions.  Akinto la1s government would not vacate  
o f f i c e .  Instead i t  introduced a B i l l  for  the amendment of  
the Regional C onst itu t ion .  This had the e f f e c t ,  w ith  
r e t r o a c t iv e  fo rce ,  of a l t e r in g  the governor1s power to  
dism iss  a premier, l im it in g  I t  to a s i t u a t i o n  where a vote  
of no confidence was passed by the House o f  Assembly. The 
B i l l  was passed by both Houses of the L e g is la tu r e  (Regional  
and F e d e r a l ) .  I t s  main aim was of course t o  n u l l i f y  the  
d e c i s io n  of the Privy Council with r e t r o a c t iv e  e f f e c t .
Any controversy that might have a r isen  on the v a l i d i t y  of
1 .  c f .  de Smith,  o p . c i t . ,  p.  90.
such s tep s  was put to an end when N iger ia  became a Republic
in  October 1963. The p o l i t i c a l  struggle  wheich gave r i s e  to
the case has been resolved dramatically  in  d i r e c t io n s  not
expected  by e i t h e r  of the p ro ta g o n is ts .  But the problems
posed by the case s t i l l  remain with dual ex e cu t iv e  systems
in which the power of the Head of State  in  r e l a t i o n  to  the
ex e cu t iv e  head remains u n c la s s i f i e d ,  in  the absence of
d e t a i l e d  p rov is ions  or l i v in g  conventions r e g u la t in g  such
r e la t io n s h i p .  As 1 mg as there i s  unregulated power-
r e la t io n s h i p ,  i t  w i l l  not be convention or precendent of
other cou n tr ios ,  but r o a l p o l i t ik  that w i l l  determine  
1
d isputes*  Conventions exert in f luence  ohly when they are
l i v i n g  in  the minds of s ig n i f i c a n t  groups in  the  n a t io n .
The N iger ian  c r i s i s  of 1962-3 demonstrated the d i f f i c u l t y
of the j u d i c i a l  ro le  in  an atmosphere h ighly  charged w ith
p o l i t i c a l  ten s io n .  Even where the law i s  not u n c l a r i f i e d ,
the p a r t i c ip a t io n  of judges to  decide between c o n f l i c t i n g
claims on p o l i t i c a l  leg it im acy would impair t h e i r  in d e -
2
pendent growth*
3* The function  of the cabinet
The fu n c t io n  of the cabinet in the Gambia and Lesotho
1 .  For a d iscu ss io n  in  the r e la t iv e  merits  and demerits of  
incorporating  certa in  conventions by r e fe r e n c e ,  c f .  de 
Smith, o p . c i t . ,  pp. 82-86*
2 .  The re . ort of the co n s t i tu t io n a l  commission o f  Tanganyika 
must have had the Nigerian c r i s i s  in  mind when i t  observed  
to  the same e f f e c t .  c f .  see p . l ^ z i n f r a .
208.
i s  s t a t e d  to  be to  advise the Head of S ta te  in  whom ex ecu t iv e
power i s  v e s te d ,  in  s t r i c t  law; to  advise  him, th a t  i s  t o
say,  in  the government of the s t a t e .  Subject to  t h i s  and
to  what has been explained already in  t h i s  regard, the
cab inet  has the general d ir e c t io n  and co n tro l  of the
1
government in  both countr ies .  The genera l  nature of the  
p r o v i s io n  in  respect of the fu n c t io n  of the cabinet  fo l lo w s  
the B r i t i s h  example. I t  ha3 advantages of f l e x i b i l i t y ,  
but i t  assumes that the c o n s t i t u t io n a l  conventions o f  
B r i t a i n  w i l l  be followed. I t s  d isadvantages are abvious:  
i t  i n v i t e s  the p oss ib le  re so r t  to  a r b i t r a r in e s s ,  and could  
l e a d  to  c r i s e s .
In Somalia, fo llowing a co n t in en ta l  v a r i a t i o n  on the  
W estm inister  theme, the ca b in e t1s fu n c t io n s  are 3 p e l t  out  
in  d e t a i l .  The Lqw of June 3rd, 1962 empowers the Council  
o f  M in is ters  to  deal with the fo l lo w in g  matters
a) major questions of p o l ic y ;
b) approval of draft laws to  be presented  to  the  
N ational  Assembly, and withdrawal o f  draft  laws 
p rev iou s ly  presented;
c) approval of decree-law3, l e g i s l a t i v e  d ecrees ,  
and those regulations  which require  the approval  
of  the Council of M inisters  under the c o n s t i t u t i o n  
or by law;
1 .  Cons, the  Gambia, s e c t .  65; Leso tho ,  s e c t .  73.
d) proposals for in te r n a t io n a l  t r e a t i e s  and major 
questions  of in te r n a t io n a l  p o l ic y ;
e) se tt lem ent  of c o n f l i c t s  of j u r i s d i c t i o n  between  
d i f f e r e n t  m in is ters ;
f )  r e g i s t r a t i o n  with reserve  of a d m in is tr a t iv e  decrees  
under the finance and accounts lav/;
g) any other matter exp ress ly  reserved  to  the Council
o f  m in isters  by the c o n s t i tu t io n ,  law or re g u la t io n ,
or deemed by the Prime m in is ter  t o  be o f  p a r t i c u la r  
1
importance*
The powers of the Council of M in isters  in  r e s p e c t  of
f i n a n c i a l  and personnel matters are a l s o  provided fo r  by
the  same law with even more p a r t icu la r i ty *  In  f i n a n c i a l
m a tters ,  the council  i s  empowered to  deal w i th  the budget;
government contracts  invo lv ing  sums above s p e c i f i e d  amount;
the w r i t in g  o f f  of u n co l lec ted  revenue above a s p e c i f i e d
amount; and any other matter exp ress ly  re served  to the
2
co u n c i l  by the c o n s t i tu t io n ,  law or regu la t ion *  In p e r ­
sonnel  m atters ,  the council  i s  empowered t o  d ea l  with  the  
appointment of i t s  own sec re ta r y ,  the p res id en t  and members 
of the Supreme Court; the A ttorney-genera l;  the m ag is tra te  
of a cco u n ts ,  and the State attorney (a v v o c a t o e r a r ia l e ) ;
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the heads of diplomatic m issions;  the d ir e c t o r s - g e n e r a l  
of the m in i s t r i e s ;  commanders and o f f i c e r s  of the army, 
p o l i c e  and any other m i l i ta ry  force;  p res id en ts  and mana­
gers of  public  bodies; the members o f  commissions and
i n t e r - m i n i s t e r i a l  committees; other o f f i c e r s  ex p r e s s ly
1
in d ica ted  in  the c o n s t i tu t io n ,  laws or r e g u la t io n s .
A l l  these  appointments are made by the Pres ident  of  
the Republic i n  a c c o rd a n c e  with the c o n s t r i c t i o n a l  p ro v is io n  
which requ ires  that high o f f i c i a l s  of the s t a t e  and com­
manders of the m il i tary  f o r c e s  a r e  appointed by the  P r e s i ­
dent on the p r o p o s a l  of the Competent m in is te r  a f t e r
2
approval by the Council of m in is te r s .  The same procedure  
fo r  appointment a lso  governs the p o s t in g ,  promotion, t r a n s ­
fe r  and term ination  of serv ice  of the above-mentioned  
3
o f f i c e r s .
These provis ions  e s ta b l i s h in g  the e x te n t  of the  
Somali cabinet  appear ( i )  to  l i m i t  the power of the Prime 
m in is te r  and ( i i )  to involve the cabinet in  d e c i s io n s  
concerning m attersof d e t a i l .
As regards the apparent l i m i t a t i o n  o f  the Prime M in is te r 1 s 
power, the provis ions  may be m is leading.  In f a c t  the  Prime
1 • A rt .  7 ( 1 ) •
2.  Cons. a r t .  87, and Law of June, 1962, a r t .  7 ( 2 ) .
3 .  Law of  June 3, 1962, a r t .  7 ( 3 ) .
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m in is ter  i s  in  a much more dominant p o s i t i o n ,  He i s  e x p r e s s ly
empowered to  d irec t  the general p o l icy  of the government.
He i s  resnon s ib le  for  t h i s  p o l ic y  and maintains i t s  u n ity  by
1
co-ord in at in g  and promoting the a c t i v i t y  of the m in i s t e r s .
The e f f e c t  of the e x p l i c i t  d e l in e a t io n  of the ca b in e t1s
fu n c t io n  in  Somalia w i l l  a l s o  be to  leave  anything not covered
th e r e in  to  the Prime m i n i s t e r 1 s determ ination. As i f  to  put
the matter of h is  predominance beyond q u es t ion  the law of
June 3rd, 1962 says that the Prime M in is ter  i s  ”d i r e c t l y  in
charge of the presidency of  the counci l  of  m in i s t e r s ,  which
2
s h a l l  provide for  the execu t ion  of h i s  d e c i s i o n s ” . The 
presidency of the Council o f  M inisters  i s  an eq u iv a len t  to  
what i s  elsewhere known as cab inet  s e c r e t a r i a t .  The Prime 
M in ister  not only presides  a t  cabinet meetings but decides in  
advance what i s  to be d isc u sse d  there and in  what order of  
p r i o r i t y .  He does th is  through h is  d ir e c t  co n tr o l  of the  
s e c r e t a r i a t ,  which a ls o  transm its  d e c i s io n s  to  a l l  the  
appropriate persons and departments, as w e l l  as maintains  
r eco rd s .  This i s  a f a i r l y  common p r a c t ic e  elswwhere, of  
course ,  but one fu n ct ion  p e c u l ia r  to  the Somali cab inet  
s e c r e t a r ia t  i s  that i t  i s  required  by law t o  deal w ith
1 .  Con3. a r t .  83 (1 );  Law o f  June 3,  1962, a r t .  3 ( 1 ) .
2 .  A rt .  9 ( 1 ) .
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"matters a f f e c t in g  the government in  g e n e r a l ,  a l l
a d m in is tra t iv e  acts  r e la t in g  t o  personnel employed by the
S t a t e ,  w h ic h  a r e  n o t  e x p r e s s l y  r e s e r v e d  by  law  t o  i n d i v i d u a l
m in is t e r s ,  planning s t a t i s t i c a l  s e r v ic e s  and d r a f t in g  of  
1
l e g i s l a t i o n . "
The d e ta i led  provis ions  of  the lav; d ea l in g  w ith  the  
fu n ct ion s  of the cabinet in  Somalia, though s ta tu ta r y  i n  many 
ways, r a i s e  certa in  problems of fu n c t io n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  be­
tween the Prime minister and the ca b in e t .  The Prime m in is ter  
i s  empowered to "direct the genera l  p o l i c y  of  the govern­
ment", the cabinet  i s  empowered to "deal w ith  major q u est io n s  
of p o l ic y " .  An a u to -cen tr ic  Prime m in is te r  could conceivably  
in te r p r e t  d irec t io n  of genera l  p o l i c y  as meaning determin­
a t io n  th e r e o f ,  and a c t  on important matters without the con­
sent o f  the  cabinet.  The p ro v is io n  on the fu n c t io n  o f  the  
s e c r e t a r i a t  noted above lends c r e d i b i l i t y  to  t h i s  su p p o s i t io n .  
I t  i s  a l s o  in te r e s t in g  to  note th a t  the  E n g l i sh  v e r s io n  of  
the p ro v is io n  in  r espect of the fu n c t io n s  both of  the Prime 
M in ister  and the cabinet i s  a t  variance  with  the I t a l i a n  
v e r s io n  in  some p arts .  A r t i c l e  3 (1) of the Law of June 3,  
1962 in  the I ta l ia n  uses the word "determina" (determ in es) ,  
w h ile  the E nglish  vers ion  u ses  the word " d ir e c t s " .  Whether 
the variance i s  in te n t io n a l  or a t r a n s l a t e r 1 s o v e r s ig h t ,  i t  
maybe presumed determination* im p lies  d e c i s io n  on p o l i c y ,
1 .  I b i d . ,  a r t .  9 ( 3 ) .
whereas d ir e c t io n  implies con tro l  and su p e r v is io n  o f  such.
I t  might be argued that  the Prime m in is t e r 1 s j u r i s d i c t i o n  
can be caught within the cabinet*s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  of  d ea l in g  
w ith  major questions of p o l i c y .  But i t  must be remembered 
th a t  the Prime minister prepares what i s  to  be d e a l t  w ith  
In the cabinet and that he p res id es  at cab inet  m eetings .
A lso ,  such an in terp re ta t io n  would defeat  the purpose o f  
the  law o f  June 3rd, which aims at defined fu n c t io n a l  r e ­
l a t i o n s h i p s  between Prime M in ister  and ca b in e t .
The question  cannot bo posed e n t i r e l y ,  or even  
p r in c ip a l ly ^ in  terms of formal p r o v is io n s .  I t  i s  b es t  seen  
In human and p o l i t i c a l  terms# A d i v i s i o n  between the Prime 
m in is te r  and the other m in is te r s  in  t h i s  manner would impose 
an in t o l e r a b l e  s tr a in  on the d a i ly  r e la t io n s  between them.
The observat ions  made e a r l i e r  in  connection w ith  the B r i t i s h  
Prime I i in i s t e r  are equally  a p p l icab le  here ,  as the q u est io n  
in v o lv e s  a un iversa l  human problem of power. I f  the r e ­
l a t i o n  d e te r io r a te s  in to  the extreme and the Prime I i in i s t e r  
seeks  to  d ic ta te  in  complete d isregard  of the ca b in e t ,  there  
would be a m in i s t e r ia l  r e v o l t  to  unseat him. In that event  
he could r e s o r t  to  strong arm t a c t i c s  which may take the form 
of  the m i l i t a r y  coup l e d  by the Prime m in is te r  or i t  may take 
the form of  "red guards" operating outs ide  the formal i n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  framework. In ^country where the cabinet  i s  a new
i n s t i t u t i o n  such  a r e v o l t  w ould  h av e  d d e p e r  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  
t h a t  I t  would i n  B r i t a i n ,  where t h e r e  a r e  h i g h l y  d e v e l o p e d  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s h o c k - a b s o r b e r s .
The above rem arks  a r e ,  n e d d l e s s  t o  s a y ,  e q u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  
t o  t h e  o t h e r  two s t a t e s .  I n  a  c e r t a i n  s e n s e  t h e y  a r e  more 
r e l e v a n t ,  as  w i l l  now be s e e n .  I n  a c a b i n e t  s y s t e m  w h ere  
t h e  m i n i s t e r s  must be members o f  p a r l i a m e n t ,  some o f  t h e  more 
s i g n i f i c a n t  u n d e r - c u r r e n t s  o f  s t r a i n  a n d  c o n f l i c t  u s u a l l y  
a p p e a r  b e f o r e  o r  d u r in g  e l e c t i o n s .  The r e a s o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  
f a t e  o f  t h e  Prime I i i n i s t e r  i s  t i e d  up  w i t h  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  h i s  
s u p p o r t e r s  a t  t h e  e l e c t i o n .  An i m p o r t a n t  weapon  o f  a P rim e 
M i n i s t e r  a t  such  t im e s  (as  a t  a l l  t i n e s )  i s  p a t r o n a g e .  He 
may b u t t r e s s  h i s  p o s i t i o n  by h o l d i n g  o u t  p r o m i s e s  of  t h e  
p e r q u i s i t e s  o f  o f f i c e  i n  su ch  a m anner  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  i s  a 
l i k e l i h o o d  of  h i s  pa r ty *  s s u c c e s s  a t  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  e v e n  
members o f  a n  o j j p o s i t i o n  p a r t y  n a y  j o i n  h i s  " b a n d -w a g o n 1*. I n  
t h i s  way he  may i n j e c t  new s u p p o r t  i n  h i s  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  g r o u p  
w h ic h  w ou ld  a c t  a s  a b e a t i n g  s t i c k  t o  c o n s p i r a t o r i a l  c o l l ­
e a g u e s  w i t h i n  t h e  c a b i n e t .  The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  S i e r r a  Leone 
s e r v e s  a s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  l e s s o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  t h e  Gambia 
an d  L e s o t h o .
The Prime M i n i s t e r ,  S i r  A l b e r t  M a r g a i ,  i n h e r i t e d  i n  1964* 
a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p a r t y  w h ic h  was d i v i d e d  a b o u t  h i s  s u c c e s s i o n  
t o  t h e  p r e m i e r s h i p .  He d id  n o t  s u c c e e d  I n  b u i l d i n g  u p  z?
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s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  w i t h i n  h i s  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p a r t y .  I n  t h e  c o n t e s t
f o r  n o m i n a t i o n s  f o r  th e  l a s t  f a t e f u l  e l e c t i o n ,  many o f  h i s
s u p p o r t e r s  w i t h i n  h i s  p a r t y  f a i l e d ,  I n c l u d i n g  h i s  M i n i s t e r
o f  V/orks.  - t  i s  o f  g r e a t  i n t e r e s t  t o  r e c a l l  t h a t  t h e  P r im e
M i n i s t e r  t r i e d  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  h i s  p a r t y  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a s  a
v e h i c l e  f o r  power i n  the  m anner  o f  t h e  FDG- ( P a r t i  clerno-
1
c r a t i q u e  de O u in e o ) ,  and t h a t  i t  was when t h i s  a t t e m p t  f e l l e d  
t h a t  he  announced h i s  I n t e n t i o n  t o  fo rm  a o n e - p a r t y  s t a t e .
T h i s  I s  l o g i c a l  enough ,  f o r  as; h i s  power b a s e  w i t h i n  h i s  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p a r t y  beg an  t o  d i s i n t e g r a t e  an d  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  
o f  a s t r o n g  pa r t y  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  o u t s i d e  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
p a r t y  w h ich  he c o u ld  c o n t r o l ,  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  h i s  p o s i t i o n  
became p a i n f u l l y  o b v i o u s ,  f i n a l l y ,  w i t h  t h e  an n ouncem en t  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  a r e p u b l i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n  ( a n d  t h e  a p p a r e n t  
abandonm en t  o f  th e  o n e - p a r t y  I d e a )  a new m e th o d  was t h o u g h t  
o u t  f o r  t h e  r e i n f o r c e m e n t  of  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r *  s p o s i t i o n .
The d r a f t  c o n s t i t u t i o n  I n c l u d e d  a p r o v i s i o n  a l l o w i n g  t h e  
P r  ime M i n i s t e r  s i x  c a b i n e t  a p p o i n t m e n t s  f r o m  among n o n -  
members of  p a r l i a m e n t .  T h i s  power  ad d e d  t o  t h e  o b v io u s  
p o w er  o f  p a t ro n a g e  would no d o u b t  have  r e i n f o r c e d  h i s  
p o s i t i o n  h ad  he s u r v i v e d  t h e  s t o r m .  * S i e r r a  Leone was t h u s  
p o i s e d  h a l f - w a y  b e tw e en  t h e  c a b i n e t  s y s t e m s  o f  t h e  Gambia a n d  
L e s o t h o  a t  one end and t h a t  o f  S o m a l i a  a t  t h e  o t h e r .  The
1 .  See C hapter  S ix .
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d ev e lo p m e n t  t h e r e  b e f o r e  t h e  m i l i t a r y  coup m u s t  have  b e e n  
w a tc h e d  w i th  g r e a t  i n t e r e s t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  by t h e  l e a d e r s  i n  
t h e  Gambia and Lesotho*
I .  M i n i s t e r i a l  A s s i s t a n t s
I n d i v i d u a l l y  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  d i r e c t  t h e  a f f a i r s  w i t h i n  t h e  
com petence  of t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  m i n i s t r i e s  f o r  w h ic h  th e y  a r e  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e .  Min i s t ;e rs  a r e  a s s i s t e d  i n  t h e  
p e r f o rm a n c e  c f  t h e i r  d u t i e s  by p o l i t i c a l  s u b o r d i n a t e s  who a r e  
s t y l e d  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s e c r e t a r i e s  I n  t h e  Gambia,  a s s i s t a n t  
m i n i s t e r s  i n  L e so th o  and u n d e r - s e c r e t a r i e s  o f  s t a t e  i n  
S o m a l i a .  In  Som alia  t h e  c a b i n e t  g i v e s  i t s  o p i n i o n  on t h e i r  
a p p o i n t m e n t .  I n  t h e  Gambia and I n  L e s o t h o  t h e y  a r e  a p p o i n t e d  
f ro m  among th e  members o f  p a r l i a m e n t ,  e x c l u d i n g  ( i n  l e s o t h o )  
c h i e f s  and  t h e i r  s u b s t i t u t e s .  P r o v i s i o n  i s  a l s o  made i n  t h e  
Gambia f o r  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  p e rm a n e n t  s e c r e t a r i e s  -  a p u b l i c  
o f f i c e  - u n d e r  whose s u p e r v i s i o n  ©very d e p a r t m e n t  o f  g o v e r n ­
ment i s  p l a c e d ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  d i r e c t i o n  and  c o n t r o l
o f  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  m i n i s t e r .  Two o r  more d e p a r t m e n t s  may be
2
p l a c e d  u n d e r  t h e  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  a p e r m a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y .  T h is  
i s  f a m i l i a r  la n g u a g e  o f  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  and  i t s  
E q u i v a l e n t ' .  a l s o  e x i s t s  i n  t h e  o t h e r  s t a t e s  e v e n  i f  n o t  p r o v i d e d
1* Cons. The Gambia S ec t .  *71; L eso th o ,  Sect* 78* Somalia
a r t .  79 (1 ) .
2 .  S e c t .  73.
f o r  u n d e r  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .
The c a b i n e t  I s  a s s i s t e d  by a c a b i n e t  s e c r e t a r y  who i n  a l l  
c a s e s  a c t s  u n d e r  t h e  g e n e r a l  d i r e c t i o n  an d  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  t h e  
P r im e  m i n i s t e r .  H is  o f f i c e  i s  th e  c o u n t e r p a r t  of  a p e rm a n e n t  
s e c r e t a r y  a n d  i n  t h e  Gambia i t  i s  s t a t e d  t o  be a p u b l i c  
o f f i c e  a s  I n d e e d  i t  i s  i n  t h e  o t h e r s .  I n  S o m a l ia  he  i s  
a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  on t h e  p r o p o s a l  
o f  t h e  P r im e M i n i s t e r ,  h a v i n g  h e a r d  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s .
5 .  C a b i n e t  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y
C o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  a c a rd in s .1  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h e  
s y s t e m  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  o f  a l l  t h r e e  s t a t e s .  I n  t h e  Gambia and  
L e s o t h o  t h e  c a b i n e t  i s  c o l l e c t i v e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  p a r l i a ­
ment f o r  any p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n  made o r  a c t i o n  t a k e n  by o r  u n d e r  
I t s  g e n e r a l  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  f o r  a l l  t h i n g s  done by o r  u n d e r
t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  any  m i n i s t e r  i n  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  o f  h i s  m i n i -
2
s t e r i a l  f u n c t i o n .  T h i s  f o r m u l a  seems t o  e x c l u d e  t h e  p o s s i ­
b i l i t y  o f  d i s o w n in g  a m i n i s t e r  f o r  r e a s o n s  o f  e x p e d i e n c y ,  as  
i t  i m p e r a t i v e l y  e n j o i n s  c o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a l l  
t h i n g s  done i n  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  o f  m i n i s t e r i a l  d u t y .  I n  t h u s  
b e i n g  f i x e d  w i t h  w r i t t e n  c e r t a i n t y  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  becomes much 
more r i g i d  t h a n  u n d e r  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o n s t i t u t i o n  w h ic h  c a n  be
1 .  C o n s .  Gambia a r t .  7 4 ;  c f .  a l s o  S o m a l ia  ^ aw o f  Ju n e  3 ,  1962,  
a r t .  4 ( 3 ) .
2 .  C o n s .  The Gambia ,  s e c t .  6 6 ( 1 ) ;  L e s o t h o ,  s e c t .  7 3 ( 2 ) .
a p p l i e d  f l e x i b l y .  There  h a s  b ee n  no c a s e  i n  e i t h e r  t h e
Gambia o r  L e so th o  i n  w h ich  th e  q u e s t i o n  h a s  a r i s e n .  B ut  a
N i g e r i a n  e x p e r i e n c e  u n d e r  a s i m i l a r  p r o v i s i o n  may s e r v e  t o
i l l u s t r a t e  a p ro b lem .  D u r in g  t h e  1 9 6 4 -5  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e
U . N . ,  where  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  S o u t h 'A f r i c a *  s e x p u l s i o n  f rom
t h e  U.N. was d e b a t e d ,  t h e  t h e n  m i n i s t e r  f o r  e x t e r n a l  a f f a i r s
o f  N i g e r i a ,  Mr. J a j a  Wachuku, made a s t a t e m e n t  w h ic h  o p p o se d
t h e  move. The N i g e r i a n  c a b i n e t ,  t h o u g h  o p p o sed  t o  Mr. Wachuku*4
s t a t e m e n t #  f e l t  co m p e l led  t o  b a c k  him u p  when t h e  m a t t e r  was
l a t e r  r a i s e d  i n  p a r l i a m e n t ,  b e c a u s e  u n d e r  t h e  f o r m u l a  t h e y
wore l e g a l l y  o b l i g e d  t o  do s o .
■ A n e c e s s a r y  p r e c a u t i o n  h a s  b een  t a k e n  i n  e x c l u d i n g  t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n
c a s e s  o f  a p p o in tm e n t  and  r em o v a l  f ro m  o f f i c e  o f  m i n i s t e r s
a n d  t h e i r  a s s i s t a n t s .  I t  i s  a l s o  e x c l u d e d  i n  m a t t e r s  o f
a s s i g n m e n t  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o r  t h e  a u t h o r i s a t i o n  o f  a
m i n i s t e r  t o  p e r fo rm  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  t h e  P r im e I i i n i s t e r  i n  t h e
1
l a t t e r * s  a b s e n c e .  A g a in ,  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t  and  
q u e s t i o n s  of  p r e r o g a t i v e  o f  mercy a r e  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e .  A l l  o f  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  p r o p e r l y  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  th e  r e a l m  o f  e x e c u t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n .  T h e re  w o u ld
1 .  c f .  Cons ,  of  t h e  Gambia s e c t .  6 6 ( 2 ) ;  L e s o t h o ,  s e c t .  7 3 ( 3 ) .  
I n  t h e  ev e n t  of  t h e  Prime m i n i s t e r *  s a b s e n c e  h i s  f u n c t i o n  
i s  t e m p o r a r i l y  e x e r c i s e d :  i n  t h e  Gambia by a member o f  t h e
c a b i n e t  a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l  on t h e  P r im e 
M i n i s t e r * s  re co m m en d a t io n ;  ( S e c t .  6 8 ) ;  an d  i n  L e s o t h o  by 
t h e  d ep u ty  Prime M i n i s t e r ,  or i n  h i s  a b s e n c e ,  by a member 
o f  t h e  c a b i n e t ,  a p p o i n t e d  by the  l i i n g .  ( s e c t .  7 5 ) .
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i n d e e d  b g  a sham ble  i f  i t  w ere  t o  be o t h e r w i s e .
I n  S o m a l i a  t h e  P r im e M i n i s t e r  an d  t h e  o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s
a r e  Tlj o i n t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e ” f o r  t h e  a c t s  a n d  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e
1
c o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r s *  T h e re  i s  no e x p l i c i t  p r o v i s i o n  as  
f o u n d  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  tw o  s t a t e s ,  on 
c o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  a c t s  o f  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
m i n i s t e r .  I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  h a z a r d o u s ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  
c a s e s ,  t o  a t t e m p t  any  c o n c l u s i o n .  E u t  i t  may be  s a i d  t h a t  
t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u c h  p r o v i s i o n  w ou ld  mean t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no  
( l e g a l )  o b l i g a t i o n  on t h e  c a b i n e t  n o t  t o  d iso w n  a m i n i s t e r  
s h o u l d  t h a t  be n e c e s s a r y *
T h e t n l l m a r k  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  c o l l e c t i v e  
r e s i g n a t i o n  f o l l o w i n g  d e f e a t  i n  m o t i o n  o f  c o n f i d e n c e ,  an d  
t h i s  i s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  d e t a i l  i n  S o m a l i a .  W i t h i n  t h i r t y  
d ay s  o f  i t s  f o r m a t i o n  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  m ust  o b t a i n  t h e  c o n ­
f i d e n c e  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly .  The g o v e rn m e n t  may a l s o  
r e q u e s t  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  a t  an y  s u b ­
s e q u e n t  t i m e .  The N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  e x p r e s s e s  i t s  c o n f i d e n c e  
o r  n o n - c o n f i d e n c e  by open  v o t e  o f  an  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  o f  i t s  
m em bers .  A m o t i o n  o f  n o - c o n f i d e n c e  may a l s o  be  t a b l e d  a t  t h e  
r e q u e s t  o f  t e n  members o f  t h e  A s s e m b ly .  A v o t e  o f  n o - c o n f i d -  
e n c e  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  gov e rn m en t*  
T h e r e  hav e  b e e n  a  few g o v e rn m e n t  c r i s e s  i n  S o m a l i a .  The
| 1 .  Law o f  June  3 ,  1 9 6 2 ,  a r t .  4 ( 4 ) .




g r a v e s t  c r i s i s  was one f o r  s e v e r a l  m on ths  r e s u l t i n g  f rom
t h e  d e f e a t  o f  t h e  g o v e rn m en t  o f  A bd i  K a s h i d  A l i  ShaJmarke i n
a v o t e  o f  no  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  1964* The P r e s i d e n t ,  Aden
A b d u l l a  O sm a n ,n o m in a ted  t h e  t h e n  I i i n i s t e r  o f  t h e  I n t e r i o r ,
A b d i  R a j a k  H a j i  H u s s e i n ,  a f t e r  s e v e r a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s *  But
A b d i  R a j a k  was a l s o  f o r c e d  t o  r e s i g n  soon  a f t e r w a r d s  b e c a u s e
p a r l i a m e n t  p a s s e d  a v o t e  o f  no  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  h i s  governm en t*
T h i s  t i m e ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  would n o t  a c c e p t  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  and
i n s t e a d  a g a i n  n o m in a t e d  A bd i  R a j a k  who h a s  b e e n  Prim e M i n i s t e r
e v e r  s i n c e *  T h i s  exam ple  shows t h a t  e v e n  a n o n - e x e c u t i v e
P r e s i d e n t  can w i e l d  a u t h o r i t y  t h r o u g h  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e
f a c e  o f  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  power* T h i s  c a n  be
e x p l a i n e d  i n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e
o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  as a l r e a d y  e x p l a i n e d ,  an d  a l s o  i n  t e r m s  o f
t h e  p e r s o n a l  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  an d  t h e  p r e s t i g e  he  may 
1
h a v e  e n jo y e d *
The N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  may a l s o  b r i n g  m i n i s t e r s ,  i n ­
c l u d i n g  t h e  P r im e  M i n i s t e r , t o  t r i a l  f o r  t h e  co m m iss io n  o f  an y  
o f f e n c e * '  Such  d e c i s i o n  may be  t a k e n  a t  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  
o n e - f i f t h  o f  t h e  members o f  t h e  A ssem b ly  a p p r o v e d  i n  a s e c r e t  
v o t e  by a m a j o r i t y  o f  t w o - t h i r d s .  F o r  an y  t r i a l  o f  m i n i s t e r s  
on t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  coming f ro m  o u t s i d e  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly*
1* P r e s i d e n t  Aden A b d u l l a  Osman h a s  s i n c e  b e e n  d e f e a t e d  i n  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  on Ju n e  1 0 t h ,  t h i s  y e a r *  I t  i s  o f  
i n t e r e s t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  h i s  r i v a l  a n d  s u c c e s s f u l  c a n d i d a t e
i s  A b d i  R a s h i d  A l i  S h im a r k e .  The 1 2 3 - s t r o n g  p a r l i a m e n t  
v o t e d  7 3 -5 0  f o r  S h im a r k e .  c f .  T im e s ,  Ju n e  11 ,  1 9 6 7 .
221.
t h e  A ssem b ly  h a s  t o  g i v e  a u t h o r i s a t i o n  a p p r o v e d  i n  s e c r e t
v o t e  by a t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y .  I f  m i n i s t e r s  a r e  b r o u g h t  t o
t r i a l  on t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ss e m b ly ,  t h e y  a r e
1
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s u s p e n d e d  f ro m  t h e i r  d u t i e s .
C o n c l u s i o n
T h i s  c h a p t e r  o p en ed  w i t h  a q u e s t i o n  on t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  
t h e  a d o p t i o n  an d  m a i n t a i n a n c e  o f  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  fo rm  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  and  an  a t t e m p t  h a s  b e e n  made t o  a n s w e r  t h e  
q u e s t i o n .  What o f  t h e  f u t u r e ?  P r e d i c t i o n  i s  n o t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s *  But w ha t  a d d s  a new d im e n s io n  
t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  s t a t e s  i s  t h e  
p e c u l i a r  g e o - p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  e a c h  one o f  them*
The Gambia i s  t h e  m o s t  a r t i f i c i a l  o f  n a t i o n  s t a t e s .  I t s  
v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  t e l l s  a  s t o r y  o f  t h e  s c r a m b le  f o r  A f r i c a  w h ic h  
l e f t  t h e  e n t i r e  c o n t i n e n t  a  p a t c h w o r k  o f  s t a t e s  w i t h  f r o n t i e r s  
d raw n  a r b i t r a r i l y  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  and  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e a s o n s  o f  
t h e  f o r m e r  c o l o n i a l  powers*  The Gambia i s  j u s t  o v e r  4 ,0 0 0  
s q u a r e  m i l e s  i n  a r e a  an d  h a s  a  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  j u s t  o v e r  
3 0 0 ,0 0 0  ( t h e  s m a l l e s t  I n  A f r i c a ) .  The o n ly  e x p o r t a b l e  c r o p  i s  
g r o u n d  n u t  a n d  i t  c a n n o t  m ee t  t h e  c o s t  of  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  
Gambia a s  a  v i a b l e  s t a t e .  I t s  b u d g e t  i s  b a l a n c e d  by a n  a n n u a l  
g r a n t  i n  a i d  f ro m  B r i t a i n .  The v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  i t s  i n h a b i t ­
a n t s  f o rm  p a r t  o f  t h e  S e n e g a l e s e  p e o p l e  a n d  t h e  f u t u r e  i s  b e s t
1 .  Cons. a r t .  8 4 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
c o n s i d e r e d  t o  l i e  i n  some fo rm  o f  u n i o n  w i t h  S e n e g a l*  I f  
t h a t  t a k e s  p l a c e  i t  w o u ld  p u t  an  end  t o  t h e  m onarchy  u n d e r  
t h e  B r i t i s h  Crown, a n d  p r o b a b l y  t o  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
fo rm  o f  g o v ernm en t*  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u n i o n  w i t h  S e n e g a l  
h a s  b e e n  d o u b te d  by a f o r m e r  G o v e rn o r  o f  t h e  Gambia,  on t h e  
g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  t r a d i t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  dem ocracy  
i n  t h e  Gambia i s  s t r o n g  and w i d e l y  h e l d *
L e s o t h o  i s  one o f  t h e  e n c l a v e s  i n  S o u th  A f r i c a *  I t  h a s  
a n  a r e a  o f  1 1 ,7 1 6  s q u a r e  m i l e s  and  a p o p u l a t i o n  o f  8 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,
o f  whom a n  e s t i m a t e d  2 0 0 ,0 0 0  ( h a l f  t h e  m a le  w o rk in g  p o p u ­
l a t i o n )  c r o s s  t h e  b o r d e r  t o  w ork  i n  S o u th  A f r i c a 1 s g o l d  a~nd 
d iam ond m i n e s ,  and  on f a r m s .  Only 1 , 5 0 0  s q u a r e  m i l e s  o u t  o f
t h e  t o t a l  a r e a  i s  c u l t i v a t e d  owing t o  t h e  h i l l y  n a t u r e  o f
t h e  c o u n t r y ,  t h o u g h  much o f  t h e  r e m a i n d e r  i s  g r a s s l a n d  s u i t ­
a b l e  f o r  g r a z i n g *  The m a in  e x p o r t s  ( w o o l ,  m o h a i r ,  w h e a t ,  
so rghum  a n d  c a t t l e )  do*« n o t  m eet  r e q u i r e d  im p o r t s *  95$ o f  
t h t i s e e x p o r t *  g o s s  t o  S o u th  A f r i c a  w h ic h  a l s o  s u p p l i e s  40$  o f  
t h e  t e r r i t o r y 1 s r e v e n u e  f ro m  i t s  s h a r e  o f  S o u th  A f r i c a ’ s 
cu s to m  a n d  e x c i s e  t a x  p a y a b l e  u n d e r  a 1910  a g re e m e n t*  I n  t h e  
f a c e  o f  t h e s e  s t a g g e r i n g  f a c t s  " i n d e p e n d e n c e ” a n d  " g o v e rn m e n t"  
h a v e  a  h o l l o w  r i n g ,  and  t h e y  would  h av e  no m ean ing  b u t  f o r  
ai o t h e r  f a c t :  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  B a s u t o s  a g a i n s t  i n ­
c o r p o r a t i o n  I n t o  w h i t e  s u p r e m a c i s t  S o u th  A f r i c a .  T h i s  f a c t
1* cf*  H i l a r y  B l o o d ,  ’ P a r l i a m e n t  i n  S m a l l  T e r r i t o r i e s ’ i n
P a r l i a m e n t  a s  an  e x p o r t  ( e d .  A. B u r n s ) ,  pp* 2 4 7 -2 6 3  a t
p p .  2 6 0 - 2 6 1 .
u n i t e s  a l l  p a r t i e s  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  f a c t i o n a l  o r  t h e o l o g i c a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s ,  a n d  i t  may p ro v e  t o  be  t h e  one f a c t  w h ic h  w i l l  
h e l p  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  t h e  L e s o t h o  s t a t e  a n d  a f f e c t  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  k e e p i n g  a l l  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t s  
w i t h i n  c o n t r o l l a b l e  b o u n d s .  B u t  o f  c o u r s e  t h i s  w i l l  depend-  
on f o r c e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  L e s o t h o ,  a n d  fln t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
d e v e lo p m e n t  i n  t h e  w hole  o f  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a .
S o m a l i a ’ s g e o - p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r .
I n  a c e r t a i n  s e n s e  i t  i s  t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  L e s o t h o ’ s* The
R e p u b l i c  i s  b o r d e r e d  by E t h i o p i a ,  Kenya,  t h e  I n d i a n  Ocean
O f
an d  t h e  G u l f  o f  Aden, and  s h a r e s  some f o r t y  m i le s /c o m m o n  
f r o n t i e r  w i t h  F r e n c h  S o m a l i l a n d *  S o m a l i a  c l a i m s  p a r t s  o f  
E t h i o p i a ,  Kenya and  t h e  w ho le  o f  F r e n c h  S o m a l i l a n d *  a s  b e ­
l o n g i n g  t o  h e r *  E t h i o p i a  and  Kenya on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  a r e  
d e t e r m i n e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y .  T e n s i o n  
h a s  t h e r e f o r e  b e e n  b u i l t  up  a l o n g  t h e  b o r d e r s  o f  t h e  Ogaden 
p r o v i n c e  o f  E t h i o p i a ,  an d  t h e  n o r t h e r n  f r o n t i e r  d i s t r i c t  o f  
Kenya,  a n d  s e v e r a l  o u t b r e a k s  o f  v i o l e n c e  h a v e  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  
t h e  p a s t  few y e a r s .  S h o r t  o f  an  a g r e e m e n t  t o w a r d s  some fo rm  
o f  u n i t y  o f  t h e  w h o le  r e g i o n ,  t h e  h o r n  o f  A f r i c a  t h r e a t e n s  
t o  be  a n  a r e a  o f  c o n f l i c t ,  an d  t h i s  w i l l  no  d o u b t  a f f e c t  n o t  
o n ly  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e s  c o n c e r n e d ,  b u t  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  
p o l i t i c s  a s  w e l l *
F i n a l l y  i t  may be c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  
w i t h  a d i v i d e d  e x e c u t i v e  power does  n o t  seem t o  h a v e  much
a p p e a l  i n  A f r i c a .  T h e re  does  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  he  any  e v i d e n c e  
t h a t  i t  e x i s t e d  i n  any  p a s t  A f r i c a n  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m s .  The 
d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  p o s t  c o l o n i a l  d a y s ,  
w h ic h  was p a r t l y  d e s i g n e d  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  power a n d  c o n t a i n  
power c o n f l i c t s ,  h a s  n o t  w orked  i n  many c a s e s .  I n d e e d ,  i n  
some t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  two e x e c u t i v e s  e x a c e r b a t e d  t h e  c o n f l i c t ,  
l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  s y s t e m .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e ,  a l ­
t h o u g h  t h e  p r o b le m  i s  many s i d e d ,  t h e  fo rm  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  seems 
t o  h a v e  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s e s .  The r o o t  c a u se  
o f  su c h  c r i s e s  i s  an  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  o f  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  
a n d  e conomic n a t u r e  w h ic h  m a n i f e s t s  i t s e l f  - in p e r s o n a l i t y  
f e u d s  a n d  power s t r u g g l e .  I n  f r e e z i n g  s u c h  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  
i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  f o rm  may c o n t r i b u t e  
t o  c r i s e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e s o l v i n g  th e m .
W h e th e r  t h e  system, w i l l  s u r v i v e  I n  t h e  t h r e e  s t a t e s  
o f  t h e  Gambia,  L e s o t h o  an d  S o m a l ia  i s  a m a t t e r  o f  c o n j e c t u r e .  
I f  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  i n  t h e  s t a t e s  i s  a t t u n e d  t o  
t h e  s y s t e m  an d  p r o v i d e d  t h e  s y s t e m  can  i n  f a c t  s e r v e  a u s e ­
f u l  p u r p o s e ,  t h e  a n s w e r  may b e  p o s i t i v e .  A t t h e  moment a l l  
t h a t  can  b e  s a i d  by  way o f  c o n c l u s i o n  I s  t h a t ,  w i t h  t h e  
p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  S o m a l i a  -  a n d  t h e r e  a g a i n  i t  i s  n o t  a 
c e r t a i n t y  -  i t  does  n o t  seem p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  A f r i c a n  s i t u ­
a t i o n  t o  f i n d  a p e r s o n  who h a s  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  power b u t  
who d oes  n o t  e x e r c i s e  i t ,  a n d  a p e r s o n  who e x e r c i s e s  pow er  b u t  
does  n o t  h av e  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  i t .
SECTION I -  THE PRESIDENT
A. I n s t i t u t i o n a l  A n t e c e d e n t
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  
A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  y e a r s  o f  au tonom ous  g o v e rn m e n t  i s  
m arked  by a good  d e a l  o f  i m i t a t i o n  o f  m e t r o p o l i t a n  s y s t e m s .  
I b i s  phenomenon c o n t i n u e d  t o  e x i s t  i n  many c a s e s  e v e n  a f t e r  
t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  c o m p le t e  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  T h i s  i s  p e r h a p s  
u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  a s  a l l  new c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  more o r  l e s s  
i n s p i r e d  by some m odel  o r  o t h e r .  The c o u n t r i e s  o f  f o r m e r  
" B r i t i s h "  A f r i c a  b e g a n  by a d o p t i n g  t h e  W e s t m i n s t e r  m o d e l ,  
t h o s e  o f  " F r e n c h "  A f r i c a  f o l l o w e d  t h e  F r e n c h  model and  t h e  
e x - B e l g i a n  t e r r i t o r i e s  w ere  i n f l u e n c e d  by  t h e  B e l g i a n  s y s t e m ,  
i n  e a c h  c a s e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  b e i n g  made t o  s u i t  l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  
I n  f o r m e r  " B r i t i s h 11 A f r i c a  t h e  m o n a r c h i c a l  s y s t e m  was a t  
f i r s t  i n t r o d u c e d  h a r n e s s e d  w i t h  a P a r l i a m e n t a r y  fo rm  o f  g o v e r n  
m e n t ,  a l a  W e s t m i n s t e r ,  w i t h  H er  B r i t a n n i c  M a j e s t y  a s  t h e  Head 
o f  S t a t e .  I n  f o r m e r  "French** A f r i c a  t h e  a c c e s s i o n  t o  i n d e ­
p e n d e n c e  saw t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  c l a s s i c  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m  
a t  t h e  o u t s e t .  T h i s  was f o r t u i t o u s  a s  f a r  a s  A f r i c a  was c o n -
c e r n e d .  The w e i g h t  o f  F r e n c h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t r a d i t i o n  m ig h t  
h av e  f a l l e n  on t h e  m eagre  s h o u l d e r s  o f  t h e  new A f r i c a n  S t a t e s ,  
h a d  t h e  t r a d i t i o n  i t s e l f  n o t  b ee n  s u b j e c t e d  t o  a m a jo r  ch an g e  
u n d e r  t h e  G a u l l i s t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 5 8 ,  The t im e  and  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n d e r  w h ich  t h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n  h a d  b e e n  
p r o m u l g a t e d  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h ,  a n d  t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  p r o d u c e d ^ t h e  
a c c e s s i o n  t o  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  m ost  o f  t h e s e  S t a t e s .  F o r  one o f  
t h e  s u b j e c t s  o f  t h e  t e rm s  o f  “R e f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  C o m ite f -C o n su l -  
t a t i f  C o n s t i t u t i o n e l l e  w h ic h  s t u d i e d  t h e  d r a f t  o f  t h e  1958
1
C o n s t i t u t i o n  was " t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b le m  i n  B l a c k  A f r i c a * "  
T h e re  a r e  o f  c o u r s e  s t a t e s  whose c o n s t i t u t i o n s  w ere  
m o d e l l e d  n o t  on E u r o p e a n  M e t r o p o l i t a n  s y s t e m s  -  o r ,  a t  any 
r a t e ,  n o t  d i r e c t l y  o r  p r i n c i p a l l y .  L i b e r i a  i s  one e x a m p le ,  
t h e  U1A*R* i s  a n o t h e r .  A t  a l l  e v e n t s ,  i n  a l l  c a s e s  i n s t i t u - . 
t i o n a l  i n s p i r a t i o n  an d  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  a d o p t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  
p r i n c i p l e s  o r  p r a c t i c e s  ( o r ,  t h e i r  r e j e c t i o n )  a r e  complex* 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e y  a r e  n o t  a lw a y s  t r a c e a b l e  t o  a s i n g l e  sys tem * 
I t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h a t  t h e  G u in e a n  P r e s i ­
d e n t i a l  r e g im e  h a s  b o r ro w e d  f r o m c o n te m p o r a r y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
2
p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o f  A m e r i c a .
N e v e r t h e l e s s  G u i n e a 1s d e c i s i o n  t o  r e j e c t  t h e  o f f e r  o f
1 .  See R e c u e i l  d e s  T e x t e s  r e l a t i f s  au d e fe re n d u i#  C o n s t i t u t i o n n e l  
P a r i s ’! I m p r i m e r i e  de l TA ssem b ld e  N a t i o n a l © ,  1 9 5 8 .
2* cf*  Leo Hamon. Les  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  des  R e p u b l i q u e s  A f r i c a i n s  
e t  Ivlalgaohe d * e x p r e s s i o n  F r a n c a i s e * I n t r o d u c t i o n *  T h i s  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  o r  s u b s t a n t i a t e •
e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  Communaute i n  1958 d i d  n o t  mean t h e  r e j e c t i o n  
o f  a l l / i t s  F r e n c h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  h e r i t a g e .  The i n f l u e n c e  o f  
t h e  G a u l l i s t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1958 i s  a b s e n t  i n  G u in ea  b e c a u s e  
o f  G u in e a 1 s r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f ra m e w o rk  ( t h e  Communaute) u n d e r  
w h ic h  i t  was p r o p o s e d .  T h i s  m ean t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  l i m i t i n g  
t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  and  a u g m e n t in g  t h a t  o f  t h e  
E x e c u t i v e  ( p r e s e n t  i n  o t h e r  s t a t e s )  a r e  a b s e n t  i n  t h e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  o f  G u i n e a 5 S v e n  th o u g h  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
The s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  G u in e a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m  
i s  t h a t  i t  shows what  h a p p e n s  when s. new s t a t e  c h o o s e s  t o  
s t r i k e  o u t  on i t s  own i n  s e a r c h  o f  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  w h ich  w i l l  
p r o v i d e  a  b a s i s  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  e conomic in d e p e n d e n c e .  
The C o n s t i t u t i o n  com bines  a p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  ( e l e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t )  w i t h  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m  ( c o n t r o l  by p a r l i a ­
ment o f  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t )  t h u s  p r o d u c i n g  a h y b r i d  r e g im e  w h ic h ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  some o b s e r v e r s ,  can  o n ly  be  e x p l a i n e d  o r  s u s ­
t a i n e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  one p a r t y  s t a t e ,  a s  we s h a l l  s e e
1
i n  C h a p t e r  S i x .
Ghana1 s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  h i s t o r y  u n d e r  Nkrumah a l s o  i l l u s ­
t r a t e s  t h e  same p r o c e s s .  Nkrumah1 s c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  I n d e p e n ­
d en c e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1957 a s  flim p o s e d ff by t h e  B r i t i s h  
2
G overnm ent  a n d  h i s  s u b s e q u e n t  a c t i o n s  t o  change  i t  d r a s t i c a l l y
1 .  c f .  I.I• L a m p u e , , i n  L es  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  d e s  E t a t s  d1 e x p r e s s i o n  
F r a n p a i s g  r e v .  j u r .  e t  p o l .  d 1 o u t r e - m e r .  1961 ,  p .  513.
2 .  K. Nkrumah, A f r i c a  m us t  U n i t e ,  p .  59.
d i d  n o t  e n t a i l  t h e  c o m p le te  abandonm en t  o f  t h e  h e r i t a g e  of
B r i t i s h  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e s * As de S m i th  h a s  w r i t t e n :
” I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  ( a p a r t  f ro m  New Z e a la n d )  
t h e  c o u n t r y  whose c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l aw  c o r r e s p o n d s  
t h e  m ost  c l o s e l y  t o  t h a t  o f  B r i t a i n  i n  t h e s e  
m a t t e r s  i s  G hana ,  w here  t h e  s p i r i t  a n d  p r a c t i c e s  
o f  B r i t i s h  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  n o t  c o n s c i o u s l y  
e m u l a t e d . ”
Y e t  t h e  U k ru m a is t  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1960 i s  a l a n d m a r k  i n
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  i n  s e v e r a l  r e s p e c t s ,  a s  we s h a l l  
i n
s e e /^ L a te r  s e c t i o n s .
The com plex  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  g o v e r n i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s o u r c e s  a n d  n a s c e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
may be  f u r t h e r  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  c u r i o u s  f a c t  t h a t  w h i l e  
t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  d e c l a r e d  ”r e  j e c t io r f*  o f  t h e  c o l o n i a l  
h e r i t a g e  d i d  n o t  a lw a y s  do s o ,  t h o s e  t h a t  h a d  s t a r t e d  by a 
s l a v i s h  i m i t a t i o n  i n  many i n s t a n c e s  p r o c e e d e d  t o  u s e  t h i s  
i n i t i a l  a c t  a s  a p o i n t  o f  d e p a r t u r e  f o r  b o l d  i n i t i a t i v e *  Thus 
many o f  t h e  f r a n c o p h o n i c  s t a t e s ,  h a v i n g  f i r s t  a d o p t e d  t h e  
G a u l l i s t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m ,  hav e  c h a n g ed  i t ,  g i v i n g  t h e i r  
ov/n new r e g im e s  c e r t a i n  o r i g i n a l  t r a i t s *
I t  may a l s o  be n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  m e t r o p o l i t a n  pow ers  were  
n o t  a lw a y s  s o l e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
s y s t e m s  a t  moments o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e *  T h i s  m ig h t  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  
b e  r e m a r k a b l e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  f o r m e r  B r i t i s h  a n d  F r e n c h  
s t a t e s ,  w here  t h e  g r a n t  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  h a d  b ee n  c a r r i e d  o u t
1 .  The New Commonwealth and  i t s  C o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  p* 77*
i n  m os t  c a s e s  u n d e r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  c o n d u c i v e  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
e m u l a t i o n .  I t  i s  r  e m a r k a b l e ,  h o w ev e r ,  t h a t  on t h e  eve  o f  
in d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  Congo, d e s p i t e  a l l  t h e  r a n c o u r  t h a t  
a c c o m p a n ie d  t h e  e v e n t ,  some o f  t h e  more m i l i t a n t  n a t i o n a l i s t  
l e a d e r s  o f  t h a t  c o u n t r y  h a d  i n s i s t e d  a t  t h e  Hound T a b le  Con­
f e r e n c e  i n  B r u s s e l s  on t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  B e l g i a n  P a r l i a ­
m e n ta r y  G o v e rn m en t ,  b e c a u s e ^ i t  was a r g u e d ,  i t  was b e t t e r  t o  
copy a s y s t e m  t h a t  ,rh a d  b e e n  t e s t e d 1' t h a n  t o  f a c e  t h e  h a z a r d s  
o f  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n .  Thus t h e  l o i  f o n d a m e n t a l e  o f  t h e  Congo 
a d o p t e d  t h e  B e l g i a n  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m  i n c l u d i n g  a n o n -  
r e s p o n s i b l e  Head o f  ^ t a t e .
The p r im e  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  W e s t m i n s t e r  m o d e l j a s  we h a v e  
s e e n  was t h e  f a c t  o f  d u a l i s m  i n  t h e  E x e c u t i v e ,  i n  w h ic h  t h e  
Head o f  S t a t e  i s  n o t  a n  e f f e c t i v e  h e a d  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  The 
e f f e c t i v e  e x e c u t i v e  i s  a P r im e m i n i s t e r  p r e s i d i n g  o v e r  a 
C a b i n e t  o f  M i n i s t e r s  whose a p p o i n t m e n t  he  l a r g e l y  d e t e r m i n e s .  
I n  A f r i c a  t h e  d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  s y s t e m  d i d  n o t  l a s t  v e r y  l o n g .  
Ghana s e t  a t r e n d  f o r  a d i f f e r e n t  s y s t e m  by i n t r o d u c i n g  a 
R e p u b l i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  May 1960* Ghana*s exam ple  was 
f o l l o w e d  by o t h e r s  -  T a n g a n y ik a  ( 1 9 6 2 ) ,  N i g e r i a  ( 1 9 6 3 ) ,
Uganda ( 1 9 6 3 ) ,  Zambia ( 1 9 6 4 ) ,  Kenya (1 9 6 5 )  an d  Malawi ( 1 9 6 6 ) .  
I n  t h e  Gambia a n  a t t e m p t  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  t r e n d  d i d  n o t  o b t a i n  
t h e  r e q u i r e d  m a j o r i t y .
1 .  c f .  J e a n  Buchmann, L * A f r iq u e  N o i r e  I n d e p e n d a n t e ,  p .  2 1 0 .
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  N i g e r i a  a n d  Uganda t h e  d u a l i s m  o f  t h e  
E x e c u t i v e  was r e t a i n e d  a s  w e l l  a s  a f e d e r a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
s t a t e ;  b o t h  m a t t e r s  d i c t a t e d  by p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  p e r t a i n i n g  
t o  p o l i t i c a l  d i v e r s i t y ,  a s  we h a v e  s e e n .  W h a te v e r  t h e  
e v e n t u a l  outcome o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  c r i s i s  i n  N i g e r i a ,  i t  i s  now 
c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  a  d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  was n o t  i n  i t ­
s e l f  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  cope w i t h  t  he  p o l i t i c a l  p r o b le m s  e x i s t i n g  
i n  t h a t  c o u n t r y .  W h e th e r  a u n i t a r y  e x e c u t i v e  ca n  cope w i t h  
s u c h  p r o b le m s  i s  i n d e e d  one o f  t h e  m os t  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n s  
t h a t  n e e d  t o  be a n s w e r e d .
The W e s t m i n s t e r  model  h a s  i t s  c o u n t e r - p a r t  i n  m o d i f i e d  
fo rm s  i n  E u r o p e a n  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s tem s*  They a l l  h av e  
c e r t a i n  common f e a t u r e s  o f  w h ic h  t h e  t  erm c l a s s i c  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
s y s t e m  w i l l  be  u n d e r s t o o d  t o  be  a r e f e r r e n t .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
t h e  F r e n c h  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m ,  s u b s t a n t i v e  m o d i f i c a t i o n  h a s  
b e e n  made by t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1958 g i v i n g  r i s e  t o  a new 
t e r m  -  " p a r l & m e n t e r i s m e  r a t i o n a l i s t " ,  i . e *  a r e g im e  i n  w h i c h  
e x e c u t i v e  an d  l e g i s l a t u r e  w o rk  i n  c o - o p e r a t i o n ,  d e p e n d in g  on 
e a c h  o t h e r .  The p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s te m  o r  " r e g im e  d t a s s e m b l t e "  
w h ic h  was p r a c t i s e d  i n  t h e  t h i r d  an d  f o u r t h  R e p u b l i c s  o f  
F r a n c e ,  a n d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a s  s e e n  t h r o u g h  t h e  e y e s  o f  A f r i c a n  
l e a d e r s ,  some o f  whom p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e s e  i n ­
s t i t u t i o n s ,  was a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  weak e x e c u t i v e .  Now, t h e
1 .  c f .  L a v r o f f  an d  P e i s e r ,  L es  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  A f r i c a i n f B ^  V o l .  I ,  
( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  p .  3 2 .
m ain  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  G a u l l i s t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1958  was t h e  
r e i n f o r c e d  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  T h i s  f e a t u r e  was c o n ­
s i d e r e d  t o  be n e c e s s a r y  and  more e a s i l y  a d a p t a b l e  f o r  t h e  
n e e d s  o f  d e v e l o p i n g  n a t i o n s  t h a n  t h e  c l a s s i c  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
s y s t e m  w h ic h  i n  i t s  a s p e c t  o f  " r e g im e  d ^ s s e m b l e e ” h a d  m ean t  
t h e  d o m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  by t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e  w i t h  
p e r e n n i a l  c r i s e s  i n  g o v e r n m e n t .
The 1958 C o n s t i t u t i o n  was i n t r o d u c e d  t o  r e d r e s s  t h e  
b a l a n c e  b e tw e e n  t h e  two i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  new 
f r a n c o p h o n i c  c o u n t r i e s  o f  A f r i c a  h a d  a good  s p r i n g b o a r d  i n  
t h e  G a u l l i s t  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  p o s i t i o n  a n d  r o l e  o f  t h e  
E x e c u t i v e  w h ich  s u i t e d  t h e i r  n e e d s .  B u t  t h e y  d ep a r te d ,  f rom
i t  i n  some i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t s .  One o f  t h e s e  i s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f
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a m o n o c e p h a lo u s  ( u n i t a r y )  E x e c u t i v e .  F i v e  s t a t e s  i n  t h e
w h o le  o f  A f r i c a  hav e  now a  b i c e p h a l o u s  ( d u a l )  E x e c u t i v e  -
t h e  Gambia,  L e s o t h o ,  S o m a l i a ,  t h e  Congo ( B r a z z a v i l l e )  and
t h e  U n i t e d  A rab  H e p u b l i c .  I n  t h e  C a m e ro u rn  t h e r e  i s  a
p e c u l i a r  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h ic h  t h e  f e d e r a l  s y s t e m  h a s  c r e a t e d
t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  P r im e M i n i s t e r  o f  one o f  t h e  F e d e r a t e d
S t a t e s .  But t h e  F e d e r a l  Governm ent h a s  a u n i t a r y  E x e c u t i v e .
As w i l l  be s e e n ,  i n  b o t h  t h e  Congo and  t h e  U .A.H. t h e
P r e s i d e n t  i s  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Head o f  S t a t e  w i t h  a s u b o r d i n a t e
2
P r im e  M i n i s t e r  an d  a C a b i n e t .
1 ,  On t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  1958 C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  s e e  G o n id e c ,  
D r o i t  d 1 outre<~mer, V o l .  I I ,  p p .  3 9 6 - 4 1 6 .
!?•* F*
B. I n n o v a t i o n
U n t i l  v e r y  r e c e n t l y  t h e  s t u d y  o f  P u b l i c  Law d i v i d e d  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m s  i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
w h e t h e r  t h e y  b e l o n g e d  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  t h e  A m e r ic a n  o r  t h e  
F r e n c h  t y p e .  We h a v e  h a d  a  g l i m p s e  t h e  B r i t i s h  a n d  F r e n c h  
t y p e s ,  an d  h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  new A f r i c a n  
s t a t e s  h a v e  d e p a r t e d  f ro m  th e m .  The r e a s o n s  a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  
o r  p o l i t i c a l  o r  b o t h .  The m e t r o p o l i t a n  m o d e ls  ?;ere s a i d  t o  
be  f o u n d  i n a d e q u a t e  t o  c o v e r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  an  A f r i c a n  
c o n t e x t .  E v en  t h e  new G a u l l i s t  m o d e l ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  w h ic h  was 
e m u l a t e d  i n  d e t a i l  t o  p r o v i d e  A f r i c a n  l e a d e r s  w i t h  a n  i n i t i a l  
c l o a k  o f  l e g i t i m a c y ,  a s  i t  w e r e ,  was l a t e r  m o d i f i e d  s u b s t a n t i ­
a l l y .
Tho A m e r ic a n  t y p e  r e p r e s e n t s  w h a t  i s  o t h e r w i s e  known as^L 
p r e s i d e n t i a l  r e g i m e ,  whose m a in  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  f e a t u r e  i s  a 
s t r i c t  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s .  The d o c t r i n e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
p o w ers  d i d  n o t  f i n d  f a v o u r  w i t h  t h e  new t r e n d .  The i n a d a p t ­
a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  i n  t h e  A f r i c a n  r e a l i t y  h a s  b e e n  
e x p l a i n e d  c h i e f l y  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  t e n d e n c y  to w a r d s  
c r e a t i n g  a  one p a r t y  S t a t e .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  a s i n g l e  d o m in a n t  
p a r t y  im p in g e s  on t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m .  E v en  i n  c o u n t r i e s  
w here  t h e  p a r t y  i s  s u b o r d i n a t e d  t o  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r g a n s ,  as  
f o r  ex a m p le  i n  t h e  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a n d  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  
o f  pow ers  i s  f o l l o w e d ,  i t  i s  more a p p a r e n t  t h a n  r e a l .  Power
i s  s o u g h t  t o  be u n i f i e d  and  c o n c e n t r a t e d ,  n o t  d i v e r s i f i e d
a n d  d i v i d e d .  T h i s  h a s  b e e n  c a l l e d  rf c l o s e d  po w er” , w h ic h  does
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n o t  t o l e r a t e  p l u r a l i t y  o f  o p i n i o n s  an d  a t t i t u d e s .  B e c a u se  
t h i s  pow er  i s  ” c l o s e d ” t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  on w hich  i t  r e s t s  
t e n d s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  o t h e r s  an d  become t h e  o n ly  o r  t h e  d o m in a n t  
p a r t y  i n  t h e  s t a t e .  T h i s  f a c t  m a n i f e s t s  i t s e l f  i n  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  an d  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a p p a r a t u s  a n d  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  i n  t h e  E x e c u t i v e ;  an d  as  a n o v e l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p h e n o ­
menon i t  d e s e r v e s  t o  be  s t u d i e d  f ro m  as many a n g l e s  as  
p o s s i b l e •
A t f i r s t  g l a n c e ,  i t  may a p p e a r  t h a t  some of  t h e  u n i t a r y  
e x e c u t i v e  s y s t e m s  m ig h t  be  t r a c e d  t o  t h e  A m er ic an  t y p e .  
L i b e r i a ’ s c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  was m o d e l l e d  on t h a t  o f  
t h e  U .S .A* a n d ,  i n  fo rm ,  s t i l l  r e f l e c t s  i t .  A g a in ,  Ukrum ah’ s 
s t u d y  and  l o n g  y e a r s  o f  s t a y  i n  t h e  U .S .A .  may have  c o n ­
c e i v a b l y  i n f l u e n c e d  some o f  h i s  t h i n k i n g  on t h i s  s u b j e c t .
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  h i s  a s s o c i a t i o n s  w i t h  Sekou T oure  an d  
I -od ibo  K e i t a  a n d  t h e i r  r a d i c a l  a p p r o a c h ;  h i s  c o n c e p t  o f  t h e  
A f r i c a n  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  w i t h  i t s  i n h e r e n t  c l a im s  f o r  s e l f -  
e x p r e s s i o n  a t  a l l  l e v e l s ;  h i s  a d v o c a c y  o f  A f r i c a n  u n i t y ,  
w i t h  i t s  demand f o r  u r g e n t  m e thods  a t  t h e  t o p  l e v e l ;  h i s  
a t t a c h m e n t  t o  a m i l i t a n t  fo rm  o f  s o c i a l i s m ,  w i t h  i t s
1 .  c f .  G. E u r d e a u ,  T r a i t s  de s c i e n c e  p o l i t i q u e  1 , p .  464 e t  
s e q .
i n t o l e r a n c e  o f  l i b e r a l  dem ocracy  an d  e c o n o m ic s ;  h i s  p r e ­
o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  an d  f e a r  o f  w ha t  he l a t e r  c a l l e d  " n e o ­
c o l o n i a l i s m  ; t h e  l a s t  S t a g e  o f  I m p e r i a l i s m "  - t h e s e  f a c t o r s  
may e x p l a i n  some o f  t h e  n o v e l  f e a t u r e s  o f  ITkrumah1 s 
R e p u b l i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  w h a te v e r  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  A m e r ic a n  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  m ig h t  hav e  e x e r c i s e d  i n  t h e  mind o f  R k r u n a h ,  i t  
i s  c l e a r  t h a t  i t  d i d  n o t  f i n d  much p l a c e  i n  h i s  R e p u b l i c a n  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .
I t  i s  a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  t r a d i t i o n a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i n  
W e s te r n  P u b l i c  L a w  does  n o t  em brace  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s y s t e m s  o f  A f r i c a  w h ic h  do n o t  f i t  i n t o  any  o f  i t s  c a t e g o r i e s .  
T h i s  p r e s e n t s '  a c h a l l e n g e ' .  ' One s im p le  r e s p o n s e  t o ' the '  c h a l l ­
enge  i s  o f  c o u r s e  t o  d i s m i s s  t h e  new s y s t e m s  as  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
r e g i m e s .  But t h a t  w ou ld  n o t  be  v e r y  h e l p f u l .  Seme u s e f u l
a t t e m p t s  h a v e  b ee n  made t o  d i s c e r n  a g e n e r a l  p a t t e r n  I n  t h e
1
new, t r e n d  c r y s t a l l i s e d  i n  t h e  A f r i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n s .
The new t r e n d  h a s  b e e n  summed up  by Buchmann as  A f r i c a n  
" n e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m " . The t e r m  p u r p o r t s  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e
1 .  c f .  F e a n  Buchmann, (1 )  o p .  c i t . ,  p p .  2 1 4 - 2 1 5 ;  256-285, ,  an d
(2 )  La T endance  au p r e s l d e n t i a l i s m e  d an s  l e s  n o u v e l l e s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n s  ne g r o - A f r i c a  ine$ ,  1 9 6 2 .  12 C i v i l i s a t i o n s  4 6 .
Leo K ainon, IX Cl y i l l s a t T o n s  2 4 5 ,  ( 1 9 6 1 ) .  P. I d e n b u r g ,
1 5  R e v .  J u r .  e ~ P o l .  d 1 o u t r e - m e r  1 9 5 ,  ( 1 9 6 1 ) .  A G a n d o l f i ,  
i b i ' d • ,  p .  3 6 9 .  F .  Lampu^, i b i d . , p .  51 3 .  de S m i th ,  
o p . c i t », p p .  2 3 0 - 2 5 2 .
p o s i t i o n ,  I n  A f r i c a ,  w here  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m  
i s  a c c o m p a n ie d  by t h e  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  E x e c u t i v e  power w h ic h  ; 
t e n d s  t o  be  h i e r a r c h i c  a n d  p e r s o n a l i s e d ,  w i t h  one ( o r  a 
d o m in a n t )  p a r t y  a s  i t s  b a s e .  T h i s  t a l l i e d  w i t h  w hat  B u rd e a u  
c a l l e d  " c l o s e d "  p o w e r .  t h e  same t i m e  a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  t h e
f ram ew o rk  o f  c l a s s i c  s y s t e m s  i s  p r e s e r v e d .  F u n c t i o n a l  d i v i ­
s i o n ,  i f  n o t  c o m p le te  s e p a r a t i o n ,  e x i s t s  b e tw e e n  t h e  t h r e e  
o r g a n s  o f  s t a t e .  P a r l i a m e n t  i s  u n i v e r s a l l y  e l e c t e d .  But one 
o f  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  A f r i c a n  n e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m  h a s  b e e n  
t h e  e m a s c u l a t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t  and  t h e  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  power of  t h e  E x e c u t i v e .  I T e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m  grew 
o u t  o f  a s o r t  o f  n e o - p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m  w h ic h  was s e e n  on t h e  
A f r i c a n  s t a g e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  e x c i t i n g  d ay s  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  and  
t h e n  was s e e n  no m o re .  I t  was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by a more v i g o r ­
ous r o l e  p l a y e d  by p a r l i a m e n t  -  ev en  t h o u g h  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  
e n j o y e d  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  more power t h a n  u n d e r  c l a s s i c  p a r l i a ­
m e n ta r y  s y s t e m s .  T h e re  w as ,  i n  t h e  e a r l y  days o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  
more v i t a l i t y  an d  a s e n s e  o f  p u r p o s e  d i s p l a y e d  by p a r l i a m e n t ,  
s p u r r e d  on ,  i n  many c a s e s ,  by t h e  p r e s e n c e  of  a v o c a l  
O p p o s i t i o n ,  h o w ev e r  s m a l l  i t s  v o i c e .  W i th  t h e  a d v e n t  of t h e  
One p a r t y ,  t h e  s m a l l  v o i c e  was s i l e n c e d  an d  g r a d u a l l y  
p a r l i a m e n t  l o s t  i t s  v i g o u r , i f  n o t  i t s  u s e f u l n e s s  a s  a 
medium f o r  l e g i t i m i s i n g  E x e c u t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  a n d  f o r  c r e a t i n g  
n a t i o n a l  c o n s e n s u s .
An a t t e m p t  h a s  b e e n  made,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  by Buchmann, t o
i d e n t i f y  c e r t a i n  s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h i s  n e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m *  
One t r a i t ,  as h a s  b e e n  o b s e r v e d ,  i s  t h e  movement t o w a r d s  a 
h i e r a r c h i c  s t r u c t u r e  o f  power i n  w h ic h  a n  " i r r e s p o n s i b l e ”
Head o f  S t a t e  p l a y s  a  d o m in an t  r o l e  m o s t l y  i n  a m o n o c ep h a lo u s  
s y s t e m .  The Head o f  S t a t e  i s  Head o f  Governm ent  a s  w e l l  a s ,  
i n  most  c a s e s ,  h e a d  o f  t h e  d o m in a n t  p a r t y .  He e x e r c i s e s  
e x t e n s i v e  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r s .
T h i s  a t t e m p t  i m p l i c i t l y  e l e v a t e s  n e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m
t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a new a n a l y t i c a l  c o n c e p t ,  ^he a p p r o a c h  -
u s e f u l  as  i t  i s  -  ^ o v e r r e a c h e s  i t s e l f  when Buchmann p r o p o s e s v
c e r t a i n  »iinique p r o p e r t i e s  o f  A f r i c a n  n e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m ,
v i z .  (1 )  t h e  d e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  by p a r l i a m e n t  a n d
n o t  e l e c t i o n  by u n i v e r s a l  s u f f r a g e ,  ( 2 )  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l
1
t e r m  o f  o f f i c e  b e i n g  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h a t  o f  p a r l i a m e n t .  T h i s  
was t y p i f i e d  by t h e  Ghana m odel  u n d e r  t h e  H k r u m a h i s t  R e p u b ­
l i c a n  C o n s i t i t i o n  o f  I 9 6 0 .  But a n o t h e r  v a r i e t y  i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  
by t h e  I v o r y  C o a s t  i n  w h ic h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  was e l e c t e d  by 
u n i v e r s a l  a d u l t  s u f f r a g e .  T h i s  a f f e c t s  t h e  i n t e r n a l  c o n s i s ­
t e n c y  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  e x p o u n d e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  a t t e m p t  by r e f e r ­
en ce  t o  t h e  Ghana m o d e l .  F o r ,  a p a r t  f ro m  t h e  v a r i e t y  i n  t h e  
m anner  o f  a c c e s s  t o  o f f i c e ,  t h e  n a t u r e  a n d  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t *  s pow ers  were  a l m o s t  t h e  same , a s  we s h a l l  s e e .
T h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  was met by s u g g e s t i n g  a new ter';:: t o  d e s c r i b e
1 .  o f .  Buchmann (1 9 6 1 )  12 C i v i l i s a t i o n  4 6 ,  p .  60 ,  6 1 .
t h e  I v o r y  C o a s t  m ode l ,  v iz *  **p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m e  r e n f o r c e 11,
1
o r  r e i n f o r c e d  p r e s i d e n c y .
A g r d a t  d e a l  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i f e  o f  t h e s e  new 
c o u n t r i e s  i s  i n  a s t a t e  o f  f l u x j  t h e y  a r e  i n  many r e s p e c t s  
e x p e r i m e n t i n g .  Even some o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  i s  t e n t a t i v e .  A l l  t h i s  l e a d s  u s  t o  q u a l i f y  t h e  
c o n c e p t  o f  n e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m e TI• The p r a c t i c e  o f  c o i n i n g  
new te r m s  whose c o n t e n t  i s  e l u s i v e  i s  o f  q u e s t i o n a b l e  v a l u e #  
T h ese  c a u t i o n a r y  o b s e r v a t i o n s  do n o t  i n  a n y w a y  d e t r a c t  f ro m  
t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  a n a l y t i c a l  w o rk  w h ic h  summed u p  t h e  new 
t r e n d  i n  A f r i c a .  I n  l a t e r  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  a  d e t a i l e d  
d e s c r i p t i o n  and  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a n d  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
t h e  E x e c u t i v e  w i l l  be  made, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  ways i n  
w h ic h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  e l e c t e d ,  some o f  w h ic h  b e a r  s t r i k i n g  
m arks  o f  o r i g i n a . l i t y • A p a t t e r n  w i l l  em erge  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  P r e s i d e n t s  f u n c t i o n ,  i n  t h e  
m echan ism  by  w h ic h  h i s  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  d i s c h a r g e d .
1 .  c f .  J .  C. J u e r g e n s m e y e r  (1964 )  J . A . L . , pp .  1 5 7 - 1 7 7 ,  a n d  
e s p .  p .  1 7 5 .  The a u t h o r  o f  t h i s  a r t i c l e  s t a r t s  w i t h  
E u c h n a n n T s t h e s i s  on t h e  new c o n c e p t ,  a n d  e n d s  w i t h  t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  ’’r e i n f o r c e d  p r e s i d e n c y ” h a s  r e p l a c e d  
” n e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m ” • U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  f a r  f r o m  c l a r i ­
f y i n g  t h e  i s s u e s ,  t h i s  h a s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a d d i n g  f u r t h e r  
c o m p l i c a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s o ,  i n  r e t r o s e ^ p c t ,
i h a v i n g  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  e m u l a t i o n  of t h e  Ghana model  by 
\ T a n z a n i a ,  Zambia an d  t o  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  Kenya,  a s  we 
s h a l l  s e e .  See -pp.MH-SZ. i n f r a .
Ci The S t a t u s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
The t e r m  s t a t u s  i s  h e r e  u s e d  t o  i n c l u d e ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  
t h e  modes an d  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a c c e s s  t o  o f f i c e .  S t a t u s  i n  
i t s  dynam ic  a s p e c t  i m p l i e s  r o l e .  H o le  a l s o  i m p l i e s  f u n c t i o n  
a n d  h e n c e  po w er ;  b u t  t h i s  l a t t e r  w i l l  be c o n s i d e r e d  u n d e r  a 
s e p a r a t e  s e c t i o n .
1•  The H o le  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
M e n t io n  w i l l  be made h e r e  m a i n l y  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  i n  h i s  c a p a c i t y  as  Head of  S t a t e  and  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  
w h o le  n a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s a y  w here  h i s  
f u n c t i o n  a s  Head o f  S t a t e  en d s  a n d  h i s  f u n c t i o n  of  C h i e f  
E x e c u t i v e  b e g i n s  -  i n d e e d  i t  i s  u n r e a l i s t i c  t o  make su c h  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  i n  a u n i t a r y  s y s t e m  -  y e t  i t  may be  p e r m i s s i b l e  
t o  make a n  a t t e m p t  a t  d i s t i n c t i o n  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  e x p o s i t i o n .
A l l  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  c o n t a i n  t h e  
u s u a l  p r o v i s i o n  on t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a s  sym bol an d  
g u a r a n t o r  of  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  u n i t y  an d  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n .  He i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  be  t h e  g u a r d i a n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n ,  t o  e n s u r e  r e s p e c t  f o r  i t ,  t o  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  
o f  law s a n d  t h e  p r o p e r  c o n d u c t  o f  p u b l i c  a f f a i r s  i n  g e n e r a l .  
T h e se  a r e  no h o l l o w  p h r a s e s .  N lam ifes t  a n d  r e p e a t e d  f  a i l u r e  
i n  t h i s  d u t y  may be a t t e n d e d  by r e s o r t  t o  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
means t o  r e d r e s s  g r i e v a n c e s .  A n e c e s s a r y  c o n c o m i t a n t  o f  t h e  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o r  p e r s o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  power i s  t h e  r e a d i n e s s  
w i t h  w h ic h  b lam e c a n  be  l a i d  a t  t h e  d o o r  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
The p r o s p e c t  o f  t h i s  t a k i n g  p l a c e ,  w h ic h  i s  by no  means 
r e m o t e ,  a s  r e c e n t  u p h e a v a l s  h av e  shown, may e x e r c i s e  a 
p o s i t i v e  i n f l u e n c e  i n  c a u s i n g  or  e n a b l i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  
d i s c h a r g e  h i s  f u n c t i o n s  w e l l*
T h e re  i s  n o t h i n g  new i n  t h e  r o l e  i n d i c a t e d  above* But  
t o  t h e  e x a l t e d  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a s  Head of  S t a t e  i n  
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s e n s e s  I s  a d d e d  a new e m p h a s i s  on h i s  r o l e  as  
a  n a t i o n 1s p r im e  m over  -  a r o l e  w h ic h  h a s  i n f i n i t e l y  more 
dynam ic  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t h a n  t h a t  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  r u l e r s *  T h i s  
i s  s o  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  e x p l o s i o n  o f  human e n e r g y  a n d  t h e  e v e r -  
r i s i n g  e x p e c t a t i o n  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  e l e c t i o n  o u t  
o f  w h ic h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t s  o f  t h e s e  new s t a t e s  em erge  t o  l e a d  
t h e i r  p e o p le *  The g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  h a s  b e e n  t o  c a n a l i s e  t h e  
h o p e s  an d  a s p i r a t i o n s  a r o u s e d  i n  t h e s e  e v e n t s  f o r  change  -  
f o r  m a t e r i a l  p r o g r e s s *  The P r e s i d e n t  who, i n  h i s  p e r s o n  o r  
t h r o u g h  h i s  o f f i c e ,  em bod ies  t h e  h o p e s  and  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  
a  p e o p l e  a t  c r u c i a l  moments o f  i t s  h i s t o r y  h a s  o b v i o u s l y  a n  
a d d i t i o n a l  b u r d e n  a d d e d  t o  h i s  t a s k *  T h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e  i n  
A f r i c a *  The n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  t a s k  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  
pow er  w i l l  be  e x a m in e d  i n  more d e t a i l  l a t e r .
2 .  A c c e s s i o n  t o  O f f i c e
The c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  pay  due  homage t o  
d e m o c r a t i c  p r i n c i p l e s *  Many o f  them  c o n t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s  w i t h  
f o r m u l a e  an d  s l o g a n s  e x p r e s s i v e  o f  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  su ch  a s  
" g o v e rn m e n t  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ,  by  t h e  p e o p l e ,  f o r  t h e  p e o p l e ” a n d
240.
" s o v e r e i g n t y  e m a n a t e s  f ro m  t h e  p e o p l e 11, e t c .  U n i v e r s a l  
s u f f r a g e  a s  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  a u t h o r i t y  i s  r e c o g n i s e d  
a s  one o f  t h e '  p i l l a r s o n  w h i c h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m  r e s t s .
I t  i s  u n i v e r s a l ,  e q u a l  a n d  s e c r e t  i n  a l l  c a s e s ;  a n d  i t  may 
b e  e x e r c i s e d  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y •
b a s e d  on t h i s  o p t i o n  two t y p e s  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i a  
e x i s t : -  ( i )  d i r e c t  a n d  ( 1 1 ) i n d i r e c t .  T h e re  a r e ,  i t  i s  t r u e ,  
P r e s i d e n t s  who owe t h e i r  o f f i c e  t o  modes o t h e r  t h a n  e l e c t i o n .
B u t  i n  a l l  o f  t h e s e  c a s e s  p r o m i s e s  a r e  made t o  l e g i t i m i s e  t h e  
i n i t i a l  n a k e d  pow er  by h o l d i n g  e l e c t i o n . ^
( i )  D i r e c t  e l e c t i o n . The c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  m o s t  A f r i c a n  
s t a r e s  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  by d i r e c t  
u n i v e r s a l  s u f f r a g e .  The f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e s  b e l o n g  t o  t h i s  
g r o u p :  Cam eroun  ( a r t .  1 0 ) ,  Gabon ( a r t . 1 3 ) ,  G u in e a  ( a r t . 2 2 ) ,
I v o r y  c o a s t  ( a r t .  9 ) ,  L i b e r i a  ( a r t .  3 ,  s e c t .  1 ) ,  M a d a g a s c a r  
( a r t .  l b ) ,  M a u r i t a n i a  ( a r t .  1 3 ) ,  H i g e r ,  ( a r t .  9 ) ,  Rwanda 
( a r t .  5 2 ) ,  S e n e g a l  ( a r t .  2 1 ) ,  T a n z a n i a  ( I n t e r i m  C o n s .  a r t . 7 ( 2 ) ,  
T u n i s i a  ( a r t .  ^ 0 ) .  P r o v i s i o n s  a r e  made i n  e a c h  c o n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  
t h e  c a n d i d a c y  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n c y ,  t h e  m e ch an ism  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
f r o m  n o m i n a t i o n  t o  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  o f f i c e .  The p r u v i s i o n s  
a r e  d e t a i l e d  i n  some, b e l i e f  i n  o t h e r s ,  d e t a i l e d  r e g u l a t i o n  
o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  b e i n g  l e f t  ( i n  a l l  c a s e s )  t o  s u b o r d i n a t e  l a w s .
The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  c a n d i d a c y  a r e  on  t h e  w h o le  s im ­
i l a r  t o  t h o s e  u n d e r  t h e  m e t r o p o l i t a n  s y s t e m s : t h e  u s u a l  r e q u i r e -
1 .  See c h a p t e r s  b a n d  9 .
2 .  I n  m o s t  c a s e s  t h e  p a r t y  c e n t r a l  B x e c u t i v e  n o m i n a t e s  t h e  
c a n d i d a t e ,  i n  some c a s e s  t h e r e  i s  a n  E l e c t o r a l  C o l l a t e  ( t o
ca h d iu a te )  c o n s i s t in g  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  E x e c u t i v e  
c o m m i t t e e  o i  t h e  p a r t y  a n d  o f  o t h e r  members  o f  t h e  o a r  t v  su c h  
a s  m em oers  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  c o m m i t t e e  o f  p a i - ty  a u x i l l t r f e s  
( e . g .  IWalawi C o n s .  a r t .  1 1 ) .
n e n t s  o f  c i t i z e n s h i p ,  minimum a g e  (35 i n  m o s t ,  30 i n  a f e w ) ,  
p h y s i c a l  and  m e n ta l  f i t n e s s ,  an d  e n jo y m e n t  o f  c i v i l  and  
p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  c a n d i d a c y .  Some p e c u l i a r i t i e s  
may be n o t e d  i n  p a s s i n g .  The C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Ry/anda p r o v i d e s  
f o r  a  maximum age l i m i t  (60) an d  a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  c a n d i ­
d a t e  m ust  be a male c i t i z e n  who i s  a  l o c a l  c o u n c i l l o r  ( a r t #
1
54)#  I n  th e  Cameroun, b e c a u s e  of t h e  f e d e r a l  s e t - u p ,  t h e  
c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  th e  P r e s i d e n c y  and th e  V i c e - p r e s i d e n c y  must  
n o t  come f rom  th e  same s t a t e  ( a r t #  35 )#  I n  i t f lau r i tan ia  and  
T u n i s i a  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  must be a Moslem (C ons .  M a u r i t a n i a ,  a r t .  
1 0 ;  T u n i s i a  a r t .  38)#
The M echanism o f  E l e c t i o n
D u r in g  t h e  f i r s t ,  y e a r s  of  s e l f - r u l e , \7hen t h e  new s t a t e s
g a i n e d  in d e p en d en c e  - t h e r e  e x i s t e d  i n  m ost  of  them  more t h a n
of
one p a r t y .  The m e t h o d / e l e c t i n g  t h e  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  was t h e r e ­
f o r e  i n v a r i a b l y  d e s i g n e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  a p e r s o n  
who was l e a d e r  o f  t h e  P a r t y  commanding a m a j o r i t y  i n  p a r l i a ­
ment •
I n  fo rm e r  F r e n c h  t e r r i t o r i e s  t h e r e  was no u n i f o r m  p r o ­
c e d u re #  I n  some, a c a n d i d a t e  was r e q u i r e d  t o  be s u p p o r t e d  o r  
n o m in a t e d  by th e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly ,  who w ou ld  
a c t  a s  an  i n t e r i m  Head of S t a t e  and open c o n s u l t a t i o n s #  T h is
1* The Rwanda C o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  men and  women a r e  
e q u a l  i n  th e  eyes  o f  t h e  lav/,  b u t  t h a t  man i s  t h e  rfc h e f  
n a t u r e l ,r of  t h e  f a m i l y .  A r t .  30 .
2 4 2 .
was t h e  c a s e  f o r  exam ple  i n  t h e  I v o r y  C o a s t  a n d  U pper  V o l t a .
I n  o t h e r  c a s e s  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  a number o f  d e p u t i e s  o f  t h e
n a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  was n e e d e d ,  e . g .  i n  Gabon an d  M a u r i t a n i a .
H av in g  s e c u r e d  such  s u p p o r t  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  w o u ld  t h e n  p r e s e n t
h i s  prograrrm.es t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly .  I n  M a d a g a s c a r  he
1
was a p p o i n t e d  by an  e l e c t o r a l  c o l l e g e .
U n d e r  t h e  p r e s e n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Most of  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  
p r e s e n t l y  i n  f o r c e  p r o v i d e  t h a t  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  
s h o u l d  t a k e  p l a c e  a t  t h e  same t i m e  ag t h e  G e n e ra l  E l e c t i o n .
The d e t a i l s  o f  e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  s u c h  a s  r u l e s  on e l i g i b i l i t y ,  
n o m i n a t i o n ,  v o t i n g ,  c o u n t i n g  v o t e s ,  s u p e r v i s i o n ,  r e v i e w  an d  
p u b l i c a t i o n  of  r e s u l t s  a r e  l e f t  t o  be  r e g u l a t e d  by a n * o r g a n i c '  
l a w .  I n  m ost  c a s e s  t h e r e  I s  a m arked  i n f l u e n c e  o f  m e t r o -  
p o l i t a n  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m s .  T h i s / p a r t i c u l a r l y  is* so  i n  t h e  
f r a n c o p h o n i c  s t a t e s  w here  t h e  F r e n c h  e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  i s  
p r e s e n t  w i t h  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  a few d e t a i l s .
( a )  N o m i n a t i o n .  A d e c r e e  i s  i s s u e d  by t h e  E x e c u t i v e  
( u s u a l l y  t h e  C o u n c i l  of  M i n i s t e r s ) ,  a n n o u n c in g  t h e  d a t e  o f  
t h e  e l e c t i o n .  O th e r  p a r t i c u l a r s  w i H d a l s  o be a n n o u n c e d ,  s u c h  
as  t h e  p l a c e  w here  n o m i n a t i o n  i s  t o  be  p l a c e d  end t h e  P e r s o n  
d.i$r C om m iss ion  a c t i n g  as  H o t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r .  He i s ,  i n  some 
c a s e s ,  t h e  R e g i s t r a r  o f  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  ( e . g .  .Senega l)  an d  
i n  o t h e r s  t h e  C h a i rm an  o f  an  E l e c t i o n  C om m iss ion  ( e . g .  t h e
1 .  c f .  C-onidec, o p . c i t . ,  p .  4C5.
Ivory C oast);  or aga in , as in  T u n is ia , a Con3m ittee  formed 
of the P resid en t o f  the N a tion a l Assembly (Chairman), the  
Mufti ( r e l ig io u s  head) of T u n is ia , the f i r s t  P resid en t o f  
the C o u r t  of vftppeal, t h e  f i r s t  P resid en t o f  the Supreme 
Court o f Appeal, and the P u b lic  P rosecu tor . 'i'he n o m i n a t i o n  
must be  made a c e r t a i n  minimum, number o f  days  b e f o r e  t h e  d a t e  
o f  f i r s t  p o l l i n g  d ay ,  t h e  l e n g t h  o f / t i m e  v a r y i n g  f rom  s t a t e  
t o  s t a t e .
'Then n o m i n a t i o n  i s  o v e r ,  a l i s t  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  I s  p u b l i s h e d  
a c e r t a i n  number o f  days  b e f o r e  p o l l i n g  d a y .  The u s u a l  d u r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  ca m p a ig n  i s  two w ee k s ,  and  i t  c l o s e s  t h e  day  
b e f o r e  t h e  f i r s t  v o t i n g .  T h i s  i s  q u i t e  a d e q u a t e  f o r  v i t a l  
i s s u e s  t o  be  c r y s t a l l i s e d ,  and  f o r  p e o p l e  t o  d i g e s t  a rg u m e n ts  
f o r  a n d  a g a i n s t .  L in g  e l e c t i o n  cam paigns  a r e  n o t  o f  v a l u e  i n  
c o u n t r i e s  w here  t h e  e l e c t i o n  can  be c o s t l y .
(b)  V o t i n g . U nder  m o s t  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a s y s t e m  o f  
v o t i n g  by m a j o r i t y  i s  p r o v i d e d  f o r .  A c a n d i d a t e  must o b t a i n  
an  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  be  d e c l a r e d  e l e c t e d  a t  t h e  
f i r s t  b a l l e t .  T h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  he  m us t  o b t a i n  h a l f  o f  t h e  
v o t e s  c a s t  p l u s  o n e .  I f  he  d o e s  n o t  o b t a i n  an  a b s o l u t e  
m a j o r i t y  a t  t h e  f i r s t  b a l l o t ,  a s e c o n d  b a l l o t  t a k e s  p l a c e  
w i t h i n  a s p e c i f i e d  p e r i o d  ( n o r m a l l y  f i f t e e n  d a y s )  a f t e r  t h e  
f i r s t  b a l l o t .  At t h e  s- e c o n d  b a l l o t  o n ly  r e l a t i v e  m a j o r i t y  
i s  n e e d e d  t o  be d e c l a r e d  e l e c t e d ;  I n  o t h e r  words  t h e  c a n d i -
d a t e  who o b t a i n s  t h e  maximum num ber  o f  v o u e s  i s  d e c l a r e d  
e l e c t e d .
( c )  S u p e r v i s i o n  a n d  D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  E l e c t i o n . A d e c l a r a t i o n  
o f  e l e c t i o n  i s  made p r o v i s i o n a l l y . -*-f t h i s  i s  n o t  d i s p u t e d  
b e f o r e  t n e  E l e c t i o n  C o m m is s io n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  e l e c t e d .  I f  
i t  i s  d i s p u t e d ,  t h e  E l e c t i o n  C o m m is s io n ,  w h ic h  i n  many c a s e s  
i s  t h e  Supreme C o u r t ,  m u s t  d e c i d e  t o  u p h o l d  o r  a n n u l  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n a l  d e c l a r a t i o n .  I n  c a s e  o f  a n n u l m e n t  a n e l e c t i o n  
t a k e s  p l a c e ,  ue n o v u .  I n  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  (C am ero u n ,  Gabon, 
t h e  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  M a u r i t a n i a ,  N i g e r i a ,  S e n e g a l )  t h e  Supreme 
C o u r t  s u p e r v i s e s  t h e  p r o p e r  c o n d u c t  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n .  I n  Mada­
g a s c a r ,  t h e  C i> n se i l  S u p e r i e u r  d e s  I n s t i t u t i o n s  s u p e r v i s e s .  I n  
Rwandu a  C o m m iss io n  a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  b u r e a u  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A s s e m b ly  a n d  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  C o n s e i l  d fn t a t  a n d  t h e  Supreme 
C o u r t ,  p e r f o r m s  s u c h  s u p e r v i s i o n .  I n  T u n i s i a  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
c o m m i t t e e s  w a t c h e s  o v e r  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n .  The 
s u p e r v i s i n g  body i s  r e q u i r e d  among o t h e r  t h i n g s  t o  e n s u r e  t h e
e q u a l i t y  o f  t r e a t m e n t  g i v e n  t o  c a n d i d a t e s ,  r e g a r d i n g  m e d i a
1o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  e t c .
( d) A s s u m p t io n  o f  O f f i c e . The P r e s i d e n t  a s s u m e s  o f f i c e  a f t e r  
t h e  f i n a l  d e c l a r a t i o n - h a s  b e e n  made o u t  a n d  t h e  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e
1 .  S e e ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f : -  C am eroun ,  a r t s .  9 ,  1 0 ;  
G abon,  a r t .  7 ;  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a r t .  1 0 ;  M a d a g a s c a r ,  L o i  
du j u i n  1 9 e 2 ,  w h ic h  i s  a n  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
o f  1 9 6 1 ;  M a u r i t a n i a ,  a r t .  1 3 ;  N i g e r ,  a r t  1 0 ;  Rwanda, 
a r t .  52;  S e n e g a l ,  a r t s .  2 5 - 3 5 ;  T u n i s i a ,  a r t .  391
o f  h i s  o r e d e c e s s o r  has  e x p i r e d .  He i s  n o r m a l l y  r e q u i r e d  t o
1
t a k e  a n  o a t h ,  t h e  fo rm  of w h ich  v a r i e s  f r o m  s t a t e  t o  s t a t e *
( i i )  I n d i r e c t  E l e c t i o n * The c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  sfcx s t a t e s  (Congo 
B r a z z a v i l l e ,  Kenya, K a l i ,  Tchad ,  U.A.R* a n d  Z am bia )  p r o v i d e  
f o r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  of  th e  P r e s i d e n t  by i n d i r e c t  m ethods*  YIe 
may c l a s s i f y  t h e s e  u n d e r  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s : -  ( a )
c a m e r a l ,  (b)  c o l l e g i a l ,  ( c )  p r e f e r e n t i a l  an d  (d )  p l e b i s c i t a r y .
YIe w i l l  c o n s i d e r  them i n  t h a t  o r d e r .
( a )  C am era l  S l e e t  io n  -  L la l i .  I n  K a l i  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  
e l e c t e d  c a n e r a l l y  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  a s t r i k i n g l y  s i m p l e  
p r o c e d u r e .  The e l e c t i o n  i s  h e l d  a t  t h e  commencement o f  e a c h
l e g i s l a t u r e ,  o r  whenever t h e  governm en t  r©signs a f t e r  a v o t e  o f
c e n s u r e  p a s s e d  by t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly# ( a r t s *  7 ,  3 4 - 3 6 ) .  
i n  e i t h e r  c a s e  th e  P r e s i d e n t  of  t h e  1 ' I a t lo n a l  A s s e m b ly ,  a f t e r  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s ,  d e s i g n a t e s  a c a n d i d a t e  t o  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  
tfP r e s i d e n t  du Ccwernement '1. The p e r s o n  d e s i g n a t e d  th £ n  p r e ­
s e n t s  h i s  programme t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly .  T h i s  r i g h t  t o  
d e s i g n a t e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  p l a c e s  th e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
Assem bly  i n  a p o s i t i o n  o f  g r e a t  i n f l u e n c e ,  a n d  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  
c o n t e x t  o f  o n e - p a r t y  p o l i t i c s  he i s  a member o f  t h e  s ame p a r t y ,  
an d  t h e r e f o r e  one o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  s u c c e s s o r s  t o  t h e  P r e s i ­
dency* There  i s  no  p r o v i s i o n  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  be
1 .  He e i t h e r  sw ears  o r  makes a so lem n a f f i r m a t i o n  t o  p e r f o r i n  
t h e  d u t i e s  o f  h i s  o f f i c e  w i t h  h o n e s t y  a n d  i n t e g r i t y ,  t o  d e ­
f e n d  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and th e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  t e r r i t o r i a l  
i n t e g r i t y ,  e t c . ,  o r  words t o  t h a t  e f f e c t *  The o a t h  i s  sw orn  
b e f o r e  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly or t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  Supreme
a member o f  t h e  Assembly .  But P r e s i d e n t  N od ib o  K e l t  a h a s  
a lw ay s  bee n  a member.
A f t e r  he  h a s  b een  d e s i g n a t e d  th e  c a n d i d a t e  m ust  t h e n  
o b t a i n  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  by a v o t e  o f  a n  
a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  of  i t s  members.  He i s  e l e c t e d  f  o r  a p e r i o d  
n o t  e x c e e d in g  t h a t  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  H is  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e  
i s  t h u s  i n e x t r i c a b l y  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h a t  of  th e  Aagemh l y .  He i s  
e l e c t e d  f o r  f i v e  y e a r s  and  i s  e l i g i b l e  f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n ,  ( a r t .  
1 6 ) .  T h i s  i s  i n d i r e c t  e l e c t i o n  a t  i t s  s i m p l e s t .  YIe h av e
it held
t e r m e d  i t , c a m e r a l  b e c a u s e  i t  t a j ^ s  pj^rcs w i t h i n  ( a n d  by )  t h e  
A sse m b ly .
(b )  C o l l e g i a l  h i e c t i o n  -  Congo ( B r a z z a v i l l e ) ^  T ch a d .  I n  
Congo ( B r a z z a v i l l e )  and  Tchad t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  ch o se n  by an 
e l e c t o r a l  c o l l e g e .  There  i s  s i m i l a r i t y  i n  t h e  tw o  c a s e s  i n  
t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  c o l l e g e ,  w i t h  some v a r i a t i o n s .  
I n  t h e  Congo i t  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  members o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assem­
b l y ,  o f  t h e  c o u n c i l l o r s  of  t h e  p r e f e c t o r ^ a u x ,  s u b - p r e f e c t o r ^ a u x  
an d  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  ( a r t .  2 4 ) .  I n  Tchad i t  c o n s i s t s ,  of  t h e  
members o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly ,  t h e  m ayors  a n d  m u n i c i p a l  
c o u n c i l l o r s ,  mayors and  c o u n c i l l o r s  o f  r u r a l  c o m m u n i t i e s ,  
an d  o f  c u s to m ary  c h i e f s  ( a r t .  6 ) .  The i n c l u s i o n  o f  cu s to m a ry  
c h i e f s  i n  T chad ,  and  t h e i r  e x c l u s i o n  i n  t h e  Congo, r e f l e c t s  
two d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c i e s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t :  one c o n s e r v a t i v e ,  t h e
o t h e r  r a d i c a l ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Whether  t h e  e n l a r g e d  c o m p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  c o l l e g e  i n  e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  s t a t e s  makes t h e
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  n o r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t h a n  t h a t  o f
M a l i*  i s  open t o  q u e s t i o n .
The p r o c e d u r e  of  e l e c t i o n  f o l l o w s  f a m i l i a r  p a t t e r n s :  i n
t h e  Congo an  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  members o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a l
c o l l e g e  i s  r e q u i r e d  a t  th e  f i r s t  b a l l o t .  I f  an  a b s o l u t e
m a j o r i t y  c a n n o t  be o b t a i n e d  a r e l a t i v e  m a j o r i t y  a t  t h e
s e c o n d . ( a n d  f i n a l )  b a l l o t  d e c i d e s  t h e  e l e c t i o n  ( a r t .  2 4 ) .
I n  Tchad  a t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  i s  r e q u i r e d  a t  t h e  f i r s t  b a l l o t * ; ,
a n d ,  f a i l i n g ^  t h i s ,  a n  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  a t  t h e  s e c o n d  b a l l o t ;
a n d ^ s h o u l d  a t h i r d  v o te  be  n e c e s s a r y ^ a  r e l a t i v e  m a j o r i t y  a t
the b a l lo t  (art. 7)• In the Congo* the e le c t io n  takes place
tw e n t y  t o  f i f t y  days b e f o r e  t h e  d a t e  o f  e x p i r y  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g
P r e s i d e n t ' s  t e rm  o f  o f f i c e ;  w h e rea s  I n  T chad  i t  t a k e s  p l a c e
t e n  t o  s i x t y  days a f t e r  t h e  e x p i r y  o f  t h e  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e ,
~  1
w h ic h  i s  a r a r e  p r o v i s i o n .  The P r e s i d e n t  i s  e l i g i b l e  f o r  r e -  
e l e c t i o n  i n  b o t h  s t a t e s ;  b u t  i n  t h e  Congo he i s  e l i g i b l e  once 
o n l y .
( c )  P r e f e r e n t i a l  E l e c t i o n  - Kenya, Z am b ia .  The P r e s i d e n t s  o f  
Kenya and  Zambia a r e  e l e c t e d  by w hat  n a y  be c a l l e d  t h e  p r e f e r ­
e n t i a l  m e thod ,  i n  w h ich  e v e r y  c a n d i d a t e  s t a n d i n g  f o r  
N a t i o n a l  Assembly a t  a g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  s t a t e  
h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  i n  w r i t i n g  i n  f a v o u r  of  one p r e s i d e n t i a l
1 .  But t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t ime o f  a Tflarne duck"  p r e s i d e n t  d o es  n o t  
p r e s e n t  p ro b lem s  of  a b u s e ,  w h ich  c o u l d  be p e r p e t r a t e d  
w h e t h e r  t h e  t e rm  i s  f i v e  days  or f i f t y ,  d e p e n d in g  on t h e  
i n t e g r i t y  of  t h e  p e r s o n  i n v o l v e d .  An exam ple  o f  s u c h  a b u s e
i s  m a s s iv e  a p p o in tm e n t  o f  members of  h i s  p a r t y  o r  f a m i l y  
t o  l u c r a t i v e  p o s t s .
c a n d i d a t e .  The e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t a k e s  p l a c e  when­
e v e r  p a r l i a m e n t  i s  d i s s o l v e d ,  o r  t h e  in c u m b e n t  d i e s ,  r e s i g n s  o r  
i s  i n c a p a c i t a t e d .
I n  Kenya^ t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  I s  a l s o  r e q u i r e d  
t o  he a c a n d i d a t e  f o r  the  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  A c a n d i ­
d a t e  m us t  be n o m in a ted  by n o t  l e s s  t h a n  one t h o u s a n d  r e g i s t e r e d  
v o t e r s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  be d e c l a r e d  e l e c t e d  a s  P r e s i d e n t  a 
p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  i n  Kenya h a s  t o  (1 )  be  e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  
House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  a. g e n e r a l  e l e  c t i o n ,  an d  ( i i )  o b ­
t a i n  t h e  d e c l a r e d  su p p o r t  o f  a number o f  e l e c t e d  members 
( i n c l u d i n g  h i m s e l f )  e x c e e d in g  one h a l f  o f  a l l  t h e  c o n s t i t ­
u e n c i e s  a t  th e  s ane  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n .  P a l l i n g  t h i s ,  o r  i f  a 
P r e s i d e n t  h as  t o  be e l e c t e d  a t  any o t h e r  t i m e ,  he i s  c h o s e n  
by t h e  members o f  th e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , s i t t i n g  a s  
a n  e l e c t o r a l  c o l l e g e .  T here  i s  a maximum o f  f i v e  b a l l o t s  
w i t h  i n t e r v a l s  f o r  l o b b y i n g .  I f  a  c a n d i d a t e  c a n n o t  o b t a i n  
t h e  v o t e s  o f  an  o u t r i g h t  m a j o r i t y  o f  a l l  t h e  members i n  any
b a l l o t ,  a n o t h e r  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  t a k e s  o l a c e ,  a n d  t h e  w h o le
1
p r o c e d u r e  i s  r e p e a t e d .
I n  Zambia t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  e l e c t e d  by  a s i m i l a r  m e th o d  
w i t h  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  must be  n o t e d :  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e
t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  t o  s t a n d  f o r  
e l e c t i o n  as  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  t h e  R a t i o n a l  A s s e r / r l y .  H is  n o m i-
1* c f .  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of  Kenya (Amendment) A c t ,  1964 ,  F i r s t  
S c h e d u l e ,  S . 33 .
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n a t i o n  m ust  be s u p p o r t e d  by a  t h o u s a n d  e l e c t o r s , an d  i f  t h e r e  
i s  one c a n d i d a t e  o n l y ,  he w i l l  be d e c l a r e d  e l e c t e d .  I f  t h e  
e l e c t i o n  i s  c o n t e s t e d  he i s  e l e c t e d  by a s y s t e m  o f  p r e f e r e n c e .  
E v e r y  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e  must d e c l a r e  h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  i n  
f a v o u r  of  a p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e ,  who* may, i f  s o  r e q u e s t e d ,  
e n d o r s e  a p r e f e r e n c e  d e c l a r e d  i n  h i s  f a v o u r .  But h e  does  n o t  
h av e  t o  make such  a n  e n d o r s e m e n t ,  and l a c k  of  e n d o r s e m e n t  w i l l  
n o t  i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  c a n d i d a t u r e  of t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e ;  
n o r  can t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  p r e v e n t  any  p r e f e r e n c e  made 
i n  h i s  f a v o u r .
T h e re  i s  s i m i l a r i t y  i n  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  t o  be a d o p t e d  i n
c a s e  no  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  o b t a i n s  more t h a n  h a l f  o f  t h e
p r e f e r e n c e s ,  i n  w h ich  c a s e  i n  Zambia ( a s  i n  Kenya) t h e
N a t i o n a l  Assembly  s i t t i n g  as  an  e l e c t o r a l  c o l l e g e  e l e c t s
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  by an a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  f i r s t  b a l l o t .
An a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  must a l s o  be o b t a i n e d  a t  a  s e c o n d  b a l l o t ;
a n d  f a i l i n g  t h a t ,  a r e l a t i v e  m a j o r i t y  a t  t h e  t h i r d  and  l a s t  
2
b a l l o t .
T h i s  p r e f e r e n t i a l  s y s t e m  i s  a  n e a t  way o f  s e c u r i n g  t h e  
e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  h i s  s u p p o r t e r s  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
A sse m b ly ,  f h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  t i e d  w i t h  t h a t  o f  
t h e  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e  whose e l e c t i o n  w ould  be v o i d  i f  
t h e y  d i d  n o t  s t a t e  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s .  V/e can s e e  i n  t h i s  a n
1 . I n  d h a n a ,  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  h a d  t o  g i v e  h i 3  c o n s e n t  
t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e s  s t a t e d  i n  h i s  favourjfc; t h e  c h a n c e s  o f  
s u c c e s s "  o f  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e  w o u ld  t h u s  be c a r e ­
f u l l y  c o n s i d e r e d ,  b e f o r e  c o n s e n t  i s  g i v e n .
2 . G ens .  a r t s .  33*
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i m p r e s s i v e  r e t  ho o f  r e m o v in g  t h e  w eakness  i n h e r e n t  I n
sy s te m s  -  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  or  p r e s i d e n t i a l  - w here  t h e  E x e c u t i v e
c o u l d  be f e t t e r e d  by  a h o s t i l e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  F o r  i n  t h i s  new
s y s t e m  t h e  f a t e  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c n n d i d a t e  I s  l i n k e d  w i t h
t h a t  o f  t h e  p a r i l a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e .
The s y s t e m  was f i r s t  I n t r o d u c e d  by t h e  G'hana C o n s t i t u t i o n
o f  1960 w hich  e f f e c t e d  a m a jo r  b r e a k t h r o u g h  i n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
1
d e v e lo p m e n t  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  i t  s e t  a p a t t e r n  w h ic h  was
t a k e n  up by o t h e r  s t a t e s ;  T an g an y ik a  (19 6 2 ) ,  Zambia (1964)
an d  Kenya ( 1 9 6 5 ) .  The n o v e l  f e a t u r e  o f  t h i s  s y s t e m  i s  t h e
e m p h a s is  and  p r e - e m i n e n c e  i t  gave t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  I n  Kenya t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - n a k e r s
a p p e a r  t o  have  b e e n , a n x io u s  t o  p r e s e r v e ,  a l o n g  w i t h  an
E x e c u t i v e  P r e s i d e n c y ,  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m
2
of g o v e rn m e n t .  So t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  be an elect::-'" 
member o f  parliament. The “double m a n d a te ” w h ic h  he  m ust  
o b t a i n  f lo w ed  l o g i c a l l y  from t h e  compromise b e t w e e n  a p a r l i a ­
m e n ta r y  and  a p r e s i d e n t i a l  sy s t e m ,  I t  l a i d  h im  open  to 
e l e c t o r a l  h a z a r d s ;  b u t  once o b t a i n e d ,  w o u ld  s t r e n g t h e n  h i s  
h a n d .  I n  Zam bia ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  may be w eak e r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly ,  
t h o u g h  s t r o n g e r  I n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e .  7 /he reas  i n
1 .  See 3 .1 1  o f  t h e  Ghana C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1 9 6 0 .
2 . G ee (k  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t r i u m p h  o v e r  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  r e g i o n a l i s m  
by Hon• C h a , r lea ' ’T J o n J o , A t i o r h o y - V o n e r a l  o f  Kenya, i n  The 
T im es ,  O c to b e r  2 0 t h  1966 ,  p .  27,
2 51.
Kenya,  {as i n  Ghana, u n d e r  t h e  1960 C o n s t i t u t i o n )  i t  I s  t h e
p r e f e r e n c e  (and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  v o t e )  of  th e  e l e c t o r a l  supportCF-S
*
o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  t h a t  p u t s  him i n  o f f i c e ^  £ n  
Zambia e v e ry  v o te  c a s t  f o r  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c a n d i d a t e  I s  r e c k o n ­
ed  a s  a v o t e  f o r  th e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  he s u p p o r t s *  In  
o t h e r  w o rd s ,  u n d e r  t h e  s y s te m  in  Kenya ( a n d  f o r m e r l y  I n  Ghana) 
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  could  r e l y  on t h e  s u p p o r t  of a maj o r i t y  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  Assembly th o u g h  a v e r y  s m a l l  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r ­
a t e  v o t e d  f o r  h im .  I n  Zambia ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  co u ld  
c o n c e i v a b l y  have a h o s t i l e  m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly ,  
a l t h o u g h  be l a s  t h e  support of  the  u a j o i h t y  of  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e .
The P r e s i d e n t  i n  Zambia i s  n o t  a  member of  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
A sse m b ly .  I n  Kenya, t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  a d o p t  i n  p a r t  t h e  p a r l i a ­
m e n t a r y  s y s t e m  h as  m eant  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  m em b ersh ip  o f  t h e  
H ouse o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s • T h is  f a c t  a p p e a r s  t o  go a g a i n s t  
t h e  p r e s e n t  t r e n d  o f  p l a c i n g  th e  P r e s i d e n t  An a more I n d e ­
p e n d e n t  b a s i s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p c . r l i a i . i e n t .
T a n z a n i a  h a s  a b o l i s h e d  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  s y s t e m  w i t h  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  t h e  o n e - p a r t y  s t a t e .  I t  i s  of  i n t e r e s t  t o  n o t e  
t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  Commission w h ic h  s t u d i e d  a n d  r e p o r t e d  on 
t h e  “E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a D em ocra t ic  One P a r t y  S t a t e ” h a s  
w r i t t e n ;
“ The P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  i s  t h e  l i v i n g  
symbol o f  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y ,  a s  s u c h  he s h o u l d  
d e r i v e  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  f rom th e  p e o p l e .  T h e i r  
v o te s  s h o u l d  be  h i s  m a n d a te .  For  t h i s  r e a s o n
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we h a v e  r e j e c t e d  t h e  i d e a ^ o f  any fo rm  o f  
I n d i r e c t  e l e c t i o n .  • • • 11
I t  i s  c l e a r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  “p r e f e r e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n 11 i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  o r  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  one p a r t y  s y s t e m  
7/he t h e  r  Kenya an d  Zambia w i l l  f o l l o w  t h e  exam ple  o f  T a n ­
z a n i a  no one ca n  p r e d i c t .  Among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h e  outcome o f  
t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  ” one p a r t y  dem ocracy"  w i l l  s u r e l y  
w e ig h  h e a v i l y  i n  t h e  m inds  o f  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  two s t a t e s .
The em erg en ce  o f  t h e  Kenya P e o p l e ' s  U n io n  O p p o s i t i o n  p a r t y  
w h ic h  was form ed e a r l y  I n  1966 may p r e s e n t  t e m p t a t i o n s  t o  
t h a t  e f f e c t  i n  Kenya.  The b a s i s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s p o s i t i o n  
a n d  w i t h  h im  t h a t  o f  t h e  G o v ern m en t ,  w h ic h  could  h av e  b e e n  
e r o d e d  by members o f  h i s  p a r t y  c r o s s i n g  t h e  f l o o r ,  was r e ­
i n f o r c e d  by a p r o v i s i o n  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  members o f  h i s  p a r t y  
who c r o s s  t h e  f l o o r  t o  s e e k  r e - e l e c t i o n  t o  p a r l i a m e n t *  A c c o r d i n  
t o  t h e  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l ,  t h i s  haE h a d  th e  “ e f f e c t  o f  r e d u c i n g
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  Kenya P e o p l e 1s
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U n io n  O p p o s i t i o n  P a r t y .  . . . ” I f  t h e  two p a r t y  s y s t e m  i s  
t o l e r a t e d  i n  Kenya,  t h e  p r e s e n c e  of a h o s t i l e  o p p o s i t i o n  c o u l d  
m o b i l i s e  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  p a r t y  i n  p a r l i a m e n t  b e h i n d  t h e  P r e s i ­
d en t^  t h u s  g i v i n g  p o i g n a n c y  t o  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  s y s t e m .
1 • R e p o r t  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  Com m iss ion  on t h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  a D e m o c ra t i c  One P a r t y  S t a t e , 1 9 6 5 .  D a r - e s - S a l a a m ,  p .  2 3 .
2 .  C. IT j on j o ,  o p . c i t .
253.
(d )  P l e b i s c i t a r y  E l e c t i o n  -  U .A .R .  I n  t h e  U.A.R* t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o v i d e s  f o r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i n  
a m anner  w h ic h  i s  u n i q u e .  The R a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  n o m in a t e s  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  a n d  t h e  n o m i n a t i o n  i s  t h e n  r e f e r r e d  
t o  t h e  p e o p l e  f o r  a p l e b i s c i t e .  One n o m i n a t i o n  a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A ssem bly  i s  made u p o n  t h e  p r o p o s a l  o f  a t  l e a s t  one t h i r d  o f  
i t s  members .  The c a n d i d a t e  who w ins  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  t h e  v o t e s  
o f  t h e  A ssem bly  members i s  t h e n  r e f e r r e d  f o r  a p l e b i s c i t e .  I f  
no one o b t a i n s  t h e  r e q u i r e d  m a j o r i t y  t h e  n o m i n a t i o n  i s  r e p e a t e d  
two days  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  v o t e ,  w i t h  t h e  same r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  
a t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y *  A t  t h e  p l e b i s c i t e  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  i s  
c o n s i d e r e d  e l e c t e d  i f  he  o b t a i n s  an  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  of t h e  
v o t e s  c a s t .  I f  he  f a i l s  t o  o b t a i n  a n  a n s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y ,  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  n o m i n a t e s  a n o t h e r  c a n d i d a t e  a n d  t h e  same 
p r o c e d u r e  i s  r e p e a t e d  ( a r t .  1 0 2 ) .
The p r o c e d u r e  f o r  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  a new P r e s i d e n t  b e g i n s  
s i x t y  days  b e f o r e  e x p i r y  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s t e r m  o f  o f f i c e ;  
t h e  e l e c t i o n  m ust  t a k e  p l a c e  a t  l e a s t  one week  b e f o r e  t h e  
e x p i r y  o f  t h e  t e r m .  S h o u ld  t h i s  t e r m  e x p i r e  b e f o r e  a new 
P r e s i d e n t  i s  e l e c t e d  f o r  an y  r e a s o n ,  t h e  f o r m e r  P r e s i d e n t  
c o n t i n u e s  i n  o f f i c e  u n t i l  h i s  s u c c e s s o r  i s  e l e c t e d .
The o r i g i n  o f  t h e  p l e b i s c i t e  a s  a n  e l e c t o r a l  c o n c e p t  i s  
c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  
pow er  g a i n e d  by  m i l i t a r y  means I n t o  l e g i t i m a t e  p o l i t i c a l
a u t h o r i t y *  The f i r s t  t im e i t  a p p e a r e d  a  s s u c h  i n  m odern  
t i m e s  was i n  1852 when i t  was a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  coup d ' e t a t  o f  December 1851 an d  c o n f e r r i n g  t h e  I m p e r i a l  
Crown on N a p o le o n  I I I *  B u t  t h e  p l e b i s c i t o r y  m e thod  u s e d  i n  
t h e  U .A .R .  a s  a n  e l e c t o r a l  m a c h i n e r y ,  a f t e r  t h e  f a i t  a c c o m p l i  
o f  a r e v o l u t i o n  h a s  c e r t a i n  m arks  o f  n o v e l t y *  The m ost  
i m p o r t a n t  one i s  t h a t  a p o p u l a r l y  e l e c t e d  l e g i s l a t u r e  n o m in a t e s  
a c a n d i d a t e  who i s  t h e n  c h o s e n  by t h e  p e o p l e  on  a u n i n o m i n a l  
l i s t .
C» T e n u re  o f  O f f i c e
The d u r a t i o n  of  t h e  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e  i s  lo n g  en o u g h  t o  
e n s u r e  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  p o l i c i e s  b e g u n ,  p r o v i d e d  t h e y  a r e  
d i l i g e n t l y  a p p l i e d .  The d u r a t i o n  i n  some c a s e s  I s  v e r y  l o n g .
I t  i s  s e v e n  y e a r s  i n  Gabon,  G u in ea  and  M a d a g a s c a r ;  f o u r  y e a r s  
i n  Rwanda an d  S e n e g a l ,  a n d  s i x  y e a r s  i n  t h e  U .A .R .  I n  a l l  t h e  
r e s t  i t  i s  f i v e  y e a r s .  The P r e s i d e n t  i s  e l i g i b l e  f o r  r e -  
e l e c t i o n  i n  a l l  c a s e s .  I n  Togo he-wis e l i g i b l e  f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n  
o n l y  o n c e ,  an d  Rwanda a n d  T u n i s i a  t w i c e .
The a b s e n c e  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n  oh t h e  r i g h t  o f  r e - e l e c t i o n  
r e v e a l s  t h e  n e e d  and  t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  l e a d e r s  w i t h  e x p e r i e n c e  and  
p r e s t i g e  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  s e r v e  t h e i r  n a t i o n s .  The f i r s t  P r e s i ­
d e n t s  p o s s e s s e d  s u c h  q u a l i t i e s  when t h e y  f i r s t  a ssum ed  o f f i c e ,  
h a v i n g  r i d d e n  on t h e  c r e s t  o f  movements f o r  in d e p e n d e n c e  w h ic h ,  
i n  m o s t  c a s e s ,  t h e y  h e l p e d  t o  s t a r t *  The r i s k s  o f  p e r s o n a l
d i c t a t o r s h i p  a r e ^ h o w e v e r ^ n o t  u n l i k e l y ,  i f  n o t  i n e v i t a b l e .
H o rm a l ly  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c o n t i n u e s  i n  o f f i c e  u n t i l  t h e
end  o f  h i s  te rm * I n  c l a s s i c a l  p r e s i d e n c i e s  t h e  f i x e d  t e rm  o f
o f f i c e  c a n n o t  b e  en d e d  u n l e s s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  s u c c e s s f u l l y
im p e a c h e d  o r  some n a t u r a l  p r o c e s s  i n t e r v e n e s  t o  p u t  an  end  t o
i t  -  d e a t h ,  o r  i n c a p a c i t y  t h r o u g h  s e r i o u s  p h y s i c a l  o r  m e n t a l
i l l n e s s *  I n  a number o f  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t s
o f f i c e  may be  t e r m i n a t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  a c t i v e  a g e n c y  o f  t h e
A s s e m b ly ,  o r  he may h i m s e l f  d i s s o l v e  p a r l i a m e n t  a n d  t h u s
1
b r i n g  an  en d  t o  h i s  own te rm *
( i ) V acancy  i n  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  P r e s i d e n t
V acan cy  may r e s u l t  f ro m  t e m p o r a r y  o r  p e rm a n e n t  a b s e n c e  
o r  d i s a b i l i t y ,  r e s i g n a t i o n  o r  d e a t h ,  h o w ev e r  caused*  Such 
e v e n t u a l i t i e s  a r e  n a t u r a l l y  p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  
o f  A f r i c a .  I n  c a s e  o f  v a c a n c y  c a u s e d  by i l l n e s s  a s u c c e s s o r  
i s  e l e c t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a v a r i e t y  o f  p r o c e d u r e s *  T h e re  i s  t h e  
c a s e  w h ere  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h i m s e l f  I s  r e q u i r e d  t o  a p p o i n t  some­
one t o  r e p l a c e  him t e m p o r a r i l y  f o r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  a  t e m p o r a r y  
d i s a b i l i t y *  I f  he  f a i l s  t o  make s u c h  a n  a p p o i n t m e n t  t h e  P r e s i ­
d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  r e p l a c e s  h im  a u t o m a t i c a l l y .  Such 
I s  t h e  c a s e ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  i n  S e n e g a l ,  w h e re  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  a l s o  a s su m es  t h e o o f f i c e '  o f ♦P r e s i d e n t  i n  
t h e  e v e n t  o f  v a c a n c y  c a u s e d  by p e r m a n e n t  d i s a b i l i t y ,  d e a t h  o r
1 .  D i s s o l u t i o n  w i l l  be  t r e a t e d  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  s e c t i o n *  See
r e s i g n a t i o n  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t *  The r e p l a c e m e n t  l a s t s  u n t i l  a 
new P r e s i d e n t  i s  e l e c t e d ,  w h ic h  t a k e s  p l a c e  w i t h i n  s i x t y  days  
a f t e r  t h e  v a c a n c y  h a s  o c c u r r e d ;  o r  i f  t h e  v a c a n c y  o c c u r r e d  
l e s s  t h a n  s i x  m on ths  b e f o r e  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e  t h e  
e l e c t i o n  o f  a new P r e s i d e n t  t a k e s  p l a c e  w i t h i n  t h a t  r e m a i n i n g  
p e r i o d .  As f o r  i t s  c e r t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  i s  em­
pow ered  t o  exam ine  t h e  c a u s e  o f  t h e  d i s a b i l i t y  an d  th e
N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  m u s t  t h e n  v o t e  on t h e  m a t t e r  by a t w o - t h i r d s  
1
m a j o r i t y .
I n  t h e  Congo ( B r a z z a v i l l e )  a s i m i l a r  p r o c e d u r e  i s  a d o p t e d  
I n  c a s e  o f  v a c a n c y  f o r  a n y  c a u s e  c e r t i f i e d ,  by t h e  Supreme 
C o u r t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly  r e p l a c e s  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  u n t i l  a new one i s  e l e c t e d  w i t h i n  tw e n t y  t o  f i f t y  
days a f t e r  t h e  v a c a n c y  o c c u r r e d  ( a r t .  2 5 ) .
A d i f f e r e n t  v a r i e t y  e x i s t s  i n  o t h e r  s t a t e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  
I v o r y  C o a s t  a n d  N i g e r .  T h e r e ,  i n  c a s e  o f  p e rm a n e n t  d i s ­
a b i l i t y  -  d e a t h  o r  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  -  t h e  P r e s i ­
d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  a p p o i n t s  a member o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  f o r  t h e  i n t e r i m .  I f  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  t e r m  i s  
l e s s  t h a n  t w e l v e  m o n th s ,  t h e  p e r s o n  s o  a p p o i n t e d  d i s c h a r g e s  
t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w i t h  a l l  t h e  r a n k ,  pow ers  a n d  
p r e r o g a t i v e s  a t t a c h e d  t h e r e t o  f o r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e ­
m a in in g  p e r i o d .  I f  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  t e r m  i s  more t h a n  t w e l v e  
months a new e l e c t i o n  m u s t  be  h e l d .  The t e r m  o f  o f f i c e  o f
1 .  Senegal  C o n s t ,  a r t s .  26, 35 -35 .
t h e  new P r e s i d e n t  ends  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e
1
N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly*
I t  w i l l  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  i n  t h e s e  t y p e s  o f  c a s e s  i s  o f  c r u c i a l  
i m p o r t a n c e ,  w i t h  p o t e n t i a l  a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  c o u l d  be a c t u a l i s e d  
i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  s u d d e n  v a c a n c y  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ^  o f f i c e .
The P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly  i s  i n v a r i a b l y  a man 
o f  p r e s t i g e  an d  p o l i t i c a l  w e i g h t .  Lamine Guye of  S e n e g a l ,  
t o  name b u t  o n e ,  i s  a  t y p i c a l  e x a m p le .  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o ­
v i s i o n s  w h ic h  make i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly ,  i n  c a s e  o f  d i s a b i l i t y ,  t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t ,CLT&. a  m e a s u re  of  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s  f a c t .
I n  T ch a d  a n d  T u n i s i a ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  
M i n i s t e r s  a r e  g i v e n  t h e  pow er  t o  a p p o i n t  a s u c c e s s o r  t e m p o r ­
a r i l y  ( i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  T chad)  and  i n  a l l  c a s e s  o f  v a c a n c y  
( i n  T u n i s i a ) .  I n  Tchad  p e rm a n e n t  d i s a b i l i t y  d e t e r m i n e d  by a 
t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  of  t h e  members o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  
an d  c o n f i r m e d  by  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  
a new P r e s i d e n t  ( a r t .  9 ) .  I t  i s  n o t  r e m a r k a b l e  t h a t  t h i s  
s h o u l d  be  s o  i n  T c h a d ,  w here  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
i s i f l d i r e c t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e *  B u t  i n  T u n i s i a  i t  seems t o  be  
o u t  o f  t u n e  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  d i r e c t  p o p u l a r  m an d a te  t h a t  
t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  s h o u l d  e x e r c i s e  t h e  power t o  a p p o i n t  a 
s u c c e s s o r  i n  a l l  c a s e s  o f  v a c a n c y .  I t  i3  c o n v e n i e n t  o f  c o u r s e
1 .  C o n s t .  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a r t  1 1 ;  N i g e r ,  a r t .  1 1 .
a n d  s a v e s  e l e c t i o n  e x p e n s e s ;  b u t  i t  c o u l d  c o n c e i v a b l y  p r o v e  
t o  be  t o o  c o n v e n i e n t  a n d  i n  t h e  l o n g  r u n  m ore c o s t l y .
G u i n e a  p r e s e n t s  a  c o n t r a s t  t o  a l l  t h i s .  I f  a  v a c a n c y  
o c c u r s  i n  G u i n e a  a n  e l e c t i o n  f o r  a  new P r e s i d e n t  m us t  be 
h e l d  i m m e d i a t e l y .  The C a b i n e t  r e m a i n s  o n l y  t o  e x p e d i t e  
o u t s t a n d i n g -  m a t t e r s  ( a r t .  2 8 ) .
M a l i  i s  a  n o t a b l e  e x c e p t i o n  i n  t h e  m a t t e r  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  
t o  v a c a n c y ,  i n  t h a t  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  d o e s  n o t  make any  p r o ­
v i s i o n  i n  t h a t  r e s p e c t .  T h i s  s i l e n c e  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  
l e f t  a  l a c u n a  w h ic h  m a k es  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  x r e s i d e n t  o f  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly  o f  p o t e n t i a l  i m p o r t a n c e .  The P r e s i d e n t
o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly  i s  a n  ex o f f i c i o  member o f  t h e  B u r e a u
1p o l i t i q u e  o f  t h e  p a r t y ,  w h ic h  m  M a l i  i s  a  su p re m e  b o d y .
I n  t h e  s t a t e s  w hose  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  e x -  
i n s t e n c e  o f  a  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ,  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  a  v a c a n c y  i s  a  
s i m p l e r  a n d  m ore  a u t o m a t i c  a f f a i r s .  T h e s e  a r e :  C am eroon ,
G abon ,  K e n y a ,  M a d a g a s c a r ,  T a n z a n i a ,  U . A . R . ,  a n d  Z am b ia .  The 
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  i n  O am eroun  i s  e l e c t e d  on t h e  same l i s t  a s  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  a n d  f o r  t h e  same t e r m . ^  I n  Gabon t h e r e  a r e  
m ore  t h a n  one  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t s ,  c a l l e d  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t s  o f  t h e  
G o v e rn m e n t ,  who a r e  a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  ( a r t . 8 ) .  The
1 .  c f .  C h a p t e r  S i x  b e l o w .  The t i t l e  " p r e s i d e n t  du g o u v e r n e m e n t” 
i s  i n d i c a t i n g  l e s s  e m p h a s i s  on p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m .
2 .  C o n s t .  C a m e ro u n ,  a r t .  1 0 ;  I n . T o g o  a l s o  t h e  same was 
t h e  c a s e ,  c f .  a r t .  2 2 .
P r e s i d e n t  a l s o  a p p o i n t s  t h e  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  i n  K en y a ,  M a d a g a s c a r ,  
Rwanda,  T a n z a n i a  a n d  t h e  U . A . R . ,  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  R w an d a .^  I n  T a n z a n i a  a n d  
t h e  U .A .R .  m ore  t h a n  one V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  a r e  a p p o i n t e d ,  one 
o f  th em  b e i n g  d e s i g n a t e d  F i r s t  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t .
The V i c e - P r e s i d e n t s  a s s i s t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t s  i n  m o s t  
c a s e s  by e x e r c i s i n g  pow er  d e l e g a t e d  t o  th e m  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t s .  
S u c c e s s i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  c a s e  o f  v a c a n c y  f o r  w h a t e v e r  c a u s e  
u n t i l  a  new p r e s i d e n t  i s  e l e c t e d .  A g a in  t h e  c e r t i f y i n g  
a u t h o r i t y  i s  e i t h e r  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  ( e . g .  Gabon) o r  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A ss e m b ly  ( e . g .  U . A . R . ) .
The p r e s e n c e  o f  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t s  i n  E x e c u t i v e  P r e s i ­
d e n c i e s  may a p p e a r  p a r a d o x i c a l .  I n  some c a s e s ,  a s  f o r  e x a m p le ,  
i n  Gabon a n d  T ogo ,  t h e  o f f i c e  was c r e a t e d  t o  accom m odate  c e r -  
t a i n  p e r s o n a l i t i e s .  I n  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  s u c h  a s  Cam eroun ,  
t e r r i t o r i a l  r e a d j u s t m e n t  r e s u l t i n g  f ro m  t n e  f e d e r a t i o n  
n e c e s s i t a t e d  some i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e - a r r a n g e m e n t ,  t h u s  
c r e a t i n g  t h e  o f f i c e  p f  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  t o  a  ccom m odate  t h e  
l e a d e r  o f  one o f  t h e  f e d e r a t e d  u n i t s .  Not i n f r e q u e n t l y , 
t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  two o f f i c e s  may b u i l d  up ,  ow ing  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  v i e w s  o r  d i f f e r e n t  b a c k g r o u n d s .  A g o o d  
ex a m p le  o f  s u c h  ’t e n s i o n  a n d  i t s  b u i l d - u p  t o  c r i s i s  p o i n t  was
1 .  C o n s t .  Rwanda, a r t .  5 2 .
2 .  T h u s  i n  c a s e  o f  u n f i t n e s s  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t ,  t h e  C a b i n e t  may p a s s  
a  r e s o l u t i o n  a s k i n g  t h e  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  t o  i n q u i r e  i n t o  t h e  m a t t e r  
t h e  l a t t e r  may a p p o i n t  a  m e d i c a l  t r i b u n a l  f o r  t h a t  p u r p o s e
( c f .  C o n s ,  o f  K enya  (Amendment)  A c t  s e c t .  33 .E*
3 .  c f .  L a v r o f f  a n d  P e i s e r ,  o p . c i t . ,  V o l .  I ,  p . 2 5 .
260.
f  o u n d  i n  Togo . ^
How ever ,  i n  m o s t  c a s e s  a p p o i n t m e n t s  t o  t h e  V i c e -  
P r e s i d e n c y  a r e  made f rom  among l o y a l  c o l l e a g u e s .  The 
U .A .R .  i s  a  n o t a b l e  exam ple  o f  t h i s .  The b o l d  s o c i a l  a n d  
ec o n o m ic  e x p e r i m e n t  l a u n c h e d  by P r e s i d e n t  N a s s e r  a n d  h i s  
t e a m  r e q u i r e s  c o n t i n i u t y  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n .  The h i s t o r y  o f  
c o n s p i r a c y  t o  a s s a s s i n a t e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s  p r o v i d e d  a d d i ­
t i o n a l  i m p e t u s  t o  pu r  i n  l i n e  f o r  s u c c e s s i o n  the. c l o s e s t  
c o l l e a g u e s  who s h a r e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s p o l i c y .  The f o r m e r  
f i r s t  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ,  L i a r s h a l l  A b d e l  Hakim Amer, was P r e s i d e n t
N a s s e r ' s  c l o s e s t o f r i e n d  a n a  e r s t w h i l e  c o m r a d e - a t - a r m s  a s
2a  " f r e e  O f f i c e r . "  N e e d l e s s  t o  s a y ,  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n
o f  pow er  i n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c r e a t e s  r i s k s ,  n o t  t h e  l e a s t  o f  w h ic h
1 .  Ex P r e s i d e n t  G-r u n i t  sky a n d  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  Lieut c h i  w ere  
l e a d e r s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  f o c u s e s  a n d  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  
O l y m p i c ' s  d e a t h  l i v i n g  i n  e x i l e  ( i n  Dahomey a n d  Ghana 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .  On O l y m p i o ' s  u e a t h  t h e y  r e t u r n e d ' t o  fo rm  
t h e  p r e s e n t  g o v e r n m e n t .  On November 2 1 s t ,  1 9 6 6 ,  w h i l e  
txie P r e s i d e n t  was i n  P r a n c e  u n d e r g o i n g  m e d i c a l  t r e a t m e n t ,  
a  c r i s i s  o c c u r r e d  w h ich  n e a r l y  e n d e d  i n  a  d i s a s t e r .  T h i s  
b a s i c a l l y  c o n c e r n e d  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  L ie a tc h i  a n d  a n o t h e r  
p e r s o n a l i t y  ( t h e  m i n x s t e r  o f  I n t e r i o r )  who h a d  a c c u s e d  
L i e a t c h i  o f  h a v i n g  i n s t i g a t e d  a n t i - G r u n i t s k y .  t r a c t s  t o  
a p p e a r  i n  Lome. L ia tch i  d e n i e d  t h i s  a n d ,  uS a c t i n g  
P r e s i d e n t ,  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  d i s m i s s  t h e  L l i n i s t e r  o f  I n t e r i o r .  
I t  i s  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  b e h i n d  t h i s  f l a r e - u p  l a y  t h e  u a s i c  
t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  G r u n i t s k y  G o v e rn m en t .  I t  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  
t h e  c o u p .  c f .  West A f r i c a ,  December 3 r d ,  1 966 . '
2 .  The l i n e - u p  i n  t h e  s u c c e s s i o n  h a s  now c h a n g e d  r a d i c a l l y  
a f t e r  t h e  r e c e n t  war w i t h  I s r a e l  an d  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  
I . I a r s n a l  Amer.
i s  r i s k  t o  l i f e  and  h e a l t h *  The p o t e n t i a l  r o l e  o f  t h e  
V I c e - P r e s i d a n t  t h e r e f o r e  c a n n o t  he ig n o re d *
( i i )  Removal of th e  P r e s i d e n t  f r o n  O f f i c e
P r o v i s i o n s  a r e  made f o r  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
f ro m  h i s  o f f i c e  f o r  v i o l a t i o n  of  t h e  law o r  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n *  
The ty p e  o f  v i o l a t i o n  o r  m is c o n d u c t  f o r  w h ic h  a P r e s i d e n t  may 
he  rem oved  i s  n o t  d e f in e d *  The p r o c e d u r e  f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  
s u c h  v i o l a t i o n  o r  m is c o n d u c t  and f o r  f i x i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o l l o w s  a s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n  i n  a l l  s t a t e s *  I n  t h e  f r a n c o -  
p h o n ic  s t a t e s  o n ly  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assem bly  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
i n i t i a t e  t h e  process* A g a in ,  i n  nearly a l l  t h e s e  s t a t e s ,  
t h e  H igh  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  i s  empowered t o  t r y  t h e  P r e s i ­
d e n t  f o r  h i g h  t r e a s o n  com m it ted  i n  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  h i s  
f u n c t i o n *  The H igh  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  t r y i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
i s  composed of d e p u t i e s  d l e c t e d  by t h e  n a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  
a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  a new p a r l i a m e n t *  The C o u r t  e l e c t s  i t s  
own P r e s i d e n t *
I n  Rwanda t h e  Supreme C o u r t  h a s  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  t o  t r y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  h i g h  t r e a s o n *  I n  M adagas­
c a r  t h e  C o u r t  of  A p p ea l  i s  composed o f  t h e  f i r s t  P r e s i d e n t  
o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  A p p ea l  ( p r e s i d i n g )  and two o t h e r  members o f  
t h a t  C o u r t ,  and  e i g h t  members of p a r l i a m e n t *
1* The S e n e g a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a t h r e e - f i f t h s  m a j o r i t y ,  
( s e e  a r t *  8 7 ) ;  t h a t  o f  Rwanda r e q u i r e s  t h r e e - f o u r t h s  
m a j o r i t y ,  ( s e e  a r t *  101 ( c ) ) *
I n  n e a r l y  a l l  c a s e s  i t  i s  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  t r i b u n a l  
t r y i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  t o  be  g u i d e d  by t h e  law  r e l a t i n g  t o  
c r i m e s ,  a n d  t h e  p e n a l t i e s  s p e c i f i e d  t h e r e i n  s h a l l  a p p l y . ^
A n o t h e r  t y p e  o f  p r o c e d u r e  i s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  m o s t  
A n g l o p h o n i c  s t a t e s .  F o r  ex a m p le  i n  Zam bia  i f  a  w r i t t e n  n o t i c e  
i s  g i v e n  by o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  members  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly  
a l l e g i n g  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s  c o m m i t t e d  a  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  g r o s s  m i s - c o n d u c t ;  a n d  i f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A s s e m b l y ,  by a  t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  v o t e ,  s u p p o r t s  t h i s  a l l e g a ­
t i o n ,  t h e  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  a p p o i n t s  a  t r i b u n a l  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  a n d  
r e p o r t  on t h e  - m a t t e r .  I 'he members  o f  t h e  t r i b u n a l  a r e  
s e l e c t e d  by  t h e  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  a n d  t h e y  c o n s i s t  o f  a  C h a i rm a n  an d  
n o t  l e s s  t h a n  two o t h e r  p e r s o n s  who h o l d  o r  h a v e  h e l d  h i g h  
j u d i c i a l  p f f i c e -  The^ r e p o r t  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly .  I f  
t h e  r e p o r t  s u p p o r t s  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n  a n d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  
r e s o l v e s  by a  t h r e e - f o u r t h s  m a j o r i t y  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s
^ u i l t y  a s  a l l e g e d ,  t h e  P r e s i u e n t  c e a s e s  t o  h o l d  o f f i c e ,  a s  a n d
2w hen  t h a t  b o n y  so  r e s o l v e s .
A s i m i l a r  p r o c e d u r e  i s  f o l l o w e d  i n  t h e  U .A .R .  e x c e p t  
t h a t  a  s p e c i a l  t r i b u n a l  t r i e s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e r e  i s  no
1 .  F o r  t h e  r e l e v a n t  a r t i c l e s  on t h e  f o r e g o i n g  c f .  C o n s t l  
C am eroun ,  a r t .  3 6 ; Congo (B) a r t s .  7 5 ,  7 7 ;  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  
a r t .  1 4 ;  Gabon,  a r t s .  6 2 - 3 ;  u s  am ended  by  L o i  No. 2 3 / 6 3 ;  
M a d a g a s c a r ,  a r t .  IB ;  M a l i  a r t .  4 6 - 7 ;  M a u r i t a n i a ,  a r t .  
j 2 ;  N i g e r ,  a r t s .  6 3 - 4 ;  S e n e g a l ,  a r t s .  6 6 - 7 ;  Rwanda, 
a r t .  101  ( c ) ;  T c h a d ,  a r t s .  7 6 - 8 .
2 .  c f .  e . g .  a r t .  3 6 , C o n s t ,  o f  Z a m b ia .
p r o v i s i o n  r e q u i r i n g  an  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t r i b u n a l  t o  be  s e t  up
1
and  t o  s tu d y  a n d  r e p o r t  on t h e  a l l e g a t i o n .
The P r e s i d e n t  e n j o y s  im m unity  a g a i n s t  l e g a l  p r o c e e d i n g s ,
f o r  a c t s  c r i m i n a l  o r  c i v i l ,  c o m m i t t e d  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  h i s  
2
f u n c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  f r a n c o p h o n i c  s t a t e s ,  w i t h  
t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  Hwanda, t h e r e  i s  no  e x p r e s s  p r o v i s i o n  on 
s u c h  im m u n i ty .  H ow ever ,  s i n c e  l i a b i l i t y  t o  c r i m i n a l  p r o ­
s e c u t i o n  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  h i g h  t r e a s o n ,  I t  may be s a f e l y  p r e ­
sumed t h a t  t h e r e  I s  im m unity  a g a i n s t  any  o t h e r  l e g a l  p r o ­
c e e d i n g s  •
The p r o v i s i o n s  on t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a c q u i r e
s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  v ie w  o f  t h e  a d v e n t  o f
a n  " i r r e s p o n s i b l e ” E x e c u t i v e .  Where a  P r e s i d e n t  i s  n o t
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  p r e s s u r e s  s u c h  as
m o t i o n s  o f  c e n s u r e ,  o r  i s  n o t  made a n s w e r a b l e  on any  o t h e r
p u b l i c  p l a t f o r m ,  im peachm en t  becomes a l l  t h e  more i m p o r t a n t .
A r e s o r t  t o  im peachm ent  w ou ld  h o w ev e r  seem t o  be h i g h l y
3
i m p r o b a b l e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  o n e - p a r t y  s t a t e .  T h i s  
w o u ld  i n e v i t a b l y  b u i l d  u p  r e s e n t m e n t  an d  l i k e  a l l  s i t u ­
a t i o n s  w here  power I s  " c l o s e d "  w o u ld ,  a t  c r i t i c a l  m om ents ,  
l e a d  t o  e x p l o s i o n .  I t  may b e  r e c a l l e d ,  t h a t  i n  some c o u n t r i e s  
m i n i s t e r i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o r i g i n a l l y  s t a r t e d  i n ,  an d  was
1* c f .  a r t .  1 1 2 .
2 .  A r t .  4 3 ,  C o n s t .  Z am bia .  
3* c f .  C h a p t e r  S i x .
l i m i t e d  t o ,  c r i m i n a l  m a t t e r s ,  a t  a t im e  when M i n i s t e r s  
s h e l t e r e d  b e h i n d  r o y a l  p r e r o g a t i v e s .  A w is e  P r e s i d e n t  
w ou ld  n o t  a l l o w  t h e  s lo w  b u i l d  up  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p r e r o ­
g a t i v e s  t o  s h e l t e r  m a l e f a c t o r s ,  f o r  t h a t  w ou ld  p r o v e  t o  be  
h i s  u n d o i n g  and  t h a t  o f  t h e  r e g i m e .
D. Pow ers  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
I n t r o d u c t o r y
As we hav e  a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d ,  t h e  new A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  
w ere  l a u n c h e d  u p o n  in d e p e n d e n c e  w i t h  m e t r o p o l i t a n  s t y l e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n s .  But t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  new s t a t e s  w ere  n o t  
s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  w h a t  t h e y  i n h e r i t e d  o r  a d o p t e d .  From t h e  
en d  o f  1960 t o  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  1962 t h i r t e e n  s t a t e s  h a d  
i n  r a p i d  s u c c e s s i o n  h a d  e i t h e r  new c o n s t i t u t i o n s  drawn up  
o r  t h e  f i r s t  ones r e v i s e d .  O th e r s  f o l l o w e d  s u i t  t o  change  
t h e i r  I n d e p e n d e n c e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s .  The change  i n  a l l  c a s e s  
i s  m arked  by t h e  r e i n f o r c e d  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  
Common h i s t o r i c a l  t i e s  an d  new a s s o c i a t i o n s  c r e a t e d  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  u n i f o r m i t y  o f  a p p r o a c h  and m u t u a l  i n f l u e n c e .  
Hew i d e a s  a n d  a t t i t u d e s  e m e rg in g  f ro m  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  u n d e r  
i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  a n d  i n  some c a s e s  o l d  ones w h ic h  h ad  b e e n  
s u p p r e s s e d  f o r  t a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s ,  now p e r s i s t e d  i n  s e e k i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  e x p r e s s i o n .  The t r e n d  was a movement f rom
1
t r a d i t i o n a l  p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m  t o  a  new f o rm  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m .
I m p l i c i t  i n  t h i s  movement t o w a r d s  a  r e i n f o r c e d  p r e s i  
d e n t i a l i s m ,  t h e r e  i s  a  d e s i r e  f o r  e co n o m ic  a n d  s o c i a l  c h a n g e .
As a  c o r o l l a r y  t o  t h i s  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  t h e  w i l l  t o  n a t i o n a l  
u n i t y .  The s o u r c e  o f  t h e  w i l l  f o r  c h a n g e  l i e s  i n  t h e  
c h a l l e n g e  ox two r e l a t e d  f a c t s :  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  m o d e rn
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  w o r l d ,  a n d  t h e  s t a g g e r i n g  f a c t  o f  u n d e r ­
d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e  new s t a t e s  made t h e  m ore u r g e n t  by  i n c e s s a n t  
dem ands  f o r  im p r o v e m e n t .  S o c i a l  a n d  econom ic  c h a n g e  t h r o u g h  
e d u c a t i o n  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e  i s  s e e n  a s  a  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  x j r o g r e s s ,  a n d  e v e n  f o r  s u r v i v a l .  The s o u r c e  o f  t h e  w i l l  
t o  u n i t y  l i e s  i n  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t x c a l  
l i f e  a n d  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  s e c u r i t y  p o s e d  by  e t h n o c e n t r i f u g a l  
t e n d e n c i e s .  I n  a  number  o f  s t a t e s  t h e  l e a d e r s  may be  c a l l e d  
l e a d e r s  m ore  o f  s t a t e s  t h a n  o f  n a t i o n s .  U n l i k e  i n  E u r o p e ,  
f ; , r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  new s t a t e s  a r e  t h e r e f o r e  
d e s i g n e d  t o  p e r f o r m ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  
c r e a t i n g  o r  c o m e n t i n g  new n a t i o n s .
A l l  t h i s  c a l l e d  f o r  d i s c i p l i n e  -  d i s c i p l i n e  i n  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  a s  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  l i f e .  The i n s t r u m e n t s  c h o s e n  
t o  i n s t i l ^  d ev e lo p m f in < k jm a in ta in  t h i s  s p i r i t  o f  d i s c i p l i n e  
a n d  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  p o l i c y  a r e  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  
t h e  P a r t y ,  o f  w h ic h  he i s  H ea d .  B u t  w h i l e  t h e  r e i n f o r c e d
1 .  T h i s  t e r m  c o n v e y s  t h e j c e n t r i f  u g a l  t e n d e n c y  o f  e t h n i c  g r o u p s .
2 6 6 .
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  f o r m a l l y  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r a m e w o rk  t h e  P a r t y ,  i n  n e a r l y  a l l  c a s e s ,  
i s  l e f t  t o  o p e r a t e  e x t r a - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y .
The Governm ent i t s e l f  i s s u e s  o u t  o f  t h e  P a r t y ,  w h ic h  
i s  u s e d  a s  a ire d ium o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n  t o  r e a c h  down t o  t h e  
r o o t s  o f  s o c i e t y .
I t  was a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  w ho le  p o l i c y  d ep e n d ed  f o r  i t s
s u c c e s s  on a s t r o n g  g o v e r n m e n t ,  w i t h  c l e a r  programmes and
a n  a s s u r a n c e  o f  a r e a s o n a b l y  l o n g  t e r m  o f  o f f i c e  t o  c a r r y
o u t  t h e  p ro g ram m es .  Such ,  i n  o u t l i n e ,  i s  t h e  a rg u m e n t  f o r
t h e  new t y p e  of  E x e c u t i v e  P r e s i d e n c y ,  an d  t h e  o n e - p a r t y
s t a t e  s tem s  from i t ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  o r g a n i s e d
1
o p p o s i t i o n  i n  m ost  s t a t e s .
The new A f r i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  t h e n  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
by e n h a n c e d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r .  The P r e s i d e n t  com bines  t h e  
pow ers  o f  Head o f  S t a t e  a n d  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e .  T h i s  i s  so 
w h e t h e r  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  i s  b i c e p h a l o u s ,  ( d u a l )  a s  i n  t h e  IT .A.m. 
o r  m o n o c e p h a lo u s  ( u n i t a r y ),&& Drltar I n  b o t h  t y p e s
e x t e n s i v e  pow ers  a r e  c o n f e r r e d  on t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  He r e p ­
r e s e n t s  t h e  s t a t e  i n  a l l  p u b l i c  a c t s  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  e x e r c i s e s  
pow ers  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a s s o c l a t e d w i t h  a Head of S t a t e .  A t  t h e  
same t im e  he e x e r c i s e s  a v a r i e t y  o f  i m p o r t a n t  e x e c u t i v e  
p o w e r s ,  and  pow ers  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  some o f  
w h ic h  b e a r  m arks  of  n o v e l t y .  The P r e s i d e n t 1s power  may be 
d i v i d e d  i n t o  tw o :  n o rm a l  a n d  e x c e p t i o n a l .
1 .  The r a i s o n  cl1 e t r e  o f  t h e  o n e - p a r t y  s y s t e m  on w h ic h  e x e c u ­
t i v e  p r e s i d e n c y  d e p e n d s ,  w i l l  be  exam ined  i n  C h a p t e r  S i x .
267.
(1 )  f o r m a l  Powers
The power o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  e x e r c i s e d  i n  n o rm a l  t i m e s  
may be  s u b d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s :  power i n  r e l a t i o nis  w .  *
t o  t h e  G ov ern m en t ;  pow er  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e ;
an d  power i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  J u d i c i a r y .
( i ) Power i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  G overnm ent
The P r e s i d e n t 1s power  u n d e r  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  i s  so m e t im es
te rm e d  E x e c u t i v e  p o w er .  The m a j o r i t y  of t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n s
p r o v i d e  t h a t  E x e c u t i v e  pow er  i s  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  t h a t
he  i s  t h e  s o l e  h o l d e r  o f  power of t h i s  n a t u r e ,  and  t h a t  he
may e x e r c i s e  i t  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  t h r o u g h  o f f i c e r s
s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  h im .  T h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o u r s e  s tem s  f ro m
t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  p o l i c y  o u t l i n e d  i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t o r y  p a r t  o f  
1
t h i s  s e c t i o n .  Or t h e  E x e c u t i v e  power may be v e s t e d ,  a s  i n  
Z am bia ,  i n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  who e x e r c i s e s  i t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y , 
s u b j e c t  t o  th e  p r o v i s o  t h a t  p a r l i a m e n t  can c o n f e r  e x e c u t i v e
2
f u n c t i o n s  t o  p e r s o n s  o r  a u t h o r i t i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,
( a )  P o l i c y - m a k i n g  p o w e r . Prom t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  w h a t  m ig h t  
b e  c a l l e d  t h e  “ e x c l u s i v e  e x e c u t i v e .  power*1 f lo w s  l o g i c a l l y  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  be t h e  p r i n c i p a l
1 .  E x c e p t i o n a l l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s  b e e n  e x p l i c i t l y  
r e q u i r e d  t o  s h a r e  E x e c u t i v e  power w i t h  members o f  t h e  
G o v e rn m e n t» c f .  e . g .  a r t .  20  C o n s ,  o f  Togo w h ic h  was i n  
f o r c e  b e f o r e  t h e  m i l i t a r y  c o u p .
2 .  C o n s t .  Z am b ia ,  a r t .  48 ( 1 - 3 ) .
p o l i c y - m a k i n g  a u t h o r i t y ,  an d  t h e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n s  so  p r o v id e *
1
But i n  a few s t a t e s  t h i s  power i s  c o n f e r r e d  on t h e  c a b in e t *
A l s o ,  i n  t h e  U'.A.h. th e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a r e s  w i t h  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t
t h e  f u n c t i o n  of  l a y i n g  down " t h e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  S t a t e
i n  a l l  r o l i t i c a l ,  e c o n o m i c ,  s o c i a l  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d o m a in s”
2
an d  i n  t h e  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  i t s  i m p l e m e n ta t io n *  I n  a l l  t h e
r e s t  i t  i s  p r o v id e d  w i t h  v a r i a t i o n  i n  w o rd in g  b u t  w i t h  t h e
same e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  t a s k  o f  d raw in g  up p o l i c y  and  o f  d e f i n i n g
an d  p ro m o t in g  g e n e r a l  programmes o.f a c t i o n  b e l o n g s  t o  t h e
P r e s i d e n t *  I t  need  h a r d l y  be s a i d  t h a t  i n  t h e s e  s y s t e m s  t h e
g o v e rn m e n t ,  which  i s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t *  s g o v e r n m e n t ,  must h av e  a
s u b s t a n t i a l  s h a r e  i n  t h i s  t a s k .  I n d e e d ,  i t  I s  s i g n i f i c a n t
t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  U .A .B. s h o u ld  be  an  e x c e p t i o n
i n  e n t r e n c h i n g  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  g r o u p  d e c i s i o n ,  i n  an  e x p r e s s
p r o v i s i o n  i n  v iew  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  o r i g i n  o f  P r e s i d e n t  IT a s se r1s 
3
p o w e r - b a s e .
(b )  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  po w er . H av ing  c o n c e i v e d  a n d  d raw n u p  
p o l i c y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  must  n e x t  have i t  im p le m e n te d  i n  p r o ­
grammed a c t i o n .  The two s t a g e s  do i n  f a c t  fo rm  i n s e p a r a b l e
1 .  e . g .  C o n s t .  Congo ( B r a z z a v i l l e ) ,  a r t .  39 ;  M a d a g a s c a r ,  a r t s .  
11 and  12 ;  and L o i  du 28  J u i n  1961 and  6 J u i n  1 9 62 .
2 .  U.A.B. C o n s t ,  a r t .  1 13 .
3 .  I t  mould  of  c o u r se  be a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  p s y c h o l o g y  and  p r a c ­
t i c e  o f  " s t a f f  work" i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  f a c i l i t a t e s  r a t h e r  
t h a n  h i n d e r s  g ro u p  d e c i s i o n ,  and  t h a t  t h i s  s t r e n g t h e n s  t h e .  
p o s i t i o n  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
l i n k s  i n  t h e  same p r o c e s s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t*  I n  o r d e r  t o  g i v e
a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a s i s  t o  t h i s  m a t t e r  i t  i s  i n v a r i a b l y
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s h a l l  hav e  t h e  g e n e r a l  d i r e c t i o n
and  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  govern m en t*
I n  t h e  c l a s s i c  c a b i n e t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  c a b i n e t  i s  t h e
c o re  o f  t h e  sys tem *  As J e n n i n g s  h a s  w r i t t e n  a b o u t  t h e
c a b i n e t  i n  B r i t a i n :
J,I t  i s  t h e  su p rem e  d i r e c t i n g  a u t h o r i t y *  I t  
i n t e g r a t e s  w h a t  w ould  o t h e r w i s e  be a h e t e r o ­
g en e o u s  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t i e s  e x e r c i s i n g  
a v a s t  v a r i e t y  o f  f u n c t i o n s / *  ^
I n  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m s  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  h e r e ,  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  and  n o t  t h e  c a b i n e t  i s  t h e  suprem e d i r e c t i n g  
a u t h o r i t y *  The c a b i n e t  i s  h i s  p r i n c i p a l  o r g a n  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  
t h r o u g h  w hich  he  d i s c h a r g e s  h i s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  d i r e c t i n g  an d  
s u p e r v i s i n g  t h e  w ork  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .  B ut  h e ,  an d  n o t  t h e  
c a b i n e t ,  p r o v i d e s  t h e  u n i t y  t o  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  governm en t*  I n  
most c a s e s  h e  p r e s i d e s  o v e r  t h e  c a b i n e t *  T h i s  f a c t ,  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  s h i f t  o f  m i n i s t e r i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f ro m  
o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  l e n d s  p r a c t i c a l  r e a l i t y  
t o  t h e  p r e - e m i n e n t  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
A p a r t  f r o m  p r e s i d i n g  o v e r  t h e  c a b i n e t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  can  
a l s o  e x e r c i s e  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  c o n t r o l  t h r o u g h  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l  m i n i s t e r i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  owed t o  him* T h e re  
i s  n o t h i n g  new i n  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  w o rk  o f  e a c h
1* C a b i n e t  G o v ernm en t ,  3 r d  e d . ,  p* 1*
m i n i s t e r *  A p r im e  m i n i s t e r  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  c a b i n e t  s y s t e m s
c a n  d e a l  w i t h  e a c h  one o f  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s .  B u t  w h e re a s  i n
t h a t  c a s e  h i s  pow er  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a c h i n e r y  o f
1
g o v e rn m e n t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t ,  i n
A f r i c a n  n e o - p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m  s u c h  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  r a r e *  I n
t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i d i o n s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y
made c o n f e r r i n g  on t h e  P r e s i d e n t  r e g u l a t o r y  p o w e r s ,  and  power
t o  a s s u r e  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  o f  law s  an d  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n s ,  an d
2
pow er  t o  s i g n  o r d i n a n c e s  and  d e c r e e s .  The r e g u l a t o r y  power
may be e x e r c i s e d  by p r e s i d e n t i a l  o r d e r  o r  d e c r e e  n o r m a l l y
g i v e n  u n d e r  h i s  s o l e  a u t h o r i t y .  E x c e p t i o n s  t o  t h i s ,  where
ecM 3
i t  i s  g i v e n  i n  C o u n c i l ,  a r e  Congo ( B r a z z a v i l l e ) , / I v o r y  C oas t*
Some o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  r e q u i r e  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  a c t s  t o  be
4
c o u n t e r s i g n e d  by t h e  M i n i s t e r  i n  c h a r g e  o f  t h e  m a t t e r *  I n
5
some s t a t e s ,  f o r  exam ple  t h e  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  r e g u l a t o r y  o r d i n ­
a n c e s  a n d  d e c r e e s  may be exam in ed  by t h e  Supreme C o u r t  b e f o r e  
t h e y  a r e  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s .
1* cf* D e n n in g s ,  op* c i t . , p .  1*
2* e . g .  C ons t*  o f  C am eroun ,  a r t .  1 2 ;  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a r t . 1 5 ;  
Gabon, a r t .  1 3 ;  M a d a g a s c a r ,  a r t .  1 1 ;  M a l i ,  a r t .  1 1 ;  
G u i n e a ,  a r t .  2 5 ;  M a u r i t a n i a ,  a r t .  1 8 ;  S e n e g a l ,  a r t .  3 7 ;  
T ch a d ,  a r t .  2 6 ;  Congo (B ) ,  a r t .  2 9 .
3 .  C o n s t ,  a r t s .  2 9 ,  22 r e s p e c t i v e l y *
4 .  Congo (B ) ,  a r t .  3 8 ;  Gabon, a r t .  2 1 ;  G u in e a ,  a r t .  2 6 ;  
M a d a g a s c a r ,  a r t .  1 7 ;  M a l i ,  a r t .  1 2 ;  M a u r i t a n i a ,  a r t .  1 9 ;  
T ch a d ,  a r t .  6 .
5 .  C o n s t .  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a r t .  23*
The e x e r c i s e  of e x e cu t iv e  power cannot, by i t s  nature
and purpose, be l im i t e d  to  the P re s id en t .  In p r a c t ic e  the
Pres ident  d e le g a te s  h i s  powers to  m in i s t e r s ,  even where there
i s  no law requ ir in g  him to  do so* Such d e le g a t io n  which can
be revoked at  any time i s  u s u a l ly  s i g n i f i e d  by an instrument
under the hand of the P res id en t ,  or in  matters o f  temporary
1
duration o r a l l y ,
(c)  Power of appointment. E xecutive  a u th o r i ty  m anifests  
i t s e l f  more dramatical  iy  in  the power o f  appointment. In  
a l l  the s t a t e s  under study the President i s  g iven  e x te n s iv e  
powers o f  appointment. He appoints  the members o f  the  
government who are r e sp o n s ib le  to  him, and he determines  
t h e i r  powers. With the power of appointment goes the power 
of d i s m is s a l ,  t r a n s fe r  and r e s h u f f l e ;  and determ ination  
o f  m i n i s t e r i a l  powers in c lu d es  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the  
p o r t f o l i o s .  The t o t a l i t y  of th e s e  powers p lace  in  the hands 
o f  the P res ident  p o l i t i c a l  instruments n ecessary  for him to  
maintain h is  p o s i t i o n  and to  carry out h i s  d u t ie s  by p utt ing  
the r ig h t  man in  the r ig h t  job.
I l in i s t e r s  and Deputy M in i s t e r s . Key-posts which would o f te n  
require  l o y a l t y  to the P res id en t ,  apart from a b i l i t y ,  are  
Defence, I n t e r i o r ,  F in a n c e / 'S x te r n a l  A f f a i r s .  Sometimes
1 .  Information based on ora l  in terv iew s  w ith  o f f i c i a l s  o f  
some A fr ican  governments. Where such d e le g a t io n  occurs,  
however, the M in ister  i s  required  to  a f f i x  to  the docu-  
' m e n t^ th e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s e a l  or the p ub l ic  s e a l .
1
J u s t i c e  and Economic Planning are considered  key posts#
The President a l s o  makes a l l  m i l i t a r y  and ( in  most ca se s )
c i v i l  appointments. This i s  l in k e d  w ith  h is  p o s i t i o n  as
the Head of  the A dm in istra t ion  vihich he e s t a b l i s h e s , organ ises
and d i r e c t s ;  and w ith  h i s  p o s i t i o n  as Commander-in-Chief
2
of the armed f o r c e s .  K a l i  marks an ex cep t io n  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,
in  th a t  the Pres ident  makes c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y  appointments
3
”en c o n s e i l  des m i n i s t r e s ” • I t  must a l so  be noted th at  the
Prime M in is ter  in  the Congo (B) appoints  c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y
4
o f f i c e r s  by d e l e g a t io n  of a u th o r i ty .  A lso  some c o n s t i t u t io n s
conta in  p ro v is io n s  req u ir in g  the Council o f  M in is ters  to
5
decide on appointments ”to  higher p os ts  of the S t a t e ” .
1 .  On appointment of  members of the Government, see  C o n s ts . :  
Cameroun, a r t .  11; Congo ( B ) ,  a r t .  27; Gabon, a r t .  21;  
Guinea, a r t .  23; L ib e r ia ,  a r t .  31, s e c t .  5; Mali, a r t s .
8, 11; Ivory Coast,  a r t .  12; M a u r i t a n i a ,  a r t .  17; Rwanda, 
a r t .  10; T u n is ia ,  a r t .  43; U.A.R*, a r t .  114; Zambia, 
a r t .  4 4 (2 ) ;  Tchad, a r t .  8; Kenya, s e c t .  77 C o n s t i tu t io n  
of  Kenya (Amendment) Act ,  1964. The need of g iv in g  key 
p o r t f o l i o s  to  t r u s te d  co l lea gu es  ( e s p e c i a l l y  Defence and 
I n te r io r )  i s  understabdable in  view of the th rea t  o f  temp­
t a t i o n s  to  use u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l  means t o  remove the P r e s i ­
dent and h is  government, which i s  home.out by the many coup3 
d * e ta t ,  as we s h a l l  see in  l a t e r  chapters*
2 .  Const.  Cameroun, a r t .  12; Ivory Coast,  a r t s .  17-8;  Gabon, 
a r t .  20; Madagascar, a r t s .  11-2; Mauritania, a r t s .  18, 20?, 
S enegal ,  a r t .  38; Tchad, a r t .  12; Rwanda, a r t .  56 (8 );  
Congo (B), a r t .  28; Tanzania, a r t .  21; T u n is ia ,  a r t s .  45-6;  
U .A .R .,  a r t s .  123, 128; Zambia, a r t s .  49 and 115; Malawi, 
a r t s .  48 and 87.
3 .  Const, a r t .  9, para. 5.
4 .  C o n st . ,  a r t .  40 .  I . e .  by a u th o r i ty  de legated  to  him from 
the P re s id en t .
5. Iv o ry  C o as t ,  C o n s t ,  a r t .  22; Tchad, a r t .  10 .
The p r e s i d e n t i a l  fu n c t io n  as Commander-in-Chief of  
the armed fo r c e s  Implies  an Important c o n t r o l l in g  power 
in c lu d in g  op era t io n a l  c o n tr o l .  I t  a l s o  in c lud es  the co n tro l  
of the term of  s e r v ic e  through h is  powers of appointment and 
d i s m is s a l .  The dynamics of  p r e s i d e n t i a l  power would obviously  
in v o lv e  s p e c i a l  r e l a t i o n  w ith  people who man the armed (and 
s e c u r i t y )  s e r v i c e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  v iew o f  the shadow of the  
coup d* e t a t .  The p r e s i d e n t s  powers are thus enhanced by the  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d ev ices  which can be used at h is  d i s c r e t io n  to  
ensure the s e c u r i ty  of the s t a t e .
(d) Diplomatic  powers. The P res ident  appoints ambassadors to  
fo r e ig n  s t a t e s  and ambassadors from fo r e ig n  s t a t e s  are accred ­
i t e d  to  him. He n e g o t i a t e s ,  s igns  and r a t i f i e s  t r e a t i e s  and 
In te r n a t io n a l  agreements, w ith in  c e r ta in  l im i t s *  In the  
m ajority  of the s t a t e s  the l i m i t s  are s e t  out in  the c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n s .  The approval of parliament i s  required  fo r  s ig n in g  
peace t r e a t i e s ,  t r e a t i e s  of commerce, t r e a t i e s  of agreements 
concerning in te r n a t io n a l  o r g a n iz a t io n ,  t r e a t i e s  which commit 
the f in a n c es  of the s t a t e ;  or which modify the p ro v is io n s  
of a l e g i s l a t i v e  nature; or which concern the s ta tu s  of  
persons;  or which in vo lve  c e s s io n ,  exchange or a d d i t io n  of  
t e r r i t o r y .  Moreover, no c e s s io n ,  exchange or a d d i t io n  of  
t e r r i t o r y  i s  v a l i d  u n le ss  approved by the p opu la t ion  concerned. 
The Supreme Court has power to  examine in te r n a t io n a l  o b l i ­
g a t i o n s ;  a n d  i f  i t  d e c l a r e s  a n y  o f  th e m  a s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i t  c a n  b e  r a t i f i e d  o r  a p p r o v e d  o n l y  a f t e r  a
1c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a m e n d m e n t .
The C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  C am eroun  d i s p o s e s  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  
b y  p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  t r e a t i e s  w h ic h  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  "d o m a in  o f
l a w " ,  m u s t  be  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly  f o r  r a t i f i c a -
2t  i o n .
I n  T u n i s i a ,  a l l  t r e a t i e s  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h o u t  e x c e p t i o n  m u s t  b e  s u b m i t t e d  f o r  t h e  
a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly .
( i i )  Pow er  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e
The i n c r e a s e d  pow er  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i n  t h e  new 
s t a t e s  i s  n o t  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  s p h e r e .  I n  m o s t  o f  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  r o l e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  e n ­
h a n c e d  a n d  i t s  s c o p e  e x t e n d e d  f a r  b e y o n d  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
p o s i t i o n .  To b e g i n  w i t h ,  w h i l e  i t  i s  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  l a w s  
a r e  v o t e d  by  p a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e " d o m a i n o f  la w "  i s  e n u m e r a t e d  
i n  m os t  c a s e s .  T h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  n e a r l y  a l l  t h e  f r a n c o -
1 .  C o n s t .  G abon ,  a r t .  52 ;  G u i n e a ,  a r t .  33 ;  Congo (i3) a r t .
60 ;  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a r t s .  5 3 - 5 ;  M a l i ,  a r t s .  3 6 - 9 ;  M a u r i ­
t a n i a ,  a r t s .  4 4 - 5 ;  N i g e r ,  a r t s .  5 3 - 5 ;  Rwanda, a r t . 5 6 ( h ) ;
( i ) ,  ( j ) ;  S e n e g a l ,  a r t s .  7 6 - 9 ;  T ch a d ,  a r t s .  6 9 - 7 1 ;
U . A . R . ,  a r t s .  124 -5 *
2 .  A r c .  1 2 .  The " d o m a in  o f  l a w "  i s  e x h a u s i t v e l y  d e f i n e d  i n  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  d e r a i l e d  p r o v i s i o n  i n  t h e  dom ain  
o f  law  i s  a  f e a t u r e  o f  P r e n c h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l a w  a d o p t e d  
by a l l  f r a o c o p h o n i c  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s .  Among o t h e r  t h i n g s  a  
s t a t e  o f  u r g e n c y  (11 t a t  d 'U r g e n c e )  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  dom ain  o f  la w
p h o n i c  s t a t e s ,  f o l l o w i n g  i n  t h e  f o o t s t e p s  o f  F ra n ce *  7/hat  
i s  n o t  c o v e r e d  by t h e  fldomain  o f  law" e n u m e r a t e d  i n  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  l e f t  t o  t h e  " r e g u l a t o r y "  power  o f  t h e  P r e s i ­
d e n t  -  a n o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n r o a d  i n t o  p a r l i a m e n t 1s l e g i s ­
l a t i v e  f u n c t i o n .  A d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power  o f  
p a r l i a m e n t  h a s  t h u s  mean t  a p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h a t  
o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e .  I n d e e d  some C o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s u c h  as  t h o s e
o f  Rwanda a n d  Zambia ,  v e s t  l e g i s l a t i v e  power  I n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
1
an d  t h e  n a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y .
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  Zambia ,  s u c h  power  i s  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  by v i r t u e  of  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p a r l i a m e n t  c o n s i s t s  o fo
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y .  T h i s  p r o v i s i o n
no d o u b t  owes i t s  s o u r c e  t o  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f
Ghana o f  I 9 6 0 ,  w h i c h  w i t h  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  m o n a r c h i c a l
p a r l i a m e n t  (Queen a n d  P a r l i a m e n t )  s u b s t i t u t e d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
f o r  t h e  Queen i n  making  p a r l i a m e n t  c o n s i s t  o f  P r e s i d e n t  a n d
3
Hat- i o n a l  As sembly  •
1 .  Rwanda,  a r t .  7 3 ;  Zambia ,  a r t *  57.
2 .  A r t .  57*
3* The Zambian  a n d  T a n z a n i a n  p r e s i d e n t s  a l s o  a p p o i n t  a l i m i t e d  
number  of  members o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y .  T h i s  d e v i c e  
e n a b l e s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  i n  p a r l i a m e n t  
o f  p e o p l e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  s p e c i a l  p r o f e s s i o n a l  o r  o t h e r  
g r o u p s .  Nor  i s  i t  p u r e l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  i n  p u r p o s e ,  i t  
i s  p a r t l y  d e s i g n e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  p e o p l e  w i t h  
s p e c i a l  e x p e r i e n c e  a nd  e x p e r t i s e ,  o r  some o t h e r  q u a l i t y .
 ^ 276 .
M o r e o v e r ,  s e v e r a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  p r o v i d e  t i i a t  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  may a s k  t h e  n a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  t o  a u t h o r i s e  h im f o r  
a  l i m i t e d  pex- iod t o  p a s s  d e c r e e s  o r  o r d i n a n c e s  f o r  t h e  e x e ­
c u t i o n  o f  h i s  programme i n  m a t t e r s  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  dom a in  
o f  lav/ .  I n  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  s u c h  a u t h o r i s a t i o n  i s  g i v e n ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t h e  d e c r e e s  o r  o r d i n a n c e s  c e a s e  t o  h a v e  f o r c e  a n d  
e f f e c t ,  i f  t h e y  a r e  n o t  s u b m i t t e d  f o r  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  a p p r o v a l  
b e f o r e  t h e  t i m e  l i m i t  f i x e d  by t h e  e n a b l i n g  law.-"** A l s o  u n d e r  
t h e  U .A .R .  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w h e r e  no ’’dom a in  o f  l a w ” i s  enum­
e r a t e d ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  g i v e n  power  t o  i s s u e  ’’d e c i s i o n s
2h a v i n g  t h e  f o r c e  o f  l a w . ”
We mu s t  now e x a m in e  some o t h e r  a r e a s  w h e r e  s p e c i f i c  
l e g i s l a t i v e  f u n c t i o n  i s  g i v e n  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  They c o n s i s t  
i n  t h e  r i g h t  t o  i n i t i a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t o  g i v e  a s s e n t  t o  a n d  
p r o m u l g a t e  l a w s ,  t o  a d d r e s s  p a r l i a m e n t ,  t o  d i s s o l v e  p a r l i a ­
m e n t  a n d  t o  l e g i s l a t e  by r e f e r e n d u m .
( a )  L e g i s l a t i v e  i n i t i a t i v e .  T h i s  i s  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  power  
w h i c h  t h e  f r e s i d e n t ^ n j o y s  c o n c u r r e n t l y  w i t h  t h e  d e p u t i e s .
I t  i s  o f  c r u c i a l  x m p o r t a n c e  i n  t h e  c h o i c e  a n d  e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  
p r o j e c t s  t o  be  p a s s e d  a s  l a w .  T h i s  i s ,  t o  De s u r e ,  a  f e a t u r e  
o f  a l l  m o d e rn  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s .  Bu t  i n  t h e  A f r i c a n  
C o n s t i t u t i o n s  i t  h a s  a c q u i r e d  a  d i f f e r e n t  m a g n i t u d e :  t h e
1 .  c f .  e . g .  C o n s t .  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a r t .  45 ;  M a l i ,  a r t .  26 ;  
M a u r i t a n i a ,  a r t .  36 ;  S e n e g a l ,  a r t .  66;  N i g e r ,  a r t .  45 ;  
Rwanda,  a r t .  5 5 • Bor  ex a m p le  t h e  S e n e g a l e s e  P a r l i a m e n t  
p a s s e d  L o i  No. 6 0 -0 4 6  o f  S e p t .  I 9 6 0  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e .
2 .  A r t .  1 2 0 .
P r e s i d e n t  i s  p l a c e d  i n  a  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  by  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  U . S . A . ,  f o r  ex a m p le ,  who can o n ly  r e s o r t
t o  i n d i r e c t  m e thods  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
1
laws* The C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  S e n e g a l  c o n t a i n s  a u n i q u e  
p r o v i s i o n  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t !  a r t i c l e  6 6 ,  h a v i n g  e n u m e r a t e d  
t h e  s u b j e c t s  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  dom ain  o f  lav/,  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  can  "by  r e a s o n  o f  t h e i r  s o c i a l ,  econom ic  an d  
f i n a n c i a l  i m p o r t a n c e ,  s u b m i t  t o  t h e  v o t e  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A ssem b ly  d r a f t  lav/s h a v i n g  t o  do w i t h  m a t t e r s  o t h e r  t h a n  
t h o s e  e n u m e r a t e d  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  a r t i c l e "  w i t h o u t  d e r o g a t i n g  
f ro m  t h e  power o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
2
(t>) A s s e n t  t o  B i l l s  and  P r o m u l g a t i o n . I t  w i l l  be  s e e n  t h a t  
t h i s  r i g h t  t o  s e n d  B i l l s  f o r  s e c o n d  d e l i b e r a t i o n  does  n o t  
am ount t o  c o m p le t e  v e t o .  B u t  t h e  d e l a y s  w h ic h  i t  c o u l d  
e n t a i l ,  p l u s  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  w h ic h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w i e l d s  i n  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  o f  t h e s e  new s t a t e s  c o u l d  t u r n  i t  i n t o  
a weapon o f  no mean i m p o r t a n c e .  The p e r i o d  o f  d e l a y  i s  f u r t h e r  
e x t e n d e d  i n  some c a s e s ,  a s  f o r  ex a m p le  i n  t h e  I v o r y  C o a s t ,
N i g e r  a n d  T ch a d ,  by a / p r o v i s i o n  w hic j i  g i v e s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a
1 .  c f .  e . g .  C o n s t .  Carrier oun,  a r t .  2 3 ;  Gabon,  a r t .  2 2 ;  G u in e a ,  
a r t . 1 4 ;  M a l i ,  a r t . 1 1 ;  M a u r i t a n i a ,  a r t . 3 7 ;  Rwanda, a r t .
5 6 ( j  ) ;  N i g e r ,  a r t . 1 3 ;  S e n e g a l ,  a r t . 69;  T ch a d ,  a r t . 3 3 ;  
T u n i s i a ,  a r t . 2 8 ;  U . A . R . ,  a r t . 1 1 6 .  I n  a n g l o p h o n i c  s t a t e s
t h e r e  I s  e x e c u t i v e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  an  a b s e n c e  o f  e x p r e s s  p r o v i s i o n  t o  t h a t  
e f f e c t .
2 .  cf*  C o n s t s .  C am eroun ,  a r t l . 1 8 ;  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a r t . 1 3 ;  Gabon, 
a r t . 1 2 ;  M a u r i t a n i a - ,  a r t . 4 1 ;  M a d a g a s c a r ,  a r t .  13 ;  M a l i ,
a r t * 1 0 ;  Rwanda,  a r t . 5 6 ( k ) ;  Congo (B ) ,  a r t . 3D; Zam bia ,  a r t .  
71 ( 3 1 7 ) ;  T c h a d ,  a r t . 55 ;  S e n e g a l ,  a r t . 62 ;  T u n i s i a ,  a r t .  
4 4 ;  U . A . R . , a r t .  1 1 8 .
r i g h t  t o  r e q u e s t  t h a t  t h e  s e c o n d  d e l i b e r a t i o n  s h o u ld  t a k e  
p l a c e  d u r i n g  t h e  s e s s i o n  a f t e r  t h e  o n e . a t  w h ic h  t h e  B i l l  
was f i r s t  a d o p te d *  Ap^aln, t h i s  r e q u e s t  c a n n o t  be r e f u s e d *
( c )  l i i g h t  t o  A d d r e s s  P a r l i a m e n t * A l l i e d  w i t h  l e g i s l a t i v e  
i n i t i a t i v e ,  a s s e n t  t o  an d  p r o m u l g a t i o n  o f  B i l l s ,  i s  t h e  
r i g h t  t o  a d d r e s s  m e s s a g e s  t o  p a r l i a m e n t ,  d i r e c t l y  o r  t h r o u g h  
a n  i n t e r m e d i a r y *  Cf p r i m a r y  i m p o r t a n c e  among s u c h  m e ssa g e s  
i s  t h e  a n n u a l  a d d r e s s  g i v e n  by  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a t  t h e  o p e n in g  
( a n d  so m e t im es  a t  t h e  c l o s i n g )  o f  p a r l i a m e n t *  T h i s  i s  o f  
c o u r s e  a t r a d i t i o n a l  r i g h t  i n  many c o u n t r i e s ,  f o r  h e a d s  o f
s t a t e s *  But i t  h a s  a c q u i r e d  a  s p e c i a l  q u a l i t y  i n  t h e  new
c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  A f r i c a *  T h ro u g h  i t  t h e  p o l i c y - m a k i n g  pow ers  
o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  can  be  bfcught t o  b e a r  on t h e  work  o f  p a r l i a ­
ment* The P r e s i d e n t  c a n  d e t e r m i n e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  i s s u e s  w h ich
a r e  t o  be  d e b a t e d  i n  p a r l i a m e n t  by p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  o u t l i n e  o f
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  program m e. He may make t h i s  
programme t h e  more i m p e r a t i v e  by l a y i n g  due 3t r e s s  on  c e r t a i n  
s u b j e c t s  i n  a d e s c e n d i n g  o r d e r  o f  i m p o r t a n c e *  T h is  he c a n  
do a s  a Head o f  S t a t e  a n d  a r e p o s i t o r y  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t *  A r e p o r t  on t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n  and  a  p r o ­
gramme o f  a c t i o n  w i t h  a n  a r r a y  o f  p l a n s  a n d  p r o j e c t s  d e s i g n e d  
t o  s o l v e  p r o b le m s  and  t o  im p lem e n t  p o l i c i e s  c a n n o t  f a i l  t o  
s e t  t h e  t o n e  a n d  p a c e  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  a c t i v i t y *  The r i g h t  
o f  a d d r e s s  i s  c o n t r i b u t o r y  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  s u c h  a s t a t e  
o f  a f f a i r s *  I t  i s  i n d e e d  l i n k e d  w i t h  a n d  i s  a  v e h i c l e  o f  t h e
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r i g h t  t o  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n i t i a t i v e .  T h a t  i t  i s  a  r i g h t  w i t h  
a  new q u a l i t y  c a n  be  s e e n  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  u n l i k e  t h e  
Q u e e n ' s  s p e e c h  i n  t h e  l i . n . p a r l i a m e n t , f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e
1P r e s i d e n t ' s  a d d r e s s  i s  n o t  s u o j e c t  t o  d e b a t e  o r  q u e s t i o n .
f h e  o p e n i n g  a n d  c l o s i n g  o f  o r d i n a r y  s e s s i o n s  o f  a
p a r l i a m e n t  a r e  f i x e d  i n  m o s t  c a s e s ,  b u t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s
t h e  r i g h t  t o  o p e n  ana. c l o s e  e x t r a - o r d i n a r y  s e s s i o n s .  T h i s
i s  s u b j e c t  t o  a  t i m e  l i m i t  ( u s u a l l y  a  maximum o f  t h i r t y  d a y s )
i m p o s e d  on t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  e x t r a - o r d i n a r y  s e s s i o n s .
( d )  D i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y . The d e s i r e  t o
e s t a b l i s h  a n d  a s s e r t  E x e c u t i v e  s u p r e m a c y  o v e r  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e
i s  p e r h a p s b e s t  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a )  t o
d i s s o l v e  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y ,  a n d  b) t o  go o v e r  t h e  h e a d  o f
t h a t  b o d y ,  h a v i n g  r e s o r t  t o  r e f e r e n d u m  -  b o t h  r i g h t s  r e c o g n i s e d
i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  s e v e r a l  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s .  We s h a l l
e x a m i n e  f i r s t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s  power  o f  d i s s o l u t i o n .
A number  o f  A f r i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  make p r o v i s i o n
2
f o r  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t .  Two (G-abon a n d  Zambia )  do 
n o t  f i x  c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  r i g h t  o f  d i s s o l u t i o n  -  
A r t i c l e  63 (2 )  o f  t h e  Z a m b i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s i m p l y  p r o v i d e s :
" S u o j e c t  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
1 .  The r i g h t  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  a t t e n d  a n d  a d d r e s s  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly  i s  e x e m p l i f i e d  by a r t i c l e  75 ( l )  o f  t h e  
Zambian  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2 .  e . g .  Congo ( B ) ,  a r t .  32 ;  Gabon,  a r t . 1 7 ;  M a d a g a s c a r ,  a r t . 45 ;  
M a law i  a r t .  4 5 ( 2 ) ;  M a l i ,  a r t . 37;  Rwanda,  a r t . 97 ;  T c h a d ,  
a r t s .  45,  47 ;  Z am bi a ,  a r t .  o 3 .
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may a t  any  t i fee  d i s s o l v e  p a r l i a m e n t ” . S uch  p r o v i s i o n  f i r s t
a p p e a r e d  i n  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Ghana o f  I 9 6 0 .
U n d e r  t h a t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t s  own o f f i c e  f e l l  open
t o  r e - e l e c t i o n  i f  he  d i s s o l v e d  p a r l i a m e n t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Zambia p r o v i d e s  t h a t  w h en e v e r  p a r l i a m e n t  i s
d i s s o l v e d  a n  e l e c t i o n  s h a l l  be  h e l d  f o r  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  
1
P r e s i d e n t .  The p r o v i s i o n s  o f  A r t i c l e  3 3 ( 1 )  an d  A r t i c l e  8 3 ( 2 )  
t a k e n  t o g e t h e r  mean t h a t  w h a t  a p p e a r s  t o  be  a n  u n l i m i t e d  
power o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  d i s s o l v e  p a r l i a m e n t  i s  c o u n t e r ­
b a l a n c e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t s  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n  w h ic h  
i s  c o n s e q u e n t i a l  on t h e  a c t  o f  d i s s o l u t i o n .  I n  p r a c t i c e  s u c h  
an  e x t r e m e  m e a su re  w o u ld  o n ly  be t a k e n  i n  c a s e  of  s e r i o u s  
d i f f e r e n c e s  a r i s i n g  b e tw e e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  an d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  \  
A ssem bly  l e a d i n g  t o  a d e a d l o c k .  T h i s  c a n  c o n c e i v a b l y  a r i s e ,  
among o t h e r s ,  f r o m  a r e f u s a l  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  a s s e n t  t o  
B i l l s  p a s s e d  by p a r l i a m e n t  a f t e r  a s e c o n d  d e l i b e r a t i o n  by 
a t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y .
I n  Gabon, t h e  P r e s i d e n t  may d i s s o l v e  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
Asembly  ” i n  c a s e  o f  n e c e s s i t y ” , and  a f t e r  c o n s u l t i n g  t h e  
C o u n c i l  o f  I - I i n i s t e r s  an d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
A ss e m b ly .  He i s  n o t  bound  by t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  a n y o n e .  He h a s
a l s o  t h e  r i g h t  t o  p r o r o g u e  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  o n c e ,  f o r  a
2
maximum p e r i o d  o f  e i g h t e e n  m o n th s .  B ut  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f
1 .  A r t . 3 3 ( l ) .  c f .  a l s o  I l a l a w i  C ons ,  w h ic h  p r o v i d e s  ”The
P r e s i d e n t  may a t  an y  t im e  d i s s o l v e  p a r l i a m e n t ” , a r t . 4 5 ( 2 ) .
2. A r t .  17 .
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p a r l i a m e n t  does  n o t  e n t a i l  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t .
As f o r  t h e  o t h e r  s t a t e s  ( a l l  f r a n c o p h o n i c ) t h e  c i r c u m ­
s t a n c e s  u n d e r  which t h e  P r e s i d e n t  can d i s s o l v e  t h e  R a t i o n a l  
Assembly  a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  f o u r ,  Congo ( B ) ,  
M a d a g a s c a r ,  Rwanda and  Tchad .  Ther e  must  be  m i n i s t e r i a l  c r i s e s  
r e s u l t i n g  f rom t h e  p a s s i n g  of a  m o t i o n  o f  c e n s u r e  o r  t h e  d e f e a t  
o f  a v o t e  of  c o n f i d e n c e .  I n  M a l i  t h e  r e l e v a n t  p r o v i s i o n  r e f e r s  
t o  m i n i s t e r i a l  c r i s e s  w i t h o u t  s t a t i n g  t h e  c a u s e .  B e f o r e  d i s ­
s o l u t i o n  can t a k e  p l a c e ,  two m i n i s t e r i a l  c r i s e s  mu s t  o c c u r  
i n  t h e  c o u r s e  of  18 months  i n  t h e  Congo ( B ) ,  a n d  more t h a n  
two c r i s e s  In  the course o f  three consecutive y e a r s  i n  Rwanda.
I n  T c h a d  a m o t i o n  o f  c e n s u r e  o r  a d e f e a t  o f  a v o t e  o f  c o n -
1
f i d e n c e  o c c u r r i n g  once  i s  s u f f i c i e n t .
D i s s o l u t i o n  of  t h e  R a t i o n a l  Assembly  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e ­
s u l t s  i n  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  o f f i c e  i n  Rwanda 
as  I t  does  I n  Zambia .  I n  M a dag ascar  a t w o - s t a g e  p r o c e d u r e  i s  
d e v i s e d  a s  a c o n d i t i o n  f o r  d i s s o l u t i o n  and  r e s i g n a t i o n .  I n  
t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  may p l e d g e  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
o f  h i s  govern ment  on t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  a programme embodying  
g e n e r a l  p o l i c y .  I f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  Assembly r e j e c t s  t h i s  p r o ­
gramme or  a d o p t s  a m o t i o n  o f  c e n s u r e  t h e  M i n i s t e r s  mus t  s u b m i t
1 .  I n  Togo,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  was t h a t  a f t e r  s u c h  a c r i s i s ,  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  had  t h e  o p t i o n  o f  a l t e r i n g  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  
h i s  g o v e r n m e n t ,  o r  o f  c h a n g i n g  i t  c o m p l e t e l y  o r  o f  d i s ­
s o l v i n g  t h e  n a t i o n a l  Ass e m b ly .  I n  Tc h a d ,  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  
t w o - t l i l r d s  I s  r e q u i r e d .
282.
t h e i r  r e s i g n a t i o n  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  The s e c o n d  s t a g e  b e g i n s  
a t  t h i s  p o i n t .  The P r e s i d e n t ,  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  S e n a t e ,  may form, a new g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  p r e s e n t  
a new programme t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y .  I f  t h e  R a t i o n a l  
Ass e m bly  r e j e c t s  t h e  new programme i t  i s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  d i s ­
s o l v e d  and  e l e c t i o n s  f o r  a new N a t i o n a l  Assemb ly  a r e  h e l d .
I f ,  a pt e r  t h e  e l e c t i o n , '  t h e  new N a t i o n a l  Asse mbly  does  n o t  
a c c e p t  t h e  programme l a s t  r e j e c t e d ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  mus t  r e s i g n  
a n d  w i t h  h im  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s ,  a n d  an  e l e c t i o n  f o r  a 
new P r e s i d e n t  i s  h e l d .
T h i s  t w o - s t a g e  p r o c e d u r e  w i t h  i t s  Ms h i f t s ™  o f  e l e c t o r a l  
h a z a r d s  i s  a u n i q u e  d e v i c e  o f  m u t u a l  r e s t r a i n t  an d  p e r s u a s i o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  and  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y j  i n v o l v i n g  
a s  i t  d o e s ,  t h e  f a t e  o f  b o t h .  S t i l l ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h a s  an  
a d v a n t a g e  o v e r  t h e  Asse mb ly  I n  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  g o e s  o u t  f i r s t  
t o  f a c e  t h e  h a z a r d s .
I n  M a l i  a n d  T ch a d  ( a s  i n  Gabon)  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A sse mb ly  does  n o t  I n v o l v e  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t '  o r  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t*  I t  i s  a l s o  I n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  
t h a t  i n  T c h a d ,  up on  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly ,  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h a t  body  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  becomes a N i n i s t r e  
d1E t a t ,  w h i c h  i s  r e v e a l i n g  a s  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n  
I n  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e - E x e c u t i v e  n e x u s .
I t  w i l l  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e
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P r e s i d e n t  i n  A f r i c a  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p a r l i a m e n t  a s  r e g a r d s  
d i s s o l u t i o n  i s  marked  by a v a r i e t y  o f  f o r m s .  Whi le  some 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  s i l e n t  on t h e  m a t t e r ,  o t h e r s  h a v e  a v a r i e t y  
o f  a r r a n g e m e n t s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  Gabon s t a n d s  i n  t h e '  
s t r o n g e s t  p o s i t i o n ,  f o l l o w e d  by t h o s e  of  Zambia ,  Tchad a n d  
I . l a l i ,  a nd  p e r h a p s  M a d a g a s c a r .
T h i s  l a c k  o f  u n i f o r m i t y  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e ;  i t  r e f l e c t s
some v a r i a t i o n  i n  h i s t o r i c a l  a nd  p o l i t i c a l  b a c k g r o u n d s • The
s u b j e c t  o f  d i s s o l u t i o n  t o u c h e s  on a s e n s i t i v e  a r e a  o f  p o l i t i c a l
l i f e .  Ho Asse mb ly  l i k e s  t o  r e s o l v e  i t s e l f  o u t  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i n
n o r m a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  The same may be s a i d  o f  P r e s i d e n t s .  I n
c l a s s i c a l  P r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m s ,  a s  t h a t  o f  t h e  U . S . A . ,  t h e
t e n u r e  o f  o f f i c e  o f  P r e s i d e n t  a n d  members of  C o n g r e s s  i s  f i x e d .
I n  c a s e  o f  d e a d l o c k  t h e y  have  t o  w a i t  t o  t h e  end o f  t h e  t o r n .
E v e n  i n  c a s e  o f  h o s t i l i t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  C o n g r e s s  r e c o g n i s e s
t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  t o  go on.  The A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  t h a t  h a v e
a d o p t e d  d i s s o l u t i o n  as a wav o u t  o f  d e a d l o c k  co u l d  n o t  f a i l  t o
r e c o g n i s e  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  t o  go on.  I f  a r e c a l c i t r a n t
p a r l i a m e n t  and. a n  o b d u r a t e  P r e s i d e n t  p e r s i s t  i n  h o s t i l i t y ,
g o v e r n m e n t  w i l l  b r e a k  down, a n d  d i s s o l u t i o n  wou ld  t h e n  b e  a
1
s e n s i b l e ,  i f  n o t  t h e  o n l y ,  way o u t .  O t h e r w i s e ,  i t  may be 
s a f e l y  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  r e s o r t  t o  d i s s o l u t i o n  woul d  be  r a . r e .
I f  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  p a r l i a m e n t  i s  any g u i d e ^
1# The e v e n t s  i n  t h e  Congo i n  l a t e  1965  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  a f e r t i l e  g r o u n d  f o r  m i l i t a r y  c o u p s .
d e c i s i o n s  by the Prime H in is te r  to  " a d v ise” d i s s o l u t i o n  are
r a r e y c e n t e r i n g  on c r u c i a l  e v e n t s ,  i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f
n a t io n a l  d i v i s i o n  over important i s s u e s .  The Prime H in is te r
who a d v i s e s  d i s s o l u t i o n  mus t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  be  p r esume d  t o
choose  a mos t  s u i t a b l e  moment* He d o e s  t h i s  w i t h  t h e  hope
1
o f  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t Ts r e - e l e c t i o n *
(e )  R e f e r e n d u m * The mos t  i m p o r t a n t  l e g i s l a t i v e  power  o f  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  i n  t h e  new s t a t e s  i s  p e r h a p s  f o u n d  i n  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
r e s o r t  t o  r e f e r e n d u m *  T h i s  i s  a l s o  a  d r a m a t i c  method  o f  
o v e r c o m in g  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  l e g i s l a t i v e  programmes 
o f  g r e a t  p u b l i c  i m p o r t a n c e .
R e f e r e n d u m  as  a p o l i t i c a l  c o n c e p t  o f  r e s o l v i n g  o u t ­
s t a n d i n g  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  b y r  e f e r r i n g  th e m  t o  t h e  p o p u l a c e  
h a s  a l o n g  h i s t o r y .  R e f e r e n d u m  a s  a l e g i s l a t i v e  c o n c e p t  t o  
be u s e d  by t h e  E x e c u t i v e  b r a n c h  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  s i d e - t r a c k  
o p p o s i t i o n  i s  o f  r e c e n t  o r i g i n .  I n  i t s  mod ern  c o n t e x t  i t  h as  
a  w i d e r  sc o p e  o f  m e an in g  and  a p p l i c a t i o n .  I t s  a d v e n t  i n  
A f r i c a  I s  p o s t - G a u l l i s t  ( 1 9 5 8 ) ,  and G a u l l i s m  was i t s  p r i n c i ­
p a l  s o u r c e  o f  i n s p i r a t i o n .  B u t  i n  i t s  mos t  e x t r e m e  f o r m  i t  
h a s  moved a s t a g e  f u r t h e r  t h a n  u n d e r  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
t h e  F i f t h  R e p u b l i c .  Unde r  t h a t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  
t o  u s e  r e f e r e n d u m  d oes  n o t  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  I t  i s  
d e c i d e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  upon  p r o p o s a l s  made by t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  d u r i n g  t h e  s e s s i o n ,  o r  up on  t h e  j o i n t  p r o p o s a l  o f  t h e
1 .  On t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n s  o f  1 918 ,  1931 ,  c f • F . f / .G .  Benemy, 
TThe E l e c t e d  Llonarch” , (London  1 9 6 5 ) ,  p p * 4 7 - 5 7 .
two A s s e m b l i e s *  A l s o ,  t h e  s u b j e c t s  w h i c h  may be s e t t l e d  by 
r e s o r t  t o  r e f e r e n d u m  a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s :  1)  B i l l s  
i n v o l v i n g  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  p o w e r s ;  2 )  B i l l s  i n v o l ­
v i n g  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  a n  a g r e e m e n t  of  t h e  ” communaute” , a n d  3) 
B i l l s  a u t h o r i s i n g  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a t r e a t y ,  ”q u i  s a n s  ^ t r e  
c o n t r a i r e  a l a  c o n s t i t u t i o n  a u r a i t  des  i n c i d e n c e s  s u r  l e/y\ ^
f  o n c t i o n W e n t  des  i n s t i t u t i o n s ” •
I n  A f r i c a  t h e  r e f e r e n d u m  h a s  b e e n  a d o n t e d  by t h e  con-
2
s t i t u t i o n s  o f  a number  of  t h e  s t a t e s .  The f r a n c o p h o n i c
s t a t e s  u s e d  t h e  F r e n c h  c o n s t i t u t i o n  a s  a mode l  f o r  t h i s ,  a s
i n  many o t h e r  q u e s t i o n s .  However ,  o n l y  M a d a g a s c a r  h a s  f o l l o w e d
t h e  F r e n c h  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  jtfalfiing i n i t i a t i v e  o u t  o f  t h e  h a n d s
of  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  I n  f a c t ,  i n  M a d a g a s c a r ,  o n l y  t h e  N a t i o n a l
A ss e m bly  a nd  t h e  S e n a t e  can make t h e  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a r e f e r e n d u m ^
v o t i n g  s e p a r a t e l y  by a n  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
3
members .
I n  f o u r  o f  t h e  o t h e r  s a t e s ,  i . e .  Gabon,  I v o r y  C o a s t ,
N i g e r  and  S e n e g a l ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  may s u b m i t  a l l  q u e s t i o n s
w h i c h  a p p e a r  t o  h im t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  d i r e c t  c o n s u l t a t i o n  o f  t h e
p e o p l e .  H© may do t h i s  a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  b u r e a u  o f
4
t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ss e m b ly  , o r  w i t h  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s  a n d  
1* A r t .  11*
2 .  Though  n o t  i n  Cameroun,  I . la l i ,  t h e  f o r m e r  B r i t i s h  t e r r i ­
t o r i e s  and T u n i s i a .
3 .  A r t .  3 4 ,  p a r a g r a p h  4 .
4 .  I v o r y  C o a s t  a nd  N i g e r ,  Co ns .  a r t s .  14*
1
the bureau of  the N ational  Assembly; or w ith  the P res id en ts
2
of the Supreme Court and the N ational  Assembly; in  a l l  these  
four s t a t e s  the c o n s u l ta t io n  i s  o f /a d v is o r y  nature, and 
there i s  no l i m i t  on the matters that may be su bjec t  to  
referendum*
In Mauritania, no c o n s u l ta t io n  i s  required  of the  
P res id en t ,  but the referendum i s  l im i t e d  to  two matters:
1) B i l l s  in v o lv in g  the o rg a n isa t io n  of Public Powers, and
3
2) B i l l s  a u th o r is in g  the r a t i f i c a t i o n  of a treaty*
In the Congo (B), and in  Tchad the President may submit
any su b jec t  to  a referendum without the requirement t o  con-
4
s u i t  any person or body* I t  i s  a l s o  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  note
that  the re leva n t  p ro v is io n  In the Tchad C o n s t i tu t io n  adds
that  " a l l  law contrary to  the w i l l  of the people expressed
5
by way of referendum i s  a u tom atica l ly  v o id 11 •
In Rwanda p r e s i d e n t i a l  power over referendum as a 
l e g i s l a t i v e  instrument i s  n o n -ex is ten t*  Referendum i s  used  
to  s e t t l e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d isp u tes  between the Executive  and 
the L e g is la tu r e  in  matters not provided fo r  in  the C o n s t i tu t io n ,  
a f t e r  the q uest ion  h a$  been submitted fo r  a c o n s u l t a t iv e
1* Gabon, Cons, art* 16.
2 .  Senegal ,  Cons. a r t .  46.
3 .  A rt .  41.
4 .  Cons. Congo art* 33; Tchad, art* 11*
5. A rt .  11, para* 3*
opinion of  the Supreme Court and i f  the d isp u te  cannot he
1
s e t t l e d  thereby .  The n o v e lty  o f  t h i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  p r o v is io n  
l i e s  in  br in g in g  the people t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  s e t t l i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d isp u tes  between the E xecutive  and the L e g i s ­
l a t u r e .  The Rwanda C o n s t i tu t io n *  i s  a f a i r l y  exh au st ive  one, 
however, and a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s i s  a r i s i n g  out of matters  
unforeseen  by i t  would be most unusual.
In the U.A.R. the P res ident  may c a l l  a referendum 11 in
important matters a f fec t in r;  the supreme i n t e r e s t s  of the  
2
co u n try .11
In anglcphonic A fr ica  the referendum was adopted in  
Ghana, presumably by way of Nkrumah* s contact  w ith  some of  
the francophonic s t a t e s .  The C o n s t i tu t io n  provided that  a 
referendum ( fo r  a re p e a l  of an entrenched p r o v is io n  of the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n )  would be ordered by the P r e s id e n t .  But as 
Rubin and Murray po inted  out,  th ere  was no p r o v is io n  on the 
means by which the people were required  to  in d ic a t e  t h e i r  
d es ire  for  such a referendum "which l e f t  the Pres ident  w ith  
an a b so lu te  d i s c r e t i o n  to  decide whether the referendum 
should take p la ce" .  Indeed the i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the referendum^ 
w h ile  on the face  o f  i t  democratic^ could be used to  d efeat
1.  A rt .  72.
2.  A rt .  129.
3 .  c f .  Rubin and Murray, * The C o n s t i tu t io n  and Government of  
Ghana* (2nd ed. 1964) ,  pp. 97 -8 .
d e m o c r a t i c  e n d s .  The c o m p le x i ty  o f  t h e  i s s u e s  on w h ic h  t h e  
p u b l i c  a r e  a sked  t o  p a s s  judgm en ts  i n  a ,fy e s - o r - n o tT f a s h i o n  
j u s t i f y  a d oub t  t o  be e x p r e s s e d  on i t s  TAerit* P r e s i d e n t i a l  
r e g i m e s  by t h e i r  v e r y  n a t u r e  t e n d  t o  f o c u s  a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  and  away from p a r l i a m e n t  as a c e n t r e  o f  pow er ,  i n ­
c l u d i n g  l e g i s l a t i v e  power.  C h a r i s m a t i c  l e a d e r s  c a n  c o n ­
c e i v a b l y  g e t  t h e  p u b l i c  t o  a c c e p t  most o f  w h a t  t h e y  w i s h .
This i s  the lo g i c  of the system, and i t s  dependence on a 
mass-based party underlines  the dangers.
( i i i )  Power in  r e la t io n  to  the Ju d ic ia ry
Where the President i s  engaged in  the e x e r c i s e  of power
in  r e l a t i o n  to the ju d ic ia ry ,  three types  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  may
by i n v o l v e d .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  power o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  t o
j u d i c i a l  p o s ts ;  second^there i s  the r i g h t  of the  Pres ident
*
to  ask fo r  j u d ic ia l  opinion on some q u e s t io n s ;  thtntythere i s  
the r ig h t  to  grant pardon.
( a )  J u d i c i a l  a p p o in tm e n t
In  anglophonic s t a t e s ,  the President appoints  the Chief  
J u s t i c e ,  ^e a l s o  appoints the other Judges of the Superior  
Courts on the advice of the J u d ic ia l  S erv ice  Commission* The 
advice  o f  the Commission i s  mandatory in  some ( e . g .  Zambia) 
and c o n s u l ta t iv e  in  others ( e .g .  Malawi). The Pres ident  can
remove the Chief Ju s t ice  and the other Judges of the Superior
Courts on the recommendation of an independent tr ib u n a l  s e t  
up by him. He may remove them only for  proved misbehaviour
or i n a b i l i t y  t o  perform the fu n ct io n s  of  t h e i r  o f f i c e .  Other­
wise t h e i r  tenure i s  secure .
The power of appointment of what are c a l l e d  J u d ic ia l  
O ff ic e r s  i s  v e s te d  in  the Pres ident  only in  the case of Malawi. 
This in c lu d es  power of removal. The P res ident  may d e lega te  
t h i s  power to  the J u d ic ia l  Serv ice  Commission. In the other  
s t a t e s  the J u d ic ia l  O ff ic e r s  are appointed and removed by the  
J u d ic ia l  Serv ice  Commission. The term J u d ic ia l  O ff icers  
in c lu d es  the R eg is tr a r  or Deputy R e g is tr a r  of the  Supreme 
Court ( or High Court),  the Resident M agistrate  or M agistrate ,  
and such other o f f i c e r  as  may be prescr ibed  by parliament.
The Commission c o n s i s t s  of  the Chief  J u s t i c e  (Chairman), the  
Chairman of the Public  Serv ice  Commission or any member of  
that body des ignated  by i t s  Chairman^ a Judge d es ignated  by 
the P res ident  (as in  Malawi) or the C hief  J u s t i c e  (as i n  
Zambia). One a d d i t io n a l  member i s  provided fo r  in  Zambia, 
and he i s  appointed by the P res id en t .
The fu n c t io n  of the J u d ic ia l  Serv ice  Commission inc ludes  
d i s c ip l in a r y  matters in  regard t o  j u d i c i a l  o f f i c e r s .  In the  
e x e r c i s e  of sucji d i s c i p l i n a r y  fu n ct ion  the Commission i s  not
1 .  The experience o f  Ghana has been i n s t r u c t i v e .  There the  
Chief J u s t ic e  was removed and put under p r o t e c t i v e  custody  
for  a judgment which he had g iv en ,  d ism iss in g  the case  
a g a in s t  some former m in is te r s  charged w ith  the crime of  
attempts on the l i f e  of the Pres ident  and on h i s  govern­
ment,. The removal of  the Chief J u s t i c e ,  S ir  Arku Korsah 
s e t / a  wave of commentSymostly h o s t i l e .  For lawyers i t  
showed the i n s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  formal p ro v is io n s  of s e c u r i t y  
of ten u re ,  u n le s s  other necessary  co n d it io n s  are p rese n t .
su b jec t  to  the con tro l  o f  any person o r rhody, except th a t  in  
Halawi the Pres ident may from time t o  time g ive  genera l  or 
s p e c ia l  d i r e c t io n .
In the francophonic s t a t e s  the P res id en t  appoints judges 
of  the h igher  courts -  the 11 magi s tr a ta  du s i e g e ”, who are  
irremovable ,  u n le ss  they have been proved t o  have misbehaved 
or to be unable to  perform the d u t ie s  of t h e i r  o f f i c e *  The 
President i s  a s s i s t e d  by the C onsei l  Superieur de l a  Llagis- 
tra tu re  which in  most s t a t e s  recommends judges (du s i e g e )  fo r  
appointment* The C on se i l  u s u a l ly  c o n s i s t s  of the m in is ter  
of  J u s t i c e  (Chairman), the P res id en t  o f  the Supreme Court and 
other judges* In some c a se s ,  as in  the Congo (B) i t  i s  pre­
s id ed  over by the P res id en t  of the Republic h imself*  Again,  
the com posit ion v a r ie s  sometimes, as In Tchad, where i t  
in c lud es  a l l  the judges o f  the Supreme Court. In Madagascar 
the C onsei l  i s  known as the C o n se i l  Superieur des I n s t i t u t i o n s  
which a l s o  a c ts  as a C o n s t i tu t io n a l  Court. In some s t a t e s ,  
as frtp example Ivory Const, Niger and Togo the recommending 
a u th o r i ty  fc£p j u d i c i a l  appointments i s  the m in is ter  o f  J u s t i c e ,
s '
who a c t s  on the advice of the C on se i l  Superieur de l a  I lag is -  
t r a tu r e .  The C on se i l  a l s o  e x e r c i s e s  d i s c i p l i n a r y  con tro l  
over a l l  m ag is tra ts  du s i e g e ,  which in c lu d es  the Pres ident  and 
the judges of the Supreme Court*
(b ) The r ig h t  to requ est  j u d i c i a l  opinion
This may perhaps be properly  regarded as a l i m i t a t i o n
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on  t h e  P r e s i d e n t 1 s power injk^much a s  i t  r e l a t e s  more t o  t h e  
pow er  o f  t h e  C o u r t s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  E x e c u t i v e  ( a n d  L e g i s ­
l a t i v e )  a u t h o r i t y  t h a n  v i c e  v e r s a .  But even  s o ,  i n  a d i s ­
c u s s i o n  on t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s power i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  j u d i c i a r y ^ ;  
p r o v i s i o n s  t h a t  d e r o g a t e  f ro m  s u c h  power a r e  w o r t h  n o t i n g .
Such  p r o v i s i o n s  e x i s t  i n  a number o f  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  A f r i c a ,  
w h e r / e  t h e  C o u r t s  ( n o r m a l l y  t h e  Supreme C o u r t ,  o r  i t s  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  s e c t i o n )  may be  a s k e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  t o  make a 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  on t h e  l e g a l i t y  o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  any 
p r o p o s a l  o f  l a w  o r  any  law a l r e a d y  i n  f o r c e .  I n  t h e  e v e n t
t h a t  a p r o p o s a l  o f  law  i s  d e c l a r e d  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  by t h e
1
C o u r t ,  i t  c a n n o t  be p r o m u l g a t e d .  The r o l e  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a r y
i n  e x e r c i s i n g  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  i n  t h i s  m anner  i s
o b v i o u s l y  l i m i t e d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  I n  v ie w  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e
i n i t i a t i v e  l i e s  e l s e w h e r e ,  an d  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t s  havd  t o  w a i t
u n t i l  t h e i r  o p i n i o n  i s  s o u g h t .  B u t  once o p i n i o n  i s  g i v e n
t h e r e  i s  no  a p p e a l  f rom  i t ,  an d  i t  must  be  f o l l o w e d .  Gabon
p r o v i d e s  a s t r i k i n g  e x c e p t i o n  i n  t h a t  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  t h e r e
may on i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e  p o i n t  t o  l e r a l  a n o m a l i e s  a n d  o r o -
2
p o s e  c o r r e c t i v e  m e a s u r e s .
Such  p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  a b s e n t  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  
a n g l o p h o n i c  A f r i c a .
1 .  c f .  e . g .  C o n s .  Gabon, a r t .  60;  M a d a g a s c a r ,  a r t .  4S ;
M a l i ,  a r t .  4 4 .  I n  some s t a t e s  s u c h  as  M a l i ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
o f  t h e  H a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  h a s  a l s o  t h e  r i g ; h t  t o  s e e k  t h e  
o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  on s i m i l a r  m a t t e r s .
2 ,  C o n s .  a r t .  6 0 .
T h is  i s  a r i g h t  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  r e c o g n i s e d  I n  a l l  A f r i c a n
c o n s t i t u t i o n s *  As i t  i s  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a p r e r o g a t i v e ,  t h e
P r e s i d e n t  h i m s e l f  a l o n e  d e c i d e s ,  t h o u g h  he  w o u ld  n o r m a l l y
t a k e  a d v i c e  from, t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a u t h o r i t y *  The l a t t e r  i n
m ost  c a s e s  i s  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  J u s t i c e ,  t h o u g h  he  may be a s s i s  -
1
t e d  o r  e v e n  s u b s t i t u t e d  by a c o n s u l t a t i v e  bodv*
Mr ^
The s i g n i f i c a n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o
t h e  J u d i c i a r y  l i e s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l l i n g  p a r t  p l a y e d  by t h e
J u d i c i a r y  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  i t s  f u n c t i o n *  T h i s  h a s  o f t e n
o c c a s i o n e d  c o n f l i c t  an d  c o n t r o v e r s y  i n  o t h e r  s y s t e m s ,  a n d  i t
a p p e a r s  t h a t  i n  A f r i c a  e f f o r t s  have  b e e n  made I n  many c a s e s
t o  r e d u c e  t h e  a r e a s  o f  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t *  P ro m in e n t  among
t h e s e  a r e  t h e  o m i s s i o n  o f  T i l l s  o f  b i g h t s  i n  many A f r i c a n
c o n s t i t u t i o n s .  An e l o q u e n t  p l e a  f o r  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  of  P i l l s  o f
T i g h t s  h a s  b e e n  made by t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  C om m iss ion  on t h e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a d e m o c r a t i c  one p a r t y  s t a t e  o f  T a n g a n y ik a ,
as  i t  t h e n  w as ,  w h ich  a r g u e d  t h a t  d e t a i l e d  B i l l s  o f  R i g h t
w o u ld  n o t  o n ly  i n v o l v e  c o n f l i c t  b e tw e e n  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  a n d
J u d i c i a r y ,  b u t  c o u l d  i m p a i r  p l a n s  f o r  d e v e lo p m e n t  w h ic h :
ffc a n n o t  be  Im p le m e n te d  w i t h o u t  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
ch a n g es  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e *  • • D e c i s i o n s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h ic h  I n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  
m u s t  g i v e  way t o  t h e  w i d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  
s o c i a l  p r o g r e s s ,  a r e  n o t  p r o p e r l y  j u d i c i a l
1* e*g» i n  T chad  t h e  C o n s e i l  S u p e r i e u r  de l a  h a g i s t r a t u r e  
s t u d i e s  t h e  d o c k e t s  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  pagr#eR, an d  g i v e s  i t s  
o p i n i o n s  on th e m .  C ons .  a r t .  62*
d e c i s i o n s .  They a r e  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  
b e s t  t a k e n  by p o l i t i c a l , l e a d e r s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e .  . . tf
F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  t h e  s c o p e  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  o f  E x e c u t i v e
a c t i o n  i s  a l s o  r e s t r i c t e d ,  a s  i s  l e g a l  p r o c e e d i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e
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P r e s i d e n t ,  w h i l e  he i s  i n  o f f i c e .  P r e s i d e n t i a l  im m un ity  f rom  
l e g a l  p r o c e e d i n g s  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  u s u a l  t o  a Head of  S t a t e .
Hut w here  he i s  a l s o  t h e  Head o f  t h e  G o v ern m en t ,  i t  may be 
j u s t i f i a b l y  f e a r e d  t h a t  t h i s  im m un ity  a s  a Hoad o f  S t a t e  
may make s e r i o u s  i n r o a d s  i n  t h e  a r e a  of  " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  E x e c u t i v e  p ow er ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w here  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  w i e l d s  immense E x e c u t i v e  pow ers  a s  ho does  i n  t h e  
A f r i c a n  s t a t e s .
F o r  t h e  r e s t ,  t h e  J u d i c i a r y  i s  r e c o g n i s e d  as  Tlg u a r a n t o r  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y ” an d  i t s  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  
e x p l i c i t  p r o v i s i o n  i n  most  o f  t h e  s t a t e s ;  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  
o f  t h e i r  j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n  t h e  j u d g e s  a r e  t o  b e  s u b j e c t  t o  
no o t h e r  a u t h o r i t y  t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  l a w .  E q u a l l y  u n i v e r s a l  
i s  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  g u a r a n t o r  of  t h i s  
i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e re  a r e  no  c a s e s  i l l u s t r a t i n g  i n  w h a t  way t h i s  p r e s i ­
d e n t i a l  d u ty  can  be c a r r i e d  o u t .  I n  p r a c t i c e ^ t h e  P r e s i d e n t
1 .  H e p o r t  o f  t h e  C o m m iss io n ,  D a r - e s - S a l a a m  ( 1 9 6 5 ) ,  p .  3 1 .
2 .  The r e p o r t  o f  t h e  C om m iss ion  was im p l e m e n te d .
being the head of the e x e c u t iv e ^ i t  i s  from t h i s  quarter th a t
any p o s s ib l e  th r e a ts  t o j u d i c i a l  independence may be expected
t o  come, i n  w h ic h  c a s e  he  w o u ld  be " j u d g e  and  p a r t y  i n  h i s  own
case"* In s t a t e s  w ith  r a d ic a l  p a r t i e s ,  the Pres ident  of the
Republic  would be expected  to  p ro tec t  the  ju d ic ia r y  a g a in s t
measures taken by a party over which he pres ides*  But in
such cases  the judge1s r o le  i s  conceived in  the context  of
a genera l  p o l ic y  in  which the party i s  supreme. Thus in  l i a l i
t h e  B u re a u  p o l i t i q u e  n a t i o n a l  i n c l u d e s  i n  i t s  m em bersh ip  t h e
Secretary  of the A d m in is tra t ive  A f f a ir s  who ensures the co-
o o e r a t i o n  b e tw e e n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l , ;  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  an d  • i u d i c i a l  
1
organs. Again in  Guinea j u s t i c e  i s  considered  as any o rd in ­
ary p ub l ic  s e r v ic e  of which the o f f i c e r s  must be from the
m a s s e s .  G u inea  h a s  t h u s ,  f o l l o w i n g  o t h e r  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s ,
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e s t a b l i s h e d  people*s co u rts .
In t h i s  connect ion  a commendable s tep  was taken in  Tan­
zania  fo l lo w in g  the recommendation of  the P r e s id e n t ia l  Com­
m is s io n .  The Commission was conscious  th a t  in  a rap id ly  
developing  n a t io n  in  which many o f f i c i a l s  are a u th o r ised  to  
e x e r c i s e  wide d i s c r e t io n a r y  powers, there  would be abuse of  
power. I t *  th e r e fo r e *  recommended th a t  in  a d d it io n  to  d i s -
1* c f .  I n t e r n a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  USRDA p a r t y *
2 .  Syedou Lladany Sy, * I Ie ch e rch e s  s u r  1* e x e r c i s e  du p o u v o i r  
en  A f r i q u e  n o i r e * ,  ( P a r i s  1 9 6 5 ) ,  p .  1 8 4 .
c ip l in a r y  committees, a _ permanent commission be e s t a b l i s h e d  
w ith  j u r i s d i c t i o n  to  enquire i n t o  a l l e g a t i o n s  of abuse of  
power of both government and party a l i k e .  This commission 
which has been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  r e p o r ts  to  the P res ident  on i t s  
f in d in g s*  The P res id en t*s  problems as guarantor of  j u d ic i a l  
independence as w e l l  as bp^ng Chief  E xecu t ive  may be obviated  
through t h i s  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  which i s  worth im i t a t io n  e lsew here .
2 .  Extra-ordin&ry Powers
So f a r ,  we have d isc u sse d  the powers of the President  
in  normal t im es .  The exper ience  of other cou n tr ie s  has 
proved th a t  normal powers may hot adequately  cope w ith  
matters which need urgent and draconian measures* A fr ica  i s  
no ex c e p t io n  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t j  the c o n s t i t u t io n s  have pro­
v ided fo r  the e x e r c i s e  of p r e s i d e n t i a l  power in  periods of  
emergency* The read in ess  w ith  which r e c o g n i t io n  was g iv e n  -  
and l a t e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  e x p r e s s io n  accorded -  t o  t h i s  f a c t  
i s  borne out by the  r e l a t i v e l y  sm all  amount of debate on the  
su b jec t  in  A fr ican  constitu tion-m aking*
Perhaps the  b e s t  example of a f o r e ig n  exper ience  i n  recent  
years  which was a v a i la b le  in support of "emergency provis ions"  
was that  o f  Prance, during the debate on what i s  now A r t i c l e  
16 o f  the French C o n s t i tu t io n  of 1958. This a r t i c l e  was used  
as a b a s i s  fo r  francophonic A fr ican  constitutions* on the s u b je c t  
The arguments fo r  i t  are in c o n t r o v e r t ib l e ;  denying i t  would
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mean making an opening fo r  the d isr u p t io n  of the normal 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  system.
The use o f  emergency powers during the c o lo n ia l  per iod  
a l s o  adds w eight to  the argument. Thus to  take the case of  
Tanzania as an example, the Republic of Tanganyika (Consequen­
t i a l ,  T r a n s i t io n a l  and Temporary P r o v is io n s )  Act ,  1962 pro­
v id es  th a t  the Emergency Powers Order-in-Council  1939-1961,  
are to  continue in  force  as part of the law of Tanganyika 
(as i t  then was) .  The Pres ident  thus acquired a l l  the powers 
of making emergency r e g u la t io n s  p rev io u s ly  v e s te d  in  the  
Governor-general.
We may consider  two q uest ions  in  r e l a t i o n  to  emergency 
m a tt e r s ; -  ( i )  what c o n s t i t u t e s  emergency and ( i i )  what 
l i m i t a t i o n  can be Imposed on the  e x e r c i s e  of emergency powers,
( i )  The nature of  a s t a t e  of emergency. ^'morgency s i t u a t i o n s ,  
n a t u r a l ly ,  cannot be p red ic ted  w ith  p r e c i s io n ,  e i t h e r  in  
terms of the time or the manner of occurrence. C o n s t i tu t io n a l  
p r o v is io n s  in  t h i s  regard must th er e fo re  be l a c o n ic .  Two 
v a r i e t i e s  of p r o v is io n s  have been adopted in  A fr ica  to  cope 
w ith  emergency s i t u a t i o n s .  The f i r s t  simply s t a t e s  that  the  
Pres ident  may, at any t ime, by Proclamation, published  in  
the O f f i c i a l  G azette ,  dec lare  th a t  a s t a t e  o f  p ub l ic  emer­
gency e x i s t s  or th a t  a s i t u a t i o n  e x i s t s  which may lead  to  a 
s t a t e  o f  p u b l ic  emergency, i f  i t  i s  a l low ed  to  continue.
This i s  the type fo l lo w e d  in  £nglophonic s t a t e s .  The other  
type of p r o v is io n ,  found in  the c o n s t i t u t i o n s  of francophonic
2 9 7 .
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s t a t e s  i s  more s p e c i f i c .  A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n  w h ic h
may he  c i t e d  i s  t h e  one c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  
2
I v o r y  C o a s t .  I t  r e a d s :
nWhen t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c ,  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ,  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of  
i t s  t e r r i t o r y ,  o r  t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  i t s  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  com mitm ents  a r e  t h r e a t e n e d  by a g r a v e  
an d  im m e d ia te  d a n g e r ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  
R e p u b l i c  s h a l l ,  a f t e r  o b l i g a t o r y  c o n s u l t a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  R a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly ,  
t a k e  t h e  e x c e p t i o n a l  m e a s u r e s  r e q u i r e d  by t h e s e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  He s h a l l  i n f o r m  t h e  N a t i o n  o f  
t h e  w hole  m a t t e r  i n  a  m e s s a g e .  The N a t i o n a l  
A ssem bly  s h a l l  m ee t  f o r t h w i t h . ' 1
I t  w i l l  be  s e e n  f ro m  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  t y p e  
o f  p r o v i s i o n  g i v e s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f u l l  pow er  o f  d e c i s i o n  on 
a n  em erg en cy  s i t u a t i o n ;  he d e c i d e s  w h e t h e r  a n d  when i t  
e x i s t s ,  and  he a l o n e  d e c i d e s  t o  t a k e  t h e  m e a s u re s  r e q u i r e d .
I n  t h e  s e c o n d  t y p e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n s  w h ic h  g i v e  r i s e  t o  em erg en cy  
a r e  s p e l l e d  o u t ,  i n  g e n e r a l  t e r m s * .  E ven  i n  t h i s  v a r i e t y ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  g e n e r a l  a n d e x h a u s t i v e  en o u g h  t o  
g i v e  a F r e s i d e n t  a w ide  s c o p e  f o r  d e c i s i o n .  He i s  s o l e  j u d g e  
o f  w h a t  i s  g r a v e  a n d  im m inen t  d a n g e r .  And once t h e  c o n ­
d i t i o n s  o f  em ergency  a s  f o r e s e e n  by t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o ­
v i s i o n  e x i s t ,  t h e  power t o  t a k e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  m e a s u re s  l i e s  
w i t h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
1 .  The U .A .R .  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s i m p ly  p r o v i d e s :  f,The P r e s i d e n t
p r o c l a i m s  t h e  s t a t e  o f  em ergency  i n  t h e  m anner  p r e s c r i b e d  
by  t h e  l a w * ft But i t  ad d s  t h a t  t h e  p r o c l a m a t i o n  m u s t  be  
s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  w i t h i n  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  
t h i r t y  days  f o r  a p p r o v a l ,  a r t .  12 6 .
2 .  A r t .  1 9 .
The t r a n s i t i o n  from normal t o  emergency powers would, of  
course ,  invo lve  q u a n t i ta t iv e  as w e l l  as q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  
in  the power e x e r c is e d  by the P re s id en t .  The work normally  
handled by parliament* would f a l l  on the shoulders of  the  
President^thus adding more work to  h i s  O f f i c e .  I t  would a l s o  
add a l e g i s l a t i v e  q u a l i ty  to what i s  normally ( c h i e f l y )  an 
e x e cu t iv e  fu n c t io n .
We may note ,  in  p a ss in g ,  th a t  in  the case of the Franco- 
phonic s t a t e s ,  the p a r a l l e l  of a r t i c l e  16 of the French 
C o n s t i tu t io n  i s  not apt In a l l  r e s p e c t s ;  i t  must be remem­
bered th a t  in  France the P res ident  of  the Republic i s  
normally required  to  e x e r c i s e  an a r b i t r a l  fu n c t io n ,  and that  
he would take complete charge of the government only by v i r ­
tue of  a r t i c l e  16 .  In A fr ic a ,  on the other hand, the not ion  
of an a r b i t e r -F r e s id e n t  Is  ab sen t ,  as we have seen. ' Presum­
ably t h i s  f a c t  would make the t r a n s i t i o n  to  the e x e r c i s e  of
1
emergency power l e s s  marked in  A fr ic a .  N everth e less  the  
p r o v i s io n  in  emergency, even p o t e n t i a l l y ,  i s  an important 
source of a u th o r i ty  supplementing the normal powers In  
a ssu r in g  the primacy of the P res id en t .
( i i )  L im ita t io n  on emergency power. One kind o f  l i m i t a t i o n  
on emergency powers, i s ,  o f  course ,  the c o n d i t io n s ,  i f  any,  
s e t  by the c o n s t i t u t i o n  fo r  I t s  e x e r c i s e .  This in c lud es  the
1. c f .  J. Lanarque, f,La th e o r ie  de la  n e c e s a i t e  e t  l f a r t i c l e  
16 de la  C o n s t i tu t io n  de 1958" R .D .P . ,  1961 No*3, p. 558.
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  s u c h  a s  when t h e r e  i s  a t h r e a t  t o  t h e  i n d e p e n ­
dence  o r  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  n a t i o n *  The P r e s i d e n t s  i n  A f r i c a  
a r e  g i v e n  c o m p le t e  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  d e c i d i n g  w hat  t y p e  o f  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  r e q u i r e  e x c e p t i o n a l  m e a s u r e s .  T h is  roust be 
q u a l i f i e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  i 'h a n c o p h o n ic  s t a t e s  w here  i n  
m ost  c a s e s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  m ust  be 
c o n s u l t e d  b e f o r e  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  e m e rg e n c y .  
Y e t ^ e v e n  i n  t h a t  c a s e  t h e  c o n s u l t a t i o n  i s  done f o r  o b t a i n i n g  
a d v i c e s  o n l y .
The m essag e  t o  t h e  n a t i o n  and  t h e  a u t o m a t i c  m e e t i n g  o f
p a r l i a m e n t  c o u ld  be  p o t e n t i a l l y  an  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  c o n t r o l
T h e re  a r e  no s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s i o n s  e n a b l i n g  p a r l i a m e n t  t o
c o n t i n u e  t o  h o l d  s p e c i a l  m e e t i n g s  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  e m e r -  
— wvejeitvcgJ
g e n c y , / w h i c h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c a n n o t  c l o s e .  Such  g u a r a n t e e s  
(w h ich  e x i s t  i n  P r a n c e )  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  an  i m p o r t a n t  means 
o f  c o n t r o l ,  a s  t h e y  m ig h t  h a v e  e n a b l e d  p a r l i a m e n t  t o  im p e ac h  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  f o r  any  a b u s e  o f  pow er .  ITor a r e  t h e r e  p r o ­
v i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  e m e rg e n c y .  A p r o ­
v i s i o n ,  s u c h  - s  u n d e r  a r t i c l e  16 o f  t h e  F r e n c h  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
w h ic h  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  m e a s u r e s  t a k e n  s h a l l  be  rli n s p i r e d  by 
t h e  v / i l l  t o  a s s u r e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p u b l i c  b o d i e s  t h e  means o f  
a c c o m p l i s h i n g  t h e i r  m i s s i o n ,  w i t h i n  t h e  s h o r t e s t  p o s s i b l e  
t i m e ” , w o u ld  h a v e  e n a b l e d  p a r l i a m e n t  t o  a v o i d  o r  c u r t a i l  
undue  p r o l o n g a t i o n  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  of e m e r g e n c y .  L a v r o f f  a n d
1 .  I n  Cam eroun t h e  P r e s i d e n t  c o n s u l t s  t h e  P rim e L l i n i s t e r s  o f  
t h e  f e d e r a t e d  s t a t e s  -  a r t .  1 5 .
2 .  I n  k a u r i t a f n i a ,  t h e  m e e t i n g  of  t h e  n a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  i s  
n o t  a u t o m a t i c ;  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  convoke i t .
P e i s e r  i n  commenting on t h i s  s u b je c t  have w r i t t e n :
"Thus, the p r o v i s io n s  o f  a r t i c l e  16 o f  th e  
French C o n s t i t u t io n  have been en larged  in  the  
new C o n s t i t u t io n s  o f  A fr ica n  S t a t e s .  Rendering  
e a s i e r  the a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  e x c e p t io n a l  powers and the  
c o n t r o l s  th a t  co u ld  be e x e r c i s e d  l e s s  sev ere  
the A fr ica n  C o n st i tu t io n -m ak ers  have accep ted  
to  run the r i s k  o f  s e e in g  a P r e s id e n t  o f  the  
Republic l e s s  fav ou ra b le  to  democracy e s t a b l i s h  
a v e r i t a b l e  d i c t a t o r s h i p  by ap p ly in g  the  l e t t e r  
o f  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n . f|l
A P r e s id e n t  bent on d i c t a t o r s h i p  can l e a n  on the  public  a t
la r g e  p o in t in g  to  the f a i l u r e  o f  the  normal fu n c t io n in g
o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  to  j u s t i f y  h i s  con tin ued  use o f  emergency
powers. On the o ther  hand, such an e x c e s s  l i k e  a l l
e x c e s s e s  c o n ta in s  the seed  of i t s  own undoing. When
emergency measures are adopted the government u s u a l ly
sta te 's  th a t  they are adopted “i n  .order to  ensure an
e a r ly  re tu rn  to peace ,  order and good government11 or
words to  th a t  e f f e c t .  This  was how such measures were
taken  in  the  'Western Region o f  N ig e r ia  in  May 1962.
These measures,  or perhaps the g o v e r n m e n ts  approach to
them ( a s ’ an easy way out o f  a problem) c o n tr ib u te d  to
2th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r i s i s  o f  N ig e r ia .
1 .  Les C o n s t i t u t io n s  A f r i c a i n e s .  Tom Premier 1961, p . 25.
2 .  Cf .  0 . 1 .  Odumosu, 'The N ig er ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  H is tory  
and Development',  (1963) p p .276 -30 4 .
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The c e n t r a l  f a c t  o f  A f r i c a n  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n c y  i s  t h e  
p r e p o n d e r a n c e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o v e r  o t h e r  p u b l i c  p o w e r s ,  as  
a l r e a d y  e x p l a i n e d .  T h i s  f a c t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  im p in g e s  upon  th e  
r o l e  o f  t h e  I h n i s t e r s ,  w h e t h e r  c o n s i d e r e d  i n d i v i d u a l l y  or  
c o l l e c t i v e l y .  I n d i v i d u a l l y  t h e y  a r e  a p p o i n t e d  and  d i s m i s s i b l e  
by h im ,  and  t h e y  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  e x e c u t i v e  f u n c t i o n  by d e l e ­
g a t i o n  f ro m  him as  h i s  a s s i s t a n t s .  T^ggp c o l l e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  
as  a c a b i n e t  o r  C o u n c i l  o f  b a n i s t e r s  I s  d i s c h a r g e d  s u b j e c t  
t o  t h e  ( j u f f i d i w t )  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  I s  t h e  p o l i c y - m a k i n g  
d i r e c t i n g  an d  c o n t r o l l i n g  a u t h o r i t y ,  and  t h a t  ho p r e s i d e s  o v e r  
t h e  C a b i n e t .
T h a t  b e i n g  t h e  c a s e ,  why, i t  may be a s k e d ,  s h o u l d  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  m e r i t  a s e p a r a t e  t r e a t m e n t  -  s e p a r a t e ,  
t h a t  I s  t o  say ,  f ro m  t h e  s e c t i o n  on t h e  P r e s i d e n t ?  Or i n d e e d  
why c o n s i d e r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  a t  a l l ?  V/ould n o t  t h e i r  d i m i n i s h e d  
s t a t u s  and  s u b s e r v i e n t  r o l e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
r e n d e r  s u c h  t r e a t m e n t  u n j u s t i f i a b l e ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  o f  q u e s t i o n ­
a b l e  v a l u e ?
The p o i n t  o f  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  I s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  i r r e l e v a n t ,  
b u t ,  i f  c a r r i e d ,  t o o  f a r ,  w o u ld  r e s u l t  i n  an  e l e m e n t a r y  m i s ­
t a k e  a b o u t  th e  n a t u r e  o f  p o l i t i c s :  no  m a t t e r  how c o n c e n t r a t e d
t h e  power of any h e a d  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  s u c h  
power i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  h i s  ,ft e a m !l# I n  any
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g i v e n  s i t u a t i o n  power i s  e x e r c i s e d  w i t h  optimum r e s u l t  when 
the  l e a d e r  has the  good w i l l  and support  o f  h i s  11 team” , 
e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e  b e in g  eq u a l .  This l e s s o n  cou ld  not  have been  
l o s t  on th e  makers of  A fr i c a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n s .  The move from 
a c l a s s i c a l  C abinet  government to  A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  lain 
u n d e r l in e d  th e  need fo r  u n i f i e d ,  s i m p l i f i e d  and e f f e c t i v e  
power a t  th e  t o p .  But w h i l e  t h i s  toned  down th e  im portance  
o f  the C a b in e t  by enhancing t h a t  o f  the  P r e s i d e n t ,  i t  d id  n o t  
a b o l i s h  i t .  I t  m erely  pushed the C abinet  t o  th e  background -  
and, even th e n ,  not  i n  a l l  m a t t e r s .
A l l  the  same, a d e t a i l e d  ex a m in a t io n  o f  th e  m i n i s t e r i a l
sy s tem  i s  n o t  a p p r o p r ia te  in  the c o n te x t  of  t h i s  s t u d y .  For,
ap art  from th e  above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  m i n i s t e r i a l  f u n c t i o n s  i n
A f r i c a  are  v ery  much the same ?.s everywhere e l s e ,  h ea r in g
a l l  t h i s  In  mind, however, v/e may n o te  b r i e f l y  the  p o s i t i o n
o f  th e  m i n i s t e r s  i n  A fr ic a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m s .
1 .  The m i n i s t e r s  i n d i v i d u a l l y  c o n s id e r e d
the
In  th e  b ic e p h a lo u s  systems of/Congo (B) 'and the  U .A .H . ,  
t h e  m i n i s t e r s  c o n s i s t  o f  th e  Prime M i n i s t e r  and o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s .  
I n  b o th  s t a t e s  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  and o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s  are  
a p p o in te d  by th e  P r e s i d e n t .  The P r e s id e n t  a l s o  a p p o i n t s  and 
d i s m i s s e s  m i n i s t e r s  In the o th er  ( u n i t a r y - e x e c u t i v e )  p r e s i ­
d e n c ie s  as we have seen ;  so th a t  t h e r e  Is no ap paren t  
d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  the u n i t a r y  and th e  dua l  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i ­
d e n c ie s  i n  r e s p e c t  of  the  appointment and d i s m i s s a l  o f  m i n i s t e r s
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I n  t h e  Congo (3 )  a n d  t h e  IT.A . 3 .  t h e  P r im e M i n i s t e r  h a s  neb 
pow er  o v e r  m i n i s t e r i a l  a p p o i n t m e n t  o r  d i s m i s s a l ,  u n l i k e  h i s  
c o u n t e r p a r t  i n  a f i g u r e h e a d  . p r e s i d e n c y .  A l th o u g h  he  p l a y s  a n  
I m p o r t a n t  n o m i n a t i n g  r o l e ,  i n  s t r i c t  l a w ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  may 
r e j e c t  any  n o m in e e .  11 o r  i s  t h e r e  any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n  
i n  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m s  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  t o  
s u b m i t  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  a p p r o v a l  a t  t h e i r  a c c e s s i o n  
t o  o f f i c e .
E a c h  m i n i s t e r  h e a d s  a m i n i s t r y  w h ich  i s  a s s i g n e d  t o  h im  
by t h e  P r e s i d e n t #  He e x e r c i s e s  h i s  m i n i s t e r i a l  f u n c t i o n s  
w i t h i n  "the f ram ew o rk  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c i e s  l a i d  down by t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  e i t h e r  p e r s o n a l l y  o r  i n  C a b i n e t .  Y f i th in  t h a t  f r a m e ­
w o rk  t h e  m i n i s t e r  i n  A f r i c a ,  a s  e l s e w h e r e ,  h a s  a wide m a r g i n  
o f  pow er .  He r e t a i n s  h i s  p o s t  a s  l o n g  a s  he  h a s  th e  c o n f i d e n c e  
o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  o r  u n l e s s  he  r e s i g n s  i n d i v i d u a l l y  o r  t o ­
g e t h e r  w i t h  h i s  C a b i n e t  c o l l e a g u e s .  Some c o n s t i t u t i o n s  c o n t a i n  
p u z z l i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  d i s m i s s a l  o f  m i n i s t e r s .  An 
exam ple  o f  t h i s  i s  a r t i c l e  21 o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Gabon 
w h ic h  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  p u t s  an end  t o  t h e i r  ( i . e .
1
t h e  m i n i s t e r s 1 ) f u n c t i o n s  by  d e c r e e ,  flen  c o n s e i l  des  m i n i s t r e s ” , 
t h i s  means t h a t  a m i n i s t e r  t a k e s  p a r t  I n  a d e c i s i o n  a b o u t  h i s  
own d i s m i s s a l .
I n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  w i t h  o t h e r  F u n c t i o n s
M i n i s t e r i a l  p o s t s  a r e  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  m em bersh ip  o f  t h e
1 .  A r t .  21, p a ra g ra p h  3.
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N a t i o n a l  Assembly  i n  a number o f  s t a t e s .  T h i s  i s  e x e m p l i f i e d
by a r t i c l e  25 o f  t h e  I v o r y  C o n s t  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
T h i s  f u n c t i o n a l  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  f o l l o w s  a norm d e r i v e d
from t h e  d o c t r i n e  of  s e p a r a t i o n  of  p o w e rs ,  w h ich  s t i l l  e x e r t s
I t s  I n f l u e n c e ,  th o u g h  n o t  as ^ o r i g i n a l l y  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  l * S s p r i t
des  L o i s .  Some c o n s t i t u t i o n s  have d e p a r t e d  from t h e  norm by
p e r m i t t i n g  members o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  t o  be e l i g i b l e  f o r
1
m i n i s t e r i a l  a p p o i n t m e n t s .  An example  o f  t h i s  i s  Gabon.
O thers  f o l l o w  t h e  W e s tm i n s t e r  n o d e l^ m a k in g  m em b ersh ip  o f  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly a r e q u i r e m e n t  fox'* s u c h  a p p o i n t m e n t  -  
f o r  ex am p le ,  a r t i c l e  4 4 ( 2 )  o f  t h e  Zam bian  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and  
a r t i c l e  4 9 ( 2 )  o f  t h e  N a law i  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  B u t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
c a n  a p p o i n t  a l i m i t e d  number o f  m i n i s t e r s  f ro m  o u t s i d e  p a r l i a ­
m ent  •
The U.A.N. C o n s t i t u t i o n  contains some i n t e r e s t i n g
p r o v i s i o n s  on th e  s u b j e c t .  I t  i s  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  no  member o f
t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly  may a t  t h e  same t i m e  assum e any o t h e r
p u b l i c  o f f i c e  i n  t h e  governm en t  o r  i n  t h e  u n i t s  o f  l o c a l
2
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  B ut  i t  i s  a l s o  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  members o f  t h e
N a t i o n a l  Assembly  may be  a p p o i n t e d  m i n i s t e r i a l  u n d e r -
3
s e c r e t a r i e s  f o r  N a t i o n a l  Assembly  a f f a i r s *  The a p p a r e n t  
c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e s e  two p r o v i s i o n s  can be  r e s o l v e d  i f  we c o n s t r u e
1 .  A r t .  2 1 .
2 .  A r t .  96 .  
o • A r t • 1 4 3 .
3 0 5 .
t h e  p h r a s e  " m i n i s t e r i a l  u n d e r - s e c r e t a r y  f o r  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  
a f f a i r s "  a s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  a  p o s t  w h ic h  f a l l s  o u t s i d e  t h e  c a t e ­
g o r y  o f  " p u b l i c  o f f i c e  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t " .  The t e r m  " p u b l i c
1
o f f i c e "  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .
T h e p o l i c y  b e h i n d  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  a  m i n i s t e r i a l  p o s t  
w i t h  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  m a n d a t e ,  a p a r t  f ro m  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n ­
n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  of p o w e r s ,  c a n  b e  ex ­
p l a i n e d  by  r e f e r e n c e  t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  s t a b i l i t y .
I n  f r a n c e ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t n e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  p a s t  r e p u b l i c s  h a s
shown t h a t  t h e  m a in  c a u s e  o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t
2was t h e  a m b i t i o n  o f  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s  t o  become m i n i s t e r s .
I n  A f r i c a  t h i s  l e s s o n  s u p p l i e d  one  o f  t h e  c o g e n t  r e a s o n s  i n  
s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n  E x e c u t i v e  i n d e p e n d e n t  f ro m  an d  
p r e p o n d e r a n t  o v e r  t h e  L e g i s l a t u r e .  I t  a l s o  g i v e s  t h e  P r e s i ­
d e n t  a  w i d e r  f i e l d  o f  c h o i c e  o f  t a l e n t  a n d  q u s i i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
m i n i s t e r i a l  a p p o i n t m e n t . T h i s  l a t t e r  f a c t o r  seem s t o  h a v e  
i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s  o f  some A n g l o p h o n i c  A f r i c a n
1 .  Such  a n  e x p l i c i t  p r o v i s i o n  p r o h i b i t i n g  t h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  
b u r e a u c r a t i c  ( c i v i l  s e r v i c e )  power w i t h  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  man­
d a t e  a n d  p r i v i l e g e  i s  r a r e .  B u t  i t  r e f l e c t s  a  r ^ a d i c a l  
p o l i c y ,  t h o u g h  n o t  a r t i c u l a t e d  i n  o t h e r  A f r i c a n  c o n s t i t u t ­
i o n s  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h i s  p o l i c y ,  a p a r t  f ro m  f a c t o r s  o f  e f f i ­
c i e n c y ,  t h r o u g h  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r ,  i s  a  s u s p i c i o n  o f  t h e  
" m a n d a r i n s "  who a r e  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  o p p o n e n t s  o f  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p ro g ra m m e s .
2 .  c f .  LI. L u v e r g e r ,  o p . c i t .  p .  1 0 5 .
S t a t e s *  w here  t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  r e q u i r i n g  m i n i s t e r s  t o  come 
f ro m  p a r l i a m e n t  i s  m o d i f i e d  hy p r o v i s i o n s  em powering  t h e
P r e s i d e n t  t o  a p p o i n t  a l i m i t e d  number o f  m i n i s t e r s  f ro m  o u t -
1
s i d e  p a r l i a m e n t *
O th e r  p r o h i b i t i o n s  a l s o  e x i s t  w h ic h  a r e  d e s i g n e d  t o
g u a r d  a g a i n s t  p o s s i b l e  a b u s e s *  I n  most  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s
o f  t h e  F r a n c o p h o n i c  s t a t e s  m i n i s t e r s  a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  p r e c l u d e d
from  m em b ersh ip  o f  t h e  c a d r e s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e ;  an d  i n
no  s t a t e  may a m i n i s t e r  be  e n g a g e d  i n  any  p r i v a t e  p r o f e s s i o n a l ,
c o m m e rc ia l  o r  i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e ,  t h o u g h  t h i s  I s  l e f t
o u t s i d e  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  A n g lo p h o n ic  s t a t e s .  T h i s  i s  a
s u b j e c t  on w h ich  e x p r e s s  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  c a n
be  v e r y  u s e f u l ,  i n  a s  much as  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  and  t h e  code
o f  c o n d u c t  t h a t  i t  d e c r e e s  a r e  p resum ed  t o  be more known by
2
more p e o p l e  t h a n  o r g a n i c  law s  i s s u i n g  f ro m  i t .
A g a in ,  i n  m ost  o f  t h e  a n c o p h o n ic  s t a t e s  m i n i s t e r s  a r e  
p r o h i b i t e d  f rom  e x e r c i s i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t r a d e s  u n i o n s  o r  c o - o p e r a t i v e s .  T h i s  
p r o h i b i t i o n  i s  a im ed  a t  a v o i d i n g  p r e s s u r e  f ro m  b e i n g  b r o u g h t
! •  c f . ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  a r t .  50 o f  t h e  N a la w i  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2 .  Not t h a t  t h i s  i s  i n  I t s e l f  a g u a r a n t e e  a g a i n s t  c o r r u p t  
p r a c t i c e s ;  b u t  i t  w o u ld  be a h i g h e r  f ra m e  o f  r e f e r e n c e  
a s  a n  e d u c a t i o n a l  code  p r e s c r i b i n g  m i n i s t e r i a l  b e h a v i o u r  
o r  a c t i v i t y .  Such  a p r o v i s i o n  w ou ld  make i t  i m p o s s i b l e  
f o r  m i n i s t e r s  t o  h o l d  p o s t s  an d  a t  t h e  same t i m e  u s e  i t  
i n  f u r t h e r a n c e  o f  p r i v a t e  g a i n s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h r o u g h  
l i c e n s i n g  p ow ers  w h ich  some f o r m e r  N i g e r i a n  and  C-fhanian 
m i n i s t e r s  a r e  a l l e g e d  t o  h a v e  u s e d .
t o  b e a r  on t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  by econom ic  g r o u p s .  I t  i s  t h e  
c o u n t e r w e i g h t  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  l a s t  p a r a ­
g rap h *
2* The Governm ent
The m i n i s t e r s  c o n s i d e r e d  c o l l e c t i v e l y  a n d  g r o u p e d  r o u n d  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a r e  known as t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h o u g h  t h i s  t e r m  
i s  a l s o  u s e d  i n  g e n e r a l  t e r m s  t o  d e s c r i b e  a  much w id e r  o r g a n ­
i s a t i o n  r u n  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  and  h i s  m i n i s t e r s *  The g o v e r n ­
ment p r e s i d e d  o v e r ,  d i r e c t e d  and  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
i s  t h e  suprem e e x e c u t i v e  and  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o rg a n  o f  t h e  
s t a t e *
I n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  A n g lo p h o n ic  s t a t e s  t h e r e  i s  a 
body  known a s  t h e  C a b i n e t  v ;h ich  fo rm s  t h e  c o r e  o f  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment* I t  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  an d  t h e  m i n i s t e r s ,  and  I s  
p r e s i d e d  o v e r  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  M em bersh ip  o f  t h e  C a b i n e t  d.oe3 
n o t  i n  e v e r y  c a s e  I n c l u d e  a l l  m i n i s t e r s ,  a u t o m a t i c a l l y .  I n  
M a law i ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  C a b i n e t  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
a n d  n s u c h  m i n i s t e r s  a s  may f rom  t im e  t o  t im e  be a p p o i n t e d  a s
1
members o f  t h e  C a b i n e t  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t ” * The c o m p o s i t i o n
o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ^ i s  w i d e r ;  i t  i n c l u d e s
m i n i s t e r s  an d  j u n i o r  m i n i s t e r s  ( o r  d e p u t y  m i n i s t e r s ,  a s  t h e y
2
a r e  c a l l e d  i n  some s t a t e s ,  e .g *  t h e  U .A .P i* ) .  The o f f i c e  o f
1 .  A r t*  5 3 ( 1 ) .
2 .  The number o f  m i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  i s  r a r e l y  f i x e d .  
I t  i s  f i x e d  a t  f o u r t e e n  i n  Z am b ia ,  •
308
m i n i s t e r s  an d  j u n i o r  m i n i s t e r s  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by p a r l i a m e n t #
I n  f h a n c o p h o n i c  s t a t e s  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  t h e  C a b i n e t  i s
1
t h e  C o n s e i l  de3 m i n i s t r e s  ( C o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r s ) ,  w h ic h  c o n ­
s i s t s  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t /  an d  h i s  m i n i s t e r s .  The P r e s i d e n t  
p r e s i d e s  o v e r  t h e  C o u n c i l .  I n  some o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  t h e  
C o u n c i l  of m i n i s t e r s  i s  a t  t i m e s  u s e d  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y  w i t h  
f,t h e  g o v e rn m e n t"  • A l s o ,  e x c e p t i o n a l l y ^  no m e n t io n  i s  made o f  
a C o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r s  i n  the" c o n s t i t u t i o n j  ( e . g .  Caineroun 
a n d  M a u r i t a n i a ) .
I t  s h o u l d  be n o t e d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  no  d i f f e r e n c e  e x i s t s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n c i e s  o f  t h e  Congo (F>) 
an d  t h e  U.A.I1. f ro m  t h e  o t h e r s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  C a b i n e t  an d  i t s  c h a i r m a n s h i p ,  t h e  r e l e v a n t ,  a r t i c l e  of 
t h e  TJ.A.u. C o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  h as  t h e
prlu'ht t o  c a l l  a m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  h in i s t e ~ n s  ami t o
J 2
a t t e n d ^ a n d  t o  p r e s i d e  a t  t h e  m e e t i n g s  w h ic h  he a t t e n d s .  The 
P r im e  L l i n i s t e r  p r e s i d e s  a t  m e e t i n g s  n o t  a t t e n d e d  by t h e  P r e s i  
d e n t .  T h i s  a r r a n g e m e n t  g i v e s  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a f r e e  h a n d ,  aa 
t h e  n ee d  a r i s e s  t o  a s s e r t  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  d i r e c t l y ,  an d  a l s o  
t o  p r e s e r v e  a d e t a c h e d  p o s t u r e .  T h i s  i s  one a d v a n t a g e  t o  be 
d e r i v e d  f ro m  a d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n c y ,  w here  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  
P r e s i d e n t  can t h r o w  a s r n o k e - s c r e e n  around, h i m s e l f  and  th u s
1 .  I n  G u in e a  i t  i s  c a l l e d  C a b i n e t .
P .  A r t .  115 .
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m a i n t a i n  c o n t i n u i t y  of t h e  s t a t e ,  w h i l e  g o v e r n m e n t s  may cone 
and  go *
The F u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  C a b i n e t
The e x e r c i s e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  c r e a t e s  an  
e s p r i t  de c o r p s ,  w h ic h  t e n d s  t o  make a c o l l e c t i v e  .o rg a n  a 
l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n t  f ro m  b e i n g  f tu s t  t h e  mere  sura t o t a l  of
i t s  members* T h i s  i s  tru e  o f  a c a b i n e t  an d  i t  i s  t r u e  e v e n  
i n  cases w here  t h e  c a b i n e t  i s  n o t  f o r m a l l y  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  one
o f  t h e  h i g h e s t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,  s u b o r d i n a t e  a s  i t  i s
t o  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t *
I n  A n g lo p h o n ic  A f r i c a  t h e  u s u a l  f o r m u l a ' a d o p t e d  i n  th o  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  C a b i n e t  i s  t h a t  i t  s h a l l  be  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
a d v i s i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t  o t h e  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  
G overnm ent and  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  su c h  o t h e r  m a t t e r s  as  may he * x o
2
r e f e r r e d  t o  i t  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
I n  f h a n c o p h o n i c  s t a t e s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  C a b i n e t  
I s  g i v e n  a r o l e  w h ich  i s  more t h a n  a d v i s o r y ,  a n d  i n  many 
s t a t e s  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  make i t  an  o b l i g a t i o n  
f o r  t h e  C a b i n e t  t o  d e c i d e  c u e s t i o n s  o f  p o l i c y .  Among t h e  
u s u a l  q u e s t i o n s  w h ic h  t h e  C a b i n e t  m u s t  d e l i b e r a t e  upon  a r e ; -
1* I n  t h e  TT.A.M* t h e r e  h av e  b e e n  t h r e e  g o v e rn m e n t  c h a n g e s .
7 / i t h  e a c h  change t h e  new Prim e M i n i s t e r  h a s  tended ,  t o  
r e p r e s e n t  d i f f e r i n g  v ie w s  f ro m  t h e  o u t g o i n g  Pr im e M i n i s t e r ^  
on t h e  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n s  o f  p o l i c y  c a u s i n g  t h e  change  -  
a  s o r t  o f  t r i a l  and  e r r o r  p r o c e s s  seems t o  be i n v o l v e d .
See C h a p t e r  S i x .
2* c f .  a r t .  5 1 (1 )  Cons# of  Z am bia ,  and  a r t .  5 2 (2 )  Cons* o f  
M a la w i •
-  m a t t e r s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  of  t h e  s t a t e *
-  d r a f t  l a w s  t o  be s e n t  t o  p a r l i a m e n t *
-  o r d i n a n c e s  ; and  e x e c u t i v e  d e c r e e s .
1
-  a p p o i n t m e n t s  t o  t h e  h i g h e r  p o s t s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .
I n  some s t a t e s  t h e  f o r m u l a  v a r i e s  w i t h  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t h e  same
r e s u l t ;  f o r  exam ple  I n  M a d a g a s c a r  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  r e a d s : -  n I n
t h e  c o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r s ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  d e t e r -
2
m ines  t h e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c ,  e t c . ”
Among t h e  i m p o r t a n t  f u n c t i o n s  of t h e  Cab I n e t  must a l s o  be 
m e n t io n e d  t h a t  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  of  g o v e r n m e n t  w o rk .  The d e v i c e  
o f  C a b i n e t  and  i n t e r - m i n i s t e r i a l  c o m m i t t e e s  h e l p  i n  t h i s  t a s k .  
T h e re  i s  a l s o  a C a b i n e t  S e c r e t a r i a t  w i t h  a S e c r e t a r y  a p p o i n t e d  
by an d  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .  The w o rk in g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
o f  C a b i n e t  C o m m it tee s  w i t h  t h e  C a b i n e t  an d  t h e  v a r i o u s  m i n i ­
s t r i e s  i s  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  w r i t t e n  r e g u l a t i o n s ;  i t  o n e r a t e s  on
3
a n i  n f o rm a 1 b a s i s *
It- i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  C a b i n e t  i n  A f r i c a  makes d e c i s i o n s
on m a jo r  p o l i c i e s ,  an d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a n  e s p r i t  de c o rp s  p r e s e n t
i n  a s  much a s  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  who make u p  t h e  C a b i n e t  b e l o n g  t o
t h e  same p a r t y ,  and  hav e  t h e  same o b j e c t i v e s .  The p o l i c i e s
on
w h ic h  t h e y  d e c id e i  a r e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  them  a s  a g r o u p ;  f ro m  t h e  
s u c c e s s  o r  f a i l u r e  o f  s u c h  p o l i c i e s  t h e y  r e a p  a h a r v e s t  o f  
p r a i s e  o r  b lam e -  a s  a b o d y .
1 .  c f .  f o r  e x a m p le ,  C o n s .  I v o r y  C o a s t ,  a r t *22; T chad ,  a r t . 1 0 .
2 .  A r t .  1 2 .
3* This  has  been g a t h e r e d  from i n t e r v i e w s  o f  o f f i c i a l s  o f  
v a r i o u s  aovernments  o f  A f r i c a .
The d i f f e r e n c e s  f ro m  t h e  W e s t m i n s t e r  t y p e  o f  C a b i n e t
e m erg e^ ,  h o w e v e r ,  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  o v e r - r i d i n g  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e
P r e s i d e n t /  i n  A f r i c a ,  The d i f f e r e n c e  w ou ld  be p a r t i c u l a r l y
e v i d e n t  where  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  p l a y s  a  c o n c i l i a t o r y  r o l e  -  w here
t h e r e  i s ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  an  i n t e r - m i n i s t e r i a l  d i s p u t e .  I n  s u c h
a s i t u a t i o n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t . h a s  t h e  l a s t  w ord ,  n o t  t h e  C a b i n e t ,
w h ich  i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e ,
1
f o r  example#
As a c o n s e q u e n c e  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n  b e tw e e n  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  i n  A f r i c a  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  an  
a m b i v a l e n t  one# On t h e  one h a n d ,  i n  h i s  c a p a c i t y  a s  C h a i rm an  
o f  t h e  C a b i n e t ,  he  m ust  a r b i t r a t e ,  u r g i n g  t h i s ,  t h a t  Smd t h e  
o t h e r  p r i o r i t y ,  b u t  s t e e r i n g  t a c t f u l l y ,  i /h e re  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
b u d g e t a r y  a l l o c a t i o n  t o  v a r i o u s  m i n i s t r i e s  a r e  i n v o l v e d ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t h e r e  w ou ld  be  a s c r a m b le  and t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  
F i n a n c e  nay  n ee d  b a c k i n g  o r  p r o d d i n g  by t h e  P r e s i d e n t  a s  t h e  
p r i o r i t i e s  o f  t h e  c l a i m s  d e t e r m i n e .  I n  t h i s  a r b i t r a l  f u n c t i o n  
t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  n o t  d i f f e r e n t  f ro m  t h a t  o f  t h e  
P r im e  I l i n i s t e r  u n d e r  t h e  W e s t m i n s t e r  t y p e  o f  governm en t#  On 
t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  P r e s i d e n t  i n  A f r i c a  i s  no mere 
a r b i t r a t o r ,  I s  n o t  o n l y  a "m anag ing  d i r e c t o r " ,  b u t  a l s o
t h e  " c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s " ,  t o  u s e  t h e  l a n g u a g e  
o f  co m m erc ia l  l a w .  The m i n i s t e r s  w ou ld  be s u b t l y  r e m in d e d  
t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  em bod ies  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  n a t i o n a l  p u r p o s e ,
1 .  c f .  J e n n i n g s : The B r i t i s h  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  4 t h  ed# pp#143-4#
See a l s o  C h a p t e r  F o u r  su p ra#
i n  t h e  name o f  w h ic h  t h e y  a l l  w o rk .  I t  i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
them  t o  r e a d  " o r d e r "  i n  h i s  " o p i n i o n s " .  I t  m ust  be rem em bered  
t h a t  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
Clovernrnent R e s p o n s i b i l i t y
I n  t h e  W e s t m i n s t e r  t y p e  o f  C a b i n e t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  C a b i n e t  
I s  s a i d  t o  be  c o l l e c t i v e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  w ho le  p o l i c y  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t .  T h i s  means t h a t  i f  a m i n i s t e r 1 s d e c i s i o n  i s  
a c c e p t e d  by t h e  C a b i n e t ,  a n d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  q u e s t i o n e d  i n  
p a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e  C a b i n e t  w ou ld  t r e a t  t h e  m a t t e r  a s  one o f  
c o n f i d e n c e  i n  i t s e l f .  P a r l i a m e n t  p r o v i d e s  t h e  medium f o r  t h e  
d i s c h a r g e  o f  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I t  a c t s  a s  a fo ru m  f o r  deep  
p r o b i n g s  a n d  q u e s t i o n s  on t h e  i s s u e s  i n v o l v e d ;  t h e  r e s t  i s  
l e f t  t o  t h e  p r e s s ,  r a d i o  an d  t e l e v i s i o n  r e p o r t e r s  an d  com­
m e n t a t o r s .  E v e r y t h i n g  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  p u b l i c  
o p i n i o n ,  and  t h e  p u b l i c  a c t s  a s  ju d g e  e v e r y  f o u r  o r  f i v e  
y e a r s  a t  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .
A l l  t h i s  a s su m es  s e v e r a l  t h i n g s .  C o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l ­
i t y  i s  i n s e p a r a b l e  f rom  C a b i n e t  g o v e rn m en t  w h ic h  goes  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m .  A . p a r l i a m e n t a r y  s y s t e m  i n  t h e  
c l a s s i c  s e n s e  a s su m e s  a t w o - p a r t y  o r  m u l t i - p a r t y  f o r m a t i o n  
i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n .  I n  m os t  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  
n one  o f  t h e s e  t h i n g s  a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  fo rm  t h a t  t h e y  e x i s t ,  
s a y ,  i n  B r i t a i n .  Where t h e  i d e a  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  h a s  b e e n  
i n t r o d u c e d  i t  h a s  b e e n  m o d i f i e d  i n  v a r i o u s  w a y s ,  f o r  v a r i o u s  
r e a s o n s .
I n  tome A n g lo p h o n ic  s t a t e s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  P a r l i a m e n t  i s  r e c o g n i s e d *
I n  t h e  f r a n c o p h o n i c  s t a t e s  two v a r i e t i e s  o f  a r r a n g e m e n t s  
e x i s t *  I n  one ty p e  m i n i s t e r s  a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
an d  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  p a r l i a m e n t *  7/e may c i t e  
two e x a m p le s :  M ali  and M a d a g a s c a r . I n  M a l i  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  s t r i c t  c o n d i t i o n s ;  t h e  P r e s i ­
d e n t  may be p u t  u n d e r  a m o t i o n  o f  c e n s u r e  i n  two s i t u a t i o n s  
o n l y ,  ( a )  where he p le d g e s  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  h i s  g o v e r n ­
m en t  o v e r  a g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  d e c l a r a t i o n ,  a n d  (b )  w h ere  n o t  l e s s  
t h a n  a q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  members of  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  s i g n  a
m o t i o n  o f  c e n s u r e .  I n  any e v e n t ,  t h e  m o t i o n  o f  censure ,  m u s t
2
be “c o n s t r u c t i v e *  The v o te  o f  c e n s u r e  i s  t a k e n  by  a n  a b s o l u t e
m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  memebers o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assem bly*  I f  a
m o t i o n  o f  c e n s u r e  i s  p a s s e d  t w i c d  o v e r  a p e r i o d  o f  t w e n t y -
f o u r  c o n s e c u t i v e  m on ths ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem b ly  i s  d i s s o l v e d ,
3
a n d  w i t h  I t  t h e  government*
A n o th e r  t y p e  f o l l o w e d  i n  Tchad  c o n t a i n s  p e c u l i a r  t r a i t s ;  
t h e r e  i s  no p r e s i d e n t i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  b u t  h i s  g o v e rn m e n t  
i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly* The P r e s i d e n t  h i m s e l f
1* e*g* c f .  a r t *  53(3)  C ons ,  o f  M alaw i .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  
i n  Zambia no su ch  p r o v i s i o n  e x i s t s .
2* I t  m ust  s t a t e  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  of  a g o v e rn m e n t  programme*
3 .  A r t *  37* For  a somewhat more i n v o l v e d  p r o c e d u r e  I n  Mada­
g a s c a r ,  s e e  p p . s u p r a .
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may, a f t e r  a d e l i b e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  M i n i s t e r s ,  p o s e
t h e  q u e s t i o n  of c o n f id e n c e  i n  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l
A s s e m b ly .  A ls o  th e  N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  n a y  p a s s  a m o t i o n  o f
c e n s u r e .  I f  a v o t e  o f  no c o n f i d e n c e  o r  a n o t i o n  o f  c e n s u r e
1
i s  p a s s e d  by th e  r e q u i r e d  m a j o r i t y ,  t h e n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  can do
one o f  two t h i n g s :  he nay e i t h e r  d i s s o l v e  t h e  A ssem b ly  o r
2
d i s m i s s  t h e  members o f  th e  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h i s  p l a c e s  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  i n  an  a r b i t r a l  p o s i t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  C a b i n e t  a n d  
p a r l i a m e n t .  As h i s  t e rm  o f  o f f i c e  i s  f i x e d ,  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  
p a r l i a m e n t  would n o t  a f f e c t  h im ; on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  he  can  
d i s m i s s  h i s  governm ent  and fo rm  a n o t h e r ’ one* E i t h e r  way he 
h o l d s  t h e  ! trump card.1 •
CONCLUSION
The d e s c r i p t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r o v i s i o n s  on  th e  e x e c u t i v e  o f  A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m s  
a t t e m p t e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  h a s  shown t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  
h a v e  e n s h r i n e d  a new p r i n c i p l e :  t h e  d o m in a n c e  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e
o v e r  t h e  o t h e r  I n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  s t a t e *  The d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  
t h i s  c h a p t e r  have c e n t r e d  r o u n d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  a s  t h e  b a s i c  
f o r m a l  s o u r c e s  of  pow er .  The d e t a i l e d  n a t u r e  o f  t h e s e  p r o ­
1 .  T w o - t h i r d  m a j o r i t y  f o r  p r o j e t s d e  l o i d j  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  
f o r  q u e s t i o n s  o f  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y .
2 .  A r t .  4 5 .
v is io n s  as w e l l  ?g the wide scope of the study made i t  
im perative to  exclude laws other than the c o n s t i t u t io n s ,  a l ­
though a few re fere n c es  to  other laws have been made, wherever 
i t  was found necessary*
Prom the c o n s t i tu t io n s  them selves i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  both  
parliam ent and the ju d ic ia r y  are in  a subordinate p o s i t io n .  
Every co n ce iv a b le  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  mechanism was d ev ised  to  
assure the dominance o f  the e x e c u t iv e .  But c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
p ro v is io n s  alone are not s u f f i c i e n t  to  guarantee t h i s .  Indeed, 
the s tru c tu r e  o f  the e x e cu tiv e  and i t s  fu n c t io n  cannot be 
properly  understood i f  i t  i s  only looked a t in  i t s  formal 
( s t a t i c )  a sp ect  as g iven  in  the c o n s t i t u t io n .  The dynamics 
of the e x e r c is e  o f  i t s  power can be b e t t e r  ap p recia ted  by 
re feren ce  to  other m atters . Part Three o f  th i s  study i s  de­
s igned  to  f u l f i l  t h i s  o b j e c t iv e .  The dominant ex e cu tiv e  has 
been d ic ta te d  by the need of the t im es . -*-t has advantages as 
w e l l  as dangers, and I t  w i l l  need a g rea t  d ea l of care, i n ­
t e g r i t y ,  im agination  and c r e a t iv i t y  to  d ev ise  the n ecessary  
means o f  c o n tr o l ,  w hile  p reserv in g  the dynamism im p l ic i t  in  
I t  at a time o f t r a n s i t io n  and development*
A strong p r e s id e n t ia l  ex e c u t iv e  system tends to  favour  
(and in  gen era l i s  based on) a s in g le  party and the dominance 
of a s in g le  person over others and t h i s  in  turn c r ea te s  a 
tendency fo r  l o y a l t i e s  to  s in g le  f ig u r e s  ra th er  than the party  
s tr u c tu r e .  This accen tu a tes  the problem o f  su c c e ss io n  and
may thus d istu rb  whatever i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s tru c tu re  may have been  
b u i l t  up, by the time the su c c e s s io n  c r i s i s  occurs. Some of  
the c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p ro v is io n s  on th i s  q u e s t io n  provide an answer, 
b u t, there ag a in , they are not in  them selves s u f f i c i e n t  to  avert  
or r e s o lv e  a c r i s i s  ftf t h i s  so r t  i f  i t  comes. As we s h a l l  see  
in  Chapter S ix ,  some s t a t e s  ( e .g .  H a li)  pay due a t t e n t io n  to  
the b u ild in g  o f  a party s tru c tu r e  in  which c o l l e c t i v e  le a d e r ­
sh ip  i s  emphasised. This i s  one s o lu t io n ,  but the gen era l  
trend  so fa r  has been more p e r s o n a l i s a t io n  o f  power which, as 
we have seen , i3  g iven  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  le g it im a c y  in  the strong  
ex e c u t iv e  p r e s id e n t ia l  system . C o n s t i tu t io n s  can, of course , 
b^ changed to  s u i t  changing circum stances as the need a r i s e s .
But once e s ta b l i s h e d  they tend to  acquire an aura o f perman­




THE DYNAMICS OP EXECUTIVE POWER
In  th e  p reced in g  chapter we saw th a t  i n  the  
m ajo r ity  o f  A fr ica n  s t a t e s  the supremacy o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  
i s  an e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t .  The f o l lo w in g  
two ch a p ters  attem pt to  answer th e  q u e s t io n  what t h i s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t  i s  based  on, and how th e  e x e c u t iv e  
se c u r e s  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and a d m in is tr a t iv e  b a s i s  fo r  
th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  i t s  power, fo r  ca r r y in g  out i t s  p o l i c i e s  
and m ain ta in in g  i t s  predominance. The form al l e g a l  
sta tem en t o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e la t io n s h ip s  c r y s t a l l i s e d  
i n  any w r it t e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a sta tem en t o f  a b s tr a c t  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  a c t io n ,  o f  r i g h t s  and d u t ie s .  I t  cannot  
be exp ected  o f  men to  l i v e  up to  i t  f u l l y .  In  th e
dynamics o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i f e  p r a c t ic e  o f t e n  d ep arts  
from th eo r y . T his i s  probably  more tr u e  o f  th e  
A fr ic a n  s i t u a t i o n  -  and o f  a l l  d ev e lo p in g  n a t io n s  -  
where the frequency and l a t i t u d e  o f  departure o f  a c tu a l  
p r a c t ic e  from c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v is io n s  must be g r e a te r  
in  view o f  th e  g r e a t  gap e x i s t i n g  between modern i n s t i ­
t u t io n s  and the r e a l i t y  o f  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  
on which th ey  have been superim posed.
T r a d it io n a l  system s such a s  th e  A fr ic a n
m onarchies r e ly  on t r a d i t i o n a l  (and above a l l  r e l i g i o u s )
i n s t i t u t i o n s  as a b a s i s  o f  su p p ort. Yet th ey  a l s o
now make use o f  modern d e v ic e s  fo r  the same purpose .
1 .  o f .  th e  use o f  th e  referendum and a p a la c e  p arty  by 
King Hassan I I  o f  Morocco.
I t  i s  much more n ece ssa r y  fo r  modern l e a d e r s ,  who 
have th e  w eight o f  t r a d i t i o n  and i n e r t i a  a g a in s t  them, 
t o  d e v ise  e f f e c t i v e  means o f  rea ch in g  down th e  r o o t  o f  
t h e i r  s o c i e t i e s ,  and r e l a t i n g  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  mechanism 
w ith  th e  a d m in is tr a t iv e  mechanism o f  ca r r y in g  out 
d e c i s i o n s .  The p o l i t i c a l  party  f u l f i l s  th e  f i r s t  
o b j e c t i v e ,  w h ile  the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  i s  th e  p r in c ip a l  
a d m in is tr a t iv e  instrum ent e x e cu tin g  th e  d e c i s io n s  o f  
th e  governm ent.
The Party
The party  i s  g e n e r a l ly  r e c o g n ise d  as th e  
most im portant p o l i t i c a l  in stru m en t. A fr ic a ,  however, 
i s  not th e  b ir t h  p la c e  o f  modern p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  but 
ra th e r  owes much to  Europe where p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
were developed  and r e f in e d .  As M.Duverger has w r it te n :
nth e  development o f  p a r t i e s  has exploded o ld  
ty p e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  in s p ir e d  
by A r i s t o t l e  and M o n te sq u ieu .. . . . I n  f a c t  
th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  one p a rtism , b i -p a r t is m  
and m u lt i -p a r t ism  ten d s  to  become th e  fun­
damental c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  contemporary  
r e g im e s ."1
The im portance o f  and th e  need fo r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
i s  th e r e fo r e  not l im i t e d  to  A fr ic a .  But A fr ic a  has
1 .  M. Duverger: Les P a r t i s  P o l i t i q u e s ,  p . 431*
produced a typ e o f  one-party  government which may he 
d e scr ib ed  as p e c u l ia r  to  th a t  c o n t in e n t .  T his  
p e c u l ia r i t y  i s  very much r e la t e d  to  A fr ica n  E x ecu tiv e  
p r e s id e n c ie s .^  I t  i s  in  t h i s  co n tex t  o f  the o n e-p a rty  
s t a t e  th a t  th e  dynamics o f  e x e c u t iv e  power can be 
p rop er ly  understood . Hence th e  two ch ap ters  th a t  
f o l lo w .  Here we w i l l  g iv e  a summary o f  th e  rea so n s  
which are u s u a l ly  advanced as j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  the  
advent and need o f  the on e-p arty  s t a t e .
F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  seen  as a p r e r e q u is i t e  fo r  
n a t io n a l  in t e g r a t io n .  S econ d ly , i t  i s  regarded as  
an e s s e n t i a l  agency in  th e  p rocess  o f  m o d ern isa tion  
i n  which A fr ica n  c o u n tr ie s  are in v o lv e d . T h ir d ly ,  i t  
can a c t  as a v i t a l  l in k  and l i n e  o f  communication  
between modern governments and the m asses . F ou rth ly  
i t  i s  seen  as an e s s e n t i a l  t r a in in g  ground fo r  a  modern 
p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e  which would be engaged in  m od ern isa tion  
but which must a t  the same time be c o n s ta n t ly  i n  touch  
w ith  th e  m asses and rep resen t t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  A l l  
th e s e  v i t a l  t a s k s ,  i t  i s  argued, cannot be performed in  
A fr ic a  in  a b i -p a r ty  or m u lt i -p a r ty  s i t u a t i o n .  In  
ch a p ter  s i x  we w i l l  examine t h i s  m atter a long w ith  an 
account o f  th e  o r g a n isa t io n  o f  some (r e p r e s e n ta t iv e )
1 .  o f .  J .  Buchmann, o p . c i t ,  p p .234 e t  seq . e sp .  pp. 3 3 9 -4 2 .
p a r t ie s *  in  A fr ic a ^  and th e ir  r e la t io n  to  th e  e x e c u t iv e
The c i v i l  s e r v ic e
As fa r  the p lace  and r o le  o f  th e  c i v i l  s e r v ic e  
i n  a on e-p arty  s t a t e ,  some q u est io n s  a r i s e  on the  
e x e c u t i v e - c i v i l  s e r v ic e  r e la t io n s h ip s  and p a r t y - c i v i l  
s e r v ic e  r e la t io n s h i p s ,  many o f  which are p e c u l ia r  to  
th e  on e-p arty  s t a t e .  In  chapter sevenwe w i l l  d is c u s s  
t h e s e  r e la t io n s h ip s  and some o f  the problems th a t  may 
a r i s e  from them.
Chapter S ix  
The E x ecu tiv e  In  R e la t io n  to  th e  
P o l i t i c a l  Party
1 .  The Emergence o f  on e-p arty  systems
The phenomenon o f  the one-party s t a t e  has  
become an alm ost u n iv e r s a l  one in  A fr ic a .  Even in  s t a t e s  
where more than one party  are allow ed to  e x i s t  l e g a l l y ,  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t s  o f  a dominant party p r a c t i c a l l y  
e c l i p s e  th e  o th e r s ,  i f  any, or render t h e i r  emergence 
im p o s s ib le .  Por example, in  the Ivory C oast, the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  gu aran tees  freedom of o r g a n isa t io n  and 
e x p r e s s io n  to  a l l  p a r t i e s  and groups th a t  r e sp e c t  
dem ocratic p r in c ip le s  and th e  p r in c ip le s  on which th e  
Communaute^and the I v o i r i e n  repu b lic  are based .^  But 
th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  dominant party  apart (or ra th er  owing 
to  th e s e  f a c t s )  th e  p en a l law of the Ivory Coast l e a v e s  
l i t t l e  room f o r  l e g i t im a t e  c r i t i c i s m  and hence e f f e c ­
t i v e l y  d isco u ra g es  any form of p o l i t i c a l  co m p e t it io n  or
2o f  p u b lic  d eb ate .
1 .  A rt . 7 .
2 .cf A r i s t id e s  Z olberg -  ’One-party Government in  th e  Ivory  
C oast, (P r in c e to n  U .P . 1964), p p .261-3; Cf. a l s o  
Law p p .59 -118 , Journal O f f i c i e l ,  S ep t. 1 ,  1959, A r t s .  
1 , 2 and 7 c i t e d  t h e r e in .
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S im i la r ly  i n  Guinea, a r t .  40 o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n
gu a ra n tees  freedom o f a s s o c i a t i o n  and in  s t r i c t  law
p a r t i e s  can he c r e a te d .  But a s  P r e s id e n t  Sekifcl Toure
has s a id  th ey  must be formed Hw ith  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e
1
n a t io n  in  v i e w .1* What i s  th e  n atu re  o f  th e  on e-p arty
s ta te d  What are i t s  r o o t s  and what are i t s  fu n c t io n s?
S ev er a l  s t u d ie s  have been made r e c e n t ly
which attem pt to  a n a ly se  and e x p la in  th e  o r ig in s  and
2c h a r a c te r  o f  on e-p arty  governm ents. Some o f  th e s e  
s t u d ie s  a n a ly se  th e  s o c i a l  background, o r g a n is a t io n  
and fu n c t io n  o f  th e  p a r t i e s .  O thers a n a ly se  the  
c a u ses  o f  on e-p a rty  system s and d i s c u s s  some o f  th e  
im p l ic a t io n s  in  more d e t a i l .^ - Some la y  more emphasis
5
on t h e i r  r o l e  as  in stru m en ts  o f  n a t io n a l  u n ity .
1 .  C . f .  Seydou, Madani Sy. ’ Recherches sur L* e x e r c i s e  du 
pouvoir p o l i t iq u e  en A fr iqu e N o ir e * (P a r is  1965) P .1 4 4 .
2 .  C f. e . g .  (1 ) Ruth Scha^bhter, 'S in g le -p a r t y  system s
i n  West A frica*  -  55 American P o l i t i c a l  S c ien ce  Review 
(June 1961) p p .297-307; (2) M arinin K ils o n ,  •A uthori­
ta r ia n ism  and s in g le - p a r t y  t e n d e n c ie s  in  A fr ica n  
p o l i t i c s ’ . 15 World P o l i t i c s  (Jan . 1963) p p .262-294;
(3) Immanuel W a l le r s te in ,  *A fr ic a :  the p o l i t i c s  o f
Independence* (New York Random House, 1961) p p .85-  
102, 163-167• (4 ) Prank G. Snyder. O ne-party govern­
ment in  M ali (Yale U .P . 1 9 6 5 ) .  (5 ) John A. B a l la r d ,
•The E v o lu t io n  o f  S in g le - p a r ty  system s in  French  
E q u a to r ia l  A fr ic a * , -  I n s t i t u t e  o f  A fr ica n  S tu d ie s ,
U n iv e r s i ty  o f  I f e ,  Ibadan Branch, Ibadan -  Seminar 
paper 1 9 6 3 /6 4 /8 .
3 .  E .g .  Ruth Schachter o p . c i t .  On A fr ic a n  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
i n  g e n e r a l  c f . Thomas Hodgkin, ’A fr ica n  P o l i t i c a l  
P a r t ie s*  (London, Penguin  I 9 6 0 ) .
4 .  E .g .  M. K i ls o n ,  o p . c i t .
5 .  E .g .  I .  W a l le r s te in ,  o p . c i t .  T his author l a t e r  s h i f t s  
h i s  a t t e n t i o n  more to  some o f  th e  problems o f  th e  on e-  
p arty  s y s t e m : c . f .a n  unpublished  paper e n t i t l e d  ' P o l i t i c a l
P a r t ie s  i a  P o st- in d ep en d en ce  A fr ic a :  recru itm en t and participatena-v'-h i  r* i r>n t  t n n  .
Prom such s t u d ie s  and from a c l o s e  o b se r v a t io n  
o f  th e  contemporary p o l i t i c a l  scene in  A fr ic a  i t  
can  be s a id  th a t  th e  emergence o f  th e  on e-p arty  s t a t e  
was in e v i ta b le *  Moreover th e  phenomenon i s  l in k e d  
w ith  th e  emergence o f  th e  s tro n g  ex e cu tiv e*  The 
l e a d e r s  who founded or h e lp ed  to  found th e  p a r t i e s  in v a ­
r ia b ly  emerged as  th e  f i g u r e s  round whom o th er  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  
r e v o lv e d .  With th e  a c c e s s io n  to  independence th e  party  
lea d e r ^  became th e  c h i e f  e x e c u t iv e  and the more prominent 
among h i s  p arty  b reth ren  became h i s  m in i s t e r s .  The c h i e f  
e x e c u t iv e  rem ains the le a d e r  o f  the p a r ty , in  most s t a t e s .  
Thus came about th e  party-governm ent dichotomy which  
c h a r a c t e r i s e s  th e  dynamics o f  e x e c u t iv e  power in A fr ic a  
to d a y . The i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  advent o f  the one 
p a r ty  s t a t e  can be borne out by th e  fa c t^  th a t  in  some 
s t a t e s  th e  O p p o sit io n  le a d e r s  v o lu n te e r e d  or were per­
suaded to  jo in  th e  government p arty  and d i s s o lv e  t h e i r  
own p a r ty . Thus in  Kenya Mr. Roland N gala, th e  le a d e r  
o f  KADU (Kenya A fr ica n  Dem ocratic Union) c r o s se d  th e  
f l o o r  o f  th e  Kenya House o f  Assembly w ith  most o f  h i s  
f o l l o w e r s ,  and; having d i s s o lv e d  KADU, became a m in is te r  
i n  th e  KANU government o f  Mr. Jomo K en yatta . Y e t ,  on
th e  eve o f  Kenya* s independence th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between  
th e  two p a r t i e s  were s a id  to  be unbridgeable^ b e in g  roo ted )
e i t h e r  through a d m in is tr a t iv e  or p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvres
a s  in  Kenya, or l e g a l l y  by p a ss in g  an Act to  th a t  e f f e c t ,
a s  happened i n  Tanzania. In  th e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  no
o p p o s i t io n  p arty  can l e g a l l y  e x i s t ,  whereas in  th e  former
i t  can, as i t  does in  Kenya, where Mr. Oginga Odinga,
one o f  th e  c h i e f  le a d e r s  o f  KANU, r e s ig n e d  from the
government and party  o f  KAMJy'to form another p a r ty .
In  many s t a t e s  th e  e x i s t e n c e ,  or th e  l e g a l  p r o v is io n s
p e r m it t in g  th e  e x is t e n c e  o f  ’’o p p o s i t io n ’1 p a r t i e s  sim ply
masks th e  r e a l i t y  o f  what i s  in  e f f e c t  a o n e-p arty
s i t u a t i o n ,  a s  y i  has been p o in te d  out a lrea d y  in  r e sp e c t
o f  the Ivory  C oa st. The same i s  tru e  o f  many e x -
2Prancophonic s t a t e s .
E .g .  The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t a l k s 3 h e ld  i n  London i n  the
Autumn o f  1963, on th e  eve o f  independence were marked 
by such d ivergen ces^  o f  v ie w s ,  and the c o n s t i t u t i o n  
worked out a t th a t  co n feren ce  c o n ta in s  some o f  the  
most e la b o r a te ly  cumbersome p r o v is io n s  on ’ reg io n a l*  
and ’m inority* r i g h t s .  The KANU government su b stan ­
t i a l l y  m o d if ied  th e se  a f t e r  independence . P r e s id e n t  
K enyatta  e x p r e ss in g  s a t i s f a c t i o n  on t h i s  m atter  has sa id :  
"Our g r e a t e s t  triumph as a p arty  and as a-na^tjon came 
w ith  th e  v o lu n ta ry  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  KADU. fffoeaar&j: KAXTU 
parliam entary  group c . f .  East A fr ic a n  Standard 1 2 .3 .6 6 .
2 .  E .g .  Congo ( B r a z a v i l l e ) , Gabon and Chad, c . f .  J .A . B a l la r d ,  
o p . c i t .  p . 2 .
1a s  i t  was c la im ed , on t r i b a l  d i f f e r e n c e s .
O p p o sit io n  p a r t i e s  have been d is s o lv e d
2. The Raison d ’etre of the one-party system
The appearance o f  o n e-p arty  system s i n  A fr ic a  
has been v a r io u s ly  r e c e iv e d  in  v a r io u s  q u a r te r s .  The 
7/estern  p r essy 'a n d  some academic w r i t e r s  g e n e r a l ly  con­
demned i t  as a u th o r i ta r ia n .  Some b o d ie s  which have an 
i n t e r e s t  i n  A fr ic a  have r e c e iv e d  i t  w ith  ca u tio n a ry  
remarks. Thus the A fr ic a  Bureau wrote in  1963, as  
f o l l o w s : -
"The form ation  o f  one p arty  s t a t e s  in  A fr ic a  has 
been a c o n t r o v e r s ia l  s u b j e c t .  The dominance 
by one p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y ) which nas been to  the  
fo r e  in  th e  campaign fo r  independence, over weak 
o p p o s i t io n  groups based  on r e g io n a l  c o n s id e r a ­
t io n s  or formed a f t e r  independence was to  be 
ie x p e c te d . The q u e s t io n  now r a i s e d  i s  whether  
Ithe form al c r e a t io n  o f  a on e-p a rty  s t a t e  i s  in  
I c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  e s ta b lish m en t o f  a f r e e  s o c i e t y .  
|0ne p arty  s t a t e s  e x i s t  in  many c o u n tr ie s  form ing  
the O rg a n isa tio n  o f  A fr ica n  and Malgasy s t a t e s ,  
and in  Ghana, Tanganyika and s e l f - g o v e r n in g  
N yasaland. C ircum stances d i f f e r  in  each o f  
th e s e  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  and no g e n e r a l i s a t io n s  are  
p o s s i b l e .  But th e  E xecu tiv e  (o f  th e  A fr ic a  
Bureau) v iew s w ith  a n x ie ty  th e  tendency in  
c e r t a in  c o u n tr ie s  to  put le a d e r  and party  above 
law and to  regard  a l l  c r i t i c i s m  as tr e a c h e r y .
The government o f  a d ev e lo p in g  t e r r i t o r y  must 
c l e a r ly  g iv e  p r i o r i t y  to  economic developm ent, 
and tim e cannot be spared fo r  p r o tr a c te d  debate  
about th e  m e r its  o f  one scheme over a n o th e r 's  
but accep tan ce  o f  any scheme or p o l ic y  by th e  
p eop le  a f f e c t e d  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  i t s  s u c c e s s .  
Concentratior^of e n e r g ie s  through one s in g le  
p arty  may b rin g  good r e s u l t s  in  c e r t a in  
c ircu m sta n ces  but th e  uest o f  freedom w i l l  
come when new p a r t i e s  b eg in  to  canvass  
a l t e r n a t iv e  methods and a ch iev e  a reason ab le  
measure o f  support from th e p e o p l e .1'1
1 .  Annual Report o f  th e  A fr ic a  Bureau, (London), A p r il  
1962 -  March 1963* p p .5 - 6 .
These words, i n  e f f e c t ,  summarised th e  v iew s
o f  s e v e r a l  w r i t e r s  who c o n s id e r e d  th em se lv es  as  f r ie n d s
o f  A fr ic a ,  and who were p u zz led  by th e  on e-p arty  system .
Some o b serv ers  who have w r i t t e n  about A fr ic a  condemned
i t  out o f hand, w h ile  o th e r s  defended i t .  The debate
betw een  P r o fe s s o r  Arthur Lewis and Mr. C o lin  Legum
1e x e m p li f ie s  th e s e  r e s p e c t iv e  p o s i t i o n s .
Perhaps the most e loq u en t ca se  which has
been  made fo r  the o n e-p a rty  s t a t e  from amongst A fr ica n
2l e a d e r s  i s  one by P r e s id e n t  Nyerere o f  Tanzania.
Dr. Nyerere argued the c a s e  fo r  th e  on e-p arty  s t a t e  
i n  Tanganyika (aw i t  th en  was) c h i e f l y  l o g i c a l ,  
r a t io n a l  grounds, and not m erely  on th e  b a s i s  o f  need  
i n  developm ental c o n t e x t .  His arguments l e d  him to  
th e  c o n c lu s io n  th a t  the o n e-p a rty  system  can be more 
dem ocratic than  tw o-p arty  or m u lt i -p a r ty  sy s tem s. He 
b e g in s  by q u e s t io n in g  th e  v a lu e  or th e  democratiQheitstre 
o f  b i -p a r ty  or m u lt i -p a r ty  system s a s  p r a c t is e d  in  
W estern c o u n t r ie s .  9n a n a t io n a l  e x e c u t iv e  o f  a p a r ty > 
he e x p la in s ,  i t  i s  common p r a c t ic e  f o r  the members
1 .  c . f .  Encounter, Aug. 1965, p*3 'and Dec. 1965 p . 51 
'Beyond A fr ica n  D ic t a to r s h ip '  c f .  a l s o  Arthur Lewis 
' P o l i t i c s  in  West A fr ic a  (London 1965) p p .1 7 -6 3 .
2 .  c . f .  J u l iu s  K. Nyerere 'Democracy and the P arty  
System* -  D ar-es-Salaam , 1962.
f r e e l y  to  d is c u s s  and c r i t i c i s e  th e  p o l ic y  o f  th e  p a r ty •
But t h i s  freedom i s  den ied  them once th ey  en ter  
P a r lia m en t.  There a p arty  l i n e  must be fo l lo w e d  -  a 
l i n e  which i s  approved by th e  p a r t y ' s  l e a d e r s .  The 
rea so n  i s  th a t  a t  th e  e x e c u t iv e  m eetin g  o f  th e  p a r ty -  
bflfaiad p o l ic y  i s  b e in g  l a i d  down which not on ly  perm its  
but r e q u ir e s  f r e e  d i s c u s s io n s .  There i s  no p arty  l i n e  
to  fo l lo w  a t  th a t  l e v e l ,  because  no such l i n e  has been  
agreed  upon, as  y e t ,  whereas a t  th e  p arliam en tary  
l e v e l  th ere  i s  a l i n e  to  be fo l lo w e d .  T h e o r e t ic a l ly
a l l  th a t  i s  l e f t  open to  d i s c u s s io n  in  P arliam ent i s
d e t a i l  on how, when and in  what order o f  p r i o r i t y  the  
p o l i c i e s  s h a l l  be put in t o  e f f e c t .
“Given th e  two p a r ty -s y s te m  some l i m i t a t i o n
o f  freedom i s  e s s e n t i a l  -  both  a t e l e c t i o n  time 
and in  debate -  i n  order to  en fo rce  p arty  d i s ­
c i p l i n e  and u n i ty .  And we have seen  th a t  
th e se  r e s t r i c t i o n s  are not n ece ssa r y  where you  
have on ly  one p a r ty .  I t  seems a t  l e a s t  open
to  doubt, t h e r e f o r e ,  th a t  a system  which fo r c e s
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  to  l i m i t  th e  freedom o f  t h e i r  
members i s  a dem ocratic system , and th a t  one 
which can perm it a party  to  le a v e  i t s  members
t h e i r  freedom i s  undemocratic (a n d )  t h a t ,
where th er e  i s  one p arty j and th a t  p arty  i s  
i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  th e  n a t io n  as a w h ole , the  
fo u n d a t io n s  o f  democracy are  f irm er  than th ey  
can ever be where you have two or more p a r t i e s ,  
each r e p r e s e n t in g  on ly  a s e c t i o n  o f  th e  
community.
1 .  C . f .  N yerere , o p . c i t .  p p .4-5*
Nyerere fu r th e r  argues th a t  a tw o-party  
system  can he j u s t i f i e d  on ly  when th e  p a r t i e s  are  
d iv id e d  over some fundam ental i s s u e ;  and th a t  i f  i t  
i s  based o th erw ise  i t  can on ly  le a d  to  f a c t io n a l i s m ,  
antagonism  and w a ste .^
To c r i t i c s  o f  th e  on e-p arty  system  he adds:
"Our c r i t i c s . . . .  s h o u ld  remember th e
h i s t o r i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between p a r t i e s  in  
A fr ic a  and th o se  in  Europe or America, i'he 
Europeanjand American p a r t i e s  came in to  b e in g  
as th e  r e s u l t  o f  e x i s t i n g  s o c i a l  and economic 
d iv i s io n s  -  th e  second party  b e in g  formed to  
c h a l le n g e  th e  monopoly o f  p o l i t i c a l  power by 
some a r i s t o c r a t i c  or c a p i t a l i s t  group. Our 
own p a r t i e s  had a very  d i f f e r e n t  o r i g i n .  They 
were not formed to  c h a l le n g e  any r u l in g  
group o f  our own p eo p le ;  th ey  were formed to  
c h a l le n g e  th e  f o r e ig n e r s  who ru led  over us.
They were n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p o l i t i c a l  • p a r t i e s ’
|  -  i . e .  f a c t i o n s  -  but n a t i o n a l i s t  movements.
\ And from the o u ts e t  th ey  r e p r esen ted  th e  2
i n t e r e s t s  and a s p ir a t io n s  of th e  whole n a t i o n . 1*
Nyerere*s id e a s  on A fr ica n  s o c ia l i s m  ( o f  a 
c l a s s l e s s  A fr ica n  s o c i e t y )  p rov id e a t h e o r e t i c a l  back­
ground fo r  h i s  p r a c t i c a l  c o n c lu s io n s  about th ro n e-p a rty  
s t a t e .  But t h i s ,  a s  we have seen  in  chapter  one^was not 
on the b a s i s  o f  a M arxist argum ent.J I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
t o  note  th a t  some n o n -M a rx is ts ,  in  the Ivory C oast, fo r
1 .  i b i d .
2 .  i b i d .
3 . For a t h e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the on e-p a rty  
system s a lon g  M arxist l i n e s  c . f .  Madeira K e ita  ’IheLt  
PaitL Unique, en A fr iqu e N o ir e ’ . P resen ce  A fr ic a in e ,  
XXX (Feb.-M arch I9 6 0 )  p p .3 -2 7 .
in s ta n c e  j u s t i f y  th e  on e-p arty  system  on th e  b a s i s  of-foe. 
M arxist n o t io n  o f  a correspondence between p arty  and 
c l a s s .  The argument was th a t  s in c e  th e r e  was a s  y e t  
no c l a s s  d i s t i n c t i o n  in  A fr ic a ,  th er e  cou ld  be on ly  
one movement fo r  th e  e n t i r e  co u n try . T his i s  sometimes 
put in  r e v e r s e :  s in c e  p a r t i e s  r e f l e c t e d  c l a s s  d i v i s i o n s ,
th e  appearance o f  an o p p o s i t io n  p arty  must be prevented  
i n  order to  av o id  the development o f  a c l a s s  struggle.'*' 
I t  must oe s t a t e d  here th a t  on e-p arty  govern­
ment i s  not p e c u l ia r  to  A fr ic a .  Communist c o u n tr ie s  
p r a c t i s e  on e-p arty  government in  th e  name o f  th e  working  
c l a s s .  Nor i s  t h i s  a n o v e l  phenomenon. As an eminent 
American academ ician  has w r it te n :
"The overwhelming m a jo r ity  o f  a l l  the o rg a n i­
s a t io n s  o f  man throughout h i s t o r y  have been  
r u le d  by on e-p arty  governm ents. Most o f  the  
tim e in  most p a r ts  o f  th e  world a l l  
o r g a n is a t io n s  have been under o n e -p a r ty -  
r u l e .  In c e r t a in  p a r ts  o f  th e  world a t  
c e r t a in  t im es in  h i s t o r y  th er e  have been a 
few tw o-p arty  (or m u lt i -p a r ty )  o r g a n is a t io n s ;  
but on e-p arty  r u le  i s  th e  standard and w e l l -  
n ig h  u n iv e r s a l  c a s e . '^
1 .  C . f .  A. Z olberg , o p . c i t .  p . 264 and a ls o  fo o tn o te  4 8 , 
o f  p . 264.
2 .  C f. Clark Kerr, ’Unions and Union Leaders o f  t h e i r  
own choosing* -  Centre fo r  th e  study o f  Democratic  
I n s t i t u t i o n s ,  Santa Barbara, C a l i f o r n ia ,  p . 12 .
But h i s t o r i c a l  p a r a l l e l s  or r a t io n a l  arguments 
are not alw ays advanced in  support o f  on e-p arty  govern­
ments i n  A fr ic a .  ' Even in  some c a s e s  where t h i s  i s  done, 
i t  may be ra th e r  in  th e  n atu re  o f  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  
s t e p s  a lrea d y  taken  under th e  p ressu re  o f  immediate 
problem s. The le a d e r s  who had l e d  independence move­
ments were fa c e d  w ith  growing d is i l lu s io n m e n t  on the  
p art o f  s e c t io n s  o f  t h e i r  p o p u la t io n s .  The removal o f  
th e  fo r m er . enemy, th e  c o l o n i a l  power, l e f t  them fa c in g  
a d iv e r s i ty |o f  problem s, some o f  them c r e a te d  by th e  
c o l o n i a l  e x p e r ie n c e .  There was a tendency to  r e - a s s e r t  
s e c t i o n a l  or r e g io n a l  i n t e r e s t s  which made p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  th e  h o t-b ed  o f  e t h n o - c e n t r i f u g a l  f o r c e s .  The 
O p p osit ion  p a r t i e s  in  Ghana, fo r  in s t a n c e ,  were based  
m ain ly  on r e g io n a l  grounds, though t h i s  was by no 
means l im i t e d  to  Ghana. P r e s id e n t  K enyatta  on th e  o th er  
hand fa c in g  an O p p osit ion  which grew as a s p l i n t e r  from 
h i s  KANU p arty  on grounds o f  d i f f e r i n g  p o l i c i e s  has  
had t h i s  to  say:
" . . . .P e r h a p s  th e  g r a v e s t  danger fo r  us and f o r  
a l l  o th er  d eve lop in g  c o u n tr ie s  i s  the tendency  
fo r  some peop le  to  e x p l o i t  th e  known problems  
o f  our p eop le  fo r  p e r so n a l  p o l i t i c a l  r e a so n s .
We sometimes hear o f  p eop le  who go about t e l l i n g  
the g e n e r a l  p u b lic  th a t  government had done 
very  l i t t l e  to  improve th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  th e  
m a s s e s . . . . . th e y  w ish  to  e x p lo i t  th e  f a c t  th a t  
we cannot a ch iev e  e v e r y th in g  o v e r n ig h t .  They 
p la y  upon th e  em otions o f  our p eop le  a lth ou g h  1
th ey  know th a t  th ey  have no a l t e r n a t iv e s  to  o f f e r ."
1 .  Jomo K e n y a t t a ,  o p . c i t .
As the "independence le a d ers"  found th a t  t h e i r  n a tu ra l  
a u th o r ity  became ta r n is h e d  w ith  th e  passage o f  tim e  
and in  th e  fa c e  o f  th e  c h a l le n g e  o f  the p ost- in d ep en d en ce  
r e a l i t y ,  th ey  were d riven  to  ta k in g  d r a s t ic  measures  
to  r e g a in  t h e i r  former p o p u la r ity  and to  m a in ta in  t h e i r  
a u th o r i t y .  Some became d e fe n s iv e  and Ipiijper-sensitive  
to  c r i t i c i s m .  Some o f  th e  measures th ey  took  tended  
to  c r e a te  t e n s io n  and h o s t i l i t y  and i n  some c a s e s  some 
l e a d e r s  o f  supp ressed  o p p o s i t io n  p a r t i e s  r e p l i e d  by 
d esp era te  a ttem p ts  on nhe l i f e  o f  th e  c h i e f  executive.^"
T h is  in  turn  h e ig h ten ed  th e  t e n s io n  and sen se  o f  in s e c u r i t y  
o f  the government l e a d e r s .  I t  a l s o  confirm ed the argu­
ments fo r  th e  need o f  o n e-p arty  governm ent.
C o lo n ia lism  produced th e  framework o f  a 
c e n t r a l  government, and in  r e a c t io n  to  i t s e l f ,  i t  a ls o  
( l a t e r )  produced a n a t i o n a l i s t  movement. But, as Mr. 
C o lin  Legum has observed , " i t  f a i l e d  to  in t e g r a t e  the
t r i b a l ,  r e g io n a l  and s e c t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  in to  a coh eren t
2n a t io n a l  u n it  w ith  an o v e r r id in g  s i n g l e  l o y a l t y ."
1 .  E .g .  the a s s a s s i n a t io n  a ttem p ts  on Nkrumah in  1962.
2 .  C . f .  C o l in  Legum ’ I s  A fr ic a  f a l l i n g  a p a r t ’ , The 
O bserver, 2 7 .2 .6 6 .
A fr ica n  governments o f a l l  newly independent  
c o u n tr ie s  have thus been fa ced  w ith  the double ta s k  o f  
( i )  e s t a b l i s h in g  t h e i r  own a u th o r ity ,  and ( i i )  a c h ie v in g  
a r a te  o f  economic growth commensurate w ith  th e  expec­
t a t i o n s  which they  th em se lves  helped  to  c r e a t e .  T his  
was o f t e n  accompanied by the emergence o f  a s s e r t i v e  
p ressu re  groups which le d  to  s tr u g g le  fo r  power and to  
d iv e r s io n  o f energy and w aste . Where. Governments 
fa c e d  such s i t u a t i o n s  at tim es when t h e i r  own p o s i t i o n s  
might be p r e c a r io u s ,  the id e a  of the on e-p arty  s t a t e  
had an i r r e s i s t i b l e  a t t r a c t io n ,  and a l l  the arguments 
i n  i t s  favour acqu ired  g r e a te r  s ig n i f i c a n c e  as a g a in s t  
any con trary  arguments.
3 .  The C haracter and Role o f  the p arty; and i t s  
R e la t io n  to  the e x e c u t iv e
The heading o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  may be m is le a d in g  
i n  th a t  i t  might appear to  subordinate the e x e c u t iv e  
to  th e  p a r ty .  In  a c tu a l  f a c t ,  th e  h is t o r y  and o rg a n i­
s a t io n  o f th e  p arty  in  most A fr ica n  c o u n tr ie s  i s  such  
th a t  i t  i s  th e  e x e c u t iv e  which dominates the p a r ty ,  and 
n ot v i c e  v e r s a .
B efore  independence, th e  popular p a r t i e s  
were orga n ised  fo r  th e  purpose o f  m o b i l is in g  the m asses  
i n  order to  remove c o l o n i a l  r u le  and a t t a i n  independence.  
With th e  a tta inm ent o f  p o l i t i c a l  independence th e  fo c u s  
s h i f t e d  to  th e  c o n s o l id a t io n  o f  power, o f  n a t io n a l  u n ity  
and economic developm ent. For t h i s  purpose th e  e x e c u t iv e  
co n ce n tra ted  in  i t s  hands th e  e s se n c e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  m otive  
f o r c e ,  and t h i s  in  turn  c h i e f l y  determ ined the natu re  
o f  the p arty  as o f  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  The 
p a r ty  le a d e r s  and s ta lw a r t s  who were o r i g i n a l l y  a lm ost  
always a combat group s t r u g g l in g  f o r  independence^  became 
th e  le a d e r s  o f  government in  th e  new independent s t a t e s .  
They now had to  govern and, fo r  t h i s  purpose, had taken  
over the s t a t e  apparatus o f  g o v ern in g . As regard s th e  
p arty  t h i s  co u ld  mean e i t h e r  th a t  i t  would oe l e f t  in  
tjar  ^ lim bo, or a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  th a t  i t  would be o rg a n ised  fo r  
a new purpose . The l a t t e r  cou rse  was fo l lo w e d , o f  
n e c e s s i t y .
The i d e a l  r o le  o f  the p arty  in  such a 
s i t u a t i o n  would be , on th e  one hand, to  a r t i c u l a t e  th e  
aims o f  th e  government to  th e  p eop le  and, on the o th er  
hand, to  remind th e  government o f  th e  needs o f  th e  p eop le  
and to  th a t  end to  p a r t i c ip a t e  in  th e  p rep a ra tio n  and 
a p p r a is a l  o f  p o l i c y .  These ta s k s  are o f  prime
im portance. The f i r s t  i s  im portant, g iv e n  th e  f r a g i l e  
n atu re o f  the new S t a t e .  The p arty  i s  in d isp e n sa b le  
i n  the ta sk  o f  n a t io n a l  i n t e g r a t io n  and m od ern isa tion .
T his i s  so because o f  th e  d r iv in g  fo r c e  ox the p a r ty ’ s 
c e n t r a l  a u th o r ity  as a d ir e c t in g  and c o -o r d in a t in g  organ  
a^d the l o c a l  ’ a n im a tio n 1 which i t s  branches co u ld  produce.
The second ta sk  i s  a l s o  n e c e s sa r y ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  
i n  view o f  th e  weakness o f  p arliam en tary  and other  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  organs o f  c o n t r o l .  The s tr u c tu r e  and 
o r g a n is a t io n  o f  the p arty  in  most newly independent  
s t a t e s  r e f l e c t s  th e s e  c o n s id e r a t io n s .  The r o le  o f  the  
p arty  and i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  government i s  a su b je c t  
on which th e r e  are p a t te r n s  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  in  most o f  th e  
s t a t e s .  The d i s c u s s io n  th a t  f o l lo w s  w i l l ,  th e r e fo r e ,  he 
l im i t e d  to  a few s e l e c t e d  but r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  c a s e s .
The exam ination  o f  th e  p arty  s tr u c tu r e  and 
th e  o r g a n is a t io n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  u n d er ly in g  the party  
s tr u c tu r e  w i l l ,  i t  i s  hoped, em phasise th e  r o le  o f  the  
p a rty  and i t s  impact on th e  government. The p arty  has  
r e p la c e d  p arliam en t as th e  r e a l  fo c u s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y ,  i n  th e  sen se  th a t  i t  i s  in  th e  p arty  th a t  a ttem p ts  
are made to  secu re  a co n sen su s  o f  o p in io n . The le a d e r s  
keep in  touch  w ith  th e  g r a s s  r o o t s  through the p arty  
o r g a n is a t io n ,  p r a c t i c a l l y  every day o f  the y ea r ,  
whether parliam ent i s  in  s e s s i o n  or n o t .  M essages pass
up and down th e  o r g a n is a t io n a l  network con veyin g  o rd ers ,
id e a s  and o p in io n s  o f  th e  government to  th e  p o p u la t io n
and r e a c t io n s  o f  th e  cou n try  to  th e  government m easures.
T h is  mechanism does not r e q u ir e  th e  l i t e r a c y  o f  the
members, fo r  communication can be c a r r ie d  out in  v a r io u s
ouher ways in  v a r io u s  v er n a c u la r s  by th e  p arty  b r a n c h e s ^
The p arty  co n g ress  i t s e l f  i s  an event o f  g r e a t  ceremony.
Apart from i t s  fu n c t io n  a s  a p o licy -m ak in g  body, i t  has
a r i t u a l  fu n c t io n ,  r i t u a l  in  th e  la r g e r  sen se  o f  the
word -  as  in  any g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  or p arty  co n v en tio n  in
2Am erica, fo r  example.
We w i l l  s t a r t  examining some p a r t i e s  in  
Francophonic s t a t e s  and l a t e r  move on to  o th e r s .
A. Francophonic S ta te s
In some s t u d ie s  a ttem p ts have been made to  
c l a s s i f y  A fr ic a n  o n e-p a rty  system s on th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  
n atu re o f  t h e i r  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e  governm ent.
1 .  An in te r v ie w  w ith  some Guinea o f f i c i a l s  has r e v e a le d  
to  me th a t  P r e s id e n t  Sekou Toure used tiie p arty  
o r g a n is a t io n  to  secu re  th e  con sen t o f  th e  p arty  when 
he d ec id ed  to  i n v i t e  Kwame Kkrumah to  share th e  
headship  o f  the Guinea s t a t e .
2 .  C . f .  V.W. Turner’ s d e f i n i t i o n  o f r i t u a l  a s  a mechanism 
which p e r i o d i c a l ly  c o n v e r ts  th e  o b l ig a to r y  in t o  th e  
d e s ir a b le :  in  ’C losed  Systems and Open Minds1 , p .3 2 .
3 .  C . f .  Seydon Madani Sy, o p . c i t .  p p .1 6 7 -202 .
Three ty p e s  o f  r e la t io n s h i p s  are d isc e r n e d  accord in g  to  
such study: (1) th e  pre-dom inance o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e
over th e  p a r ty , as e x e m p lif ie d  th e  Ivory  C oast;
(2 )  the c o -o r d in a te  ( c o l la b o r a t iv e )  r e la t io n s h ip  between  
th e  e x e c u t iv e  and th e  p a r ty a s  found in  Guinea and (3) 
th e  su b o rd in a tio n  o f  the e x e c u t iv e  to  th e  p a r ty ,  as  
found i n  M a li .  I t  i s  m ain ta in ed  th a t  in  s p i t e  o f  
th e  i d e n t i t y  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  o r g a n is a t io n  o f  the  
p a r t i e s  in  th e  th re e  s t a t e s  o th er  d i f f e r e n c e s  are none­
t h e l e s s  e v id e n t .  The s tr u c tu r e  o f  th e  p arty  in  a l l  
th r e e  s t a t e s  i s  h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  o rg a n ised , but ( i t  i s
m ain ta in ed ) th e  in t e r n a l  fu n c t io n in g  o f  th e  P a r t i
/  U Democratique de/C ote d ' I v o ir e  (PDCI) i s  r e l a t i v e l y  more
f l e x i b l e  than in  Guinea and M a li .  The reason  g iv e n
f o r  t h i s  i s  h i s t o r i c a l ,  i . e .  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  PDCI
s t i l l  r e t a in s  c l o s e  l i n k s  w ith  the Hassemblement 
/
Democratique A fr ic a in  (HDA). The reason  g iv e n  fo r
th e  predominance o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  over th e  p arty  i s  the
p e r so n a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  P r e s id e n t  HouphoUet-Boigny•
A lthough every p arty  a n d zgovernment le a d e r  in  A fr ic a  has
a p erso n a l h i s t o r y  and s p e c i a l  p o s i t i o n  in  th e  S ta te
1 .  Sy, o p . c i t .  p .14b; c . f .  a l s o  g e n e r a l ly  Thomas 
Hodgkin o p . c i t .
because o f  such h isto ry ^  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  p r e s id e n t  
Houphonet Boigny i s  p a r t i c u la r ly  enhanced.
P e r s o n a l i t i e s  can a f f e c t  th e  ch a ra c te r  and 
fu n c t io n  o f  p a r t i e s .  As founder o f  th e  PDCI, HouphoHet 
Boigny has been a dominant f i g u r e ,  as were Sekou Toure 
and Modibo K e ita  in  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  p a r t i e s .  But 
u n lik e  th e se  two Houphohet Boigny d id  not have to  contend  
w ith  th e  Preneh c o l o n i a l  (or  ra th e r  n e o - c o lo n ia l )  power
<f^ e*vb fh
and th e ir ^ y e a r s  im m ediately  b efo re  independence and
i
a fte rw a r d s . H is dependence on th e  p arty  was th e r e fo r e  
l e s s  marked, w ith  th e  consequent d im in ish ed  r o le  and 
s t a t u s  o f  th e  party  in  p o l i c y  fo r m u la t io n  and c o n t r o l .
The PDCI does not govern or l e g i s l a t e ,  but r a th e r  p la y s  
a minor a d v iso r y  r o le  in  th e  h igh er  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  th e  
s t a t e ,  a c t in g  as a medium o f  communication between  
government and p e o p le .
The p arty  in  th e  Ivory Coast i s  co m p le te ly  
su b ord in ate  to  the e x e c u t iv e ;  in  G uinea^ executive  
predominance i s  q u a l i f i e d  Tfciegk th e  u n ity  o f  p arty  and 
government a t  th e  l e v e l  o f  c h i e f  e x e c u t iv e  and i s  tem­
pered  by o th er  f a c t o r s .  But th e  predominance o f  th e  
e x e c u t iv e  i s  th e r e .  In  M ali n ot on ly  i s  th e r e  u n ity  o f  
p a rty  and government a t  th e  h ig h e s t  and a t  th e  lo w e s t
1 .  H is p o l ic y  was in  harmony w ith  th a t  o f  Prance .
l e v e l s ,  but the s tru c tu r e  and r o le  o f  the p arty  i s  such  
th a t  i t  may be sa id  to  c o n tr o l  the e x e c u t iv e .  In  r e a l i t y  
a c o -o r d in a te  r e la t io n s h ip  i s  perhaps nearer to  th e  
t r u th  than ex e c u t iv e  su b ord in ation  to  the p a r ty .
( i )  S tru ctu re
The s tru ctu re  o f  the th ree  p a r t i e s  ( th e  PDCI
o f  the Ivory Coast; the PPG o f  Guinea and th e  USRPA
o f  M ali) owes much to  the f a c t  th a t  th ey  were based  on
th e  o r g a n isa t io n  o f the Preneh Communist p a r ty , u n lik e  th e
^ /
Union p r o g r e s s i s t s  S en eg a la ise  (UPS) which was in f lu e n c e d
1by French s o c i a l i s t  p a r t i e s .  In  a l l  th ree  p a r t i e s  the
*
o r g a n is a t io n a l  p r in c ip le s  o f  democratic c e n tr a l ism  and
o f  party  d i s c i p l i n e  o p era te . The f i r s t  means th a t
a l l  the p erson n el o f  the d ir e c t in g  organs o f  th e  p arty
are chosen by a democratic p rocess  o f  e l e c t i o n  from the
to p  to  th e  bottom. A l l  party  branches are accou n tab le
p e r i o d i c a l ly  to  the organ which e le c t e d  them and to
th a t  which i s  im m ediately above them. The branches
can  ask fo r  in form ation  or make p r o p o s it io n s  on p arty
programmes and a c t i v i t i e s  to  any party  organ above them
fo l lo w in g  the h ierarchy  o f  the o r g a n isa t io n .  A l l
1 .  Cf. MifllceuX, ' f o r c e s  e t  id e e s  f o r c e s . . . p . 56 c i t e d  
by Sy o p . c i t .  p . 147.
d e c i s io n s  o f  a l l  branches are tak en  by th e  m a jo r ity  
o f  the members p rese n t;  and once a d e c i s io n  i s  taken
1th e  m in or ity  are bound by th e  d e c i s io n  o f  th e  m a jo r ity .
The branches must implement th e  d e c i s io n s  o f  th e  h igh er
2organs o f  th e  p a r ty .
Again as  regard s  d i s c i p l i n e ,  th e  th re e  
p a r t i e s  share common p r in c i p l e s  and p r a c t i c e .  The f i r s t  
p r in c ip le  ( o f  dem ocratic c e n tr a l ism )  im p lie s  th e  n e c e s s i t y  
o f  s t r i c t  d i s c i p l i n e .  Members o f  th e  p arty  must submit 
to  c e r t a in  s t r i c t  o b l ig a t io n s  which make them party  
m i l i t a n t s .  They must p a r t i c ip a t e  a c t i v e l y  i n  th e  p o l i ­
t i c a l  l i f e  o f  th e  co u n try . W ithin th e  framework o f  th e  
p a rty  o r g a n is a t io n  th ey  are  exp ected  to  o f f e r  id e a s  and 
c r i t i c i s m s  on programmes and a c t i v i t i e s .  Each^must 
f i g h t  a g a in s t  r a c ia l i s m ,  re j im a a lism , t r ib a l i s m  and 
o th er  v i c e s  -  in d iv id u a l  or c o l l e c t iv e .  There are a 
s e t  o f  s a n c t io n s  a p p l ic a b le  a g a in s t  members fo r  breach o f  
p a rty  d i s c i p l i n e .  The o v e r - a l l  e f f e c t  o f  th e s e  s a n c t io n s
1 .  c f .  Sy, o p . c i t .  p . 1 48 .
2 .  C f. however, A r t s .  1 9 , 20 S ta tu te s  o f  th e  USRDA; the  
p arty  le a d e r s  in  M ali are req u ired  to  e x p la in  the  
o b j e c t iv e s  o f  the p a rty  to  th e  m i l i t a n t s  of''and  
m o tiv a te  them through argument and not c o e r c io n .
C f. a l s o  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t  p r e s id e n t  S en ghor's  exhor­
t a t i o n  to  a 11 d ia lo g u e ” v/ith  th e  p eop le  as a g a in s t  
c o e r c io n  -  rappurt du s e c r e t a i r e - g e n e r a l  de L’UPS 
Ve C ongres.
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i s  to  make members a c t iv e  and o b e d ie n t ,  to  curb i n d i s ­
c i p l i n e  and th u s in t e g r a t e  tbem to  th e  p arty
The party  machine and i t s  fu n c t io n in g  r e f l e c t  
th e  two o r g a n is a t io n a l  p r in c ip l e s  m entioned above. 
Dem ocratic c e n tr a l is m  im p l ie s  a pyramidal s tr u c tu r e  o f  
th e  machine w h ile  d i s c i p l i n e  en su res th e  c o h e s io n  and 
r e g u la r  fu n c t io n in g  o f  th e  m achine. In  th e  ordinary  
o p e r a t io n  o f  t h i s  m achine, the c e n tr e  must be g iv e n ,  
w ith  th e  g r e a t e s t  accuracy  p o s s ib le j  th e  p o in t  o f  
v iew  o f  th e  base (b ran ch es) so th a t  i t  can make the  
r ig h t  d e c i s io n s .
At the top  o f  th e  o r g a n is a t io n  o f  th e  party  
th e r e  i s  th e  C on gress , which i s  th e  supreme p o l i c y ­
making organ. I t  i s s u e s  programmes o f  a c t io n ,  h ears  
r e p o r t s  and c o n t r o ls  th e  accou n ts  o f  th e  p a r ty .  I t  
a l s o  e l e c t s  th e  e x e c u t iv e  o f f i c e r s  (members o f  the  
p o l i t i c a l  B ureau). In  th e  Ivory C oast the Congress  
m eets  once a year in  ord in ary  s e s s i o n s .  In  Guinea 
i t  m eets every fou r  y e a r s ,  and i n  M ali i t  m eets every  
th r e e  y e a r s .  The Congress may be convened in  e x tr a ­
ord in ary  s e s s io n s  e i t h e r  a t  the in s ta n c e  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
Bureau or a t  th e  re q u est  o f  more than  h a l f  o f  i t s  members.
1. Cf. Sy, op.cit. pp.149-150.
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In  th e  Ivory  Coast the Congress i s  composed 
o f  d e le g a te s  from th e branches ( s o u s - s e c t i o n s ) . In  
Guinea i t  i s  composed o f  th e  members o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
Bureau and th e  members o f  th e  f e d e r a l  bureaux (from the  
r e g io n s )  who are s t a t u t o r y  members. In  Mali a l s o  i t  i s  
composed o f  th e  members o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau, o f  
p o l i t i c a l  com m issioners and o f  branch d e le g a t e s .
Next to  th e  C ongress th er e  i s  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
Bureau which i s  the supreme e x e c u t iv e  organ. The d e c is io n s  
o f  th e  C ongress are ex ecu ted  by t h i s  organ, and because  
Qf i t s  permanence and s i z e ,  i t  is^ in  r e a l i t y ,  the most 
im portant organ o f  th e  p a r ty .  In  the Ivory  Coast th er e  
i s  an e x e c u t iv e  committee (com ite  d ir e c t e u r )  c o n s i s t i n g  
o f  t h i r t y - f i v e  members which d e le g a te s  th e  power to  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  Bureau to  assum e,!the d i r e c t io n  o f  th e  p o l ic y  
o f  the p arty  during th e  i n t e r v a l s  between i t s  m e e t in g s .
The p o l i t i c a l  Bureau^ in  tu rn  d e le g a te s  to  th e  s e c r e ta r y  
g e n e r a l  "the a d m in is tr a t io n  o f  the p arty  and g iv e s  him 
wide powers o f  co n v o ca t io n  and o f  d e c i s io n s  to  th a t  
effec t ." '* ’ The s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l ’ s p r in c ip a l  fu n c t io n
1 .  C f. Ph. Yace ( s e c r e t a r y  g e n e r a l  o f  PDCI) in  P r a t e r n i t e  
no. 119 o f  Aug* 1961 p . 7 .
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i s  to  c o n tr o l  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  branch s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a ls  
( s o u s - s e c t io n s )  who e x i s t  in  every a d m in is tr a t iv e  sub­
d i v i s i o n  o f  th e  co u n try . The p o l i t i c a l  Bureau i s  
composed o f  an honorary p r e s id e n t  (a t  th e  moment Houphoiiet 
B o ig n y )ja  s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l ,  a t e c h n ic a l  a d v ise r  on 
p o l i t i c a l  m a tte r s ,  an o r g a n is a t io n  s e c r e ta r y ,  a t r e a s u r e r -  
g e n e r a l ,  a s s i s t a n t - t r e a s u r e r , s e c r e ta r y  on a d m in is tr a t iv e  
a f f a i r s ,  p r e s s - s e c r e t a r y ,  propaganda s e c r e ta r y ,  s e c r e ta r y  
f o r  mass ed u ca tio n  and one sim ple member. The com ite  
d ir e c te u r  c o n s i s t s  o f  th e  members o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau  
p lu s  branch s e c r e t a r i e s - g e n e r a l ,  o f  d e p u t ie s ,  o f  m in i s t e r s ,  
o f  p r e f e c t s ,  o f  c o u n c i l lo r s  ( l o c a l ;  and o f  mayors.
At the branch l e v e l  th e r e  i s  a s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l ,  a 
tr e a su r e r  and s i x  members e l e c t e d  by th e  branch assem b ly .  
The branch s e c r e t a r i e s  g e n e r a l  are a g en ts  o f  e x e c u t io n  
o f  th e  p o l ic y  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau.
In  Guinea, th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureaa, which i s  a l s o  
th e  supreme e x e c u t iv e  organ, c o n s i s t s  o f  f i f t e e n  members 
e l e c t e d  fo r  fo u r  y ea rs  by th e  Congress from amongst ou t­
g o in g  members ( o f  th e  Bureau) and members o f  th e  bureau o f  
f e d e r a t io n s .  The Bureau implements d e c i s io n s  o f  th e  
Congress and o f  th e  'n a t io n a l  c o u n c i l  o f  th e  r e v o lu t io n '  -  
a body which n ex t to  th e  Congress i s  a h igh  organ and
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which h o ld s  m eetings in  between th e  m eetings o f  th e  
C on gress . The Bureau m eets at l e a s t  once a month 
and i s  convened by the s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l .^  I t  has  
fo u r  com m ission s;- ( i )  Commission on p o l i t i c a l  c o n tr o l  
and o r g a n is a t io n ,  ( i i )  Commission.on e x te r n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  
p r e s id e d  by th e  m in is te r  o f  fo r e ig n  a f f a i r s ;  ( i i i )  
economic commission, p res id ed  by th e  M in is ter  fo r  economic 
development; ( i v )  s o c ia l  commission, p res id ed  by th e  
m in is te r  o f  h e a lth  and s o c i a l  a f f a i r s .  The members 
o f  th e  Commissions are a l l  members o f  th e  Bureau. The 
com m issions are c o n tr o l le d  by the s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l ,  
p r e s id e n t  Sekou Toure, who i s  a s s i s t e d  in  t h i s  ta s k  by 
th e  permanent sec re ta r y  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  Bureau. There 
i s  a l s o  an ex e cu tiv e  commission c o n s i s t in g  o f  th e  
s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l ,  the p r e s id e n ts  o f  the four com m issions  
and th e  permanent se c r e ta r y  o f the Bureau. The execu­
t i v e  commission c o -o r d in a te s  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  
com m ission and prepares the m eetings o f  the Bureau.
The permanent se c re ta r y  o f  the Bureau a c t s  as th e  
c e n t r a l i s i n g  agent fo r  a l l  in form ation s coming fr o i^ a ll  
branches o f  the p arty , and he r e g u la te s  a l l  c o n f l i c t s  
a r i s i n g  between branches.
1 .  P re s id en t  Ahm»d S£kou Tour^ i s  th e  se c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l .
34ff.
At th e  next l e v e l  o f  o r g a n is a t io n  the fe d e r a ­
t i o n s  have a bureau o f  sev en  members o f  whom s i x  are  
e l e c t e d 1 and th e  sev en th  i s  th e  governor o f  th e  r e g io n ,  
and i s  an ex o f f i c i o  member. I t  i s  e l e c t e d  fo r  th ree  
y e a r s ,  and su p e r v is e s  the im plem entation  in  th e  r e g io n  o f  
th e  d e c is io n  o f  the h ig h er  organ o f  th e  p a r ty .
A s im i la r  o r g a n is a t io n  e x i s t s  in  M ali.
The p o l i t i c a l  Bureau, which c o n s i s t s  o f  e ig h te e n  members, 
i s  the supreme d ir e c t iv e  organ. I t  c o n s i s t s  o f  the  
s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l ,  the p o l i t i c a l  s e c r e ta r y ,  s e c r e ta r y  
fo r  o r g a n is a t io n ,  s e c r e ta r y  fo r  a d m in is tr a t iv e  and 
j u d ic i a l  a f f a i r s ,  s e c r e ta r y  fo r  econ om ic^ soc ia l and 
c u l t u r a l  a f f a i r s ,  p r e ss  s e c r e t a r y ,  th e  tr e a s u r e r -g e n e r a l  
and h is  a s s i s t a n t ,  and t e n  commissioners,jjwhom two are  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  e x te r n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  two fo r  r e g u la t in g  
c o n f l i c t s ,  two fo r  a cc o u n ts ,  two fo r  th e  youth , p lu s  
one com missioner fo r  women a f f a i r s  and one f o r  tr a d e s  
union m a tte r s .  The p r e s id e n t  o f  the government and
th e  p res id en t  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  assem bly are e x - o f f i c i o
2members o f  the p o l i t i c a l  Bureau. The Bureau, among 
oth er  fu n c t io n s ,  d i r e c t s  and c o n t r o ls  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f
1 .  one o f  the s i x  must be a woman. The n a t io n a l  Bureau 
must a ls o  have a t l e a s t  two women members. C f.
Sy o p . c i t .  p p . 1 5 6 - 7 .
2 .  C f. A rtS. s t a t u t s .
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a l l  e l e c t e d  members. W ithin  th e  framework o f  th e
powers o f  th e  Bureau, th e  s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l  a c t s  as  the
gu id e  o f  th e  p a r ty .^  He r e p r e s e n ts  th e  p arty  in  a l l
p la c e s  a t  a l l  t im es  and i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w ith
th e  agreement o f  th e  Bureau. He en su res th e  r e s p e c t
and the m aintenance o f  th e  party  l i n e  and ^  th e  c o r r e c t
e x e c u t io n  o f th e  p arty  programme. He can c a l l  m eetin gs
o f  the Bureau and he d i r e c t s  th e  correspondence on i t s
work. He can d e le g a te  h i s  fu n c t io n  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l
s e c r e ta r y ,  who i s  n ex t  i n  l i n e  to  th e  s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l
i n  the Bureauj and who i s  in  charge o f  th e  g e n e r a l
2p o l i t i c a l  ed u ca tio n  o f  m i l i t a n t s .  The o th er  s e c r e t a r i e s  
are in  charge o f  th e  m a tter s  which correspond  to  t h e i r  
t i t l e
In  M ali a g r e a t  d ea l o f  emphasis i s  l a i d  on 
c o l l e c t i v e  le a d e r s h ip  as a concom itant o f  th e  o rg a n isa ­
t i o n a l  p r in c ip le  o f  dem ocratic c e n tr a l is m . As th e  party  
weekly l e s s o r  has p o in te d  out "for our p arty  fhartr 
c o l l e c t i v e  combat supposes c o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
a t  the base and c o l l e g i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a t  th e  top ." ^
1 .  Cf. I n te r n a l  r e g u la t io n  o f  th e  p arty  -  Iravaux du 
Vie eon gres de l'USEDA p . 2 .
2 .  In th e  6 th  Congress i t  was th e  p o l i t i c a l  s e c r e ta r y ,
Mr. I d r i s s a  D iarra , who p rese n te d  th e  main r e p o r t ,  
c f .  V ie Congres de l ’USRDA. Bamaka, l e s  10 -12  S ep t.
1962 p p .1 3 -1 4 0 .
3 .  The s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l  o f  the USRDA i s  Modibo K e ita ,  
p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  governm ent.
4 .  c f .  L/'Essor A p r il  2 , 1962 .
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Again the political secretary of the party has declared:
"whatever may be th e  i n t r i n s i c  v a lu e  o f  our le a d e r s  taken
in d iv id u a l ly j  th e  d e c i s io n s  which th ey  might be l e d
to  make a lo n e  are l i k e l y  to  be marred w ith  e r r o r s .  We
can never emphasise s u f f i c i e n t l y  th e  n e c e s s i t y  and
e f f i c a c y  o f  teamwork. I t  i s  th e  on ly  sure way to  avo id
e r r o r s ,  as  much as p o s s ib l e  to  choke o f f  th e  p o l i t i c s
o f  p e r so n a l i ty ^  and to  a ssu re  th e  c o n t in u i t y  o f  the
p a r t y . I n  t h i s  co n n e c t io n  i t  i s  worth m ention ing
th a t  the p r e s t ig e  and p o p u la r ity  o f Modibo K e ita  i s  used
a g rea t  d ea l  fo r  p arty  and government work. But the p arty
i s  always c a r e f u l ,  as t h i s  q u o ta t io n  shows, to  p reserv e
th e  image o f  c o l l e c t i v e  d ec is io n -m a k in g  which i s  e s s e n -
2t i a l  to  u n i ty .  T his a t t i t u d e  and p r a c t i c e , to g e th e r  
w ith  the h i s t o r y  o f  th e  p a r ty %e x p la in s  the p a r t y ' s  
supreme p o s i t i o n  in  M a li ,  The c lo s e n e s s  o f  th e  p arty  
to  th e  p eo p le  r e s u l t s  in  th e  primacy o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
over the a d m in is t r a t iv e .  I m p l ic i t  i n  such a prim acyJ
1 .  C f. I d r i s s a  D iarra , rapport d * o r g a n isa t io n . 1955 
USRDA Congres^.
2 .  E .g .  th e  m in is te r  fo r  I n t e r io r ,  In form ation  and 
Tourism lauded  Modibo K e ita  a s  a g ia n t  o f  r e v o lu ­
t io n a r y  thought and a c t io n  but went on to  add th a t  
Mali w i l l  triumph under th e  gu idance and d ir e c t io n  
o f  th e  N a tio n a l P o l i t i c a l  Bureau. C f. L*Essor,
Jan. 27 , 1964 .
however, i s  an in h eren t t e n s io n  between p arty  and
governm ent, between p o l i t ic ia n s  and adm inistrators.^"
So f a r ,  apart from a few a r r e s t s  , m a n ife s t in g  c o n f l i c t ,
harmony seems to  r e ig n  between p arty  and government.
fk
The n a t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau e x e c u te s^ p o lic y  
o f  th e  p arty  through the p arty  machine s t r e t c h in g  from 
th e  n a t io n a l  c a p i t a l  down to  th e  lo w e s t  p arty  branch.
But t h i s  does not mean th a t  the machine i s  a one-way 
t r a f f i c .  At th e  l o c a l  l e v e l s  th e r e  are b o d ie s  which  
d e l ib e r a t e  in  l o c a l  m a tters  w ith  th e  g e n e r a l  p arty  
p o l i c y  in  mind. At each l e v e l  th ere  are com m ittees and 
e x e c u t iv e  o f f i c e r s .  The v i l l a g e  com m ittees are  o f  
g r e a t  im portance, because they  e s t a b l i s h  c o n ta c t  w ith  
th e  v i l l a g e  c h i e f s  ( i f  any) or e ld e r s  and w ith  th e  
v i l l a g e  com munities in  general; and, in  c o -o p e r a t io n  w ith  
th e s e j th e y  s o r t  out v i l l a g e  a f f a i r s  and implement party  
d e c i s i o n s .
There are a l s o  p a r a l l e l  o r g a n is a t io n s  which  
are  a s s o c ia t e d  to  th e  p a r ty ;  such as/womens' o rg a n isa ­
t i o n ,  youth  o r g a n is a t io n ,  trad e  unions and war v e te r a n s .
1 .  T his w i l l  be examined i n  th e  n ex t  ch a p ter .
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These b o d ie s  can m o b il ise  t h e i r  members in  a manner 
a p p ro p r ia te  to  the ch ara c ter  o f  t h e ir  o r g a n isa t io n s  but 
i n  accordance w ith  the g en er a l p r in c ip le s  o f  th e  p a r ty .
The party  can then  reach every s e c t io n  o f  
s o c i e t y  through i t s  branches as w e l l  as  through a f f i ­
l i a t e d  o r g a n is a t io n s .  These p a r a l l e l  o r g a n is a t io n s  
are  p a r t i c u la r ly  u se fu l  whenever party  apathy s e t s  in  
f o r  any rea so n .
The v i t a l i t y  o f  a party  depends on the
v ig o r o u s  p a r t i c ip a t io n  o f  i t s  members. This in  tu rn
depends on th e  h is to r y  o f  the p arty , th e  s e r v ic e s  i t  k**
rendered  and co n tin u es  to  render to  i t s  members, and
th e  o r g a n isa t io n  and r e la t io n s h ip  o f th e  le a d e r sh ip  to
th e  members. To take  the  example o f  the Union
tk
Soudanaise RDA (USEDA) o f  M ali, as Ruth Schafer has  
p o in te d  out^the p a r ty ’ s s e r v ic e s  to  th e  m asses to g e th e r  
w ith  o r g a n is a t io n ^ l ia v e  been o f  g re a t  importance in  
i t s  growth during the 1950s and in  th e  c o n s o l id a t io n  
and maintenance o f  i t s  p o s i t i o n  a f t e r  independence.
And a f t e r  independence party  activjsbs have been d ir e c te d  
toward p ro v id in g  l e i s u r e  a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  the p eo p le ,  
s o l i d i f y i n g  party  support, la y in g  i t s  b ases  fo r  
n a t io n a l  economic development. L e isu re  time a c t i v i t i e s
35®.
o rg a n ised  by th e  p arty  or i t s  a u x i l i a r i e s  in c lu d e  
s p o r t in g  e v e n ts  fo r  which th ere  i s  the com ite n a t io n a l  
des sp o r ts  c o n tr o l le d  by th e  party; l o c a l  and r e g io n a l  
f o lk lo r e  trou p es  and annual n a t io n a l  c o m p e tit io n s  and 
p r iz e s  fo r  th e  b e s t  performance; and n a t io n a l  youth  
week or Women's day e t c .  They a ls o  in c lu d e  a d u lt  
ed u ca tio n  and e x te n s io n  s e r v ic e s  o f  v a r io u s  k in d s .  Most
p arty  s e r v ic e s  in  the economic f i e l d  are in c lu d ed  in  
th e  f i v e  year p lan  ( e . g .  th e  1961-5 p la n ) .
( i i )  R e la t io n  to  government
In  s p i t e  o f  a l l  the s i m i l a r i t i e s  in  the  
p r in c ip le  and o r g a n is a t io n  o f the p a r t ie s  in  th e  th r e e  
s t a t e s ,  i t  has been su g g e s te d  as  a lready mentioied th a t  th e  
p la c e  o f  th e  p arty  in  th e  government in  the th ree  
c o u n tr ie s  i s  not the same. In th e  Ivory Coast th e  
PDCI has ce a sed  to  d e f in e  th e  gen era l gu ide l i n e s  o f  
th e  p a r ty , s in c e  the p a rty  con gress  o f  1959; and the  
p o l i t i c a l  Bureau p la y s  on th e  r o le  o f  c o u n s e l lo r  to  th e  
p r e s id e n t  o f  the r e p u b l ic .  As th e  Congress does not  
meet th e  p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  re p u b lic  (honorary p r e s id e n t  o f  
th e  p arty ) d e f in e s  the p a rty  programme which becomes th e
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same a s  th e  government programme. In  e f f e c t ,  p r e s id e n t
Ho uphove t-B o ign y  has rep la ced  the Congress o f  th e  party
i n  the ta sk  o f  g en era l o r ie n ta t io n  o f  the government
p o l ic y  and a c t io n .  In s p i t e  o f  c la im s to  th e  con trary
made by th e  party o f f i c i a l s  o f the PDCI.^in f a c t ; th e
primacy o f  party over government i s  not the r u le  in  th e
Iv ory  C o a st .  The primacy o f p o l i t i c s  has been abandoned.
NkrumaJki* dictum "seek ye f i r s t  the p o l i t i c a l  kingdom,
and a l l  th in g s  e l s e  s h a l l  be added unto you", has i t s
a n t i t h e s i s  in  Houphob(et-Boigny1 s p h ilo so p h y . He has
s a i d  t o  h i s  p e o p l e :  !,i f  y o u  d o n ' t  w an t t o  v e g e t a t e  i n
bamboo huhs con cen tra te  your e f f o r t s  on growing good
cocoa  and good c o f f e e .  They w i l l  f e t c h  a good p r ic e ,
2and you w i l l  become r ic h ."
In  p r a c t ic e  of course both Nkrumah and 
Houphonet-Boigny departed from t h e ir  d ic t a .  The former 
knew th a t  man does not l i v e  by p o l i t i c s  a lo n e , a s  the  
l a t t e r  knew th a t  man does not l i v e  by bread a lo n e .  He 
p a id  a t t e n t io n  to p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n is a t io n .  The d i f f e r e ­
nce between the PDCI and the USRDA i s  th a t  th e  PDCI 
h as become, t w i l l i n g  instrum ent o f  H ouponet-Boigny‘s
1 .  C f .  Sy, o p . c i t .  p p . 2 6 4 - 5
2 .  Cf. A. Zolberg, o p . c i t .  p . 151.
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p erso n a l power, ju s t  as  th e  CPP in  Ghana became a w i l l i ^  
in strum ent o f  Nkrumah though w ith  a d i f f e r e n t  purpose .  
T h is  m a n ife s t s  i t s e l f  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s .  The s e c r e ta r y  
g e n e r a l  o f  th e  PDCI i s  a l s o  th e  p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  N a tio n a l  
Assembly o f  th e  Ivory C o a st ,  T h is  f a c t  r e in f o r c e s  th e  
predominance o f  Houphonet-Boigny over the N a tio n a l  
Assembly through the p a r ty .  ' A gain , a lth ou gh  in  
axopearance^ th e  party  hom inates th e  ca n d id a te s  to  th e  
N a tio n a l Assem bly, in  f a c t  i t  i s  Houphonet-Boigny who 
has the l a s t  word a f t e r  c o n s u l t a t io n  w ith  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
Bureau.^- In th eory  th e  c a n d id a te s  are chosen  by the  
s e c r e t a r i e s  o f  the PDCI and by such o th er  major groups  
th a t  p a r t i c ip a t e  in  th e  e l e c t i o n  arrangem ents. Then 
th e  l i s t  i s  subm itted  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau fo r  f i n a l  
a p p ro va l. In  p r a c t ic e  th e  in ner c i r c l e  c o n t r o l l e d  by 
H ou p h on et-B o ign yy 'reta in s  c o n tr o l  over th e  e n t ir e  p r o c e s s .  
L ocal part,y branches are inform ed o f  th e  number o f  p la c e s  
t h e i r  r e g io n  w i l l  have and are asked to  draw up a l i s t  
o f  c a n d id a te s  fo r  th e s e  p la c e s  i n  order o f p re fe r n n c e .
In  I960 , fo r  example, th e  g e n e r a l  s e c r e t a r i e s  o f  the  
p arty  assem bled  in  A bijan  to  prepare th e  l i s t s ,  heard  
Houphonet-Boigny*s recommendations and th en  approved a
1 .  C f. Sy, o p . c i t .  p . 170 .
m otion to  g iv e  him and th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau f u l l
l is t  2.
a u th o r ity  to  draw up th e  sftscg&jr.
The s i t u a t i o n  has been a p t ly  summarised thus
11 • • • • i n  the r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  democracy o f  th e  Ivory  
C oast, the p r e s t ig e  o f  one man r a d ic a l ly  
tran sform s th e  c l a b s i c  th e o r y .  I t  i s  no lo n g er  
a q u e s t io n  fo r  th e  e l e c t o r s  to  choose r e p r esen ­
t a t i v e s  who are a b le  to  d ec id e  and a c t .  General 
e l e c t io n s s e r v e  on ly  to  show th e  co n fid en ce  o f  
th e  p eop le  fo r  one m an.“2
The nature o f  th e  r e l a t i o n  o f  th e  PDCI to  
th e  government in  i t s  p arliam en tary  a sp e c t  may be seen  
c l e a r l y  in  th e  unanimous approval o f  th e  Bureau and the  
Commissions o f  th e  N a t io n a l  Assembly which was proposed  
by the p arty  spokesman on Nov. 27, I960* Again in  
m atters  o f  a r b i t r a t in g  c o n f l i c t s  between m in is t e r s  and 
any parliam entary  com m ission, a m in is t e r  would norm ally  
r e f e r  th e  m atter  to  th e  p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  r e p u b lic  who 
may submit th e  q u e s t io n  in th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau o f  the  
p a r ty .  I f  th e  party  spokesman in  parliam ent announces 
th a t  th e  Bureau has d ec id ed  in  such and such a way, a l l  
would submit to  t h i s  d e c i s i o n .  But th e  party  does not 
norm ally in te r v e n e  in  t e c h n ic a l  m a tte r s ,  whoch are
1 .  C f. A. Z olberg , o p . c i t .  p p .272-4*
2 .  Gonidec quoted by By, o p . c i t .  p .1 1 1 .
3 .  C f. P r a t e r n i t e  No. 87, 16 Dec. I9 6 0 , p . 2 .
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norm ally  worked out between th e  other i n s t i t u t i o n s .
The p arty  in te r v e n e s  only in  p o l i t i c a l  m a tters , or in  
m a tters  which would have deep p o l i t i c a l  im p l ic a t io n s .
In  Guinea and in  M ali, the party appears to
be p red om in an t in  p r a c t ic e  as w e l l  as in  th e o r y .
A d i s t i n c t i o n  must be made between gen era l q u e s t io n s  o f
p o l i c y  in  which the party in  both c a se s  i s  predominant,
and m atters  o f  day-to-day a d m in is tra t io n  in  which th e
governments are in  firm  c o n t r o l .  Once the Congress has
e s t a b l i s h e d  the gen era l p o l ic y  as a guide l i n e  fo r  a c t io n
i t  i s  l e f t  to  the government to  fo l lo w  those gu id e  l i n e s
and implement them. The dynamics of ex e c u t iv e  a c t io n
con n ected  w ith  the im plem entation of the g en era l p o l ic y
in v o lv e s  q u e s t io n s ,  the d e t a i l s ,  volume and t e c h n ic a l
co m p lex ity  o f  which n e c e s s a r i ly  le a v e  them to  be d e a l t
w ith  by rhe government bureaucracy. But the c h i e f
e x e c u t iv e s  o f  th e  two governments who are a ls o  s e c r e —
t a r ie s - g e n e r a l  o f  th e ir  r e s p e c t iv e  p a r t ie s  s u p e r v ise
th e  e x e c u t io n  o f  the party  p o l i t i e s .  The merger o f  the
o f f i c e  o f  head o f  the party  and government in  th e  hand
o f  one man may p a r t ly  e x p la in  the fu n c t io n  o f  th e  p a r ty .
a
One v a lu e  o f  such/merger i s  th a t  i t  $&&&$£ p r e se r v e s  the  
primacy o f  th e  p arty , making i t  im p ossib le  fo r  th e  c h i e f  
e x e c u t iv e  to  em asculate i t  by su bord inating  th e  c h i e f  
o f  th e  party  to  him. I t  a l s o  avo ids c o n f l i c t ,  p r e se r v e s
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u n ity ,  and o b v ia te s  th e  problem of s u c c e s s io n ,  which i s  
one o f  th e  problems th a t  i s  c r i t i c a l  in  p e r s o n a l is e d  
sy s tem s .
With r e fe r e n c e  to  the d i s t i n c t i o n  drawn 
between th e  Guinea and M ali case in  r e sp e c t  o f  th e  r e l a ­
t i o n  o f  th e  p arty  to  th e  ex ecu tiv e  i t  must be s a id  th a t
in  Guinea th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau,which the s e c r e ta r y -
to to
g e n e r a l  c o n t r o l s ,  does not in  fa c t  d ic ta te /h im  o r / h i s
governm ent, bu t  ra th e r  le a v e s  i t  to  him to see  to  i t
th a t  p arty  m i l i t a n t s  a ccep t the d e c is io n s  o f  the govern-
ment. I t  i s  a l s o  tru e  th a t  the manner in  which th e
p arty  p o l ic y  and programme i s  worked out shows a c o l l a -
2b o r a t iv e  r e la x in s h ip .  But th i s  i s  not p e c u lia r  to  
G u in ea;, o th er  p a r t i e s  f o l lo w  the same p rocedure. A lso  
th e  co n te n t  o f  the s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l^  report and th e  
manner o f  kits p r e s e n ta t io n  i s  not n e c e s s a r i ly  a sound 
gu id e  on th e  feature o f  th e  p a r ty -e x e c u t iv e  r e la t io n s h i p .
In  S en eg a l,  f o r  example, th e e  report o f  the s e c r e t a r y -  
g e n e r a l  o f  th e  UPS, Leopold S£de(r Senghor, to  th e  5th  
Congress shows the same approach as th a t  o f s£kon Toure.
The same i s  tr u e  o f  th e  report of I d r i s s a  D iarra , th e  
p o l i t i c a l  s e c r e ta r y  o f  th e  USRDA of M ali, to  th e  6 th  Congress
1 .  C f. Sy, o p . c i t .  p . 165
2 .  E .g .  th e  Congress p a s s e s  r e s o lu t io n s  on the b a s i s  o f  
p r o p o s i t io n s  co n ta in ed  in  the report p resen ted  by
the s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l  who as c h ie f  e x e cu tiv e  would g iv e  ^  
a government o r ie n t a t io n  to h is  rep ort -  C f. S£koU Toure 
La R ev o lu t io n  Guineenne e t  l e  progress s o c ia l  t  VI 
( e d i t i o n  s p e c i a l )  Conakry s.d* (1963)*
. On . n i t .
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In  each, c a se  an ex h a u stiv e  exam ination o f  th e  p a st  
performance o f  the government and the party i s  p r e s e n t e d .  
Problems are an a lysed  and s o lu t io n s  su ggested  in  o u t l in e ^ '  
on economic^* s o c i a l  p o l i t i c a l  and c u l tu r a l  m a tte r s .  The 
rep ort cannot be too  c r i t i c a l  as i t  i s  p resen ted  by th e  
le a d e r  of th e  government. On th e  other hand th er e  i s  
a remarkable depth o f  s e l f -e x a m in a t io n .  The re p o r t  o f  
P r e s id e n t  Senghor to  the 5th Congress of th e  UPS^/ 
c o n c e n tr a te s  i t s  a t t e n t io n  on the economic 3#cL development 
p la n  and a r e a p p r a is a l  th e r e o f .  Senghor puts i t  th u s:  
“th e p lan  i s ,  must be , during the next four years^ th e  
p r in c ip a l  o b je c t  o f  our a c t io n  a s  w e l l  as o f  our p re­
occupations^  because planning i s  a method o f  a c t io n  
which i s  in d isp e n s a b le  to  a l l  th ose  who espouse n ot on ly  
s o c ia l i s m  but more g e n e r a l ly  the economic e f f e c t i v e n e s s  in  
s o c i a l  j u s t i c e . . . . ”
The r e l a t i o n  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  Bureau to  th e  
e x e c u t iv e  in  both  Guinea and Mali i s  one of c o -o p e r a t io n  
and u nd erstan d in g . But c e r ta in  d i f f e r e n c e s  e x i s t  which  
have g iv e n  r i s e  to  th e  su g g e s t io n  th a t whereas in  Guinea  
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  i s  c o l la b o r a t iv e ,  in  Mali i t  i s  one in  
which the Bureau i s  predominant.
1 .  R epor t  t o  t h e  5 th  C ongress ,  p . l .
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In  Guinea ^af t e r  the 7th  Congress, th e  r o l e
o f  the p o l i t i c a l  Bureau seems to  have been reduced to
ohat o f  confirm ing the d e c is io n s  prepared or even taken
by an e x e c u t iv e  commission o f  f i v e  members c o n s i s t i n g
o f  th e  s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l  (chairman)^ o f th e  p r e s id e n t s
o f  the t e c h n ic a l  commissions o f the Bureau and o f  th e
1
permanent s e c r e ta r y .  Moreover, th e  com m issions, i t
w i l l  be remebered, fu n c t io n  under the d ir e c t io n  and
s u p e r v is io n  o f the s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l  who i s  h e lp ed  in
2t h i s  ta sk  by the permanent sec r e ta r y  of th e  Bureau.
Hence th e  r e la t io n  between the Bureau and the e x e c u t iv e  
i s  t ig h te n e d ,  through the agency o f the e x e c u t iv e  
com mission o f  the Bureau in  which both party  and govern­
ment m eet. The p o l i t i c a l  Bureau, which m eets once a 
monthjseems to  b e ^ a  permanent organ o f  c o n tr o l  and 
c o n s u l t a t io n ,  rather  than an ex ecu tiv e  organ. In  
between i^ s  m eetings the government ex ecu tes  th e  d ir e c ­
t i v e s  o f  the party con gress  and the d i r e c t iv e s  o f  th e  
Bureau. The p res id en t of the rep u b lic  in
1 .  The p r e s id e n ts  of the te c h n ic a l  commissions in  1965 
were a l l  ca b in et  m in is t e r s .  Gf. Sy, o p . c i t .  p . l7 9 »
2 .  T his part i s  occupied by Mr. Leon Maka who i s  th e  
p r e s id e n t  o f  the N ation a l Assembly. The r e l a t i o n  
o f  the e x e c u t iv e ,  the party and parliam ent i s  th u s  
n e a t ly  t i e d  up under the c o n tr o l  o f  the s e c r e ta r y  
g e n e r a l .
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th e  Bureau b e n e f i t s  from the a u th o r ity  o f th e  p arty  
which i^> th e  r e v o lu t io n a ry  id eo lo g y  o f  Guinea i s  th e  
m o tiv a t in g  fo r c e  o f the p o l i t i c a l  system . The p r e s id e n t  
a c t s  a s  th e  organic l in k  between party  and government, 
in form in g  th e  Bureau on the a c t io n s  o f  the government 
and n o t i f y in g  m in is te r s  about the d e c is io n s  o f  th e  
Bureau. But the Bureau in  no way r e p la c e s  th e  c o u n c i l  
o f  m in is t e r s ^  as an e x e c u t iv e  organ o f s t a t e .
The powers o f th e  p res id en t o f  th e  re p u b lic  
(and s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l  o f  the party) are e x e r c is e d  in  
Guinea i n  a manner which conveys a p ic tu r e  o f  a much 
more t i g h t l y  h e ld  governmental and party e x e c u t iv e  
a u th o r i ty .  In apply ing  th e  g en era l guide l i n e s  l a i d  
down by th e  Congress th e  se c r e ta r y  gen era l can in  th e  
name o f th e  Bureau push ahead h i s  id ea s  u nq u estion ed .
Thus d)n August 3rd, 1963* ^ e Council o f  M in is te r s  
approved a prop osa l o f  p res id en t  Sekou Toure, con cern in g  
m easures fo r  c o n t r o l l in g  f i n a n c i a l  and commercial 
t r a n s a c t io n s  entered  in to  abroad. He a u th o r ised  Mr. 
D ia l lo  S a ifo u la g ey , who was in  charge o f  a d m in is tr a t iv e  
and f i n a n c i a l  m atters in  th e  Bureau, to  prepare a 
d ecree c r e a t in g  an i n t e r - m i n i s t e r i a l  commission which  
would study a l l  agreements concluded w ith  fo r e ig n
c o u n t r ie s .  T his d e c is io n  was an a p p l ic a t io n  o f  a 
d e c i s io n  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau which was made in  
accordance w ith  the economic r e s o lu t io n  o f  the six tfo
i
Congress o f  December, 1962.
In  M ali, on the other hand, the party  
d i r e c t s  a l l  the i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  the S ta te .  The p o l i ­
t i c a l  Bureau p la y s  a v i t a l  c o n s t i t u t io n a l ,  governm ental 
r o l e .  I t  h o ld s  weekly m eetin gs to  su p erv ise  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  andjthe l e g i s l a t u r e .  The p r e s id e n t  
o f  the government p r e s id e s  a t th ese  m eetings o f  th e  
Bureau. P arty  and government thus appear to  be more 
u n ite d , but th e  Bureau p r ese rv es  a v i t a l  and predominant 
r o l e .  I t  i s  guided by the gen era l p o l ic y  l a i d  down by 
th e  C ongress. A reading o f  the S ix th  Congress o f  1962 
shows t  e wide range o f  such p o l ic y .  As an i l l u s t r a t i o n  
we w i l l  c i t e  an e x tr a c t  from the economic f i e l d .  The 
Congress gave an im perative  mandate to  the Bureau and 
to  the government on th e  n a t io n a l  p la n f
"to ta c k le  economic etecftloarbisation im m ediately  
and v ig o r o u s ly ;  to  e s t a b l i s h  new economic 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  r a p id ly  turn ing  and d evelop ing  * * * 
commercial c e n tr e s  in  a s o c i a l i s t  p lanning  
based on A fr ican  r e a l i t i e s ;  to  use every means
1 .  C f. Horoya, No. 296, August 10, 1,,63. p . l .  
c f .  a ls o  Sy, o p . c i t  pp. 179.
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to  c r e a te  in f r a s t r u c t u r e s  o f  r a i lw a y s ,  road, 
water and a ir  ( t r a n s p o r ta t io n )  in  accordance  
with, th e  needs o f  th e  country; to  i n t e n s i f y  
th e  a g r ic u l t u r a l  p ro d u ctio n  to  in c r e a s e  
i n t e r n a l  consum ption and th e  e x p lo i t a t io n  
p o t e n t i a l ;  to  use every means to  e s t a b l i s h  
i n d u s t r i e s  o f  tr a n sfo r m a tio n  witJ^a view  to  
a v o id in g  w a s te fu l  c o s t s ;  to  i n t e n s i f y  
r e se a r c h  on m in era l r e so u r c e s  in  order to  
make M ali a s t a t e  f i t  to  be a member o f  
modern A fr ic a ;  and to  d ir e c t  and c o n tr o l  
e f f e c t i v e l y  th e  economy o f  th e  country  by 
the s t a t e  which w i l l  take more a c t iv e  part  
i n  i t  n o ta b ly  by th e  c r e a t io n  o f  a n a t io n a l  
o f f i c e  o f  e x te r n a l  commerce and th e  i n t e n s i ­
f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  c o -o p e r a t iv e  s e c t o r . 1’1
The a c t i v i t y  o f  the p arty  in  M alikas in  Guinea^ 
i s  gu ided  and d ir e c t e d  by th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau. But 
th e r e  i s  more m assive p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  M ali.  Aththe
top  th  ureau a c t s  as an a u th e n t ic  c o u n s e l lo r  o f  govern­
ment. Ar th e  base th e  a d m in is tr a t iv e  a u t h o r i t i e s  do 
n o th in g  w ith ou t the support o f  th e  r e s p o n s ib le  p arty
q u e s t io n s  i s  a f ir m ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i n c i p l e .  The 
membership o f  th e  Bureau r i t s e l f  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ^  in  
t h i s  r e s p e c t .  Out o f  th e  n in e te e n  members e l e c t e d  by 
th e  6th  C on gress , on ly  s i x  were m in is t e r s  in  th e  
governm ent. A lthough th e s e  s i x  occupy an im portant  
p la c e  in  th e  Bureau, th e  r e s t  have num erical preponderance
s /■ /
1 .  C f. Vie Congres de I'USEBA -  ’’R e s o lu t io n  economique 
e t  s o c i a l e  in t’E ssor No. 170, S e p t .  1962, p p .1 - 3 .
o f f i c i a l s .  The supremacy o f  p o l i t i c a l  over t e c h n ic a l
3 el.
and can thus perhaps su b ord in ate  th e  e x e c u t iv e  to  th e  
p a rty .^  I t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  to  n o te  th a t  th e  Mali 
government, formed soon a f t e r  th e  end o f  the 6 th  Congress  
on S ep t. 14 , 1962 was so formed by th e  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau, 
on the p r o p o s i t io n  o f  th e  s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l ,  ( who was an 
ou tgo in g  p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  governm ent). The i n v e s t i t u r e  
by the n a t io n a l  assem bly took  p la c e  th re e  days l a t e r .
The dual r o le  o f  th e  s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l  i s  r e v e a le d  in  
h i s  p r e s e n ta t io n  speech  made to  th e  n a t io n a l  assem b ly .
“What I can t e l l  you1' he d e c la r e d , “i s  th a t  we 
have th e  f e e l i n g  th a t  t h i s  new ca b in e t  which  
has ju s t  been formed as w e l l  as the departm ents  
which are more b a lanced  than th o se  o f  th e  
former government w i l l  a l lo w  th e  new c a b in e t  
to  p la y  e f f e c t i v e l y  i t s  r o le  o f  r e a l i s i n g  th e  
development p lan  o f  th e  r e p u b lic  o f  Mali 
in  th e  b e s t  c o n d i t i o n s ."
Thus fa r  he spoke as th^/new c h i e f  e x e c u t iv e .  Then he
added
"And what I can add, and I  say t h i s ,  in  th e  
name o f  the n a t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau, i s  th a t  
th e s e  measures which we have ju s t  taken  are  
the prelu d e to  o th er  courageous v ig o ro u s  and 
n e c e ssa r y  measures i n  the p o l ic y  o f  r e a d ju s t ­
ment which co u ld  not op erate  i n  th e  p er io d  
between th e  two c o n g r e s s e s .
1 .  The Guinea p o l i t i c a l  Bureau, by c o n t r a s t ,  i s  l a r g e l y  
dominated by members o f  the governm ent.
2 .  c f .  Sy, o p . c i t . p p . 190-1
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How does th e  s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l  in  p r a c t ic e  
f u l f i l  t h i s  dual r o le  in  such a c l o s e l y  c o -o r d in a te d  work 
between party  and government? The weekly m eetin gs  o f  
th e  Bureau take p la ce  on Tuesdays a t  which date th e  
s e c r e ta r y  g en er a l  in form s th e  Bureau o f  th e  work o f  th e  
c o u n c i l  o f  m in is t e r s  a t  th e  p rev io u s  m eeting  (which i s  
h e ld  every T hursday). The s e c r e ta r y  g en er a l d e c id e s  on 
m a tters  d isc u s se d  in  c o u n c i l  which are im portant ehough 
to  b e  p resen ted  to  th e  Bureau. B u g  i f  th e  Bureau has  
made a d e c i s io n  on a su b je c t  which th en  comes to  be 
debated in  c o u n c i l ,  th e  c o u n c i l ’ s debate would c e n tr e  on 
t e c h n i c a l i t i e s  and on d e t a i l s  o f  im p lem en tation . The 
d e c i s io n  o f  th e  Bureau must p r e v a i l .  In t h i s  way the  
p arty  supremacy can be e x e r c is e d  every week. The 
p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  government tr a n sm its  th e  d e c i s io n  
o f  th e  Bureau to  th e  ap p ro p r ia te  department fo r  
e x e c u t io n .  I f  a p r e s id e n t i a l  decree i s  needed fo r  
example, he would (a s  s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l)  ask th e  s e c r e ­
t a r i a t  o f  th e  Bureau to  prepare i t .  In  h i s  absence  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  s e c r e ta r y  o f  the p arty  (who i s  second in  
l i n e  in  th e  p arty  h ie r a r c h y )  p r e s id e s  a t  th e  Bureau 
and he works in  c o -o p e r a t io n  w ith  th e  a c t in g  p r e s id e n t  
o f  the government. A l l  d e c i s io n s  o f  the Bureau reached  
i n  h i s  absence are b in d in g  on him when he resumes
3<g.
1
work. This con stan t l in k  between the Bureau and th e
c o u n c i l  o f  m in is te r s  i s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d .  T his can
be seen  c l e a r ly  in  the regu lar  p u b lic a t io n  o f  th e
d e c i s io n s  o f th e  Bureau and the eq u iva len t d e c i s io n  o f
th e  C ouncil o f  M in is te r s .  They both appear s id e  by s id e
r e g u la r ly  in  L’E ssor , the o f f i c i a l  organ of th e  p a r ty .
As an example o f the ex ten t  of th e  Bureau’ s
powers we w i l l  c i t e  one d e c is io n  among man  ^ . In  i t s
m eetin g  o f  Jan. 22nd, 1963, the Bureau^approving the
recommendations o f the n a t io n a l  personnel o f f i c e ,  decided
to  modify th e  s ta tu s  o f  the Governor o f  the Bank o f  th e
M ali R ep u b lic , r a i s in g  h i s  rank to  th a t  of a m in i s t e r .
The p r e s id e n t  o f  the government presented  t h i s  d e c i s io n
to  th e  C ou n cil o f  M in is ter s  at i t s  next m eeting on Jan.
22 4 , and the proposal became law on Feb. 1, 1963 .
The Bureau i s s u e s  c i r c u la r s  to a l l  th e  s e c t io n s  
o f  th e  p a r ty ,  which are b ind ing  on a l l  party m i l i t a n t s ,  
be they p arty  o f f i c i a l s  or c i v i l  s e r v a n ts .  The c i r c u la r s  
a re  s ig n e d  by the sec r e ta r y  gen era l who in  t h i s  r e sp e c t
1 .  Cf. statem ent to  th a t  e f f e c t  g iv en  by the s e c r e t a r y -  
g e n e r a l  o f  the government o f  Mali (who i s  th e  
a d m in is tr a t iv e  a s s i s t a n t  o f  the p r e s id e n t ) -  
rep o rted  in  Sy, o p . c i t .  p .191.
2 .  as No. 31 P.G.R.M. c f .  Sy, o p . c i t .  p p .191 -2 .
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a c t s  i n  both  c a p a c i t i e s ^ a s  c h i e f  e x e c u t iv e  and as  party  
c h i e f .  A t y p i c a l  c i r c u l a r  o f  importance i s  one dated  
Nov. 13, 1962 on the  s u b j e c t  o f  "economic and f i s c a l  
fraud" (or e v a s i o n s ) .  I t  was p u b l i sh e d  i n  I ' E s s o r ,  
on Nov. 19 i n  the  name o f  the  government and the  p a r ty .
In  i t  the s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l  began by say in g  th a t  w h ile  
during c o l o n i a l  t im es  such an o f f e n c e  was understandable  
because  i t  operated  a g a in s t  a f o r e i g n  o p p resso r ,  i n  a 
f r e e  Mali i t  was an a n t i - s o c i a l  and a n t i - p a t r i o t i c  a c t  
and must be punished as  such .  He then  proceeded to  
announce the  e s ta b l ish m en t  o f  a s p e c i a l  a d m in is t r a t iv e  
organ or a committee i n  each g o v er n o r a te .  This body would 
a d m in is ter  export c o n t r o l s  i n  a manner s t a t e d  i n  the  
c i r c u l a r .  A l l  party  m i l i t a n t s  are a l s o  en jo in ed  to  be 
v i g i l a n t  a g a in s t  "economic o f fe n d e r s " ,  f o r  "each 
m i l i t a n t  o f  the  USREA  ^ must co n s id e r  the  d en u n c ia t io n  
and d isc o v ery  o f  o f f e n d e r s  as  a p o l i t i c a l  ta sk ." ^
The o r g a n i s a t io n  and r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  party  
and a d m in is t r a t iv e  organs a t  l o c a l  l e v e l s  i s  a l s o  marked 
by a hfl i ty  o f  purpose. The s i x t h  co n g ress  of  th e  PDG- 
o f  G-uinea condemned the  d u a l i t y  o f  party  and adm inis­
t r a t i v e  o r g a n i s a t io n  a t  th e  l o c a l  l e v e l  as c o n s t i t u t i n g
1. Cf. Sy, op.cit. pp.193-4*
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a th r e a t  to  the  u n ity  o f  the s t a t e ,  (Then th e  seven th
Congress d ec ided  to  t r a n s f e r  the power o f  v i l l a g e  c o u n c i l s
t o  v i l l a g e  party  com mittees a f t e r  which th ere  has been a
u n i ty  o f  p arty  and a d m in i s t r a t iv e  f u n c t i o n  a t  t h a t  l e v e l .
Again at  the  h ig h er  l e v e l  (arronaisfement and
r e g io n s )  the  d u a l i t y  e x i s t s ,  i n  p r a c t i c e  the  a d m in i s t r a t iv e
o f f i c i a l s  a t  th e s e  l e v e l s  c o n s u l t  tn e  party  o f f i c i a l s  on
a l l  important q u e s t io n s ,  The party  i s  thus u n i f i e d  a t  the
l o c a l  l e v e l  w ith  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  organs .^
That the l o g i c  o f  the one party  r u le  seems
t o  lea d  to  the  a b o l i t i o n  o f  d u a l i t y  or p fru la i i ty  not
on ly  o f  t h i s  k ind but o f  r e g io n a l  government can be
fu r th e r  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the  b r i e f  p o s t  independence h i s t o r y
o f  the Ghana r e g io n a l  a s s e m b l i e s .  They were e s t a b l i s h e d
i n  1958 and a b o l i s h e d  i n  1959.  Dr. Nkrumah declaimed:
"It  would be w a s t e f u l ,  cumbersome and a lth ough  unsound
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y ,  to  have i n  th e  proposed l o c a l  government
s t r u c t u r e ,  another t i e r ,  i n  the  form o f  r e g io n a l
2a s s e m b l i e s  *'
1 .  Cf.  Sy, o p . c i t .  p p .1 8 0 -1 ;  194 .
2 .  Ghana Government White Paper on R egional  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
Commission, 1958.
The CPP, however, was n e i t h e r  as  thoroughgoing i n  i t s  
v i l l a g e  mass o r g a n i s a t io n  nor ,  i t  seems i n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  
i d e o l o g i c a l l y  as  f i r m ly  based  as  was the  USBDA o f  Mali ,  
f o r  example. I t  i s  easy  to  f i n d  f a u l t s  i n  a party  th a t  
has f a i l e d .  But i t  seems c l e a r  th a t  a l though  the  CPP 
appeared to  have s t a r t e d  as  a mass p arty  and con t in ued  to  
p r e se n t  such a f r o n t ,  i t  cou ld  not i n  r e a l i t y  have been  
a genuine m ass-party  as  e v e n ts  proved. I t s  "control"  
o f  l o c a l  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  o r g a n i s a t io n s  d id  not i n  any way 
amount to  a predominant p o s i t i o n  o f  party  ©Y®er ad m in is tra ­
t i o n .  A c l o s e  observer  o f  the  Ghana p o l i t i c a l  scene
4saw i n  the a b o l i t i o n / t h e  power o f  r e g io n a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
“measures taken  to  “emphasise and augment th e  power 
o f  the  party  i n  th e  r e g i o n s . O t h e r s ,  b e in g  w ise  
a f t e r  the  e v e n t ,  c la im  t h a t  th e s e  measures were des igned  
t o  secure  Nkrumah*s personal c o n t r o l  over developments  
throughout th e  cou n try .  I s  i s  fu r th e r  c la im ed th a t  
i t  m attered  very  l i t t l e  whether the  newly appointed
2r e g io n a l  commissioners were a l l  members o f  the  CPP.
"Aside from th e  party  l e a d e r ,  th er e  e x i s t e d  
no c e n t r e ,  no source o f  power, c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e i r  c o n d u c t . . .
1 .  Cf. Dennis A u st in  -  P o l i t i c s  i n  Ghana. 194-6-1960 
(London & New York. Oxford U.P. 1964) p . 364.
2 .  C f .  Henry L. B r e t to n .  *The R ise  and P a l l  o f  Kwame 
Nkrumah -  A Study o f  P erson a l  Rule i n  A fr ica .  (London 
1967) p . 46.
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He (Nkrumah) s e l e c t e d  and appointed the  com missioners,  
remained p e r s o n a l ly  i n  touch w ith  them, c o n t r o l l e d  t h e i r  
emoluments, and decided when and on what grounds th ey  
were t o lb e  d i s c ip l in e d ." ^
The p a r t i e s  in  Guinea and Mali,  a s  i n  most 
A fr ic a n  s t a t e s ^ s t a r t e d  as i d e o l o g i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  not  as  
p a r t i e s  ox i n t e r e s t .  Themovement fo r  independence had 
in v o lv e d ,  i t  i s  tr u e ,  a gen era l  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .  But 
t h i s  was a fa r  cry from the  so r t  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  th a t  
m o tiv a ted  many o f  the h i s t o r i c  p a r t i e s  in  Europe and 
America. Some of the A fr ican  p a r t i e s  seemed to  have 
d e v ia t e d  from t h e i r  • ' id e o lo g ic a l1 l i n e  as sk etch ed  i n  
t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  aims and o b j e c t i v e s .  The s h i f t  o f  
a u t h o r i t y  from the Congress of  the PDCI to  p r e s id e n t  
Houphobfe t -B o ign y  i s  one example. Why has the  PDCI not  
r e s i s t e d  t h i s ?  One exp lan a t ion  may be th a t  th e  r e a l  
power base o f  Houphotiet-Boigny was the p la n t a t io n  owners 
and workers union which might be descr ibed  as  an i n t e r e s t  
group th a t  ha-j^ co n tr ib u ted  to  a process  o f  " i d e o l o g i c a l  
discharge" o f  the PDCI. one c o n c lu s io n  may
be hazarded as  being g e n e r a l ly  a p p l ic a b le :  the
n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r  must earn and r e t a i n  the c o n f id e n c e  o f  
th e  party  o r g a n is a t io n  more than th at  o f  the l e g i s l a t u r e .
1 .  i b i d .  This  a s s e r t i o n  i s  not e lu c id a te d  by i l l u s t r a t i o n s .
3flf.
The party  i s  t h e r e fo r e  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  which must he 
mainly r e l i e d  on as  p ro v id in g  means o f  c o n t r o l  over the  
e x e c u t i v e .
B . Other p a r t s  o f  A f r i c a
Turning to  o th er  p a r ts  o f  A f r i c a ,  we f i n d
s i m i l a r  p a t te r n s  o f  d ev e lop m en t^  For example, to  take
one p a t te r n ,  Dr. H ast in g s  Banda;the p r e s id e n t  o f  Malawij
has  turned th e  Malawi Congress Party  i n t o  an instrum ent
o f  p e r s o n a l  power. He i s  the  l i f e  chairman o f  the p a r ty ,
and the c e n t r a l  e x e c u t iv e  o f  th e  party  i s  w holly  s e l e c t e d
i-U
by him. The chairman has co n ce n tra ted  power o f  d i s -A
m i s s a l  o f  members e n t i r e l y  i n  h i s  hand. The party  has
a h ig h ly  c e n t r a l i s e d  o r g a n i s a t io n  and ifti branches must
rem it  to  the  party  c e n t r a l  o f f i c e  a i l  funds however
co l lec ted .^"  Dr. Banday does not  r e l y  &n th e  party
a lo n e  as  an instrument o f  p erso n a l  power. He has b u i l t
2a p r iv a te  army out o f  the  ”Young P io n e e r s ’1. The Young
1 .  c f .  H. Chipembere, 'Dr. Banda's O p p o s it io n  i n  E x i l e * ,  
The Guardian, 7 * 7 .6 6 .  The author w r i t e s  n o ta b ly :
*1 was m y se l f  an e n t h u s i a s t i c  advocate  o f  i t  (o n e -  
party government) u n t i l  two years  ago, when as  a 
r e s u l t  o f  ex p er ien ce  w i t h in  Malawi and o b s e r v a t io n s  
o f  tren d s  i n  o ther  A fr ic a n  s t a t e s  the  s y s te m ’ s su s­
c e p t i b i l i t y  to  abuse became c l e a r . ” The author was 
a m in i s t e r  i n  Dr. Banda's c a b in e t  u n t i l  1965.
2 .  This c o n s i s t s  o f  g r e e n - s h i r t e d  youths  who form a 
movement th a t  was o r i g i n a l l y  m odelled  on th e  youth  
movement o f  Ghana, a l s o  known as  young p io n e e r s  and 
a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  the C .P .P .
P io n e e r s  are tr a in e d  by I s r a e l i s  on a m i l i t a r y  b a s i s  -
d r i l l ,  modern a g r ic u l tu r e  methods, homecraft e t c .  The
m i l i t a r y  d r i l l  i s  des igned  to  i n s t i l  i m p l i c i t  obedience
to  s u p e r io r s .  A fter  com plet ion  o f  the  t r a in i n g  the
Young P ioneer  goes in to  th e  v i l l a g e  to  work w ith  th e
r u r a l  in h a b i ta n t s  showing them how to  improve t h e i r
standards  o f  l i v i n g .  The Young P ion eers  enjoy p a r i t y
w i th  th e  p o l i c e  and the army. They enjoy powers o f
a r r e s t ,  w h ile  the p o l i c e  have no powers o f  a r r e s t  over
them. Dr. Banda i s  t h e i r  commander-in-chief
The p ra ctica l re su lt  o f a l l  th is  i s  that the
MCP l o s t  whatever o r i g i n a l  i d e o l o g i c a l  p r e t e n s io n s  w£STt
cla im ed  fo r  i t ^  and i t s  machinery j and th a t  / t h e  Young
P io n e e r s  01#£used as an instrument fo r  su pp ress in g  a l l
c r i t i c i s m  and fo r  the p erp e tu a t io n  i n  power o f  an
i n d i v i d u a l  and a c l iq u e  around him. Nor does Dr. Banda
c o n c e a l  t h i s  f a c t  behind " i d e o l o g i c a l ” pronouncements.
In  the  space o f  two years  he ha$ got  r id  o f  s i x  o f  h i s
o r i g i n a l  ca b in e t  of  seven m in i s t e r s  fo r  opposing him
on such q u e s t io n s  as A f r i c a n i s a t io n  o f  the  C i v i l  S e r v i c e ,
p o l i c i e s  towards Rhodesia, Portugal  and South A f r i c a .
1 .  In 1966 th er e  were 1 ,1 6 3  tr a in e d  Young P io n e e r s  
c f .  The Yorkshire P ost  6 . 1 . 6 6 .
The c l e a r e s t  ev idence  o f  Dr* Banda’ s p erso n a l  r u le  i s  h i s  
d e c i s i o n  i n  o p p o s i t io n  to  OAU p o l i c y  and the  
o p in io n  o f  h i s  m i n i s t e r s  to  accept  h e lp  and ad v ice  from 
South A f r i c a .  For example the Sucoma sugar m i l l  p r o je c t  
near B alantyre^  has been f in a n c e d  by the  I n d u s t r i a l  
Development Corporation o f  South Afric^lvhich s t i p u l a t e d  
th a t  at  l e a s t  s i x t y  per ce n t  o f  the  m a te r ia l  used i n  th e  
c o n s x r u c t io n  o f  the  m i l l  had to  be o f  South A fr ic a n  o r i g i n .  
The MCP was used as  the  o r i g i n a l  power b a s e .  The concen­
t r a t e d  power o f  the party  chairman enabled  him to  b u i ld  
up a core  o f  f o l lo w in g  which m o b i l i s e d  p ub lic  o p in io n  fo r  
him as a n a t i o n a l  leader*  As soon as  the  members o f  
h i s  party  who  ^next to  him, were th e  most important were 
removed, Dr. Banda cou ld  no lo n ger  r e ly o n  the  p arty  or 
th e  government apparatus a lon e  as a source  o f  power.
Hence th e  p a r a - m i l i t a r y  ’Young P i o n e e r s ’ .
The Ghana e x p er ie n c e  has some p o in t s  o f  com­
p a r a t iv e  i n t e r e s t  to  th a t  o f  the  MCP. But Dr. Nkrumah 
never abandoned the  o r i g i n a l  id e o lo g ic a l j b a s i s  o f  h i s  
p a r ty ,  even though the CPP was fu r th e r  removed from the  
masses i n  1966 than he was ready to  b e l i e v e .  As two 
s tu d e n ts  o f  the  s u b je c t  have w r i t t e n : -
1 .  South A fr ic a n  F in a n c ia l  G azette  3 . 6 . 6 6 .  This  paper 
d e s c r ib e s  Banda as  " R e a l i s t  Banda."
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"The most obvious change from the 1950 P o s i t i v e  
A c t io n  days was th a t  the CPP no longer  behaved  
l i k e  a mass p o l i t i c a l  party. I n s te a d  i t  combined 
a p r e fe r e n c e  f o r  "summit" co n feren ces  w ith  th e  
s t y l e  o f  a U n ited  S ta te s  p o l i t i c a l  machine.
The CPP d id  not work through the trade unions or 
in v o lv e  the  masses i n  i t s  b a t t l e s  i n  any way;
 Bather than o rg a n isa t io n ,  a g i t a t i o n ,  and
p o l i t i c a l  ed u ca t io n  aimed at gen er a t in g  power 
from below, the CPP preferred  or f e l t  f o r c e d  to  
t r y  to  e x e r t  in f lu e n c e  from the top down by 
n e c o g n i t io n .  And when n e g o t ia t io n  f a i l e d  i t  
r e s o r t e d  to  a d m in is tr a t iv e  r e p r e s s io n .  The 
CPP*s behaviour during and a f t e r  the t h i r d  
and l a s t  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  i n  1956 i l l u s t r a t e s  
i t s  i n c r e a s i n g  i s o l a t i o n  from i t s  popular b a se ."
The CPP a t  th e  o u t s e t  r e l i e d  on young men f o r  su p p o rt .
B u.as  i t  t r i e d  to  form a broad c o a l i t i o n  a g a in s t  the
c o l o n i a l  a d m in i s tr a t io n ,  i t  f e l t  unable to  o rg a n ise  an
a t ta c k  on traditional, and other fo r c e s  which l a t e r  became
th e  c e n tr e  o f  d i s a f f e c t i o n .  By 1956, the  CPP no lo n g er
based i t s e l f  on the young men in  the ru ra l  a r e a s .  I t
even attem pted  to  ou tb id  the  op p os it ion  f o r  th e  favour
o f  the c h i e f s ,  working through them in  the  r u r a l  e l e c t i o n  
2campaigns. I t  would a l s o  adopt A m erican -s ty le  "pork-  
b arre l"  campaigning, o f t e n  holding out to  a l o c a l  c o u n c i l  
th e  promise o f  a generous development grant or t h r e a t s  
o f  i t s  w ithdraw al.^  Soon a f te r  independence, i n  March
1 .  B. P i t c h  and M. Oppenheimer ‘Ghana: End o f  an i l l u s i o n  
(New York & Lonaon) 1966) p . 73#
2 .  i b i d ,  p . 77 .
\  j3 .  C f .D en isp .u st in ,  o p . c i t .  p . 335.
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1957, " d is tu r b a n c e s11 broke out i n  th e  T rans-V olta
Togoland area ,  the new government had to  use tr o o p s  and
p o l i c e  to  suppress  the  d isturbances^  which s e v e r a l  people
were k i l l e d ,  A few wee^s l a t e r  an anti-CPP movement
sprang up i n  Accra, from among unemployed Ga-workers and
sm a l l  merchant c l a s s e s .  They c a l l e d  th em se lves  the  Ga
S ta n d fa s t  O rg a n isa t io n .  They demanded jo b s ,  b e t t e r
1
h ousing  and lower food p r i c e s .  The r e s u l t  was the
p assage  o f  the  Avoidance o f  D is c r im in a t io n  B i l l  which
p r o h ib i t e d  a l l  t r i b a l ,  r e l i g i o u s  and r e g io n a l  p a r t i e s .
In  t h e s e  c ircu m sta n ces ,  shaken by the  mass r a l l i e s  i n
Accra and the  armed r e v o l t  i n  Togo, th e  CPP government
which was s t i l l  i n  command o f  a l l  l e v e r s  o f  power, began
to  use th e  s t a t e  apparatus to  prevent fu r th e r  e r o s io n  o f
2i t s  narrow popular base .
And i n  1958 the  p r e v e n t iv e  D e te n t io n  Act was 
p a s s e d .  Under i t  the  E x ecu t iv e  cou ld  "order th e  
d e t e n t i o n  of  any person  who i s  a c i t i z e n  o f  Ghana i f  
s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  the order i s  n e c e s sa r y  to  prevent th a t  
person  a c t in g  i n  a manner p r e j u d i c i a l  to  th e  s e c u r i t y  
o f  the s t a t e . T h e  a d m in is tr a t io n  o f  the  P r e v e n t iv e
1 .  Their marches and r a l l i e s ) .w h ic h  numbered i n  t e n s  o f
thousands,  apparently  c r e a te d  q u ito  a shock i n  the
government f o r c i n g  CPP m i n i s t e r s  to  dr ive  t h e i r  cars
down the  s i d e  s t r e e t s  o f  Accra, c f .  P i t c h  and 
Oppenheimer o p . c i t .  p .?9*
2 .  i b i d .
3# Clause 2, s e c t i o n  1 o f  the  P r e v e n t iv e  D e te n t io n  A c t ,1958
D e te n t io n  Act between 195b and 19 66 ,  which i s  a s s o c i a t e d
a s  much w ith  th e  CPP as  w ith  Dr. Nkrumah, does no c r e d i t
to  either.'*’ In  a c t u a l  f a c t  even some o f  th e  b i t t e r e s t
c r i t i c s  o f  Nkrumah agree that  he "disp layed  a sen se  of
moderation and humane c o n s id e r a t io n  in  the  e x e r c i s e  of
2h i s  ever-grow ing  p o w e r . . . . "  The G-hana ex p er ien ce  has 
an added s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  that  i t s  outcome has been  
c o n c lu s iv e /o n e  s e n s e ,  demonstrating the p o in t  th a t  a party  
which has no popular b a s i s ,  or which has Si 
such b a s i s j c o u l d  not be r e l i e d  on to support a government 
i n  d i s t r e s s .  Whether the  Malawi Congress party  w i l l  
go the way o f  the  CPP i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say .  But i f  the  
p r e s id e n t  o f  Malawi r e l i e s  more and more on the  Young 
P io n eers  fo r  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  m i l i ta r y  b a lance ,  i t  i s  
d oub tfu l  whether the MCP would act d i f f e r e n t l y  i n  the  
event o f  an armed c h a l l e n g e .^
We now turn  to  Tanzania and the  UAR, where 
some i n t e r e s t i n g  experim ents  have been ta k in g  p l a c e .  The 
two c a s e s  have been chosen for  t h e i r  i n t r i n s i c  m e r i t s  as  
w e l l  as fo r  th e  care w ith  which they were undertaken by 
th e  l e a d e r s  o f  the  two s t a t e s .
1 .  Under i t  th e  E xecu t ive  could remove 6 u t  o f  c i r c u l a t i o n  
without p u b l i c i t y  any person regarded as  b e in g  a th r e a t  
to  the " s e c u r i ty  o f  the s ta t e ."  I t  has been c la im ed
th at  up to  2000 people  were deta ined  between 1957 and 1966.
2 .  Cf H.L. B r e t to n ,  o p . c i t .  p . 48.
3 .  Cf. Cha^Eight on the G-hana coup.
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In  Tanzania p r e s id e n t  Nyerere s e t  up a 
commission i n  January 1964, to study and rep o r t  on the  
es ta b l i sh m en t  o f  a democratic on e-p arty  s t a t e .  The 
com m ission 's  rep or t  was l a t e r  adopted almost i n  i t s
1e n t i r e t y  and th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  was m od if ied  a c c o r d in g ly .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  n o te  th a t  two members o f  the
Commission were sen t  abroad -  one to  Guinea, another  to
Y u go s lav ia  -  to  study the  system s i n  th e s e  r e s p e c t i v e  
2c o u n t r i e s .
On the ch a ra c ter  and r o l e  o f  the p arty  the  
Commission had t h i s  to  s a y : -
”In  a country where any number o f  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  are p erm it ted  to  f u n c t i o n  the  b a s ic  
c h a ra c ter  and r o l e  o f  a party can be l e f t  to  
be s e t t l e d  by the  p arty  managers. They have  
no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  I f  the  party  
managers are obtuse or i n j u d i c i o u s  or i n t o l ­
erant they  w i l l  s u f f e r  the consequences  o f  
unpopular ity  and e x c lu s i o n  from power.
In  a one-party  s t a t e ,  however th e  s i t u a t i o n  
i s  very d i f f e r e n t .  D e c i s io n s  a f f e c t i n g  the  
b a s ic  ch ara c ter  o f  th e  party  have a deep 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  s in c e  th ey  may 
w e l l  determine the  e x te n t  to  which a c i t i z e n  
i s p b l e  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  the  p r o c e s s  of
government In  a on e-p arty  s t a t e  the
t h r e a t ,  a c t u a l  or p o t e n t i a l ,  from an o p p o s i t io n  
group d isa p p ea rs .  T his  means th a t  the  p a r t y ' s  
s u r v iv a l  no lon g er  depends on mass member­
sh ip  or a f f i l i a t i o n .  from t h i s  i t  i s  some­
t im es  argued th a t  th e  party  should  see  i t s e l f
1 .  Cf. Report o f  the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  commission on th e  
es ta b l ish m en t  o f  a democratic one^party s t a t e  -  
Dar-es-Salaam , 1965*
2 .  The Commission acknowledges the u s e f u ln e s s  o f  t h i s  
r e p o r t ,  C f .  p . 7 .
i n  the  new co n te x t  as  an e l i t e  group,  
a m in o r i ty  i d e o l o g i c a l l y  d ed ica ted  who 
provide  from above the  l e a d e r s h ip  n ece s sa r y  
to  m o t iva te  the  i n e r t  mass o f  th e  community. 
Whatever p r a c t i c a l  advantages i t  may have 
i n  terms o f  dynamic l e a d e r s h ip /  we d e c i s i v e l y  
r e j e c t  t h i s  v iew o f  th e  party  and i t s  r o l e . .
We do not see  TANU as  an e l i t e  but as  a mass 
party  through which any c i t i z e n  o f  g o o d w i l l  
can p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  the  p r o c e s s  o f  Government. H
The other experiment which i s  p e c u l ia r  to  the
h i s t o r y  o f  the  n a t io n  concerned i s  th a t  o f  the  Arab
S o c i a l i s t  Union. Egypt e x e m p l i f i e s  some o f  the A fr ic a n
S t a t e s  where th er e  was no s e r io u s  e th n ic  or r e g io n a l
(problem, but where th ere  were o ther  problems. P r io r  to
2th e  r e v o lu t i o n  o f  1952 th er e  was an endemic p o l i t i c a l  
m a la ise  which was roo ted  i n  the economic and s o c i a l  
s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  cou n try .  There was the  ever growing  
power o f  the  b i g  la n d lo r d s  whose h o ld in g s  m a n ife s te d  the  
most s e r io u s  i n e q u a l i t y  i n  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  la n d -  
ownership and the  in c r e a s i n g  impoverishment o f  farmers  
and the d e c l i n in g  wages f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  workers.  There 
was a l s o  the f a l t e r i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  which had 
11 s u f fe r e d  so much from m o n o p o l i s t i c  p r e s s u r e s ,  w idespread  
e x p l o i t a t i o n ,  la c k  o f  q u a l i f i e d  en trep ren eu rs ,  s c a r c i t y
1 .  Report of  th e  Commission, o p . c i t .  p . 15*
2 .  c f .  Chapter 8 below.
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o f  c a p i t a l  and l i m i t a t i o n  o f  markets." The new
regime fa c e d  th e s e  problems, and the attem pts i t  made
t o  s o lv e  them cu lm inated  i n  the N ational  Charter o f
June 1962 and the  c o n s t i t u t i o n  which was based on i t .
The N a t io n a l  Charter p ro v id es  fo r  th e  c r e a t io n  o f  the.
Arab S o c i a l i s t  Union which, according to  the preamble
o f  i t s  s t a t u t e  “r e p r e s e n t s  the s o c i a l i s t  vanguard which
l e a d s  the  masses e x p r e s s e s  t h e i r  w i l l ,  d i r e c t s  n a t i o n a l
a c t i o n  and undertakes e f f e c t i v e  c o n tr o l  o f  th e  march
o f  such a c t i o n ,  w i t h in  the  framework o f  the N a t io n a l
Charter."  I t  was en v isa g ed  that  the p ea sa n ts ,  armed
f o r c e s ,  workers,  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  and n a t io n a l  c a p i t a l i s t s
c o u ld  a l l  j o in  i n  one a l l i a n c e .  There i s  thus  on the
f a c e  o f  i t  a s i m i l a r i t y  o f  approach to  membership o f
th^party  i n  the p o s t  N a t io n a l  Cnarter s i t u a t i o n  o f  the
U.A.4?. and i n  Tanzania b e fo r e  the Arusha D e c la r a t io n  o f
1967 .  TANU was c o n s id e r e d  to  be a " n a t io n a l i s t  movement
which i s  open to  a l l  -  which i s  i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  th e  whole 
2n a t io n ."  N e v e r th e le s s  adherence to  the p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
th e  party  i s  a c o n d i t i o n  f o r  membership in  both  c a s e s .
1 .  Cf.  Mohamed A l i  R i f a a t ,  *The Egyptian Experiment*.
Dec. 15 ,  Paper 33rd Study S ess io n  -  I n t e r n a t io n a l  
I n s t i t u t e  o f  d i f f e r i n g  c i v i l i s a t i o n s  -  (Palermo 23-  
27 S ep t .  1963) p . 3*
2 .  Cf.  J.K. Nyerere, o p . c i t .  p p .24 -5 .
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S in c e  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  exem p lify  the  '’ideologica l**  b a s i s
o f  many A fr ic a n  p a r t i e s ,  we w i l l  s e t  them out b r i e f l y
here
The aims and o b j e c t s  o f  TAMJ as  s e t  out in
th e  Arusha D e c la r a t io n  (1967) a r e : -
(a )  To c o n s o l i d a t e  and m a in ta in  th e  independence o f  
t h i s  country (Tanzania) and th e  freedom of i t s  
p e o p l e ;
(b) To sa fegu ard  the  in h e ren t  d i g n i t y  o f  the in d i v i d u a l  
in  accordance w ith  th e  U n iv e r s a l  D e c la r a t io n  o f  
Human R igh ts ;
( c )  To ensure th a t  t h i s  Country s h a l l  be governed by 
a democratic  s o c i a l i s t  government o f  the p eop le;
(d) To c o -o p e r a te  w ith  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i n  
A f r ic a  engaged i n  th e  l i b e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  A fr ic a ;
( e )  To see  t h a t  th e  Government m o b i l i z e s  a l l  the  
r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h i s  country  towards th e  e l im in a t io n  
o f  p o v er ty ,  ignorance  and d i s e a s e ;
( f )  To see  t h a t  the  Government a c t i v e l y  a s s i s t s  on 
the  form ation  and maintenance o f  c o - o p e r a t iv e  
organi sa t  i  o n s ;
(g )  To see  th a t  wherever p o s s i b l e  th e  government
i t s e l f  d i r e c t l y  p a r t i c i p a t e s  i n  th e  economic develop­
ment o f  t h i s  country;
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(h)  To se e  t h a t  the government -g ives  equal
o p portu n ity  to  a l l  men and women; i r r e s ­
p e c t i v e  o f  r a c e ,  r e l i g i o n  or s t a t u s ;
( i )  To see  th a t  the government e r a d i c a t e s  a l l  
ty p e s  of  e x p l o i t a t i o n ,  in t i m i d a t io n ,  d i s ­
c r im in a t io n ,  b r ib ery  and corru p t io n ;
( j )  To see  th a t  the  government e x e r c i s e s
e f f e c t i v e  c o n tr o l  over the p r i n c i p a l
means o f  p roduction  and pursues p o l i c i e s
-to
which f a c i l i t a t e  the  way the  c o l l e c t i v e  
ownership o f  the r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h i s  country ,
(k) To see  th a t  the government c o - o p e r a te s  w ith  
other s t a t e s  i n  A f r i c a  i n  b r in g in g  about 
A fr ic a n  u n ity ;
( l )  To see  th a t  the  government works t i r e l e s s l y  
towards world peace and s e c u r i t y  through the  
U.N.O.
The main o b j e c t i v e s  of  th e  Arab S o c i a l i s t
roJK I \ s i
Union, as  d e f in e d  by i t s  s t a t u t e ,  are to  sound
democracy’1 and to  sa fegu ard  the f o l l o w i n g  g u a ran tees  
which have been embodied i n  the N a t io n a l  C h a r te r : -
(a )  Minimum r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  i . e .  50^, f o r  workers  
and farmers i n  a l l  popular p o l i t i c a l  form ations  
a t  a l l  l e v e l s ;
(b) Right o f  c r i t i c i s m  and s e l f - c r i t i c i s m ;
( c )  P r i n c i p l e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  ownership;
(d) C o -o p er a t iv e  and labour  union form at ion s;  
and
(e )  Gradual t r a n s f e r  o f  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  the  
s t a t e  to  e l e c t e d  c o u n c i l s .
In  the p u r s u i t  o f  th e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  the  Arab 
S o c i a l i s t  Union i s  charged w ith  d u t i e s  which are expressed  
th u s :  -  **To become a p o s i t i v e  power behind the  
r e v o lu t io n a r y  a c t io n ;
-  To p r o te c t  the  p r i n c i p l e s  and o b j e c t i v e s  o f  the
r e v o lu t io n ;
-  To l i q u i d a t e  the  e f f e c t s  o f  c a p i t a l i s m  and
feu d a l ism ;
To f i g h t  a g a in s t  the  i n f i l t r a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  
in f lu e n c e ;
&-  To f i g h t  a g a in s t  the  V^turn o f  p a c t io n  which
has been e l im in a te d ;
To f i g h t  a g a in s t  th e  i n f i l t r a t i o n  o f  
opportunism;
-  To r e s i s t  p a s s i v i t y  and d e v ia t io n ;
-  To prevent  haphazard work i n  N at io n a l  
a c t i o n . ”
These aims o f  th e  p a r t i e s  i n  the two c o u n t r i e s  
r e f l e c t  the  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p eop le  as  
exp ressed  through the  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  p a r t i e s  (and 
governm ents) .  For h i s t o r i c a l  rea so n s  th er e  are
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  some o f  th e  d ec la red  o b j e c t i v e s .  For 
example i n  th e  U.A.R. a s p e c i a l  emphasis i s  l a i d  on 
th e  v i g i l a n c e  a g a in s t  the re tu rn  o f  r e a c t io n a r y  for©&5 
which were removed by the  r e v o lu t io n ;  on th e  o ther  hand 
th e  b a s ic  aims o f  c o n s t r u c t in g  a democratic s o c i a l i s t  
s o c i e t y  and m ain ta in in g  independence i s  a common fe a tu r e  
i n  the aims o f  both p a r t i e s ,  as  i t  i s  o f  most A fr ic a n  
p a r t i e s .  The summary rep r o d u c t io n  o f  these  aims o f  TANU 
and the Arab S o c i a l i s t  union may ser v e  as  a g e n e r a l  frame 
o f  r e f e r e n c e  o f  the aims o f  other  p a r t i e s  on th e  b a s i s  
o f  which governments are charged w ith  the  duty o f  
d i r e c t i n g  the  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e i r  s t a t e s .  As i t  was p o in ted  
out in  Chapter One th er e  are  some d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  approach.  
In  Mali and Guinea, fo r  example, the  p a r t i e s  s e t  out
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f o r  th em se lv es  the ta sk  o f  r a d ic a l  r e c o n s tr u c t io n  o f  
t h e i r  s o c i e t i e s ,  and the p a r t i e s  proposed to  p la y  the  
r o l e  o f  such r e c o n s tr u c t io n  along L en in is t  l i n e s .  By 
way of  c o n tr a s t  to  t h i s ,  mention was a l s o  made i n  
Chapter One o f  the approaches o f  P r e s id e n ts  N asser ,
Nyerere and Senghor. I t  i s  worth n oting  th a t  th e  U .P .S .  
O-l Senegal  has the fo l lo w in g  p r o v is io n  i n  i t s  s t a t u t e  
a s  one gu ide  o f  i t s  a c t i o n : -
”The U .P .S ,  tends to  the suppress ion  o f  a l l  
forms o f  op press ion  of  c l a s s  or c a s te  through  
th e  conquest o f  p o l i t i c a l  power, the s o c i a l ­
i s a t i o n  o f  the  means o f  production and 
exchange, the estab l ishm ent o f  a communal 
s o c i e t y  ( s o c i e t e  communautaire) and o f  a tr u e  
democracy to  the  s e r v ic e  o f  the p eop le .
That i s  to  say ,  th a t  the UPS draws i t s  i n s p i r a ­
t i o n  from the s o c i a l i s t  method, but i t  means 
to  i n t e g r a t e  i n t o  s o c ia l i s m ,  the c u l t u r a l  
v a lu e s  of  b lack  A f r i c a . 1*!
Nor was t h i s  the primary task  a s s ig n e d  to  an 
A fr ic a n  p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty .  P res ident  Habib Bourghiba has  
ex p la in e d  the  r o l e  o f  the party i n  a transformed f u n c t io n  
from s t r u g g l e  f o r  freedom to  the s tru g g le  f o r  development:
’’The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  that  in s te a d  of th e
policeman or the f o r e ig n  f l a g  that  wounds 
our d i g n i t y , i t  i s  the s p e c ta c le  o f  m iser y ,
ignorance  and under-development..........
We are m o b i l i s in g  o u r se lv e s  fo r  a s t r u g g le  
more d i f f i c u l t  than that  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  
freedom, because i t  c a l l s  fo r  the combined 
use o f  both  our m a ter ia l  and our human 
r e s o u r c e s .  I t  f o r c e s  men to  master th e -i r
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t h e i r  i n s t i n c t s  and t h e i r  e g o c e n tr ic i s m ,  
to  transcend  th e m s e lv e s ,  r a i s i n g  th e m se lv e s ,  
r a i s i n g  t h e i r  v i s i o n  and t h e i r  a c t i o n  to  
the  l e v e l  o f  the n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .  The 
b a t t l e  i s  f i r s t  o f  a l l  a conquest o f  s e l f ;  
i t  i s  im p o ss ib le  to  b u i ld  on h a tred  o f  
o t h e r s .  Our g o a l  i s  to  e n l i s t  the c o -o p e r a ­
t i o n  o f  every c i t i z e n  and to  b u i l d  a n a t io n  
which i s  n e i th e r  th e  game p rese rv e  o f  the  
b o u rg eo is  nor the  d ictatifotfsh ip  o f  the  
p r o l e r a r i a t ."1
&aef(
He may^have spoken fo r  many A fr ican  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s .
As fo r  the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the p a r t i e s ,  th e  r o l e  
s e t  out f o r  the  party  to  p la y  d i c t a t e d  a h i e r a r c h i c a l  
and c e n t r a l i s e d  party  machine d i f f e r i n g  from the  USHDA o f  
M a li , '  and the PDG o f  Guinea perhaps i n  emphasis and in  
symmetry o n ly .  I t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  i n  Tanzania f o r  example^  
tjAsCt the id e a  o f  a party  as  a n a t i o n a l  movement embracing 
t h e e n t i r e  p o p u la t io n  and e x p r e s s in g  t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n s  has  
been abandoned i n  favour o f  a more t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  
p a rty  o r g a n i s a t io n  w ith  a s t r i c t  scrutinyj^n membership 
re c r u i tm e n t .  The Arusha d e c l a r a t io n  o f  January 1967 
p u ts  the m atter  s u c c i n c t l y  th u s:
“S ince  the  founding o f  the Party  g r e a te r  emphasis  
has been put on having  as  la r g e  asmembership as  
p o s s i b l e .  This was j u s t i f i e d  during th e  s t r u g g le  
fo r  independence . Now, however, the  n a t i o n a l  
e x e c u t iv e  committee f e e l s  th a t  th e  time has come 
fo r  emphasis to  s h i f t  away from mere s i z e  o f  
membership to  the  q u a l i t y  o f  membership.
Greater c o n s id e r a t io n  must be g iv e n  to  a member’ s  
commitment to  the beLiefs and o b j e c t i v e s  o f  the  
P a rty ,  and i t s  p o l i c y  of  s o c i a l i s m . ”2
1 .  Habib Bourghiba, f The T u n is ien  way’ P o re ig n  A f f a i r s  
(A p r i l  1966,  p p .4 8 0 -8 .
2 .  The Arusha D e c la r a t io n  and TANU's p o l i c y  on s o c i a l i s m  and 
s e l f - r e l i a n c e 1 -  (D a r -es -S a l la a m , 1967) part 4 .
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I t  i s  now req u ired  o f  a l l  concerned to  observe the
membership c la u s e  o f  the  party  c o n s t i t u t i o n  c l o s e l y *
Where i t  i s  thought u n l i k e l y  th a t  an a p p l ic a n t  r e a l l y
a c c e p t s  the  b e l i e f s ,  aims and o b j e c t i v e s  o f  th e  p a r ty ,
i t  i s  requ ired  th a t  he should  be denied  membership,
1
TANU i s  "a party  o f  workers and p e a s a n t s , ” The
D e c la r a t io n  a l s o  recommends th a t  members should  g e t  a
thorough te a c h in g  on Party  id e o lo g y  so th a t  th ey  may
understand i t ,  and they  must be always reminded o f  the
2importance o f  l i v i n g  up to  i t s  p r i n c i p l e s .
Again, the  Arusha d e c l a r a t io n  r e q u ir e s  th a t  
every TANU and government l e a d e r  must be e i t h e r  a peasant  
or a worker and should i n  no way be a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  the  
p r a c t i c e s  o f  c a p i t a l i s m  or feu d a l ism ; should  not hold  
sh a res  in  a company; or h o ld  d i r e c t o r s h ip  i n  any p r iv a te  
owned e n t e r p r i s e ;  or r e c e i v e  two or more s a l a r i e s ;  or 
own houses which he r e n t s  to  o t h e r s ,  "Leaders” i n  t h i s  
sen se^  comprises members o f  the TAIfQ n a t i o n a l  e x e c u t iv e  
committee; m i n i s t e r s ;  members o f  par l iam ent;  s e n io r  
o f f i c i a l s  o f  p a r a - s t a t a l  o r g a n i s a t io n s ;  a l l  t h e s e  
appoin ted  or e l e c t e d  under any c la u s e  o f  the TANU c o n s t i t ­
u t io n ;  c o u n c i l l o r s  and c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  -  h igh  and middle  
c e d r e s .^
1 ,  i b i d ,
2 ,  i b i d ,  Part 5.C,
3 ,  i b i d ,  part 5 .A.
4 ,  i b i d .
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Tanzania i s  a s t a t e  o f  p ea sa n ts  and workers,  w ith  
s o c i a l i s t  aims but i s  not y e t  a s o c i a l i s t  s ta t e *  MI t  
s t i l l  has e lem ents  o f  c a p i t a l i s m  and fe u d a l ism  and t h e i r  
te m p ta t io n s .  These e lem ents  co u ld  expand and entrench  
t h e m s e l v e s . M And a tru e  member o f  TANU i s  a s o c i a l i s t .
"and h i s  co m p a tr io ts ,  th a t  i s  f e l l o w  b e l i e v e r s  
in  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  and economic f a i t h ,  are a l l  
th o se  i n  A f r i c a  and e lsew here  i n  the world  
who f i g h t  fo r  the r i g h t s  o f  the  p ea sa n ts  and 
workers.  The f i r s t  duty o f  a TANU member, 
and e s p e c i a l l y  b f  a TANU' l e a d e r ,  i s  to  l i v e  , 
by th e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  in  h i s  d ay-to -d ay  l i f e . . . "
The party  i n  Tanzania i s  a key i n s t i t u t i o n  and 
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  i t s  organs to  some o f  the  organs o f
2the  s t a t e  have an important c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
The supreme organ o f  TANU i s  the N a t io n a l  
Conference which meets  every  two y e a r s .^  The n a t io n a l  
co n feren ce  c o n s i s t s  of  o f f i c e r s  o f  the  p a r ty ,  n a t i o n a l ,  
r e g io n a l  and d i s t r i c t ,  d e l e g a t e s  d i r e c t l y  e l e c t e d  by the  
d i s t r i c t s  and a f f i l i a t e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  members o f  p a r l i a ­
ment and c e r t a i n  nominated p erso n s .^
1 .  i b i d ,  Part  2 ( a ) ,  ( d ) .
2 .  c f .  J.P.W.B.  McAuslan and Y.P.  G-hai, ’C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
In n o v a t io n  and P o l i t i c a l  S t a b i l i t y  i n  Tanzania: & 
p re l im in a ry  A ssessm en t’ . Journal  o f  Modern A fr ica n  
S . u d i e s ^ ( l  196(2) pp414-
3 .  TANU Cons. E . 2 .
4 .  I t s  membership i s  e s t im a te d  as between 400-450  
persons  cf .McAuslan e t  a l  o p . c i t .
38£.
I t  has g e n e r a l  powers o f  fo rm u la t in g  p o l i c y  
and s u p e r v is in g  the a c t i o n s  o f  TACT. I t  can change any 
d e c i s i o n  made by any o th er  organ o f  th e  party  or by any 
o f f i c e r  o f  th e  party* I t  has powers o f  e x p u ls io n  from 
membership and o f  amending the  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  TACT 
(by a two t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y ) .
However the l e n g t h  o f  the  time between the  
m eetin gs  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  co n feren ce  a f f e c t s  i t s  r e l a t i v e  
importance . In  p r a c t i c e  r e a l  power l i e s  w ith  the  n a t io n a l  
e x e c u t iv e  committee of  TANU, as i t  does w ith  the  p o l i t i c a l  
Bureau in  Guinea and M a l i .  The N a t io n a l  E xecutive  Bommittee 
(N.E.C. )  m eeting  once every  th re e  months, d e c id e s  on 
m a tter s  o f  g r e a t  n a t io n a l  importance which would be too  
l a t e  or too  im p r a c t ic a b le  f o r  the  n a t i o n a l  co n feren ce  to  
r e v e r s e  or r e p u d ia te  even i f  i t  had a mind to  do s o .
Some major d e c i s i o n s  o f  th e  s t a t e  have been taken  a t  NEC 
m e e t in g s ,  such as  fo r  example the  d e c i s i o n  to  e s t a b l i s h  a 
democratic on e-p arty  s t a t e .  The NEC c o n s i s t s  o f  some
n
e ig h t y  members. The p r e s id e n t  o f  the  party  i s  e l e c t e d
by the n a t i o n a l  con feren ce  fo r  s i x  y e a r s .  The other
members c o n s i s t  o f  s e v e n te e n  e l e c t e d  by the co n feren ce  and
an equal number of r e g io n a l  commissioners who are  ex
o f f i c i o  members p lu s  o t h e r s .  The s e c r e ta r y  g e n e r a l ,  the  
aeputy s e c r e t a r y  g en er a l  and the  n a t i o n a l  t r e a s u r e r  are
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appointed  by NEC. I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to note  t h a t  the  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  commission, w h i le  re co gn is in g  the  importance  
o f  the need to  m a in ta in  th e  c o n t in u i ty  of the  day to  day 
a d m in i s t r a t io n  o f  th e  p ar t j  , recommended th a t  the  p r e s id e n t  
o f  the party  should  be empowered to remove the s e c r e t a r y  
g e n e r a l ,  deputy s e c r e t a r y  g en era l  and n a t io n a l  t r e a s u r e r  
presumably a t  h i s  d i s c r e t i o n .  Prevbusly they  co u ld  
o n ly  be removed f o r  m isconduct .  He i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  
re q u ired  to  re p o r t  on th e  circum stances to th e  n ex t  m eet ing  
o f  the  NEC.1
The p r e s i d e n t i a l  commission was a t  p a in s  to  
p o in t  out the  importance o f  co -o rd in a t io n  o f  the  
d e c i s i o n s  o f  th e  NEC w ith  th o se  of the government. The 
q u e s t io n  o f  th e  NEC membership has a bearing on t h i s  
m a tter .  The NEC needs to  be w e l l  informed|)f the  d e t a i l s  
o f  a c t io n  a lrea d y  taken  or contemplated by government, 
and to  h&ve r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  expert advice on th e  adm inis­
t r a t i v e  and l e g a l  problems which may be posed by any 
p o l i c y  under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  The commission t h e r e f o r e  
recommend£dlg' th a t  the p r i n c i p l a  secre tary  to  th e  p r e s id e n t  
( o f  the r e p u b l ic )  and the  p r in c ip a l  l e g a l  a d v i se r  of the
government (p rov id ed  he i s  a member of  TANU) should  be
2e x - o f f i c i o  members o f  th e  NEC.
1 .  c f .  Report o f  Commission o p . c i t .  p . 29.
2 .  i b i d .
3 8 ? .
The r o l e  o f  th e  NEC in  r e l a t i o n  to  the n a t io n a l  assembly  
i s  a l s o  o f  i n t e r e s t *  Members of  the n a t io n a l  assembly  
are  ex o f f i c i o  members o f  the party n a t io n a l  c o n fe r e n c e ,  
and t h e i r  f u n c t io n  qua members o f  t h i s  co n feren ce  as  w e l l  
a s  qua members o f  the  n a t io n a l  assembly may a c t  as  a  
mutual re in forcem en t  o f  the co n tr o l  fu n c t io n  o f  both  
i n s t i t u t i o n s *  The report  of the commission on t h i s  i s  
i n s t r u c t i v e *  The commission has reported:
“The e s ta b l ish m en t  o f  a one party s t a t e  i n  which  
the p o s i t i o n  of  the  party i s  form ally  r e c o g n ise d
\in  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f  must n e c e s s a r i ly  d estroy  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  which e x i s t s  at p resen t  between th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of the party and th o s e  of  the government. We welcome t h i s .  The 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between government and party has  
never been understood by the people .  Eor the  
ordinary man u n in te r e s te d  in  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
th eory  TANU i s  the  government and the government  
i s  TANU. This  does not mean, o f  co u rse ,  th a t  
i n  a one party  s t a t e  the i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  the  
party must n e c e s s a r i l y  be s u b s t i t u t e d  fo r  th o se  
of the government or v ic e  v er sa .  I t  does mean, 
however, th a t  both s e t s  of i n s t i t u t i o n s  can be 
looked  a t  a f r e s h  as  in t e g r a l  parts  o f  a s i n g l e  
c o n s t i c u t i o n a l  system .
N e v e r th e le s s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  drawn between the  r o l e  o f
N.E.C.  and th e  n a t io n a l  assembly. The N.E.C. i s  concerned
w ith  the  fo r m u la t io n  of  the  broad l i n e s  of  p o l i c y .
1 .  o p r c i t .  p . 16 .
“I t  i s  t h e  s o u l  and c o n s c ie n c e  o f  t h e  p a r t y . ”
At i t s  m eet ings  the b a s ic  assumptions o f  government p o l i c y  
are  fra n k ly  q u est io n ed  and e x h a u s t iv e ly  debated. The 
n a t i o n a l  assem bly;on  the  o ther  hand, i s  p r im a r i ly  concerned  
w ith  the more d e t a i l e d  t a s k  o f  g i v i n g  e f f e c t  to  government 
p o l i c y  through ap propr ia te  l e g i s l a t i v e  measures and 
e x e r c i s i n g  v i g i l a n t  c o n t r o l  over a l l  a s p e c t s  o f  government 
expenditure  ( i t a l i c s  su p p l ied )
The other  c e n t r a l  organs o f  the p a r ty ,  are the
t y
c e n t r a l  committee ,  the  c a b in e t ,  the  e l e c t o r a l  con feren ce
and the d i s c i p l i n a r y  committee have l e s s  important  
2f u n c t i o n s .  Of th e s e  on ly  the  c e n t r a l  committee has any 
e f f e c t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e .  I t  c o n s i s t s  o f  the  s e n io r
o f f i c e r s  o f  the  p a r ty ,  togeifer w ith  such persons  as  may
be appointed by the p r e s id e n t  o f  the  party;  s e v e r a l  of  
i t s  members are ca b in e t  m i n i s t e r s ,  and t h i s  f a c t  i s  g iv e n ,  
among o th e r s ,  a s / r e a s o n  f o r  the  r e l a t i v e  unimportance o f  
th e  c e n t r a l  c im m ittee  -  “th er e  are no members who are  
powerful p ure ly  by reason  o f  t h e i r  s ta n d in g  i n  the  P arty .
1 .  i b i d .
2 .  c f .  TAKU Cons. E, 5, 7 ,  36*
3 .  c f .  McAuslan e t  a l ,  o p . c i c  • p
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At the  l o c a l  l e v e l  the organs o f  th e  party  and 
government meet i n  the same o f f i c e .  The r e g io n a l  commis­
s i o n e r s  are r e g io n a l  s e c r e t a r i e s  o f  TANTJ.  ^ A lso  s in c e  
1965, the d i s t r i c t  c o u n c i l s  inc lude  members o f  the  
d i s t r i c t  e x e c u t iv e  committee o f  TANU who are ex o f f i c i o  
members o f  the  c o u n c i l .  The same i s  true of town c o u n c i l s
Q; 2
and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  where there i s / s e p a r a t e  TANU o r g a n i s a t io n .
In  s p i t e  o f  the  in term in g l in g  o f  personnel ,  however,  
th e  organs o f  party  and s t a t e  have been kept d i s t i n c t  
Performing d i s t i n c t  f u n c t io n s .  To that  e x t e n t ,  the  
p o t e n t i a l  r o l e  o f  the party  organs as means o f  c o n t r o l  
o f  the e x e c u t iv e  may be enhanced. Some ob servers  
co n s id e r  th a t  the th r u s t  o f  the changes in  Tanzania i s  
c l e a r l y  in  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  the e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  c o n t r o l  
o f  the party over government, both in  i t s  co n ta c t  w ith  th e  
p eo p le  and in  i t s  power over the government. I t  i s  a l s o  
s u g g e s te d  th a t  the  emphasis l a i d  on i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  
c o n t r o l  over the  government in d ic a te  th a t  the problems o f  
government in  a one-party  S ta te  were p erce ived  by th e  
l e a d e r s  o f  Tanzania, and i n  p a r t ic u la r  by the p r e s id e n t  
and the p r e s i d e n t i c l  :v.; commission. The e s ta b l i sh m en t  o f
1 .  Regional  s e c r e t a r i e s  are ex o f f i c i o  members o f  the  NEC.
2 .  c f .  The Report of  Commission, o p . c i t .  p . 25*
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a permanent commission o f  enquiry i s  another example which  
supports  the  view that  the Tanzanian government and party  
l e a d e r s  have made con sc iou s  e f f o r t s  to prevent th e  emergence 
o f  a se l f -p e r p e tu a t in g '  o l ig a rch y  in  a one-party  system  
i n  which the  government a ccep ts  c e r t a in  c o n t r o l s  over i t  
without equating  co n tr o l  with o p p o s i t io n  and o p p o s i t i o n  
w ith  t r e a s o n .  The nature and ex ten t  o f  th e  p a r t y ’ s 
fu n c t io n  as  a motor fo r c e  and brake on government w i l l  
depend as much on the c e n tr a l  party organs as  on the  party  
organ i n  the  r e g io n s ,  which in  Tanzania show/ s t r e n g t h  
and v i t a l i t y .  P res id en t  Nyerere perceived  th e  importance  
o f  s tre n g th e n in g  the g ra ss  r o o t s .  He r e l in q u is h e d  h i s  
government lea d ersh ip  in  January 1962 * in  order to  r e ­
o rg a n ise  and r e - o r i e n t  the  party fo r  the new s t r u g g le  fo r  
economic development and he has co n s ta n t ly  i n s i s t e d  on the
need f o r  the party to  keep i t s e l f  in  touch w ith  th e  g r a s s -
2r o o t s  o f  the movement and the ordinary p e a s a n t , " This  
i s  fu r th e r  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the d e c i s io n  of th e  Tanzania  
government in  1966 to launch a u n iv e r s i ty  s tu d en t  s e r v ic e  
p r o j e c t  des igned  to keep the new e l i t e  in  touch  w ith  th e  
g e n e r a l  p u b l ic  and w ith  the r e a l i t y  of  the n a t i o n ’ s l i f e *
1 ,  Cf.  McAuslan e t  a l ,  o p . c i t .
2* i b i d .
The Arusha r e s o l v e  on s e l f - r e l i a n c e  i s  another a s p e c t  o f  
th e  Tanzanian l e a d e r s '  b a s ic  p o l i t i c a l  ( p o u l i s t )  
o r i e n t a t i o n .  I t  i s  not doubted th a t  th er e  are some o f  
th e  important c o n d i t io n s  f o r  the f r u i t f u l  e x e r c i s e  o f  
government party  e x e c u t iv e  power i n  a developmental  
c o n t e x t .
We must now tu rn  to  the  s t r u c tu r e  o f  the  Arab 
S o c i a l i s t  Union. I t  must beborne i n  mind th a t  the  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  Egyptian  s t a t e  a f t e r  1952 r e f l e c t s  the  
p e c u l ia r  way i n  which i t  was c r e a te d ,  which has an 
important b ear in g  on th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the p a r ty .  F i r s t  
o f  a l l  i t# '  i s  l in k e d  w ith  p r e s id e n t  G-arnal Abdel Nasser  
and h i s  m i l i t a r y  c o l l e a g u e s  who brought about the  
r e v o l u t i o n .  As a lrea d y  s t a t e d  the membership o f  the  
Arab s o c i a l i s t  union was en v isaged  to  comprise the  p ea san ts  
th e  armed f o r c e s ,  the workers,  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  and the  
n a t io n a l  c a p i t a l i s t s .  As P r e s id e n t  Nasser c laimed^the  
o r g a n is a t io n  o f  the  Arab s o c i a l i s t  union would b r in g  in t o  
l i g h t  a new vanguard -  "the n a t io n  has in v e s t e d  i n  the  
f a r  g r e a te r  a u th o r i ty  than my f u n c t i o n s  as  P r e s id e n t  
o f  the r e p u b l ic  warrant.  I  s h a l l  put t h i s  a u th o r i ty  a t  th e  
s e r v i c e  o f  t h i s  vanguard". But what k ind o f  vanguard  
was i t ?
As regards  membership q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t h i s  
corresponded rough#ly to  u n iv e r s a l  s u f fr a g e ;  p roo f  o f  
c i t i z e n s h i p ;  age l i m i t  ( IB) ;  absence o f  cr im in a l  
record; accep tan ce  o f  the  ch a r ter  and w r i t t e n  a p p l i c a t i o n .  
The union i s  founded on the  b a s ic  u n it  which i s  the v i l l a g e  
or an e q u iv a le n t  grouping such as  a f a c t o r y .  The next  
l e v e l  i s  th a t  o f  th e  c i t y ,  d i s t r i c t  or p u b l ic  co r p o r a t io n  
composed o f  more than  one b a s ic  u n i t .  Then comes the  
l e v e l  o f  markaz -  a m unic ipa l  and p o l i c e  u n i t .  A f te r  
th a t  th ere  i s  the  country  governorate  l e v e l ,  and f i n a l l y  
th e  n a t io n a l  l e v e l .  The b a s ic  u n i t s  e l e c t  t h e i r  c o u n c i l s .  
These b a s ic  u n i t s  a l s o  send d e l e g a t e s  to  e l e c t  th e  
members of  th e  c o u n c i l s  immediate ly  above them. Simi­
l a r l y  the markaz d e l e g a t e s  e l e c t  the  county c o u n c i l s .
The supreme organ o f  the  Union i s  the  General n a t i o n a l  
co n g ress  which c o n s i s t s  o f  a l l  members o f  the  c o u n c i l s ,  
r i g h t  down to  the  b a s ic  u n i t .  I t  has a s i x  year term 
and i t  meets once a y e a r .  The g e n e r a l  n a t i o n a l  
co n g ress  e l e c t s  a g e n e r a l  committee to  carry out i t s  
work between i t s  m e e t in g s .  The g e n e r a l  committee i n  
tu rn  s e l e c t s  from among i t s  members the h igher  e x e c u t iv e  
committee o f  not more than  tw e n t y - s ix  p erso n s .
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There i s  a l s o  a p res id en cy  c o u n c i l  which d e a ls  
wi t h  a l l  m atters  p e r t a in i n g  to  the powers o f  the p r e s id e n t  
o f  the r e p u b l i c .  I t s  members are chosen  from the h igher  
e x e c u t iv e  committee o f  the  co n g re ss  o f  the  Arab S o c i a l i s t  
Union. P r e s id e n t  N a s se r ’ s comment on i t s  fu n c t io n  i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t ,  -  ,!I  s t a t e d  a t  the N a t io n a l  Congress th a t  we 
would apply the system o f  c o l l e c t i v e  l e a d e r s h i p .  There 
w i l l  oe a p r e s id e n t  o f  the  r e p u b l ic  but th ere  w i l l  be 
meanwhile a P res id en cy  C ou n ci l  f o r  a l l t h e  f u n c t io n s  
in c lu d ed  in  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  There w i l l  a l s o  be a 
P rid e  M in is t e r ,  a c o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r s .  We s h a l l  a l l  thus
work i n  a c o l l e c t i v e  s y s te m   The p res id en cy  c o u n c i l
w i l l  rep resen t  the  supreme a u th o r i ty  o f  the  S t a t e .  The 
e x e c u t iv e  c o u n c i l  w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  the  e x e c u t iv e  and 
a d m in is tr a t iv e  powers o f  th e  s t a t e . fl^  He a l s o
e x p la in e d  th a t  the c r e a t i o n  of  the  p res id en cy  c o u n c i l ,  
which was regarded  as a v o lu n ta r y  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  h i s  
powers, was d es ign ed  to  r e l i e v e  him o f  many a d m in i s t r a t iv e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  government and thus enable him to  
apply  h im s e l f  more f u l l y  to  the  e s ta o l i s h m e n t  and proper  
fu n c t io n in g  o f  the  Arab S o c i a l i s t  Union.
1 .  c f .  Mohamed A l i  R i f a a t ,  o p . c i t .  p .9»
This  emphasis l a i d  on "party work" by P r e s id e n t  
N asser  can be ex p la in ed  p a r t l y  by th e  o r i g i n  o f  the  
N a s s e r i t e  r e v o lu t i o n  which needed popular l e g i t i m a t i o n ;  
and p a r t ly  by a d e s ir e  to  p la c e  the  achievem ents  o f  th a t  
r e v o l u t i o n  i n  a r e s tr u c tu r e d  p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l  and economic 
b a s i s .  The id e o lo g y  o f  Arab S o c ia l i s m  was l i n k e d  w ith  
t h i s  t a s k .  f t  w i l l  h e lp  to  tr a c e  i t s  development^ i n  
order to  g a in  a proper p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  i t s  p o l i t i o n  and 
r o l e .
The power o f  a m i l i t a r y  regime cannot bear
much f r u i t  i n  terms o f  o b ta in in g  popular response  and
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  economic and s o c i a l  development, u n le ss
i t  i s  p rop er ly  founded on such a b a se .  The o ld  adage:
C(The same a r t s  t h a t  did g a m
tfA power must i t  m ainta in
n eeds to  be q u a l i f i e d  i n  modern t im e s ,  where the  v a lu e s  o f
u n iv e r s a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  government through a p o l i t i c a l
p ar ty  g i v e s  the  party  s p e c i f i c  l e g i t i m a c y .  The m i l i t a r y
regime cannot ac t  as  c u s to d ia n s  o f  such l e g i t i m a c y  u n le s s
th ey  make genuine e f f o r t s  to  e s t a b l i s h  th e  party  on a
c i v i l i a n  b a s e .  Nor can t~ e y  r u le  as a c a s t e ,  apart from
1th e  s o c i e t y  i n  wnich they  are engaged in  p o l i t i c s .
1 .  This i s  examined in  more d e t a i l  i n  Part IV o f  t h i s  s tudy .
The term " p o l i t i c s 11 i s  here used in  a wider sense  
embracing the d i r e c t io n  and su p erv is ion  o f  p u b l ic  l i f e  
and the i n t e r a c t i o n  in vo lved  th er e in ;  and not m erely  i n  
th e  l i m i t e d  sen se  o f  the a c t i v i t i e s  geared to  g a in in g  
or m ain ta in in g  power*
The l e a d e r s  of the 1952 r e v o lu t io n  l e d  by 
Nasser were i n i t i a l l y  faced  with the task  o f  the conquest  
and c o n s o l i d a t io n  o f  power and the l i b e r a t i o n  o f  Egypt
(a )  from a much abused feud a l  regime and (b) from f o r e i g n  
dom ination.  The f i r s t  stage of t h e i r  advent was in f lu e n c e d  
by th e se  o b j e c t i v e s  which were achieved  by 1956.  L ater ,  
h aving  a ch iev ed  t h e i r  f i r s t  se t  o f  o b j e c t i v e s ,  they  turned  
to  the ta s k  o f  g iv in g  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  r e v o lu t io n  an 
economic and s o c i a l  co n te n t .  In a word they began a 
sea r ch  fo r  a s p e c i f i c  id eo lo g y .  They s t a r t e d  a s e r i e s  
o f  measures which culminated in  the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
d e c r e e s  o f  the  summer and autumn of 1961, as i f  t e s t i n g  
th e  p e c u l ia r  s o c i a l i s t  ideo logy  which they developed  by 
s t a g e s .  1961 was a l s o  marked by a s e r i e s  o f  c r i s e s ,  
in c lu d in g  th e  break up o f  the union with S y r ia .  The 
c i v i l i a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  of  Egypt at  the time seem to  
have withdrawn t h e i r  " p a rt ic ip a t io n ^  r e fu s in g  to  provide
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1th e  regime w ith  i t s  id e o l o g y .  The regime was t h e r e fo r e
l e f t  to  i t s  own i n t e l l e c t u a l  r e s o u r c e s  to  r a t i o n a l i s e  the
p ro g re s s  o f  th e  r e v o lu t i o n  g i v i n g  i t  s p e c i f i c  id e o lo g y
and d i r e c t i o n .
^sSo ,  i n  the sp r in g  o f  19 6 2 7a con feren ce  th a t
c a l l e d  i t s e l f  the  N a t io n a l  Congress o f  popular f o r c e s  o f
Egypt met to  d e l i b e r a t e  on the  n a t i o n a l  c h a r te r ,  which was
proclaim ed i n  June o f  th a t  y e a r .  The n a t io n a l  union which
had been p r e v io u s ly  formed as a m a k e -sh i f t  body to  r a l l y
support f o r  the  regime was now d i s s o l v e d  and r e p la c e d  by
a new one -  party  system . Thus the Arab S o c i a l i s t  Union
was born. Mohammed H assanein  H e ik a l ,  th e  e d i to r  o f  the
s e m i - o f f i c i a l  d a i l y ,  Al-Ahram, d e f in e d  the  r o l e  o f  the
m i l i t a r y  w i t h in  a framework o f  a "new s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l
th e o r y " : the  popdar r e v o lu t io n a r y  movement can only  l e a n
on the army to  reach th e  g o a l  o f  the  r e v o lu t i o n .  And
a g a in ,  echoing G-amal Abdel Nasser he wrote "We do not
want p o l i t i c i a n s  w i th in  th e  army. But the e n t i r e  army
2c o n s t i t u t e s  a fo r c e  w i th in  the  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s . "
1 .  Cf.  Anouar Abdel Malek, 'Le r S le  de l 'arm ee  dans l a  
v ie  p o l i t i q u e  en R. A l l . ’ Rev. f r a n f a i s e  d*etudes  
p o l i t i q u e s  a f r i c a in e s "  Fev. 1967 No. 14 ,  p . 56-73*
2 .  Al-Ahram, 23-27  Ju ly  1962, quoted by A.A. Malek o p . c i t .  
p. 69.
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This. e x p la in s  the comprehensive membership o f  the  Arab
S o c i a l i s t  Union in c lu d in g ,  as i t  does the e n t i r e  armed
f o r c e s .  The experiment i s  a l l  the more f a s c i n a t i n g
oecabe i t  i s  so u n l ik e  the majority  of other c a s e s  i n  which
a p o l i t i c a l  party^headed by men who are a l so  heads o f
1
th e  government, a ttem pts  to  p o l i t i c i s e  the army.
Here we have army l e a d e r s  who have a monopoly o f  government 
power c r e a t in g  a p o l i t i c a l  party which embraces th e  army. 
But the experiment had i t s  p ecu l ia r  precautionary  d e v ic e s ;
-  the Arab S o c i a l i s t  Union div ided  i t s  m i l i t a r y  cadres  
i n t o  two c a t e g o r i e s
(a )  The o f f i c e r s  in v o lv e d  a c t iv e ly  in  p o l i t ic a l  l i f e ,  
and
(b) The o f f i c e r s  who continue  t h e i r  m i l i ta r y  c a r e e r s .
The f i r s t  ca tego ry  had to  abandon t h e i r  uniforms and a l l  
th e  p r e r o g a t iv e s  of m i l i t a r y  rank. On the onher hand 
th ey  were g iv e n  key p o s t s  in  the s t a t e  apparatus: T,he
g r e a t e r  number o f  the h igher  d i p l im a t i c s e r v ic e ,  many 
p o s t s  of  p r e s id e n t ,  d i r e c t o r  and members of a d m in i s t r a t iv e  
c o u n c i l s  o f  s t a t e  organs, many p o s t s  as m in i s t e r s  and under­
s e c r e t a r i e s  o f  S ta te ;  d ir e c t o r s  g en era l  and d i r e c t o r s
1 .  As we s h a l l  see l a t e r ,  where t h i s  i s  attempt t h r e a te n s  
the corporate  i n t e r e s t  o f  the army, i t  can be th e  cause  
o f  a coup, c f .  Chapter 8.
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o f  d i f f e r e n t  m i n i s t r i e s ;  tjtfe a lmost a l l  the h ig h er  cadres  
and d i r e c t o r s  o f  s e c u r i t y  s e r v i c e s ;  an important p ro p o rt ion  
or directive f u n c t io n s  in  c u l t u r a l  domains, i n  in fo rm a t io n ,  
i n  the p r e s s ,  rad io  and t e l e v i s i o n .  The second category  
co u ld  remain i n  the army.
In  t h i s  waythe "free  o f f i c e r s "  had c o n t r o l  
over the apparatus o f  g o v er n in g .  The supreme organ of  
th e  s t a t e ,  th e  p r e s id e n c y ,  was i n  the hand o f  one o f  them -  
a l b e i t  a u n i v e r s a l l y  a c c e p te d  n a t i o n a l  f i g u r e .  The key 
p o s t s  i n  the  government, auch a s  the  m in i s tr y  o f  war, and 
i n i t e r i o r  w£fc^in t h e i r  hand. The government o f  S ik k i  
Soliman, who was a c o l o n e l  and en g in eer ,  co n ta in ed  four  
v i c e - p r e s i d e n t s  in  the c o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r s ,  o f  whom 
th r e e  were h igh  ranking o f f i c e r s  o f  the  army (Abdel-  
Mohsen Aboul-Noun, Mahmoud Younes and Sarwat Okasha); 
th e  fo u r th ,  doctor Mohmoud Rawzi ( f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ) ,  though  
a c iv i l ia n ^ w a s  h arnessed  w ith  a m i l i t a r y  man as the  m in i s t e r  
o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  i . e .  Mahmoud Riad. Half the number 
o f  the  c o u n c i l  o f  m i n i s t e r s  o f  th e  Soliman government 
were h igh -ran k in g  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s .  And as  a lread y  
n oted  through the  f i r s t '  c a te g o r y  o f  (former) army o f f i c e r s ^  
th e  c e n t r e s  o f  e x e c u t iv e  d ec is ion -m ak in g  o f  importance were 
c o n t r o l l e d  by the  m i l i t a r y
1 .  A.A. Malek,  o p . c i t .  p p . 6 9 -7 0 .
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N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  th e p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  r e p u b l i c ,  
though o r i g i n a l l y  a ' f r e e  o f f i c e r b e c a m e  p r e s id e n t  by a 
popular mandate. Moreover he i s  the  p r e s id e n t  o f  the  
Arab S o c i a l i s t  Union, o f  which th e  army forms a p a r t i a l  
membership. Even though some key p o s t s  in  t h i s  party  
are h e ld  by the  m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l  ca d r e s ,  (above a l l  
i n  the e x e c u t iv e  committee) the e x e c u t io n  o f  the  d e c i s i o n s  
made by the  party  l e a d e r s h ip  depends on the good w i l l  
and c o - o p e r a t io h  o f  c i v i l i a n  cadre3 o f  a c t i f i s t s  and 
on the memoershrp which i t  c o n t r o l s .  The mere (mechanical)  
c o n t r o l  o f  the  in stru m en ts  o f  power by form erly  m i l i t a r y  
cad res  i s  not s u f f i c i e n t ,  i f  the  Arab S o c i a l i s t  union,  
a s  a party  based  on the p e o p le ^ i s  to  have any meaning,  
and i f  the  government i s  to  secure popular respon se  and 
p a r t i c i p a t e s  i n  i t s  programmes of  development.
U l t im a t e ly  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  the experiment w i l l  depend on 
how fa r  the  p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  w i l l  go to  c r e a te  
a genuine p o p u la r ly  based paruy which has e f f e c t i v e  
means o f  a c t i o n  and c o n t r o l  a c t io n  to  m o b i l i s e  th e  people  
round an a cc ep ted  l e a d e r s h ip  and government, and to  
e x e r c i s e  c o n t r o l  over th a t  government. The Arab S o c i a l i s t  
Union i s  s t i l l  a movement -  a c o a l i t i o n  o f  f o r c e s  -  and 
n o t  a p a r ty .  As Anour Abdel-Malek has put i t :
"the popular masses i n  whose name a c t io n s  are taken  are  
o u t s id e  the  power o f  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s io n ;  " and he adds 
t h a t  the  r e s i s t a n c e  by th e  new c l a s s  o f  p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  
t e c h n o c r a t s  i s  the source  o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  problems o f  
Egypt.
Some General C onclus ions
This  account o f  some p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and
t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  to  the e x e c u t iv e  has been made on the  b a s i s
o f  a b e l i e f  th a t  the  c a s e s  d i s c u s s e d  are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
Blit i t  i s  r e a l i s e d  th a t  th e r e  are always l o c a l  p e c u l i a r i t i e s
which co m p lica te  the picture.^* With t h i s  c a v e a t ,  we
must now b r i e f l y  g e n e r a l i s e  on some of  the problems which
may a r i s e  i n  the system i f  ^ one-party s t a t e  w ith  a dominant
A
e x e c u t i v e .  I f  i t  i s  tru e  th a t  th e  s tr o n g  e x e c u t iv e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  system o f  government has been h arn essed  i n  
a on e-p arty  s t a t e ,  i t  i s  e q u a l ly  tr u e  th a t  i t  i s  b e s e t  
w ith  problems. We can on ly  o u t l i n e  some o f  th e  most 
im p o r ta n t .
To b eg in  w ith ,  i n  many c a s e s  the system was 
c r e a t e d  f o r  and by the n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s  who embodied 
th e  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  p e o p le .  One r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  was
1 .  The fo cu s  i s  on the p r e s i d e n t i a l  reg im es .  The r o l e  o f  
p a r t i e s  in  other regim es have been touched upon i n  the  
ap propr ia te  c h a p te r s .  C f .  ch a p ters  th re e  and fo u r .
t h a t  the  party  in  some c a s e s  became an instrum ent o f
p erso n a l  power i n  the hands of  the l e a d e r s .  The formal
w r i t t e n  t e x t s  o f  the c o n s t i t u t i o n s  which a l l o c a t e d
powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  were m odif ied  by the  f a c t  
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o f / e x i s t e n c e  and the power-dynamics of  the  o n e-p arty  
system . Ghana, Malawi and The Ivory Coast are examples,
i
a s  we have s e e n .  I t  i s  co n ce iva b le  th a t  some a s p e c t s  
o f  t h i s  problem e x i s t  in  a l l  one-party  system s,  from the  
n atu re  of t h in g s  -  the absence o f  o p p o s i t io n ,  the  h ie r a r c h ic  
and a u t h o r i t a t i v e  s tru ctu re  of the party ,  th e  monopoly 
o f  government-cum-party power o f  the l e a d e r s ,  e t c .
There are other problems which are con n ected  
w ith  t h i s  and which have f low# from i t .  They may be 
summed up i n  th e  words: popular respon se ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n
and c o n t r o l  i n  connect ion  w ith  government p o l i c y  and 
a c t i o n .  The power of the s t a t e ,  great  as i t  i s ,  has  
i t s  in h eren t  l i m i t a t i o n s .  The c o n tr o l  o f  f o r c e ,  money 
and jobs i s  c r u c ia l  as a fa c to r  in  m o t iv a t in g  p e o p le s '  
con d u ct ,  but i t  i s  not s u f f i c i e n t  to  m otivate  them to  
r e q u ir e d  d i r e c t io n s  a l l  the time or to the e x te n t  
r e q u ir e d .  Even the b est  organised  party machines are  
not i n  them selvos  enough. I t  i s  now apparent,  f o r
example, th a t  popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  party  a c t i v i t i e s  
are  not a s  g r e a t  as th ey  were i n  pre- independence or 
immediate ly  p o st- in d ep en d en ce  days.  . The most e f f e c t i v e  
mass m o b i l i s a t io n s  i n  p o s t  independence A fr ic a  have been  
i n  the s t a t e s  which were fa c e d  w ith  th e  th r e a t  o f  a 
dep art in g  c o l o n i a l  power, as  i n  Guinea and M ali .  Admittedly  
i n  Guinea and Mali the r e v o lu t io n a r y  mystique o f  the  r o le  
o f  the masses and the  Jacob in -M arx ist  t r a d i t i o n  o f  the  
l e g i t i m a c y  o f  the "convention" which th e  p a r t i e s  i n  th o se  
two c o u n tr ie s  i n h e r i t e d  h e lp ed  the emergence o f  s tron g  
mass p a r t i e s .
But the  r e v o lu t io n a r y  e la n  o f  a p arty  normally  
weakens w ith  th e  achievement o f  some o f  the  i n i t i a l  
o b j e c t i v e s  -  be i t  the removal o f  the f o r e i g n  th r e a t  or 
o th er  more p o s i t i v e  aims. This may be exp ected  to  happen 
i n  th ese  c o u n t r i e s  u n le s s  d r a s t i c  measures are taken  th a t  
can engage the  e n e r g ie s  j in t e r e s  t  and support o f  the  
m asses ,  and th e  party  i s  r e v i t a l i s e d  as  a key c e n tr e  o f  
d ec is io n -m a k in g .
The i n i t i a l  enthusiasm f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
mass movements cannot be m ainta ined  f o r  long  p e r io d s  o f  
t im e a t  the  same l e v e l .  For one th in g  p e o p le s '  p r iv a te
p r iv a t e  l i v e s  make p r io r  demand/on t h e i r  time and energy.  
T his  i s  true  at  the  l e v e l  o f  the party  l e a d e r s  and 
a c t i v i s t s .  Indeed, i n  t h e i r  c a s e ,  i t  i s  not t h e i r  p r iv a te  
l i v e s  a lo n e ,  but government work th a t  may p la c e  p r io r  
c la im s .  In the post-indexjendence p er io d  most governments  
needed a l l  the  q u a l i f i e d  men th ey  cou ld  m uster .  The 
p a r t i e s  i n e v i t a b l y  s u f f e r e d  as the  governments took
i
th e  cream o f  t h e i r  l e a d e r s h i p .  Government work 
p rec lu d es  f u l l - t i m e  party  work, so th a t  even though th ese  
former party  cadres  may be s t i l l  remembers th e  party  work 
has to  be c a r r i e d  out by other  l e s s  p r e s t i g i o u s  members.
The proper t e s t  o f  an o r g a n i s a t io n  i s  i t s  
r e s p o n s iv e n e s s  to  the needs  of  the  members, and th e  
degree to  which th e s e  in v o lv e d  in  i t s  o r g a n i s a t io n  
a c t u a l l y  and d i r e c t l y  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  d e c i s i o n  making.
The tv/o are r e la t e d ;  th e  behaviour o f  the  l e a d e r s h ip  
i n  r e l a t i o n  to  popular needs  and d e s i r e s  determ ines  the  
nature and degree o f  popular r e s p o n s iv e n e s s  to  government 
p o l i c y  and a c t io n .  Without proper popular r e s p o n s iv e ­
n e s s  performance i n  p lanned development must s u f f e r .
1 .  This i s  tru e  o f  the p a r t i e s  as o f  o ther  a u x i l i a r y  
movements l i k e  the t r a d e s  unions; f o r  in s t a n c e  Mr.
Tom Mboya o f  Kenya was the  g e n e r a l  s e c r e ta r y  o f  the  
Kenya f e d e r a t i o n o f  la b o u r .
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Consequently  the  l e a d e r s h ip  has to  pay c o n t in u a l  a t t e n t i o n  
t o  th ose  needs and d e s i r e s .  Examplary behaviour i s  
n e c e s s a r y .  There must be m a n ife s t  p erso n a l  i n t e g r i t y ;  
th e  l e a d e r s  must not on ly  be devoted and h o n e s t ,  but 
must be seen  to  be s o .  One must be c l e a r l y  l a i d  down 
r u l e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  devices o f  c o n tr o lo v e r  t h e i r  
p o l i c y  and a c t i o n .  In t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  th e  example o f  the  
Arusha d e c l a r a t io n ,  and the  r u l e s  r e s t r i c t i n g  the  
ownership r i g h t s  o f  TANU l e a d e r s  i s  a s a lu t a r y  one, and 
worthy o f  i m i t a t i o n  e lsew here  i n  A f r i c a .  A r e s p e c te d  
l e a d e r s h ip  can o b ta in  popular respon se  very  e a s i l y .
And a r e s p o n s iv e  p u b l i c ,  w i l l i n g l y  p a r t i c i p a t i n g > i s  an 
e s s e n t i a l  instrum ent i n  th e  im plem entat ion  o f  requirement  
p la n s .  Popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o rg an ised  through the  
mechanism of  a w e l l^ s tr u c tu r e d  party  i s  a l s o  an e f f e c t i v e  
means o f  ensur ing  c o n t r o l .  The e x e r c i s e  o f  governmental  
power^ i n  a development c o n te x t  can th u s  be more e f f e c t i v e  
when the  c h i e f  e x e c u t iv e  i s  a t  the  same time the  c h i e f  
o f  the p a r ty ^  and i n  a p o s i t i o n  to  s e t  the party  machine 
i n  motion f o r  such p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
What o f  the c o n t r o l  o f  governments? A system  
o f  one-party  government i s  most l i k e l y  to  su cceed  i n  
s e r v in g  a u s e f u l  purpose i n  the lo n g  run, only i f  i t  i s  
s u b j e c te d  to  proper c o n t r o l s .  T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  i n  Western
sy s tem s ,  c o n tr o l  over the ex ecu t iv e  has come from two 
sp h eres :  l e g i s l a t u r e  and the ju d ic ia r y .  The d o c tr in e
o f  the s ep a ra t io n  o f  powers was the source o f  t h i s .
L e g a l ly  c o n t r o l  means the power to  su perv ise  th e  e x e r c i s e  
o f  c e r t a i n  fu n c t io n s  w i th in  a g iv en  s i t u a t i o n  a s  d e f in ed  
by law; i t s  operat ion  was r e s t r i c t e d .  P o l i t i c a l l y  
Parliam ent could bring pressure  to  bear on the  government 
on the t o t a l i t y  of  i t s  p o l i c y  or on c e r ta in  s p e c i f i c  
a c t i o n s .  In A fr ic a ,  as  we have seen, the scope o f  both  
t h e s e  means of  c o n t r o l i s  r e s t r i c t e d ,  i f  not i n e x i s t e n t .  
Parl iam entary  c o n tr o l  can indeed be exerted  through  
budgetary means and through a debate on the b e s t  means o f  
implementing c e r t a in  proposed p o l i c i e s .  The c o n t r o l  
o f  the e x e c u t iv e  in  A fr ic a ^  must be sought e l s e w h e r e .^
In the one party  s t a t e  i t  must be sought  
w i t h i n  the  party i t s e l f .  But i s  t h i s  p o s s ib l e ?  In  
t h i s  co n n ect ion  two f a c t s  must be r e i t e r a t e d .  (1 )  the  
b e s t  among the  m i l i t a n t s  of  the party are i n  th e  govern­
ment, and ( i i )  the top le a d e r sh ip  of  the party  and 
government are the same p eo p le .  This tends to  subordinate
1 .  On the va r io u s  p o s s ib l e  means of  co n tr o l  i n  the
Tanzanian one party s t a t e  c f .  McAuslan e t  a l ,  o p . c i t .
C f . a l s o  Wjatz and Prezeworski -  'Control w ithout  
o p p o s i t io n  in  Vol .  I o f  'Government and Opposition*
(Jan. 1966) p p .227-239*
p arty  to  government; and, in  terms o f  th e  c o n t r o l l i n g  
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  the party t h i s  trend has not  been  
encouraging .  In the absence o f  properly  developed  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and p r a c t ic e s  to  t h a t e f f e c t ,  a g r e a t  d ea l  
must depend on the i n t e g r i t y  and f o r e s i g h t  o f  th e  l e a d e r s .  
M ali i s  an excep t io n  in  having more members o f  the  party  
p o l i t i c a l  Bureau who are not members o f  the government.  
Whether t h i s  w i l l  remain the p o l i c y  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to s a y ;  
but the emphasis l a i d  in  the "primaute duparti" may be 
a c i e  to  an answer in  the p o s i t i v e .  In th e  o ther  c a s e s ,  
even  where the n o t ion  of " s e l f - c r i t i c i s m ” i s  advocated ,  
i t  cannot e x e r c i s e  an e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l l i n g  f u n c t i o n  i n  the  
absence o f  a body o f  people who are p laced  i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  
t o  pass  o b j e c t iv e  judgements on the government as  f r e q u e n t ly  
a s  p o s s i b l e .  The party congress  meets too  in f r e q u e n t ly  
to  f u l f i l  t h i s  purpose and i t  i s  too unwieldy.  I t  i s  the  
p o l i t i c a l  Bureau (or execu t ive  committee) o f  th e  party  
which can th e r e fo r e  do t h i s .
The Tanzanian le a d e r s  show an awareness o f  
th e  dangers of the one-party system. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  
o f  the TANU n a t io n a l  ex ecu t iv e  committee w ith  th e  
n a t i o n a l  assembly and t h e i r  def in ed  r o l e s  which have been  
n o te d ^  are s ig n s  that  a c o n t r o l l i n g  r o le  i s  en v isa g e d  fo r  
th e  p a r ty .
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One of  the terms of re feren ce  which p r e s id e n t  
Nyerere gave the p r e s i d e n t i a l  commission in  th e  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  a democratic one party s t a t e  was the f o l l o w i n g : -  
"What should be the organs of the Party through  
which -
(a)  n a t io n a l  p o l i c y  i s  formulated;
(b) the  p e o p le ’s w i l l  c o n s ta n t ly  f in d s  e x p re ss io n ;
(c )  changes can be brought about through p e a c e fu l  
means;
(d) corruptionor abuse ox power overcome?"^
I t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  in  Tanzania, as in  Mali, the answer has
been to  make the party an organ of co n tr o l  as w e l l  as  of
p o l i c y  fo rm u la t io n .  One o f  the p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s
o f  s e l f - e x a m in a t io n  to which the Tanzanian l e a d e r s  have
s u b je c te d  them selves  i s  the  novel  e l e c t o r a l  p r a c t i c e  i n
which two members o f  TAMJ c o n te s t  an e l e c t i o n  i n  the
2same c o n s t i t u e n c y . I f  one can r e ly  on h i s t o r i c a l  
precedence  i t  i s  p o s s ib l e  th a t  other A fr ican  s t a t e s  w i l l  
adopt s im i la r  a t t i t u d e s  to  r e v i t a l i s e  the on e-p arty ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  view of the shadow of  the coup d ' e t a t .
1 .  Report o f  Commission o p . c i t .  p . 4.
2 .  The l a s t  e l e c t i o n  produced some s t a r t l i n g  r e s u l t s ;  
one important cab inet  m in is ter ,  Mr. Bumani, the then  
m in is t e r  o f  commerce pvas d efeated  along w ith  s e v e r a l  
junior  m in i s t e r s .
I t  must a l s o  be remembered th a t  in  the  
c ircum stances  of  the strong  e x e c u t iv e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  systems  
o f  A fr ic a ,  the p res id en t  can share a " c o n fe ss io n a l"  r o l e  
w ith  the party (as i t s  h ea d ) .  He could  not do t h i s  on 
th e  c la im  to a monopoly of  i d e o l o g i c a l  "truth", i f  the  
on e-p arty  i s  to  be "democratic". He can do i t  as  the  
n a t i o n ' s  l e a d e r .  He i s  head o f  s t a t e  and party  c h i e f  
as  w e l l  as c h i e f  e x e c u t iv e .  As head o f  s t a t e  he embodies 
the  n a t io n a l  w i l l ,  and as party c h i e f  he has a party  
machine at  h i s  d isp o sa l  to  a c t i v a t e  th a t  w i l l .  C o n s t i tu ­
t i o n a l l y  he has the power and in i t ia t iv e  o f  p o l i c y  and of  
p ro p o sa ls  of law to c o n c r e t i s e  th a t  p o l i c y .  But h i s  
n a t i o n a l  and party l e a d e r s h ip  charge him w ith  a respon­
s i b i l i t y  to  su b jec t  government p o l i c y  and a c t i o n  to  
n e c e s sa r y  q u e s t io n in g .  The party  n a t io n a l  Bureap over  
which he i s  p re s id e n t ,  even c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a m a jo r i ty  of  
m i n i s t e r s ,  can a f fo r d  him a l e g i t i m a t e  and e f f e c t i v e  forum 
t o  do t h i s .  I t  i s  a somewhat " Jeky l l  and Hyde" r o l e  
but i n  the c ircum stances an e s s e n t i a l  one. At the same 
t ime a w ise  lea d ersh ip  would pay due a t t e n t i o n  to  the  
es ta b l ish m en t  and development o f  an independence  
machanism of c o n tr o l .  Tanzania 's  permanent commission  
o f  enquiry i s  one such mechanism which may prove tbctbe a
c o n s c io u s  attempt has been made which may spur o th er  
or complimentary exp er im en ts .  I t  i s  on such c o n sc io u s  
s e l f - e x a m i n a t i  n th a t  the  su c c e s s  o f  the  on e-p arty  
system  may depend.
Chapter Seven
The Executive  in  r e l a t i o n  to the  
C i v i l  Service
1 .  The nature  and r o l e  o f  the C i v i l  S erv ice
The C i v i l  S erv ice  i s  an e x e cu t iv e  arm o f
government. A common d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the c i v i l  s e r v i c e
d er iv ed  from m etrop o litan  models i s  that  i t  i s  a s e r v i c e
com pris ing  a l l  servants  o f  the s t a t e ,  o ther than h o ld e r s
o f  p o l i t i c a l  or j u d ic i a l  o f f ic e s ,w h o  are employed i n  a
c i v i l  c a p a c i ty  and whose remuneration i s  pa id  out o f
1moneys v o ted  by parl iam ent.
A.L. Adu, fo l lo w in g  the s p i r i t  o f  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,
has  w r i t t e n :
"as a servant o f  the S ta te  the c i v i l  s e r v a n t ' s  
f i r s t  l o y a l t y  i s  to  the  S ta te ,  s in c e  the  
government i s  charged, by popular ch o ic e  w ith
1 .  Cf. e . g .  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the Ghana c i v i l  s e r v i c e  -  
A.L. Adu, 'The C i v i l  S erv ice  in  New A fr ica n  S t a t e s ' , 
(A l len  and Unwin 1965)  p . 2 4 .  Cf. a l s o ,  d e f in i t io n  of  
a *fftnctionnaire * ( c i v i l  servant)  in  the Ivory Coast  
p ub l ic  s e r v ic e  law ,L oi No. 6 4 -4 6 8 ,  Dec. 21 ,  19 6 4  
as 'a  person who i s  appointed to  a permanent employ-^  
ment, who i s  a r i g h t f u l  holder of a grade ( t i t u l a r i s e e )  
i n  the a d m in is tr a t iv e  hierarchy o f  the  c e n t r a l  
a d m in is tr a t io n  of the s t a t e '  (Art. 1 ) .  This  law ex c lu d es  
judges (m a g i s t r a t / s  de l 'o r d r e  j u d ic ia r e )  and m i l i t a r y  
person n el  from the d e f i n i t i o n  of a fo n c t io n n a ir e  
( a r t .  1 ,  l a s t  paragraph).
th e  c o n tr o l  and a d m in is tr a t io n  o f  the a f f a i r s  
o f  the  s t a t e  the c i v i l  s e r v a n t ’ s l o y a l t y  i s  
to  the government of  t i n  day and the should  
a p p r o p r ia te ly  f e e l  a p o s i t i v e  and c o n s i s t e n t  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  prosecute  the i n t e r e s t s  
o f  the government as  h i s  employer. U s u a l ly  
the f o c a l  point  o f  the c i v i l  servant*s  l o y a l t y  
i s  the head of the s t a t e ”
C le a r ly ,  the r o l e  of  the servant ,  here exp ressed ,  was
co n c e iv e d  in  the context  of a two-party or m u l t i—party
system  o f  the m etro p o l i ta n  kind. The use o f  the phrase
"the government o f  the day” alone su g g es ts  t h i s .  Y et ,
a t  the time o f  the p u u l ic a t io n  of A.L. Adu* s  book, the
o n e-p ar ty  s t a t e  was already in almost universal p r a c t i c e
i n  A f r i c a .  Indeed a reading o f  h i s  book r e v e a l s  th a t  he
was aware o f  t h i s .
In Tanzania, the p r e s i d e n t i a l  commission on 
t h e  e s ta b l ish m en t  of a democratic one-party s t a t e  had 
r e p o r te d  i n  the  same y ear .  I t s  recommendation 6 n  the  
c i v i l  s e r v i c e  r e f l e c t s  the  approach o f  most A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  
and i s ) t h e r e f o r e , once morejworth quot ing .  I t  h as  reported
"The p o l i t i c a l  n e u t r a l i t y  o f  c i v i l  serv a n ts  and  
members o f  the m i l i t a r y  and para-miliGary f o r c e s  
i s  no doubt an e s s e n t i a l  f e a tu r e  o f  any system  
i n  which more than one p o l i t i c a l  party i s  
a l lo w ed .  In a one-party s t a t e ,  however, the  
id e a  o f  p o l i t i c a l  n e u t r a l i t y  has no meaning and
1* i b id
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only  ser v es  to  exclude a s u b s t a n t ia l  group 
o f  s e n s i b l e  and p a t r i o t i c  c i t i z e n s  from 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  p u b l ic  a f f a i r s .
P r e s id e n t  Nyerere had w r i t t e n  in  a s im i la r  v e in ,  e a r l i e r .
In  h i s  v iew a l s o ,  the l o g i c  o f  the one-parxy s t a t e  makes
i t  absurd to  exclude "a whole group o f  most i n t e l l i g e n t
and ab le  members o f  the community from p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n
th e  d i s c u s s io n  o f  p o l i c y  simply because they happen to
. . 2 be c i v i l  s e r v a n t s . ” This view i s  chared by most A fr ica n
l e a d e r s .
The C i v i l  S erv ice  Under the C o lo n ia l  System
In the c o l o n i a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  the r o l e  o f  the  
c i v i l  servant  as ad m in is tra tor  was important i n  a t  l e a s t  
two r e s p e c t s :  ( i )  he ?^ as in strum enta l  in  ca rry in g  out the
c e n t r a l l y  d ir e c te d  c o l o n i a l  p o l ic y  and the e x e c u t iv e  
d e c i s i o n s  made under i t ;  and ( i i )  he was a l s o  important  
i n  XJtfe h e lp in g  the form ulat ion  or r e v i s i o n  o f  th a t  p o l i c y .  
The second r o l e  was c r u c i a l  during the ear ly  p er io d  of
c o l o n i a l  r u le  when there  was comparatively l i t t l e  in fo rm a t io n
1* Report o f  Commission.. . . o p . c i t . p . 24
2 .  J u l iu s  K. l lyerere,  o p . c i t .  p . 26.
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on l o c a l  c o n d i t io n s ,  and th e  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e r  or th e
•commandant de cerc le*  was a p ioneer  re sea rch er ,
o c c a s i o n a l l y  preceded only by m is s io n a r ie s .  To th e
l o c a l  i n h a b i t a n t s  he was th e  obvious symbol o f  th e  c o l o n i a l
power.^ He was part o f  the c o l o n i a l  c i v i l  s e r v i c e
2a lon g  w ith  th e  h igher o f f i c e r s  o f  that  s e r v i c e .
The s tru c tu re  o f  the c o l o n i a l  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  
had two c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e s .  f i r s t l y ,  i t  was h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  
o r g a n ise d  w ith  some room fo r  v e n t i l a t i o n  o f  popular  
o p in io n  or g r ie v a n c e s ,  but not fo r  popular c o n t r o l .
Everyone was appointed by a h igher a u th o r i ty  over whom 
th e  A fr ica n  people  had no c o n tr o l  or i n f lu e n c e .  There­
f o r e  th e  power o f  the d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e r  was a b s o lu t e  
( i f  o f t e n  b en ev o len t)  in  the eyes  o f  the l o c a l  p o p u la t io n .  
He and th e  c o l o n i a l  c i v i l  s e r v ic e  o f  which he was a 
p a r t ,  was the government. Secondly^the s t r u c t u r e  was 
based  on p a tern a l i sm  and a degree of d e c e n t r a l i s e d
1 .  Cf. Richard Symonas 'The B r i t i s h  and t h e i r  s u c c e s s o r s '  
(London Paber, 1966) p p .149-151.
2 .  i n  the e a r l i e r  years  the governor was u s u a l ly ,  i f  




a u th o r i ty  which, l e f t  much d i s c r e t io n  and in i t i a t iv e  to  
th e  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e r .  At the top ,  i n  the  c o l o n i a l  c a p i t a l ,  
th e r e  was the governor and h i s  s e c r e t a r i a t .  The d i s t r i c t  
o f f i c e r  was g e n e r a l ly  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  m ain ta in in g  law  
and order and was the r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  the  government,  
w ith  co -o rd in a t in g 1 fu n c t io n s  in  r e l a t i o n  to  the  f i e l d  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t e c h n ic a l  departments i n  h i s  prov in ce  
or d i s t r i c t .  He a l s o  had e i th e r  j u d i c i a l  power or the  
duty of  in sp e c t in g ’ ’n a t iv e  courts* .
Again, a t  the apex, the r o l e  o f  the  top  c i v i l  
servant  (the  p r in c ip a l  secretary^ sometimes c a l l e d  th e  
c o l o n i a l  se c r e ta r y )  was not seen  as purely a d m i n i s t r a t i v e .  
The c o l o n i a l  s ec re ta r y ,  the governor’ s p r in c ip a l  a s s i s ­
t a n t ,  i n  the ear ly  days tr a n sa c ted  b u s in e s s  by c o r r e s ­
ponding w ith  the d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e r s  or r e s i d e n t s .  With 
th e  in c r e a se  of  economic and s o c i a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a 
f i n a n c i a l  sec re ta r y  was added, and the twoj£ to g e th e r  
w ith  other departmental heads, would s i t  in  the  g o v e r n o r 's
e x e c u t iv e  c o u n c i l  and in  the l e g i s l a t i v e  c o u n c i l  to  d i s c u s s  
cind
■the formulate p o l i c y .  In some t e r r i t o r i e s  c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  
were even appointed as  ‘'ministers*1 r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  the  
s u p e r v i s io n  o f  departments and fo r  answering q u e s t io n s  
about t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  in  T;he l e g i s l a t i v e  assem bly .
And in  th e  l a s t  days b e fo r e  independence A fr ic a n  (non­
o f f i c i a l )  members were appointed  as m i n i s t e r s ,  w h i le
c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  r e s p o n s ib le  to  them became permanent 
1s e c r e t a r i e s .
The h i s t o r y  o f  the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  during the  
c o l o n i a l  p er io d  i s  as  important in  ex p la in in g  th e  a t t i t u d e
o f  A fr ica n s  on i t s  r o l e ,  a s  are the e x ig e n c ie s  which
c r e a te d  the one-party  S t a t e .  I t  has been s a id ,  w ith  
rea so n ,  th a t  the e x e c u t iv e  nature of  the c o l o n i a l  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  made i t s  A f r i c a n i s a t io n  (and in  p a r t i c u l a r  o f  the  
h igh er  p o s t s )  an a t t r a c t i v e  symbol o f  s t a t u s .  T his  
i s  the  1status-sym bol*  argument^ i u t  i t  i s  by no means 
the  important one. A fr ica n s  had l i v e d  under th e  impact  
o f  d e c i s i o n s  o f  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e r s  and c o l o n i a l  s e c r e t a r i e s  
which had deeply a f f e c t e d  t h e i r  l i v e s .  Any demand fo r  
p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  th e r e fo r e  n e c e s s a r i l y  in v o lv ed  a 
demand fo r  the A f r i c a n i s a t io n  of  the c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  This  
c o in c id e d  w ith  the m a te r ia l  and other a l lurem ents  which the  
a d m in is tr a t iv e  s e r v ic e s  had to  p ro sp ec t iv e  c a n d id a te s ,  thus
1 .  i b i d .  C f .  a l s o  Chapter Two supra.
2 .  Cf. R. Symonds, o p . c i t .  p . 150.
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w h e t t in g  p erso n a l  as  much as p o l i t i c a l  a p p e t i t e s .
2 .  A f r i c a n i s a t i o n  o f  the  c i v i l  s e r v ic e
The advocacy fo r  a p o l ic y  o f  A f r i c a n i s a t i o n  
o f  the c o l o n i a l  c i v i l  s e r v ic e  was s t a r t e d  some years  
b e fo r e  the  independence movements got under way. I n i t i a l l y  
c o l o n i a l  ed u c a t io n a l  p o l i c y  did not have r^om fo r  a 
planned A fr ic a n  ta k e -o v e r  of the c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  any more
2than i t  had a ca lendar  fo r  African p o l i t i c a l  independence.  
E v en tu a l ly  th e  p o l i c y  changed and more a t t e n t i o n  was p a id  
t o  che t r a i n i n g  o f  A fr ica n s  for r e s p o n s ib le  p o s t s  in  the  
a d m in i s t r a t io n .  But the  delayed s t a r t  meant th a t  fo r  
s e v e r a l  y e a r s  a f t e r  independence many key p o s t s  were to  
remain i n  e x p a t r ia t e  hands. A f r ic a n is a t io n  as  a p o l i c y
1 .  In In d ia ,  i n t e r e s t i n g l y  enoughjthe p o l i c y  o f  the  Congress  
Party l e d  by Mahatma G-handi was fo r  many y ears  one o f  
h o s t i l i t y  to  the Indian C iv i l  S e r v ic e ,  as a c o l o n i a l  
in s tru m en t .  G-handi* s philosophy o f  *Purna Swaraj* 
which advocated  v i l l a g e  democracy did not lo o k  w ith  
favour upon a h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  organised  a u th o r i ta r ia n  
a d m in i s t r a t iv e  machine. Cf. V. Subramaniam *E v o lu t io n
o f  m i n i s t e r - c i v i l  servant r e la t io n s  in  India? i n  
V o l .  1 Journal o f  Commonwealth p o l i t i c a l  s t u d i e s ,  
(1961-1963) p p .223-232 .
2 .  Cf. Kenneth Younger, ’ The Public S er v ic e  i n  the  new 
S t a t e s '  (London, O x fo r d ^ .P .  I960) p a r ts  I I ,  I I I  and
IV, and R. Symonds, o p .c i t ; .  pp. 149-170 and pp. 211-226 .
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o f  replacem ent of  ex p a tr ia te  o f f i c e r s  in v o lv e d  heavy 
f i n a n c i a l  harden in  t r a in in g  a d m in is tr a t iv e  and t e c h n i c a l  
s t a f f .
The shortage of  q u a l i f i e d  manpower was acute  
i n  some s t a t e s .  In Malawi, for  example, the government 
s e r v i c e  req u ired  some 430 o f f i c e r s  with  u n i v e r s i t y  degrees  
or p r o f e s s i o n a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  and only 33 Malawians  
had such q u a l i f i c a t i o n  in  I960, w ith  some more i n  t r a i n i n g ,  
most o f  whom have s in c e  assumed p o s t s .  I t  was e s t im ated  
th a t  o n ly  120 would be a v a i la b le  by 1971, a t  the  r a t e  of
i
ed u cat iom lp rogress  of the t ime. Nor was Malawi an 
e x c e p t io n ,  though the magnitude of i t s  q u a l i f i e d  man­
power sh ortage  i s  not r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  the m a jo r i ty  o f  
A fr ic a n  s t a t e s  Ghana, in  1950, s t i l l  had 39i* e x p a t i r a t e s
i n  i t s  c i v i l  s e r v ic e .  This represented  a ra p id  advance i n
2th e  p ro p o r t io n  &n 1952. Even then, i t  was a slow  
p r o c e s s  when looked a g a in s t  the pressure f o r  rap id  
A f r i c a n i s a t i o n .
1 .  C f .  Report o f  the L o c a l i s a t io n  Committee (Adek* Report)  
Zomba, I960 ,  p . 22.
2 .  In  1952 ,  the r a t io  was in  the reverse  w i th  41^ A fr ica n s  
i n  th e  c i v i l  s e r v ic e .  Then, there  were on ly  544 
A fr ic a n s  to  1322 e x p a tr ia t e s ,  whereas i n  1956 th ere  
were 1964  A fr icans  to  680 e x p a tr ia t e s  In o ther  words 
1440 more A fr icans  were employed in  s i x  y e a r s .  Cf
R. Younger, o p . c i t .  p . 33.
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The c o l o n i a l  ed u ca t ion a l  p o l ic y  had been geared  
f o r  a d i f f e r e n t  a d m in is tra t io n ,  an a d m in is tr a t io n  which  
was p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith  the maintenance o f  law and 
ord er .  The * s u c c e s s o r s ’, however, Vvould spend most o f  
t h e i r  time i n  adm in ister ing  development programmes which^ 
i n  many r e s p e c t s  ^ required a d i f f e r e n t  type o f  e d u c a t io n a l  
background and t r a in in g .  As i t  has been m ain ta in ed  
e lsew h e re ,  "the o b je c t iv e  o-f the former c o l o n i a l  s e r v i c e  
v.as to  provide  good government ra ther  than e x c i t i n g  
government. I t  brought i n t e g r i t y  and i m p a r t i a l i t y ,  
e f f i c i e n c y  and lo y a l t y  to  the ta s k s  of  p rese rv in g  law and 
order and o o v ia t in g  d iso r d e r .  But to  me^tiftg the  
e x c i t i n g  -  i f  somewhat im p ra ct ica b le  ( s i c )  -  a s p i r a t i o n s  
o f  the new A fr ican  m in i s t e r s  a com plete ly  d i f f e r e n t  and 
more dynamic outlook was c a l l e d  for."'*' N e v e r th e le s s  
th e  ed u ca t io n a l  p o l ic y  w ith  standards and o th er  r e q u ir e ­
ments e x i s t i n g  in  the m e tro p o l i ta n  u n i v e r s i t i e s  were 
adopted by the  new c o l le g e s w h ie h  sprouted i n  v a r io u s  
p a r t s  o f  A f r i c a .  Those A fr ica n s  who were t r a in e d  abroad  
may be presumed to have imbibed the s p i r i t  o f  the
1 . T&lwi R e t c t v e v ^  C o o k f }  ^ if
’P ar l iam en t ,  Executive and c i v i l l s e r v i c e ;  i n  Parliam ent  
as an export l o c . c i t .  p . 158. '
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univers it i /& »  education  they r e c e iv e d  i n  the  m e tr o p o l i ta n
u n i v e r s i t i e s .  One of the r e s u l t s  o f  adopting or f o l l o w i n g
th e  requirem ents  e x i s t i n g  in  the u n iv e r s i t y  o f  London
or l a r i s ,  fo r  example, was th a t  fa r  fewerjg grau d ates  were
forthcom ing  tojmeet demands. I t  with  t h i s  i n  mind
th a t  th e  Adu Committee on the l o c a l i s a t i o n  o f  th e  Malawi
c i v i l  s e r v i c e  recommended th a t  Malawians should not be
ex p ec ted  to  pass  the same standard examination s e t  up
by the B r i t i s h .  The g e n e r a l  f e e l i n g  i s  th a t  th ere
was too much emphasis on l i t e r a r y  s u b j e c t s ,  too  l i t t l e
2on tech n ica l subjects.
The c r i t i c i s m  on the h e r i ta g e  o£ educationa l  
p o l i c y  i s  not l i m i t e d  to  Anglophonic A f r i c a ; the  French  
h e r i t a g e  was su b jec ted  to  s im i la r  c a t ic i s m  by A fr ic a n  
l e a d e r s  and by some Frenchmen. P res id en t  Sekotf Toure,  
f o r  example, complained th a t  too  much emphasis was p la c e d  
on formal education  and diplomas. The top  o f f i c i a l s  m  
th e  French c o l o n i a l  c i v i l  s e r v ic e ,  who could  be p o s te d
1 .  Cf. E e p o r t . . . .  o p . c i t .
2 .  Cf. K.O. L ik e }Paper a t  N iger ian  Seminar on Manpower 
problems, Lagos 1964. This i s  the f e e l i n g  ex p re sse d  
at v a r io u s  conferences  in  education  in  A f r i c a .
/  /  /  /
3* Cf. Sekou Toure, La G-uinee e t  1* emancipation A f r i c a i n e ,
( P a r i s ,  1959) p p .125 and 166.
i n  any French t e r r i to r y  were requ ired  to  have a u n i v e r s i t y
d eg ree .  The miudle group who could  be p osted  in  any
one of the t e r r i t o r i e s  under one a d m in is tr a t iv e  group
( e . g .  AOF, AEF) were req u ired  to  have secondary ed u c a t io n .
The l a s t  group, those in  the l o c a l  cadre , who co u ld  on ly
be employed w ith in  one t e r r i t o r y ,  had primary e d u c a t io n .
But French c o l o n i a l  ed u ca t ion a l  p o l i c y  had been such th a t
by 1954 th er e  were only 68 A fr ica n s  out o f  1327 c i v i l
s e r v a n ts  o f  the middle c a t e g o r i e s  in  the AFP group o f
t e r r i t o r i e s . ^
The eco le  Willam-Ponty near Dakar produced
te a c h e r s  and some d o c to r s ,  many o f  whom were to  be the
l e a d e r s  of th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and to  emerge as heads
2o f  the new S t a t e s .  Many members of- p ar la im en ts  and l o c a l  
a s s e m b l ie s  are a lso  former t e a c h e r s .  In t h i s  r e s p e c t  
they' French p o l ic y  of  p e r m it t in g  c i v i l  s er v a n ts  to  be 
e l i g i b l e  fo r  e e l c t i o n  produced some i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t s .
1 .  Cf. R. Symonds, o p . c i t .  p p .212-3* The author quotes
a former education d ir e c t o r  o f  French West A f r i c a  
(AflF) as  saying: "the danger i s  never to  t e a c h  too
l i t t l e ;  i t  i s  to  t e a c h  tOw much." i b i d .
2 .  Cf. S.M. SyJ. o p . c i t .  Annexe I I  pp.2D-213* This'^annexe*’ 
shows an i n t e r e s t i n g  p rop ort ion  o f  former Ponty
"old boys" in  the governments of  the Ivory  C oast ,
Guinea and Mali.
The exjabdus from the o i v i l  s e r v ic e  o f  former A fr ic a n  
t e a c h e r s  and m edical  o f f i c e r s  to  take part in  p o l i t i c s  
j u s t  b e fo re  independence , had an impact dn the  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  i t s e l f  and i t s  p o s i t i o n  in  government. The 
newly e l e c t e d  A fr ican  d ep u t ie s  made t h e i r  in f l u e n c e  f e l t  
b oth  on th e  ed u ca t io n a l  system and on the p o s i t i o n  o f  
A fr ic a n s  i n  th e  government s e r v i c e s .  They demanded fo r  
equal  s t a t u s  o f  A fr ica n s  and Frenchmen in  th e s e  s e r v i c e s ,  
and th e r e ,  they  spoke w ith  the a u th o r ity  o f  e x p e r ie n c e .
As f o r  the ex -B e lg ia n  t e r r i t o r i e s  th e  congo
tragedy would probably have been averted, vver e i t  not
f o r  the  B e lg ia n  ed u cat ion a l  p o l ic y  and the p o l i c y  o f
d e c o l i n i s a t i o n  which came too l a t e .  A f r i c a n i s a t io n
programmes s t a r t e d  only 18 months before  independence,
and th ere  were only three  u n iv e r s i ty  graduates when
2independence was d ec la red .
1 .  Thus i n t e n s i v e  A f r i c a n i s a t io n  s ta r t e d  a f t e r  th e  Loi  
Cadre (1956) which enabled the  A fr ican  v o ic e  to  be 
heard more c l e a r l y  and lou d ly  than b e fo re .  Cf.  
chapter two supra. S ince  independence The French  
government has provided s u b s t a n t ia l  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  v a r io u s  
forms in c lu d in g  d ir e c t  sch o larsh ip  grants  and 
t e c h n i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  to the governments.
2 .  This i s  apart  from the four hundred Congolese t r a in e d  
as p r i e s t s .  Cf. R. Symonds, o p . c i t .  p . 223.
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P o l i t i c i s a t i o n  of  the c i v i l  s e r v ic e
The A f r i c a n i s a t io n  o f  the  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  was 
connected  w ith  i t s  p o l i t i c i s a t i o n  in  one important r e s p e c t .  
The a c c e le r a te d  replacement o f  e x p a tr ia t e  c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  
by A fr ica n s  was accompanied by an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ^ o n  the  
part  o f  th e se  A fr ican  c i v i l  s e r v a n ts ,  w ith  the  p o l i t i c a l  
id e ^ s  and sentim ents  o f  the  new A fr ica n  l e a d e r s ,  who 
v o ic e d  thejneeds and a s p ir a t i o n s  o f  the masses .  This  
i n  turn  a f f e c t e d  the s tr u c tu r e  and fu n c t io n  o f  the  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  and the  m in i s t e r - c iv i l  s e r v i c e  r e l a t i o n .  The 
c o l o n i a l  p a t te r n  o f  the governor and h i s  s e c r e t a r i a t  
s i t t i n g  at the  apex o f  the  a d m in is tr a t io n  was re p la ce d  by 
a m i n i s t e r i a l  system with  a  c a b in e t  c o -o r d in a t in g  the  
v a r io u s  m i n i s t r e i s  headed by m i n i s t e r s ,^  In s h o r t ,  the  
c i v i l  s e r v ic e  changed from b e in g  the  main machinery o f  
c o l o n i a l  government to b e in g  the e x e cu t iv e  arm o f  r e s ­
p o n s ib le  government. The se n io r  c i v i l  s er v a n ts  became 
th e  a d m in is tr a t iv e  s t a f f  o f  m i n i s t r i e s  charged w ith  
a d v i s in g  and a s s i s t i n g  m in i s t e r s  in  carry ing  out t h e i r
1 .  This  i s  o f  course s u b je c t  to  th e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  brought  
about by the  p r e s i d e n t i a l  system s which modify th e  
r o l e  o f  the  Cabinet .
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  This c o n s t i t u t e d  a fundamental change  
i n  the nature o f  the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  -  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
and te n u re ,  i n  p a r t i c u la r .  ih e  c i v i l  serv an ts  s e r v in g  
th e  m i n i s t e r s  became answerable to  them and came under t h e i r  
g e n e r a l  a d m in is t r a t iv e  c o n t r o l .  Above a l l  i t  meant a 
change o f  a t t i t u d e  on the part of  the c i v i l  servant  as  to  
th e  nature o f  h i s  fu n c t io n  -  a change from th e  bureaucrat* s 
f a i t h  i n  h i s  p a tr ia r c h a l  v o ca t io n  to d ir e c t  the d e s t i n i e s  
o f  p o l i t i c a l l y  •immature* or * incompetent* peop le  to  an 
a ccep tan ce  o f  th e  popular w i l l  a s  represen ted  by an 
e l e c t e d  government and as in te r p r e te d  bytha m i n i s t e r  
c oncerned.
T his  did not mean th a t  c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  i n  the  
new system were not invo lved  i n  the form ula t ion  o f  p o l i c y .  
Indeed one o f  th e  fe a tu r e s  o f  p o l i t i c i s a t i o n  i n  the  new 
system s under one party governments i s  the f a c t  th a t  c i v i l  
s e r v a n t s  can be members of the party  and through t h e i r  
membership in f lu e n c e  orhelp to formulate p o l i c y .  As th e  
recommendations on t h i s  su b jec t  o f  the P r e s i d e n t i a l  
Commission o f  Tanzania which was quoted above put i t  the  
id e a  o f  p o l i t i c a l  n e u t r a l i t y  in  a  one-party  system i s  
m e a n in g le s s .  In r e a l i t y ,  of course ,  the c o l o n i a l  c i v i l  
s e r v a n t s  were not unfam iliar  w ith  the one-party  government;  
was not the  c o l o n i a l  regime, ail ever-present, on e-p arty
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g o v e r n m e n t ,  a f t e r  a l l ?  The d i f f e r e n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  b a s i s  
o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  
p o l i c y ,  a n d  i n  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s .  A l s o ,  now 
t h e r e  was t h e  p a r t y  man who, a s  D r .  L l i l t o n  O b o t £  h a s  p u t  
i t ,  was r e a d y  t o  b r i n g  g r i e v a n c e s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  b e f o r e  
t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  who must  show a  g r e a t e r  a w a r e n e s s  o f  
t h i s  ^
U nder  t h e  D ren ch  s y s t e m  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  l e s s
e m p h a s i s ^  i n  t h e  d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  a n d
* p o l i t i c a l  * o f f i c e .  No p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  c o m m is s i o n s  e x i s t e d
i n  t h e  D re n c h  c o l o n i a l  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  I n  t h e  f o r m e r
B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e
c o m m i s s i o n s  h a d  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  u n d e r t a k e  r e c r u i t m e n t
t o  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  s e r v i c e s  and  t o  a d v i s e  on p r o m o t i o n .
W i t h  t h e  g r a n t  o f  i n t e r n a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n s
s u d d e n l y  a c q u i r e d  a more e x e c u t i v e  c h a r a c t e r .  The o b j e c t
o f  t h i s  c h a n g e  f a s  i t  h a s  b e e n  p o i n t e d  by  R. Symonds,  was
i!t o  p r o t e c t  uhe p o s i t i o n  o f  B r i t i s h  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  a g a i n s t
2th e  A fr ic a n  m i n i s t e r s . ' 1 But t h i s  e lev en th -h ou r  attempt
1 .  I n  a  s p e e c h  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s e m i n a r  a t  
l i a k e r e r e  c o l l e g e ,  c f .  R. Symonds, o p . c i t .  p . 2 6 3 .
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a t  c o m p l e t e  i n s u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  was c o u n t e r ­
p r o d u c t i v e .  Dor one t h i n g ,  i t  p l a c e d  what was s o m e t im e s  
c o n s t r u e d  a s  " i n s u l t i n g  l i m i t a t i o n "  on t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  
t h e  new A f r i c a n  p r im e  m i n i s t e r  t h u s  c a u s i n g  much 
i r r i t a t i o n .  Then a g a i n ,  a s  s t a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  when i t  
i s  c o n s i d e r e d  a g a i n s t  i t s  c o l o n i a l  b a c k g r o u n d  a n d  t h e  new 
t a s k s  w h ic h  t h e  A f r i c a n  g o v e r n m e n t s  s e t  f o r  t h e m s e l v e s ,  
i t  was b o u n d  t o  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  im p e d im e n t .  S o ,  i n  
m o s t  c a s e s ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m m is s io n s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  m os t  s e n i o r  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  was 
p u t  on a n  a d v i s o r y  f o o t i n g  a g a i n ,  a f t e r  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  And 
e v e n  i n  c a s e s  w here  t h e  c o m m is s io n  was r e q u i r e d  t o  b e  
con iuLted  by t h e  e x e c u t i v e  on t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  p e r m a n e n t  
s e c r e t a r i e s  s u c h  a s  was t h e  c a s e  i n  Kenya ,  i t s  members  
l e a r n t  o n l y  on t h e  r a d i o  on i n d e p e n d e n c e  day t h a t  t h e  
e x p a t r i a t e s  h a d  b e e n  r e p l a c e d  &n t h o s e  po>sts .  A g a i n  
i n  M a la w i ,  t h e  f i r s t  c a n d i d a t e s  s e l e c t e d  f o r  t r a i n i n g  a s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o f f i c e r s  w ere  c h o s e n  n o t  by t h e  p u b l i c  
s e r v i c e  c o m m iss io n  b u t  by a c o m m i t t e e  o f  m i n i s t e r s . **"
T h i s  was q u i t e  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  
t e m p e r  o f  A f r i c a n  p o l i t i c s .  A round  i n d e p e n d e n c e  d a y s .
B u t ,  a s  m a t t e r s  s t o o d ,  t h e r e  was t h e  p ro b le m  <of r e p l a c e m e n t  
a n d  t h e  l u r k i n g  f e a r  t h a t  t h e r e  m ig h t  be d i s r u p t i o n  
o f  g o v e rn m e n t  work i n  c a s e  o f  m a s s - w i t h d r a w a l  o f
1 .  i b i d .
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e x p a t r i a t e  c i v i l  s e r v n a t s  i n  d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  soj..e o f  
t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  p o l i c i e s .  The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  G-uinea a n d  
M a l i ,  was i n s t r u c t i v e .  The c o m p l e t e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f
i
F r e n c h  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  aAd f ro m  t h e s e  two 
c o u n t r i e s  a f f e c t e d  t h e  econom ic  a n d  s o c i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  
p l a n s  o f  t h e i r  g o v e r n m e n t s .  T h e s e  an d  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  
f a c t o r s  c o m p e l l e d  a  r e - a p p r a i s a l  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  a n d  i t s  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p a r t y  an d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .
( 3 )  The c i v i l  s e r v i c e  w i t h i n  t h e  m a c h i n e r y  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  
The c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  
b r a n c h  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  o p e r a t e s  t o  im p lem e n t  p o l i c i e s .
The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  j t h e r e f o r e ^ l a r g e l y  
d e p e n d s  on  i t s  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n i n g .  T h i s  m eans  a  p r o p e r  
o r i e n t a t i o n ,  oh a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  b e i n g  i n  t i l ^ e  vvith  t h e  p o l i c y  
o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  i t  m eans  e f f i c i e n c y a n d  w h a t  
A .L .  Adu h a s  c a l l e d  " a b i l i t y  t o  r e s p o n d  i n  p r a c t i c a l  t e r m s  
t o  i t s  ( t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  *s )  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s * . ^  What 
d o e s  a l l  t h i s  mean i n  p r a c t i c e ?
1 .  C f .  A .L .  Adu, 'T h e  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  i n  New A f r i c a n  S t a t e s ' ,  
l o c .  c i t .  p p . 2 5 - 6 .
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F i r s t  o f  a l l  i t  m ust  b e  rem em b ered  t h a t  t h e  
c i v i l  s e r v i c e  c o n s i s t s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  
e x p e r t s  -  o f  e c o n o m i s t s ,  s t a t i s t i c i a n s ,  a g r o n o m i s t s ,  
e n g i n e e r s ,  p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ,  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  h e a l t h  
o f f i c e r s ,  e t c .  The e x p e r t i s e  o f  t h e s e  p e o p l e  a n d  t h e  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  many among tnem m akes  tnem  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  
i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  p o l i c y .  I t  a l s o  m eans  t h a t  t h e y  p a r t i c i p a t e  
i n  d e v i s i n g  p o l i c y .  The p o l i c y  o f  a  p - r t y  ( a n y  p a r t y )  
a s  e x p r e s s e d  by i t s  c o n g r e s s e s ,  a n d  n a t i o n a l  e x e c u t i v e  
c o m m i t t e e s  ( o r  B u rea u x )  c a n  o n ly  b e  e x p r e s s e d  i n  g e n e r a ­
l i s e d  f o r m s ,  on c e r t a i n  f u n d a m e n t a l s ,  some o f  w h i c h  a l s o  
n e e d  t h e  h e l p  o f  " E x p e r t s ^ t o  f o r m u l a t e * " . ^  When one
i s  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  d e t a i l e d  t e c h n i c a l i t i e s  a n d  t h e
2i m p l i c a t i o n s  i n v o l v e d  i t  i s  t h e  " e x p e r t s "  who d e c i d e .
T o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s 1 made t o  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  o f  s u c h  p e o p l e  a r e
a m a t e u r i s h  a t  b e s t  and  s h o t s  i n  t h e  dark  a t  w o r s t .
1 .  T h e r e  may be s u c h  " e x p e r t s ” p r e s e n t  a t  p a r t y  e x e c u t i v e  
c o m m i t t e e s  a s  m em bers .  But t h e  f u n d  o f  e x p e r t i s e  f o u n d  
i n  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  i s  o f  a  d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r  o f  m a g n i ­
t u d e ,  ow ing  t o  t h e  number o f  t h e  p e o p l e  pz)§se:§§ing i t  
and  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a p p a r a t u s  a t  t h e i r  d i s p o s a l .
2 .  T e c h n o c r a c y  an d  m e r i t o c r a c y  a r e  w ords  w h i c h  a r e  b a n d i e d  
a b o u t ,  so m e t im e s  i n  d e r i s i o n .  But vkT i n  m o d e rn  
p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t e c h n o c r a t s  c o u n t  f o r  m uch .
A t a l l  e v e n t s ,  ’p o l i c y ’ s h o u l d  n o t  b e  t a k e n  t o  mean o n l y  
t h a t  w h ic h  i s  f o r m u l a t e d  o r  w h ic h  i s  m  t h e  p a r t y  r e s o l u ­
t i o n ,  o r  i n  t h e  s t a tu te  b o o k .  E v e ry  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t  
w o r t h  i t s  name i n v o l v e s  p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n .  U l t i m a t e l y  
t h e r e f o r e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  c o n c e r n  p o l i c y .
I t  i s  no w onder  t h e n  t h a t  t h e  r e p u t a t i o n  o r  
f a t e  o f  a  g o v e rn m e n t  may d e p e n d  on t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  
c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  T h i s  e x p l a i n s  d t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  
A f r i c a n  g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  
t o w a r d s  t h e i r  r e g i m e s ,  a n d  t h e i r  c o n c e r n  t o  e n s u r e  “ t h a t  
a t t i t u d e s  a n d  o r i e n t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e s  a r e  i n  c o m p l e t e  
a c c o r d  w i t h  t h e  p h i l o s o p h y  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  
p o l i c i e s . ”^  I t  a l s o  e x p l a i n s  an d  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  n e e d j fo r  
e x e c u t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  ox s e n i o r  c i v i l  s e r ­
v a n t s .  As s t a t e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  a p p o i n t s
s e n i o r  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s ,  i n  m o s t  c a s e s  on h i s  own i n i t i a t i v e
2a n d  w i t h o u t  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  m a n d a to r y  c o n s u l t a t i o n .  
T tm p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  c o m m is s i o n s  h a v e  r e v e r t e d  t o  t h e i r  p r e ­
i n d e p e n d e n c e  a d v i s o r y  c h a r a c t e r ,  a n d  w i t h  g o o d  r e a s o n .
The s e n i o r  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  a r e  t h e  m i n i s t e r s '  p r i n c i p a l
1 .  A .L .  A d u , i b i d .
2 .  c f  C h a p t e r  F i v e .
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a s s i s t a n t s  i n  d i r e c t i n g  an d  s u p e r v i s i n g  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
o f  p o l i c y .  T h i s ,  a s  we h a v e  s a i d ,  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n v o l v e s  
t h e m / s h a r i n g  “p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s ” . T h i s  i s  n o t  p e c u l i a r  
bO A f r i c a .  I t  i s  a  m a t t e r  f o r  r e f l e c t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h a t  t h e  r o y a l  co m m is s io n  on  t h e  B r i t i s h  c i v i l  s e r v i d e  
( 1 9 2 9 / 3 1 )  d e f i n e d  " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  work" a s  " t h a t  w h ic h  i s  
c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  p o l i c y ,  w i t i .  t h e  r e v i s i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  
p r a c t i c e  o r  c u r r e n t  r e g u l a t i o n s ^  a n d  d e c i s i o n s  a n d  w i t h  t h e  
g e n e r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  d e p a r t m e n t s  o f  
t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e . " ^  T h i s  i s  n o t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
r e m a r k a b l e  f o r  t h o s e  who know t h e  i n s  and  o u t s  o f  t h e  
" c o r r i d o r s  o f  power"  o f  W h i t e h a l l .  But  t o  t h e  e n t h u s i a s t s  
o f  t h e  " a p o l i t i c a l "  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  i t  ^ s e r v e s  a s  a  r e m i n d e r  
t h a t  i n  p r a c t i c e  m i n i s t e r  an d  c i v i l  s e r v a n t  w o rk  h a n d  i n  
h a n d  a s  p a r t  o f  a n  i n t e g r a l  m a c h in e ,  ev en  i n  a  two p a r t y  
s y s t e m .  The Q ueen’ s g o v e rn m e n t  c o u l d  n o t  go  on  o t h e r w i s e .
1 .  Q u o ted  by A .L .  Adu o p . c i t .  p .  4 0 .
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The S e n i o r  p o s t s
The h i g h e s t  p o s t  i n  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  i n  m os t  
A n g l o p h o n i c  s t a t e s  i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  c a b i n e t  
who i s  h e a d  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  He i s  s o m e t i m e s  c a l l e d  
t h e  c h i e f  s e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  o r  p r i m e  m i n i s t e r ,  
a s  t h e  c a s e  may be."*" The r o u g h  e q u i v a l e n t  i n  F r a n c o p h o n i c  
A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  i s  t h e  " s e c r e t a i r e - g e n e r a l  du  g o u v e r n e m e n t 1, 
who i s  d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  to  t h e  p r e s i d e n t .  Swh. a  
s p e c i a l  f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  seems 
t o  b e  d i c t a t e d  by t h e  n a t u r e  o f  A f r i c a n  p r § s i d * e n t i a l i s m .  
B o t h  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  c a b i n e t  a n d  h i s  F r a n c o p h o n i c  
e q u i v a l e n t  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  c a b i n e t - s e c r e t a r i a l  a n d  a r e  i n  
c h a r g e  o f  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  a n d  t i m e l y  t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  
a g e n d a  t o  m i n i s t e r s ,  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n -  I n
g e n e r a l  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  r e p u b l i c  i s  l o a t h  t o  go o v e r  
t h e  h e a d s  o f  h i s  m i n i s t e r s  t o  c o n s u l t  w i t h  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s .  
B u t  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  c a b i n e t  ( o r  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  g e n e r a l  
o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t )  i s  t h e r e ,  p a r t l y  t o  a c t  a s  a  p o i n t  o f  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  I t  i s  a l s o  i n t e r e s t i n g  
t h a t  i n  some F ra n c o p h o n ic  s t a t e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  C ongo (B) he
1 .  Cf .  Adu, o p . c i t .  p p . 41-2 .
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m u s t  be a  member o f  t h e  p a r t y .  I n  some s t a t e s ,  s u c h  a s
T a n z a n i a  a n d  Congo ( B ) ^ t h e  p r e s e n t  s e c r e t a y t o  t h e  c a b i n e t
i s  a  member o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e
p a r t y  ( a n d  a l s o  o f  p a r l i a m e n t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  T a n z a n i a ) *
The s e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  o c c u p i e s  a  c e n t r a l
p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  m i n i s t e r - c i v i l  s e r v a n t  r e l a t i o n .  H i s
w ork  a s  h e a d  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  s e c r e t a r i a t  a n d  a s  h e a d  o f
t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  w h ich  invo lve^ !h im  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  i n
a t t e n d a n c e  a t  c a b i n e t  m e e t i n g s  p r o v i d e s  t h e  k e y  t o  t h e
m a c h i n e r y  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w h i c h  i s
so  e s s e n t i a l  i n  g o v e r n m e n t .  He i s  c u s t o d i a n  o f  c a b i n e t
r e c o r d s *  The r e c o r d s  w h ic h  c o n t a i n  i m p o r t a n t  d e c i s i o n s
s e r v i c e  a s  p e r s o n a l  r e m i n d e r  t o  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  who m u s t
f o l l o w  up d e c i s i o n s  a n d  s e e  t h e i r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  H i s
f u n c t i o n  o f  d r a w in g  up t h e  a g e n d a  g i v e s  t h e  c a b i n e t
s e c r e t a r y  i n i t i a t i v e  f o r  p i c k i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  w h i c h  he i s  i n
a  p o s i t i o n  t o  i m p r e s s  upon  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  on t h e i r  i m p o r t a n c e ,
e . g .  p r o p o s a l s  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d -  w h i c h  h i s
1 .  I n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r e d  t h r o u g h  i n t e r v i e w s  o f  e m b a s s y  
o f f i c i a l s .  I n  t h e  Congo (3 )  t h e  s e c j e t a r y — g e n e r a l
o i  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  h a s  t h e  r a n k  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r .
C f .  S t a t u t  g e n e r a l  de l a  f u n c t i o n  p u b l i q u e  du  Congo,  
l o i  No. 1 5 6 2 ) .
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o f f i c e  k e l p s  t o  p r e p a r e  t o e  c i r c u l a t e  i n  a d v a n c e .  The 
l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  a r e  t h u s  i n d i r e c ­
t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by s u c h  i n i t i a t i v e ^ a n a  i n  t h e  m i n i s t e r s > 
j o c k e y i n g  f o r  a  p l a c e  on t h e  a g e n d a ,  t h e  p r e s i d e n t ' s  
d e c i s i o n  c a n  h e a v i l y  on t h e  i m p a r t i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
s e c r e t a r y  g e n e r a l  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h u s  m a k in g  t h e  
m i n i s t e r s  d e p e n d e n t  on t h e  l a t t e r .
The c a b i n e t  s e c r e t a r y  c a n  p r o v i d e  c o n t i n u i t y  
i n  c a b i n e t  p r o c e d u r e s  and  p r a c t i c e  w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  
w h a t e v e r  c h a n g e  o f  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  m ig h t  b e  i n t r o d u c e d  by  
new m i n i s t e r s .  I f  he  i s  a  member o f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  e x e c u t i v e  
c o m m i t t e e  he c a n  a l s o  c r e a t e  p a t t e r n s  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  p a r t y  p o l i c y ,  g o v e rn m e n t  d e c i s i o n  a n d  c o n s i s t e n t  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n  t h r o u g h  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  t o  c a r r y  
o u t  t h e  p o l i c y  a n d  d e c i s i o n .  I n ^ u c h  c a p a c i t y  he  w o u ld ,  o f  
c o u r s e ,  b e  a c t i n g  u n d e r  t h e  g e n e r a l  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s i ­
d e n t  o f  t h e  r e p u b l i c  whose c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  r e q u i r e s  
h im  t o  u n d e r t a k e  su c h  s u p e r v i s i o n .  But t h e  h a rm o n y  w h ic h  
m u s t  e x i s t  b e t w e e n  p a r t y  p o l i c y ^  g o v e rn m e n t  d e c i s i o n  a n d  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n  c a n  be  m a i n t a i n e d  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  
t h r o u g h  t h e  g o o d  flfficCSJOEy o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  s e c r e t a r y .
The d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  s u c h  h a r m o n io u s  r e l a t i o n  o r  o f  a  s e t  
o f  c o n s i s t e n t  p r a c t i c e s  on s u c h  r e l a t i o n ^  i s  o f  c o u r s e ^  
n o t  i n  i t s e l f  e v i d e n c e  o f  e f f i c i e n c y .  The f u n c t i o n a l
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s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  s u c h  p a t t e r n s  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s > i n  a  
d e v e l o p m e n t a l  c o n t e x t ,  d e p e n d  on  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  a s f w e l l .
They depend^ f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  on t h e  e f f e c t i v e  dem ands  w h ic h  
a r e  made on  th© se  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a n d  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  on t h e  c a b i n e t  and  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  Such  
dem ands  c a n  be  made by t h e  p r e s i d e n t ,  a s / h e a d  o f  s t a t e ,  
b y  t h e  p a r t y  a n d  by p a r l i a m e n t .  The r e s p o n s e  t o  s u c h  
dem ands  may be  r e v i e w e d  o r  d e c i d e d  upon by t h e  c a b i n e t  o r  
t h e  p r e s i d e n t  a s  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e .  I f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
c o n c e r n s  some f i n a n c i a l ;  econom ic  o r  s o c i a l  p r o j e c t ^  n o r m a l l y  
t h e  c a b i n e t  h a s  i n t e r - m i n i s t e r i a l  c o m m i t t e e s  t o  d e a l  w i t h  
d e t a i l s  o f  a  d e c i s i o n  made by t h e  c a b i n e t .  S u c h  c o m m i t t e e s  
w h i c h  d ep e n d  on i n f o r m a l  p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  p r o v e d  
t o  be  e f f e c t i v e  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  p o l i c y  o r  i n  p r e p a r i n g  
o n e . ' 1' B u t  t h e  c a b i n e t  o r  c a b i n e t - c o m m i t t e e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
w i l l  d e p e n d  on s u b - c a b i n e t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y .
I t  a l s o  d e p e n d s  on a  c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  d e p a r t m e n t a l  f u n c t i o n  
a n d  c o n s i s t e n t  p r a c t i c e s  b u i l t  on  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s .  T h i s  
i s  t h e  more n e c e s s a r y  i n  s t a t e s  w here  f r e q u e n t  c a b i n e t  
r e s h u f f l e  i s  p r a c t i c e d .
1 .  I n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r e d  t h r o u g h  i n t e r v i e w . . . )
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E ac h  m i n i s t e r  h e a d i n g  s u c h  a  d e p a r t m e n t  i s
a s s i s t e d  by  t h e  n e x t  m o s t  s e n i o r  c i v i l  s e r v a n t ,  n a m e ly
t h e  p e r m a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y  ( s o m e t im e s  c a l l e d  p r i n c i p a l
s e c r e t a r y ) . Each  p e r m a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y  o f  a  m i n i s t r y  i s
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a d v i s i n g  t h e  m i n i s t e r  on d e p a r t m e n t a l
p o l i c y ,  f o r  e n s u r i n g  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  s u c h  p o l i c i e s
a n d  f o r  p e r s o n a l l y  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  t h e  s e r v i c e s  o f  t h e
m i n i s t r y  on  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r .  He i s  g e n e r a l l y
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  f u b l i c  A c c o u n t s  c o m m it t e e  o f  p a r l i a m e n t
f o r  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e  u n d e r  t h e  V o t e s  o f
t h e  m i n i s t r y  i s  i n c u r r e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  s t a n d i n g
i n s t r u c t i o n s  and  w i t h  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  A c t .  The s t a f f
o f  t h e  m i n i s t r y  u n d e r  t h e  p a rm a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y  a r e :  
a
o n e  deputy p e rm a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y  ( o r  m o r e ) ,  o t h e r  s e n i o r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o f f i c e r s  u s u a l l y  w i t h  t h e  r a n i  o f  ” u n d e r ­
s e c r e t a r y ” , p r i n c i p a l  a s s i s t a n t  s e c r e t a r y  an d  a s s i s t a n t  
s e c r e t a r y . ’*" Then t h e r e  a r e  t h e  u s u a l  s u p p o r t i n g  j u n i o r  
e x e c u t i v e s ,  c l e r i c a l ^  s e c r e t a r i a l  an d  s u b o r d i n a t e  s t a f f .
)
I n  E ra n c o p h o n ic  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t  
a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y  p e r f o r m s  s i m i l a r  
f u n c t i o n s .  The g e n e r a l  p r a c t i c e  i s  t o  have  two s u c h
1 .  T i t l e s  so m e t im e s  v a r y ;  t h e  above  a r e  t y p i c a l .
G f .  A .L .  Adu, o p . c i t .  p p . 171-3*
p e r s o n s :  ( i )  t h e  d i r e c t e u r  flu c a b i n e t  who i s  i n  c h a r g e
o f  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  m a t t e r s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  m i n i s t r y ;  a n d
( i i )  t h e  c h e f  du  c a b i n e t  i n  c h a rg e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  m a t t e r s ,
i n c l u d i n g  q u e s t i o n s  on p e r s o n n e l  a n d  a c c o u n t  s .  *■
T h e y  h a v e  u n d e r  th e m  s i m i l a r  s u p p o r t i n g  s t a f f .
N o r m a l l y  e a c h  m i n i s t r y  i s  o r g a n i s e d  i n t o
f u n c t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  a n d  s e c t i o n s  t o  h a n d l e  s u b j e c t s
c o v e r i n g  t h e  d e p a r t m e n t s  .a ide r  th e  m i n i s t r y  w i t h  a  &iew
t o  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  t h e  m i n i s t r y  w i t h  minimum economy a n d
maximum e f f i c i e n c y .  The volume of work determ ines the
n u m b e r s  o f  e a c h  r a n k  o f  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  em p lo y ed  i n  e a c h
m i n i s t r y ,  t h o u g h  t h i s  h a s  n o t  p r e v e n t e d  a  P a r k i n s o n i a n
2p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  p o s i t i o n s .
1 .  Cf. e . g .  The Ivory  C oast ,  Loi No. 64-4&C o f  21 Dec. 
1961; and M auritan ia ,  Loi No. 64-67 o f  2h- A p r i l ,
1 9 6 1 .
2 .  E .g .  i n  the  Ivory  Coast there are f i v e  major c a t e g o r i e s  
i n  the  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  -  A, 3 ,  C, D and E. There are
50 corps  i n  ca teg o ry  A; 41 in  B; 39 i n  C; 22 i n  
D; and 5 i n  E. (corp s  t r a n s i t o i r e ) .  Each ca tego ry  
has i t s ' 1 corps  des fonctionn&ires^who are s u b j e c t #  to  
the same s t a t u s  e . g .  t e a c h e r s .  #7ithin each corps  th ere  
are grad es  and w i t h in  each grades there  are e c h e lo n s .  
More government work means an expansion o f  s e c t i o n s  
to  be s t a f f e d  by peop le  f a l l i n g  i n t o  any one o f  th e s e  
p o s i t i o n  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .
The p e rm a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y ?a s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
h e a d  o f  t h e  m i n i s t r y ^ c o - o r d i n a t e s  a l l  t h e  d i v i s i o n s  w i t h i n  
i t .  He i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  s e e i n g  t h a t  a l l  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l ^  
t e c h n i c a l  an d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s k i l l  i s  p u t  t o  b e s t  u se  
i n  a  c o - o r d i n a t e d  m anner  b o t h  a t  p o l i c y  d e l i b e r a t i o n  a n d  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  s t a g e s .  He m ust  d e v i s e  m e c h a n ism s  f o r  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  an d  p r o c e s s i n g  o p i n i o n s  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  
m a k in g  an  i n t e g r a t e d  p r o p o s a l s  o f  p o l i c y  r e a d y  f o r  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  or  a c t i o n  by t h e  m i n i s t e r .  He m u s t  a l s o  d i r e c t  
and c o n t r o l ^ w i t l i  s k i l l  and diplomacy)a l l  d i r e c t  a c c e s s  
o f  o t h e r  to p  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  t o  t h e  m i n i s t e r  f o r  a d v i c e ,  
when t h e r e  i s  n e e d .  S u ch  d i r e c t  c o m m u n ic a t io n  w i t h  t h e  
m i n i s t e r  i s  a lw a y s  e s s e n t i a l  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  b e s t  
f i r s t  hand  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  a d v i c e .  B u t  i t  
c a n  a l s o  be o v e rd o n e  c a u s i n g  a w a s t e  o f  t i m e ,  a n d  i t  
r e q u i r e s  t h e  s k i l l  and  ju d g e m en t  o f  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y  
t o  e n s u r e  p r o p e r  u se  o f  i t .  As a  g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  .h o w ev e r ,  
t h e  m i n i s t e r ' s  d o o r  m u s t  b e  k e p t  o p e n  t o  t o p  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
a n d  t e c h n i c a l  a u v i s o r s  o r  h e a d s  o f  d e p a r t m e n t s  f o r ,  
o t h e r w i s e  ^ r e s e n t m e n t  may be  c a u s e d  w h ic h  c o u l d  a f f e c t  
e f f i c i e n c y  and  go o d  w il l ."* '
1 .  A .L .  Adu p r o p o s e s  t h i s  a s  a  c o n s i d e r e d  o p i n i o n ,  on  
t h e  b a s i s  o f  h i s  e x p ^ r i e n c e j a s  one t i m e  p e r m a n e n t  
s e c r e t a r y  i n  Ghana c f .  o p . c i t .  p p . 1 7 5 - 6 .
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I t  must  a l s o  be  s a i d  t h a t  m a c h i n e r y  f o r  c o n ­
s u l t a t i o n  i s  n o t  l i m i t e d  t o  e a c h  m i n i s t r y .  T h e r e  a r e  
i n  many i n s t a n c e s  i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a l  a d  hoc c o m m i t t e e s  
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  t h e  p e rm a n e n t  s e c r e t a r i e s  o f  v a r i o u s  m i n i s ­
t r i e s .  The r e l a t i o n  i s  i n f o r m a l  a n d  o f t e n  c o r d i a l  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e  l i x e l y t o  i n c r e a s e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  
d e c i s i o n  an d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  a n d  t h u s  a v o i d  w a s t e  o r  
d u p l i c a t i o n . ^  Such m a c h i n e r y  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  a t
s u b - c a b i n e t  l e v e l  a p a r t  f ro m  i t s  o b v i o u s  a d v a n t a g e s ,  c a n  
also s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  c i v i l  serv ice  a s  a  unified  a p p a r a t u s  
o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  w i t h  a  p e r m a n e n t  h e a d .
R e c r u i t m e n t  an d  t e rm s  o f  s e r v i c e
An e f f i c i e n t  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  d e p e n d s  on  t h e  q iaL i ty  
o f  i t s  m em bers .  T h i s  i n  t u r n  d e p e n d s  on. c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  o f  w h ic h  i s  t h a t  th e re :  m u s t  b e  c e r t a i n  
o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a ,  w h ic h  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  r e c r u i t m e n t  t o  
a n d  a d v a n c e m e n t  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e .  T h e re  m ust  b e  f i x e d  a n d  
e a s i l y  a s c e r t a i n a b l e  r u l e s  f o r  t h e  s e l e c t i o n . ,  a p p o i n t m e n t ,  
p r o m o t i o n ,  d i s c i p l i n e  a n d  r e t i r e m e n t  o f  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s .
T h i s  e n s u r e s  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  t a l e n t s  and  tihe e f f i c i e n c y
1 .  I n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r e d  t h r o u g h  i n t e r v i e w s .
a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e . .  I n d i v i d u a l  
m e r i t  a n d  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  s h o u l d  a t  a l l  t i m e s  p r e v a i l  
a n d  e x t e r n a l  i n f l u e n c e ,  p a t r o n a g e  an d  n e p o t i s m  e l i m i n a t e d .
The n o r m a l  m a c h in e ry  w h ic h  h a s  b e e n  a d o p t e d  t o  
f u l f i l  t h i s  t a s k  i s  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  c o m m i s s i o n ,  c a l l e d  
c i v i l  s e r v i c e  c o m m is s io n  i n  some s x a t e s . ^  The c o m m i s s i o n  
i s  c h a r g e d  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a d v i s i n g  ( i n  m o s t  
c a s e s )  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  h i g h e r  r a n k s  o f  t h e  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e ,  a n d  f o r  m ak ing  a p p o i n t m e n t s ,  t r a n s f e r  a n d  d i s ­
c i p l i n e  o f  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  b e lo w  t h e  r a n k  o f  p e r m a n e n t  
s e c r e t a r y .  The c o m m iss io n  u s u a l l y  a c t s  i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  h e a d  o f  t h e  m i n i s t r y  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  h i g h e r  
p o s t s ,  I t  i s  a l s o  no rm a l  p r a c t i c e  f o r  t h e  c o m m is s i o n  
t o  d e l e g a t e  pow er  t o  t h e  h e a d s  o f  t h e  m i n i s t r y  i n  r e s p e c t  
o f  t h e  l o w e r  p o s t s .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  d a y s  when t h e  c o m m is s i o n  
was v e s t e d  w i t h  e x e c u t i v e  p o w e r s  some c o n f u s i o n  a n d  d e l a y  
w as  c a u s e d  i n  many c a s e s .  The d e l e g a t i o n  o f  p o w e r  t o  t h e  
h e a d  o f  m i n i s t r i e s  was t h e r e f o r e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  a  
n e c e s s a r y  s t e p  t o  o b v i a t e  s u c h  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  T h i s  r e s u l t e d  
p a r t l y  i n  a  c e r t a i n  amount o f  d i s a p p o i n t m e n t  w i t h  a n
1 .  T h i s  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  A nghophon ic  s t a t e s .
i n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  many w ere  t r a i n e d  t o  s e e  a s  a  g u a r a n t e e  
a g a i n s t  p o s s i b l e  a r b i t r a r i n e s s .  But t h e r e  c a n  b e  no 
d o u b t  t h a t  some d e l e g a t i o n  o f  pow er  was n e c e s s a r y T h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a r b i t r a r y  d e c i s i o n  may be  m et  by c e r t a i n  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s a f e g u a r d s  w i t h  b u i l t - i n  m e c h a n i s m s  w h ic h  
o p e r a t e  m ore o r  l e s s  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  a n d  t h u s  i n h i b i t  o r  
m i n i m i s e  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  Bor exam ple  a r t i c l e  23 o f  t h e  
I v o r y  C o a s t  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  lav; p r o v i d e s  t h a t  e a c h  y e a r  a l l  
c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  m us t  o b t a i n  a  nu m b ered  c a r d  f o l l o w e d  by  
a  g e n e r a l  a p p r a i s a l  e x p r e s s i n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e v a l u a t i o n .  
T h i s  m akes  e x t e r n a l  i n f l u e n c e  o r  m a n i p u l a t i o n  d i f f i c u l t ,  
a n d  may p e r h a p s  be r e g a r d e d  a s  a  s o r t  o f  m e c h a n i c a l  
c o m p e n s a t i o n  f o r  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  com m is­
s i o n .  T h e r e  a r e  o f  c o u r s e  p e r s o n n e l  c o m m i t t e e s  i n  e a c h  
m i n i s t r y  o r  d e p a r t m e n t  t h a t  m u s t  g i v e  t h e i r  o p i n i o n
on  t h e  a n n u a l  l i s t  o f  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  p r o m o t i o n  w h ic h  i s
2p r e p a r e d  by  e a c h  d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  m i n i  s ty . .
1 .  B a s e d  on  p e r s o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e  a s  h e a d  o f  a  d e p a r t m e n t  
an d  c o n f i r m e d  by exchange  o f  v i e w s  with ,  o t h e r  A f r i c a n  
d e p a r t m e n t  h e a d s .
2 .  They  a r e  c a l l e d  co m m iss io n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p a r i t a i r e
i n  t h e  B r a n c o p h o n ic  s t a t e s ,  w h ic h  a l s o  h a v e  a  m i n i s t r y  
f o r  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  ( f o n c t i o m  p u b l i q u e ) .
44D
The s t a t u s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  c o m m i s s i o n s
s o m e t im e s  v a r i e s .  I n  Ghana ( u n d e r  t h e  N k r u m a h i s t
C o n s t i t u t i o n )  a n d  i n  T a n z a n ia ,  f o r  e x a m p l e , / a p p o i n t m e n t s
wIC\$
a n d  p r o m o t i o n  o f  p u o l i c  s e r v a n t s  t h e t tg h  v e s t e d  i n  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t  u n d e r  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  an d  A c t s  o f  P a r l i a m e n t ,  
t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  h a d  power d e l e g a t e d  t o  i t  t o  a c t  e x e c u t i v e l y  
o v e r  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  o f  p o s t s ,  e x c e p t  t h e  h i g h e s t  a n d  t h e  
l o w e s t  p o s t s *  In  o t h e r  s t a t e s  t h e  c o m m is s io n  enjoys 
e x e c u t i v e  p o w e r s  o v e r  t h e  a p p o i n tm e n t# '  p r o m o t i o n #  a n d  
d i s c i p l i n e  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a l l  p o s t s  e x c e p t  t h o s e  
o f  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  s e c r e t a r y  and c o m p a r a b le  o r  h i g h e r  p o s t s .
A p a r t  f ro m  r e a u i t m e n t ^ p r o m o t i o n  a n d  d i s c i p l i n e ^  
i t  i s  a l s o  p a r t  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m m is s io n  t o  
a d j u d i c a t e  i n  d i s p u t e s  a r i s i n g  f ro m  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  
r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  r e c r u i t m e n t  p r o m o t i o n  a n d  d i s ­
c i p l i n e *  The c o m m is s io n  i n t e r p r e t s  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  
r e g u l a t i o n s ,  n o r m a l l y  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  i s  
a p p o i n t e d  on  a  f u l l  t i m e  b a s i s .  The o t h e r  m em bers  a r e  
f u l l  t i m e ,  a p p o i n t e d  f o r  a  f i x e d  t e rm  o f  y e a r s ,  w i t h  
s e c u r i t y  o f  t e n u r e . ^ "
O b j e c t i v e  m e th o d s  o f  r e c r u i t m e n t  t o  a n d  
a d v a n c e m e n t  i n  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  c r e a t e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y
1 .  Cf .  Adu, o p . c i t .  p . 138.
i n c e n t i v e s  which can properly m otiva te  the i n d i v i d u a l  
c i v i l  serv an t  to  make maximum c o n tr ib u t io n .  E x h o r ta t io n  
f o r  s e r v i c e ,  f o r  more e f f o r t ,  f o r  i n t e g r i t y  and hard  
work are o f  course  n ecessary .  But they cannot be a 
s u b s t i tu te j to r  o b je c t iv e  c r i t e r i a  and f i x e d  s ta n d a rd s .
The e x e c u t iv e  and the party can play a c o n t r o l l i n g  r o l e  
i n  m odify ing  th e s e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  reasons o f  d ec la re d  
p u b l ic  i n t e r e s t .  But t h i s  must be done e x p l i c i t l y  and 
accord in g  to  law . The system based on merit  has l e g a l  
backing not on ly  i n  the sense o f  sa n c t io n s  but in  
s o c i o l o g i c a l  terms the p u b l i c a t io n  of co m p e t i t iv e  
exam inations  and r e s u l t s  in  o f f i c i a l  gazettes<>* and the  
g la r e  o f  p u b l i c i t y  he lps  to x’e s o lv e  problems o f  p atron age .
E x ecu t iv e  con tro l  i n  the appointment and tenure
o f  the top c i v i l  servants  should be s u f f i c i e n t  to  ensure
th e  im plem entat ion  o f  party and government p o l i c y .
Below t h a t ,  a ttem pts  at wanton in t e r f e r e n c e  can only
harm .the w ork in g /the  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  and reduce performance
harw\
ana hence u l t i m a t e l y / t h e  party and government p o l i c y .
I t  w i l l  l e a d  to  a c r i s i s  of con f id en ce  which i s  dangerous  
i n  the  lo n g  run. This does not o f  course exc lu d e  the  r o l e  
o f  the party  as  recorder o f  p u b l ic  sentim ents  and g r ie v a n c e s  
which can be a ir e d  through proper ch an ne ls .
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The p a r t y - c i v i l  s e r v ic e  r e l a t i o n  i s  bound to
be a d e l ic a te  one fo r  many years u n t i l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l
mechanisms are developed. But i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  p l a u s i b l e
to  aarg t^e th a t  in  a one-party system which makes membership
uo the party  open to c i v i l  servants  th ere  i s  l e s s  reaso n
f o r  a ttem pts  a t  manipulation of  the c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  by
p arty  o f f i c i a l s  than under a m u lt i -p a r ty  system . I f
a ttem p ts  a t  m anipulation  are made they must be presumed to
be made on p e r s o n a l ,  family  or f a c t i o n a l  b a s i s  which i s
fA*-
c o n c e iv a b le  under any other system, In f a c t / p r e - o c c u p a t i o n  
seems to  be i n  the reverse;  a f e a r  th a t  membership o f  
the  party  might induce c i v i l  serv a n ts  to  en ter  i n t o  a c t i v e  
p o l i t i c s  by seek in g  e l e c t i o n  to  the  n a t io n a l  assembly and 
thus  cause a d e c l in e  in  e f f i c i e n c y .  As a remedy to  t h i s  
i t  was recommended in  Tanaania th a t  c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  should  
be only e l i g i b l e  fo r  membership o f  the n a t io n a l  assembly i f  
nominated by th e  p res id en t ,  but not o th er w ise .  I t  was 
a l s o  recommended that the p res id en t  should have power to  
nominate a l i m i t e d  number o f  c i v i l  serv an ts  to  membership 
o f  l o c a l  a s s e m b l ie s ,  and that  c i v i l  serv a n ts  should  not  
oe otherw ise  e l i g i b l e  fo^membership o f  l o c a l  a s s e m b l i e s .^
1. Cf. Report ox Commission op.cit, p.24.
As a r e s u l t  c i v i l  servants  in  Tanzania are encouraged to  
j o i n  TAMJ but th e ir  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  in  the se n se  o f  
se e k in g  e l e c t i o n  i s  h e a v i ly  c ircum scribed .  Some c i v i l  
se r v a n ts  have res igned  t h e i r  p o s t s  to  c o n te s t  s e a t s  in  
the  g e n e r a l  election.^*
cUshrCct
As for  reg io n a l  a n d /a d m in is tra to r s ,  many s t a t e s  
took  over the c o lo n ia l  system and r e ta in e d  th e  s e r v i c e s  
o f  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e r s  as c i v i l  s e r v a n ts .  In the c a s e  o f  
the  Prancophonic s t a t e s  the  more c e n t r a l i s e d  and d ir e c t  
system o f  ad m in is tra t ion  o f  French c o l o n i a l  a d m in i s t r a t io n  
made the con t in uat ion  of  the use of  c i v i l  s e r v a n ts  as  
d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e r s  e a s i e r .  In most of  th ese  s t a t e s  the  
c i v i l  s er v a n ts  remained as the c e n t r a l  government's
2r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in  the d i s t r i c t  w ith  a change o f  name.
1 .  Cf. McAuslan et e l ,  o p . c i t .  Mr. C.Y. Mgonja, f o r  
example, res igned  h i s  c i v i l  s e r v ic e  post  to  c o n t e s t  
an e l e c t i o n ,  won and was made m in is te r  o f  community 
development and n a t io n a l  c u l tu r e ;  and he was not  a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  party man. i b i d .
2 .  The name •Prefet* rep laced  the  c o l o n i a l  name ’ commandant 
de c e r c l e 1 c f .  Robert D e la v ig n e t te ,  -  *Des commandants 
Franca is  au p r e fe t s  A fr ic a in s ;  Revue Fran<jaise d*Etudes
. p o l ix ic iu es  A fr ica in e s  No. 2 (Feb. 1966) p p .3 0 -4 0 .
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In  some Anglophonic s t a t e s  such as  Tangania the  top c i v i l  
se r v a n ts  were appointed as r e g io n a l  com m issioners,  a p os t  
regarded as  p o l i t i c a l ,
(4) Government p o l ic y  and the  c i v i l  s e r v ic e
The c i v i l  s er v ic e  as  the e x e cu t iv e  arm o f  
government i s  an in te g r a l  part of the e x e c u t iv e  and as  
such a s s i s t s  i n  the form u la t ion ^ d irec t io n ,  s u p e r v i s io n  
and c o n t r o l  o f  p o l i c y .  In a m u lt i -p a r ty  system th ere  
i s  a r u le  which en jo ins  c i v i l  serv a n ts  to  ser v e  a l l  govern­
ments of  whatever complexion with equal l o y a l t y  and e f f i ­
c i e n c y .  I t  i s  a matter for  doubt whether a government 
w ith  r a d i c a l  p o l i c i e s  can get  unquestioned l o y a l t y  and 
e f f i c i e n c y  by a c i v i l  s e r v ic e  opposed to th o se  p o l i c i e s .
But t h i s  i s  co n ce ivab le  a lso  i n  a one-party system .
The c i v i l  s e r v i c e  being d a i ly  concerned with  a d m in i s t r a t io n
\
accord ing  to  c e r t a i n  e s ta b l i s h e d  r u le s  and p r a c t i c e s  tend s  
to  be " co n serva t ive" ,  and "radical" p o l i c i e s  ten d  to  
d is tu rb  some of  i t s  e s ta b l i s h e d  b e l i e f s  and p r a c t i c e s .  
Equally  t r u e ,  however, i s  the need of a machinery fo r  the  
fo rm u la t ion  and implementation o f  p o l i c i e s .  In  a word 
the  bureaucracy i s  a necessary e v i l .
I t  may be s ta te d  as a g en era l  r u le  tfcat th e  
new A fr ic a n  governments have not met w ith  o p p o s i t io n  
from the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  as a d i s t i n c t  b u rea u cra t ic  c l a s s .  
N e v e r t h e l e s s  the  q u a l i ty  of i t s  com posit ion  and the  
c r u c i a l  nature  of  i t s  fu n ct ion  makes the c i v i l  s e r v i c e  
a v i t a l  s e c t o r  i n  government. I t  i s  n ece ssa r y  to  d e v is e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  machinery for  the e f f e c t i v e  s u p e r v i s io n  and 
c o n t r o l  o f  the  c i v i l  s e r v ic e  in  i t s  working as  executor  
o f  government p o l i c y .
(a)  F orm u la t io n : -
As s t a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  the q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  c i v i l  
s e r v a n ts  and t h e i r  involvement in  the im plem entation  o f  
p o l i c y  compels the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  h igher  ranks  
a t  the fo r m u la t io n  s ta g e .  This could  mean during the  
p la n n in g  o f  the  o v er a l l  government p o l i c y .  I t  may be 
r e i t e r a t e d  h ere th a t  i n  most A fr ican  s t a t e s  the respon  
s i b i l i t y  f o r  the  co n cep t io n ^ d irec t io n  and s u p e r v i s io n  o f  
government p o l i c y  belongs  to the p r e s id e n t .  However, 
th e  p r e s id e n t  cannot properly d ischarge  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
by h i m s e l f .  The cab in et  i s  there  to a s s i s t  him, and 
th e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  i s  one o f  the p i l l a r s  on which both  the  
p r e s id e n t  and the cab inet  r e s t . 1 Any p lann ing  (and
1 .  The o th er  p i l l a r  being the p a r ty .
e s p e c i a l l y  economic p la n n in g )  p re su p p o se s  a  s e a r c h i n g  
and d e t a i l e d  s tu d y  of the  (economic and s o c i a l )  n ee d s  
and r e s o u r c e s  o f  th e  c o u n t ry .  G e o - p h y s ic a l ,  demographic 
and o t h e r  d a t a  have to  be known and s p e c i f i e d ,  p l u s  th e  
a v a i l a b l e  means -  equipment j t r a n s p o r t s , e t c .  Only 
su ch  b a s i c  s t u d i e s  w i l l  p e rm it  th e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  p l a n .
T h is  p r e s u p p o s e s  an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a d a p te d  t o  deve lopm ent ,
which in c lu d e s  an adequate f low  of  in form at ion  from
th e  v a r io u s  m i n i s t r i e s ,  and a c e n t r a l  c o - o r d in a t in g  m in is tr y
o r  o f f i c e  o f  p l a n n in g .  A l l  o f& iese  o f f i c e s  a l s o  need
i
adeqiate and p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  competent s t a f f .
Inj^jtar as planning means fo rm u la t io n  the  broad 
o u t l i n e s  o f  p o l i c y  on the g en era l  d i r e c t io n  the  country  
should  tak e;  and in  so far  as  i t  in v o lv e s  d e c i s i o n s  on 
p r i o r i t i e s  i n  development, on the a l l o c a t i o n  o f  re so u r c e s  
and a d opt in g  c o n tr o ls  to ensure the b es t  use o f  r e ­
s o u r c e s ,  the  Executive has o f  course the major r e s p o n s i ­
b i l i t y  o f  d e c i s i o n .  The party Congress and i t s  
R a t io n a l  E xecutive  6ommittee provides  the e x e c u t iv e  
w ith  the  p la tform  to hammer out the g en er a l  p r i n c i p l e s  
which w i l l  gu ide  p o l ic y  and a c t io n .
The Executive has n o n e th e le s s  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  
to  work out programmes and propose B i l l s  to  parl iam ent  
to  carry out the genera l  p o l i c y ,  For t h i s  purpose i t  
r e l i e s  on the  fund of e x p e r t i s e  and exp er ience  which i s  
c o n c e n tr a te d  in  the c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  There needs to  "be 
th e r e fo r e  a c l o s e  r e la t io n s h ip  between the E xecu t ive  and 
ohe c i v i l  s e r v i c e  and between g o a ls  and a c t i o n s .  As 
one economist has put i t s  1 I f  a c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  to  
e x i s t  between n a t io n a l  g o a ls  as expressed  by p o l i t i c i a n s  
and economic programmes as expressed  in  th e  p la n s ,  c l o s e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l  betv/een p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  and 
p lann ers  (wnether exp a tr ia te  or n a t i o n a l ) .  The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  needs to be two way: p lanners  to  do t h e i r
job must i n s i s t  ( l )  that they should be su p p l ie d  w ith  a 
c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  s e t  of s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s ,  fo r  
example th e  d es ir e d  l e v e l s  of  employment, consumption,  
th e  n a t i o n a l  vei^us the fo r e ig n  share of economic a c t i v i t y ,  
the economic r o l e  o f  the public  s e c t o r ,  and the minimum 
p ro g ress  to  be made in  each fro n t  w i th in  the  proposed  
p er iod ;  and (2) that  p o l i t i c i a n s  should  examine, f i r s t ,  
th e  broad a l t e r n a t i v e  strato .es  fo r  the economy, as  a 
whole and i t s  var ious  s e c to r s  and, l a t e r ,  th e  more
CL
detailed p la n  d r a f t s ,  to ensure that  th ese  do, i n  f a c t ,  
i n t e r p r e t  t h e i r  g o a ls  c o r r e c t l y .  P la n n ers ,  on t h e i r
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side, need to accept the desired socio-political
framework a s  g iven ,  and to  shape economic p o l i c y  tow ard s
i t s  a t ta in m en t;  they should  a l s o  make c l e a r  the  c o s t s ,
e s p e c i a l l y  where th e  two g o a l s  -  f o r  example , a  h ig h
r a t e  of g row th  of ou tpu t  and a  r a p i d  b uy in g  out  o f
f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t s  -  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  c o m p e t i t i v e ,  so t h a t
more of one means l e s s  o f  th e  o t h e r . " ^
The p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t  o f  n a t i o n a l  p l a n n i n g
e f f o r t s  s h o u ld  no t  be d iv o rc e d  from t h e  t e c h n i c a l
a sp ec ts*  "It  i s  not only u s e l e s s  but co u n te r -p r o d u c t iv e
t o  c h a l l e n g e  th e  b a s ic  g o a l s  and a s p i r a t i o n s  -  a s
opposed t o  s p e c i f i c  p ro jec ts !  -  which c a u se  a  government
2t o  commission a development p lan." In f a c t  a c l e a r -
c u t  p o l i t i c a l  c l im a te  of o p in io n  w e l l  o r g a n i s e d  and
o r i e n t e d  to w ard s  the  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  economic developm ent
i s  a p r e r e q u i s i t e .
By and la rg e ,  the new A fr ican  s t a t e s  d ec ided
t o  o r g a n i s e  t h e i r  economic and s o c ia ld e v e lo p m e n t  on th e
b a s i s  o f  lon g  term p lans .  P lans  which must in v o lv e
1 .  R e g in a ld  H. Green, 'P o u r  A f r i c a n  Development P l a n s :  
Ghana, Kenya, N ig e r ia  and Tanzania* i n  t h e  J o u r n a l  
o f  Modern A f r ic a n  S t u d i e s 1 3, 2 (19*65) P P -249-79> 
a t  p . 252.
2. ibid
d e c i s i o n s  Om p r i o r i t i e s  and g en era l  d i r e c t i o n  o f
development, cannot be worked out p ure ly  on t e c h n i c a l
c r i t e r i a ;  or ,  i n  other words, they cannot be th e  work
o f  te c h n o c r a t s  only,  independent o f  g en er a l  p o l i c y .
T echnocrats  can and must help to  c o l l e c t ,  c o l l a t e ,
a n a ly se  and c l a s s i f y  data, in  order to f a c i l i t a t e  c h o ic e
about p r i o r i t i e s ,  and to d ra ft  the p lan  a c c o r d in g ly .
But ,  to  paraphrase Bene' Dumont, i t  i s  im p o ss ib le  to
1e la b o r a te  an a p o l i t i c a l  p lan .  Ivgrg  tower p la n s  must
be d iscard ed  because they stand l i t t l e  chance o f  
s u c c e s s .^
I t  i s  g en er a l ly  agreed th at  the  only s o r t  o f .  
p la n s  which can e f f e c t  a "take off"  are th o se  which  
in v o lv e  th e  t o t a l  engagement o f  a government and i t s  
p e o p le ,  i n  a c t io n  based on d e l ib e r a te  choice and i n
1 .  Renef Dumont, o p . c i t .
2 .  There i s  a s tory  current among A fr ican  / e l i t e "  c i r c l e s  
which reco u n ts  the meeting between a p e a s a n t r  shepherd  
watching a f l o c k  cfcr sheep, and a c i t y  man who went on 
a p i c n i c .  The l a t t e r  asked the shepherd whyj4he l e t  
the wfool on. h i s  sheep grow so lon g ,  why d id /n o t  not  
cut i t  and take i t  to market? Whereuponjthe shepherd  
answered, h o r r i f i e d :  "V/hati and s p o i l  the  f i v e  year  
plant?" The trouble with you c i t y  p eo p le^  i s  th a t  
you donf t  p r a c t i s e  what you preach!*1'
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r e a d in e s s  to  make c e r t a in  s a c r i f i c e s .  f h i s p i l l  need a 
s e t  of  c l e a r l y  defined s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s  and an 
unreserved  commitment to  t n e i r  a t ta in m en t .  In  the  
absence o f  such o b je c t iv e s  and commitment/ p la n s  and the  
e x e r c i s e  of  executive  power based on tnem would entail 
waste  of human and m a te r ia l  r e s o u r c e s ,  llany A fr ic a n  
governments have p ro fe ssed  s o c ia l i s m  as a u n i fy in g  
id e o lo g y to  guide them in s e t t i n g  out t h e i r  s o c i o ­
p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s .  But, as  we have seen ,  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n s  o f  s o c ia l i s m  are g iv e n ,  and in  some c a s e s  i t  
i s  a mere ca tch -ph rase .  S o c ia l ism  in  so f a r  as  i t  i s  
r e l a t e d  to  a na t iona l  p lan  i s  g e n e r a l ly  understood (and 
proclaimed by many A fr ican  governments) to  imply th a t  
the  government must g iv e  p r i o r i t y  to  the s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  
th e  most urgent needs of the g rea t  mass o f  th e  p o p u la t ­
i o n .  "As a g a in s t  the m assive im porta t ion  o f  motor c a r s ,  
i t  would p r e fe r  buses and l o r r i e s ;  r e f u s in g  sumptuous 
p a la c e s ,  i t  'would b u i ld  a g r e a t  number o f  s c h o o l s  and 
sm all  d i s p e n s a r ie s .  I t  would not s a c r i f i c e  th e  primary  
and p r o f e s s i o n a l  education  o f  the peasant masses to  the  
very  h igh  (degree) of ed u cation  o f  a sm all  o l i g a r c h y ,  
d e s t in e d  to  increase  the  p r i v i l e g e d  c a s t e .  I t  would 
seek  to  remedy the shortage  o f  p r o te in  fo r  th e  poor,  
in s t e a d  o f  importing luxury gfood s t u f f  fo r  th e  r i c h . . .
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Each one of  these  p r o p o s i t io n s  determines a s e r i e s  o f
o r i e n t a t io n s  e s s e n t i a l  fo r  development. n  ^ Very few
'to
governments can claim to  have s tu ck /su c h  p r o p o s i t i o n s .
Studies  of the ea r ly  p lans  o f  some A fr ic a n s
have shown that  they s u f f e r  from a lack  o f  c l e a r l y
d e f in e d  o b j e c t iv e s ,  r e l a t e d  to  a b a s ic  i d e o l o g i c a l
commitment/ .  Some o f  t h e s e  p l a n s  have a l s o  s u f f e r e d
from over-optimism and too much dependence on f o r e i g n
a id ;  while most of them su f fe r e d  from a la c k  o f  c o -  
2
o r d in a t io n .  I t  hag been found i i i  Tanzania, f o r
example, that the p lanning  s e c r e t a r i a t  was l e f t  wdth a 
f a r  broader and l e s s  s p e c i f i c  s e t  o f  g o a l s  to  t r a n s l a t e  
i n t o  economic p o l i c y ,  as a r e s u l t  of a &ack o f  d e t a i l e d  
p ro p o sa ls  in  the f i v e  Year p lan  o f  economic and s o c i a l  
development ( IS 64- 6 9 ) • l^e s e c r e t a r i a t  t h e r e f o r e  
proceeded to o f f e r  b a s ic  a l t e r n a t i v e  c h o ic e s  to  th e  
government both on a g en era l  and on a s p e c i f i c  l e v e l .
1 .  B. Dumont, o p . c i t .  p . 96.
2 .  R.H. G-reen, o p . c i t .  pp .25o-262;  and B.C. P r a t t ,
1 The ad m in is tra t ion  of  economic p lann ing  i n  a newly  
independent s t a t e :  the Tanzanian exp er ien ce  1 963-
1966, in  Journal o f  Commonwealth p o l i t i c a l  s t u d i e s ,  
V ol.  V, No. 1 (March 1967) p p .51 -6 .
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T h i s  meant t h a t  t h e y  in d u c e d  f u r t h e r  t h i n k i n g  on a  s e t  
o f  d e t a i l e d  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  aims and an economic p l a n  
f o r  t h e i r  a t ta in m en t*  I n  o t h e r  words much o f  t h e  s o c i o ­
p o l i t i c a l  programme worked o u t ,  p o s t - d a t e d  t h e  p l a n  and 
d i d  no t  stem from a  p a r t y  i d e o l o g y .  As a  r e s u l t  t h e r e  
was efvery low l e v e l  o f  n a t i o n a l  c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  t h e  p l a n  
an d  of i t s  r e le v a n c e  to  n a t i o n a l  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  f o r  example 
i n  th e  lower ranks  o f  th e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  t h e  p a r t y  and t h e  
p a r t y - r e l a t e d  mass movements,^
Co-ordination i s  a  key to  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  a 
p l a n ,  and i t  givesmore meaning and "be t te r  e f f i c a c y  to  
i n d i v i d u a l  ex ecu t iv e  d e c i s i o n  a t  every  l e v e l .  The 
im p o r tan ce  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  im pinges  n o t  on ly  flTtt th e  
v a r i o u s  s t a g e s  of im p le m e n ta t io n ,  bu t  a l s o  a t  t h e  form u­
l a t i o n  s t a g e .  Indeed ,  th e  r a t t e r  has  a  b e a r i n g  on t h e  
fo rm e r  to  a g r e a t  e x t e n t .  Thus i n  t h e  N i g e r i a n  N a t i o n a l  
Development P lan  (1962-68) t h e r e  were f o u r  ( l a t e r  f i v e )  
p l a n s ,  one f o r  each r e g i o n a l  government and  one f o r  t h e  
f e d e r a t i o n ,  which were no t  f u l l y  c o - o r d i n a t e d  on p a p e r ,  
no l e s s  t h a n  on o r g a n i s a t i o n  and im p le m e n ta t io n .  I t  
a p p e a r s  t h a t  the  p l a n  was worked out  by a  l i m i t e d  number 
o f  e x p a t r i a t e  econom is ts ,  "working v i r t u a l l y  i n  a vacuum
1 .  Cf .  R.H. Green, o p . c i t .  p p . 253-4 .
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sc f a r  as d e t a i l e d  d i r e c t i o n  or c o n s u l t a t i o n  w ith  
p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  went, and with, only p e r ip h e r a l  ad v iso ry  
co n ta c t  w ith  N iger ian  c i v i l  serg a n ts  and p l a n n e r s . 11
In Kenya, th e  Development Plan (1964-70)  
was prepared in  g rea t  h a s te  without s u f f i c i e n t  d e t a i l ,  
owing to the urgency f e l t  for  the need o f  such a p lan  by
p1964 and th e  p o l i ' c i c a l  e v e n ts  which o v e r to o k  i t .  The
balance between in d u stry  and a g r ic u l tu r e  i s  one o f  the
su s p e c ts  on which econom ists  debate .  A h a s t i l y  co n ce ived
plan i s  bound to ups§t sueli balance, and i t s  enforcement
would be met with f a i l u r e . ^
No development p lan ,  however, w i l l  c o n c e iv e d
can rep la ce  the w i l l  to  develop .  Behind such a p la n
th e r e  must be a w e l l -o r g a n i s e d  and m o b i l i s e d  p o p u la t io n .
The need o f  u n iv e r sa l  ed u cat ion  i s  an obvious one .  But
over and above that th er e  i s  a need fo r  a p o l i t i c a l l y
educated and motivated  p o p u la t io n .  In  pre- independence
fkr
years  t h i s  was e a s i l y  ach ieved  an / fa c e  o f  th e  c o l o n i a l  
r u l e r .  Post- independence years  required  a m o b i l i s a t i o n  
for  development. I f  the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  can be termed
1 .  i b i d .
2 .  i b i d ,  pp. 259-60.
3 .  On the exper ience  of other c o u n tr ie s  in  the b a lan ce  
- between industry  and a g r i c u l t u r e .  Cf1. R Dumont,
o p . c i t .  p p .122-5#
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" development a d m in i s t r a t io n * 1, t h e n  "developm ent p o l i t i c s 11 
i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  term t o  c h a r a c t e r i s e  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  
m asses  i n  such  a c o n te x t  and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
governm en t.  The r o l e  o f  t h e  p a r t y  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  
h a s  been  d e s c r ib e d  i n  t h e  p r e v io u s  c h a p t e r .  The 
e x e c u t iv e  and th e  p a r ty  o f f i c i a l s  have a  g r e a t  t a s k  i n  
i n s p i r i n g  th e  p u b l ic  w i th  a  w i l l  to  deve lop  and to  
s u s t a i n  t h i s  w i l l .  I t  i s  n o t  an easy t a s k ,  b u t  i t  i s  
i m p e r a t i v e  g iv e n  the  need  and th e  l o g i c  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
sy s tem  ad op ted  by t h e s e  s t a t e s .
The p a r ty  c o n g r e s s e s  and= th e  m e e t in g s  o f  th e  
p a r t y  e x e c u t iv e  com m ittees  can  s e t  th e  b ro a d  s o c i o ­
p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s  and th e  p a r t y  a p p a r a tu s  c a n  h e lp  t h e  
government a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  m achinery  i n  p r o v i d i n g  t h e  
means f o r  p o l i c y  a p p r a i s a l s > f o r  s e a r c h in g  e x a m in a t io n  o f  
p u b l i c  a t t i t u d e s  and f o r  i n d i c a t i n g  p rob lem s and 
s u g g e s t i n g  s o l u t i o n s .  Thu§y p a r t y ,  e x e c u t iv e  and c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  can  f i n d  a m ee t ing  p o i n t .  One of  t h e  a d v a n ta g e s  
o f  sys tem s which perm it  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  to  be  p a r t y  
members i s  t h a t  i t  can en a b le  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  t o  a v o id  
making iv o ry  tower p r o p o s a l s .  I t  can g iv e  them an  
o p p o r t u n i t y  to  f e e l  th e  p u l s e ,  a s  i t  were, o f  p u b l i c  
o p i n i o n ,  th ro u g h  d i r e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a t  p a r t y  m e e t i n g s .
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I f  t h i s  m igh t  i n v o l v e  d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  e f f o r t s ,  i t  would 
com pensa te  adequately t h r o u g h  a v o id a n c e  o f  i s o l a t i o n  
w hich  c o u ld  be f a t a l *  S e r i o u s  e r r o r s  and w a s te  can  be 
a v o id e d  i f  p r o p e r  use  i s  made o f  t h e  o n e - p a r t y  system* 
S e n i o r  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  c a n  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  
o f  p o l i c y  n o t  o n ly  a t  t h e  m i n i s t r y  l e v e l  b u t  a l s o  w i t h i n  
t h e  p a r t y  o rg a n s ,  and  t h u s  b r i n g  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e i r  
knowledge and  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  b e a r  on t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  
^ e n e r a l  p o l i c i e s .  Such d i r e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  c i v i l  
s e r v a n t s  ca n  a l s o  n e lp  t o  a v o id  t h r e e - c o r n e r e d  t u s s l e s  
( p a r t y - e x e c u t i v e - c i v i l  s e r v i c e )  o r  t u g - o f - w a r  ( p a r t y -  
c i v i l  s e r v i c e ) ,  i n  t h a t  each  would be i n v o lv e d  i n  a 
common d e c i s i o n  which c r e a t e s  u n i t y  i n  s h a r e d  r e s p o n s i -
t
b i l i t y .  Such u n i t y  tS  one o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e
s u c c e s s f u l  i m p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a  p l a n .  I t  would a l s o
g u a r a n t e e  a g a i n s t  t h e  developm ent  o f  a  gap b e tw een  a
p r i v i l e g e d  o l i g a r c h y  and t h e  g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n . ^  But
t h i s  i s  e a s i e r  s a i d  t h a n  done. I t  would n eed  a  dynamic
and  d e d i c a t e d  l e a d e r s h i p ,  a t  p a r t y ,  government and  c i v i l
s e r v i c e  l e v e l s .  P r e s e n t  t r e n d s  a r e  n o t  encourag ing*
1 .  One of t h e  d i s t u r b i n g  phenomena i n  t h e s e
s o c i e t i e s  i s  t h e  gap be tw een  t h e  s a l a r y  s c a l e  o f  
h ig h  r a n k in g  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  (and m i n i s t e r s )  and 
t h e  lo w e s t  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  and w o rk e r s .
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More governm en ts  w i l l  have to  promote  p r o j e c t s  w i th  th e  
g e n e r a l  w e l f a r e  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  i n  mihd, and to  t h a t  end 
r e d u c e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  h i g h e r  
s a l a r i e s ,  b e f o r e  t h e y  ca n  i n s p i r e  t h e  m a sse s ,  m a i n t a i n  
t h e i r  c o n f id e n c e  and w i l l  t o  develop.*^ The r o l e  o f  
t h e  p a r t y  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  can  be c r u c i a l  a s  a  s t a n d a r d  
b e a r e r  and c o n t r o l l i n g  ag en cy .
As f o r  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e tw een  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  and 
t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  i t  h a s  b een  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  t n e r e  must 
a e v e lo p  a  c o n v e n t io n  whereby The m i n i s t e r  s h o u ld  seek  
t h e  a d v ic e  o f  h i s  s t a f f  on a l l  p o l i c y  m a t t e r s .  The 
m i n i s t e r ,  a s  th e  p o l i t i c a l  head  o f  h i s  m i n i s t r y ,  expounds 
t h e  p o l i c y  and m a n i fe s t©  o f / p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y .  The 
perm anen t  s e c r e t a r y  and h i s  team s h o u ld  know which  p o l i c y  
o r  programme would work and  which would n o t .  They sh o u ld  
be  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  make p o l i c y  p r o p o s a l s  i n  l i n e  w i th
ot h e  m i n i s t e r 1s b ro a d  p o l i t i c s ,  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  by him.
1 .  Some governm ents  have been  o v e r th ro w n  by army coups 
wh(£3fla t h e y  p ro p o se d  a r e d u c t i o n  o f  s a l a r i e s ,  e . g .
i n  t h e  Upper V o l t a ,  t h e  government o f  M aurice  Yameo^o. 
The f o r t u n e  o f  Xarneogo and some o f  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  was 
e s t i m a t e d  to  be v e r y  h ig h  which r e d u c e d  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
t h e  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  r e d u c t i o n  o f  s a l a r i e s .
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Th argument p ro c e e d s  from an a s s u m p t io n  o f  a  m u l t i ­
p a r t y  sy s tem .  I t s  v a l i d i t y  i s  n o n e t h e l e s s  a p p l i c a l b e  
to any s y s te m .  Even tho u g h  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n s  i n  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  m i n i s t r y  r e s t s  w i th  t h e  m i n i s t e r ,  a  p ro p e r  
u n a e r s t a d n i n g  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  h i s  r o l e  and t h a t  o f  h i s  
p r i n c i p a l  a s s i s t a n t  and h i s  team would compel him to  seek  
t h e i r  a d v ic e  c o n s t a n t l y  b e f o r e  making h i s  d e c i s i o n s .
P o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s  u n d e r ta k e n  i n  d i s r e g a r d  o f  such  emin­
e n t l y  n e c e s s a r y  s t e p s  a r e  bound to  be f a u l t y  o r  in a d e q u a te  
The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  p a s t  few y e a r s  s u g g e s t s ,  
however,  t h a t  t h e  r e a l  p rob lem s  i n  t h e  e x e c u t i v e - c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  r e l a t i o n  l i e s  i n  t h e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  p o l i c i e s ,  
p l a n s  and programmes more t h a n  i n  t h e i r  f o r m u l a t i o n .
(b) Im p le m e n ta t io n
Once b ro a d  p r i n c i p l e s  and g o a l s  have b een  
f o r m u l a t e d  i n  r e s o l u t i o n s ,  n a t i o n a l  p l a n s  and law s ,  th e  
e x e c u t i v e  h a s  a g a i n  t o  r e l y  on t h e  b u re a u c ra c y  t o  t r a n s ­
l a t e  them i n t o  a c t i o n .  T h is  p r o c e s s  i n c l u d e s ,  i n t e r  
a l i a ,  i n t e r p r e t i n g  p l a n s ,  and laws and making d e c i s i o n s  
a c c o r d i n g l y ;  c o n s t a n t  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  p l a n s  on t h e  b a s i s  
o f  r e s u l t s  andprob lem s e n c o u n te r e d ;  d r a f t i n g  memoranda^ 
p r o p o s in g  s o l u t i o n s  and a c t i o n  by th e  m i n i s t e r ,  who i n  
t u rn ^ w o u ld  t a k e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  d e c i s i o n  o r  t a k e  th e  m a t t e r
t o  t h e  C a b i n e t .
The s h o r t a g e  o f  t r a i n e d  manpower i s  k e e n ly  
f e l t  i n  t h i s  a s  i n  a l l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
i n  most A f r i c a n  s t a t e s .  The to p  p o s i t i o n s  i n  th e  
planning* o f f i c e s  o f  s e v e r a l  governm en ts  a r e  
m a in ly  s t a f f e d  by e x p a t r i a t e s ,  and  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  
o f  t h e s e  a t  p l a n n i n g  u n i t s  and o t h e r  t e c h n i c a l  d e p a r t ­
m ents  o f  many m i n i s t r i e s .  O b v io us ly  t h e  employment o f  
h i g h l y  p a i d  e x p a t r i a t e s ,  needed  a s  i t  i s ,  must be con­
c e n t r a t e d  o n ly  i n  a  few p l a c e s .  A f t e r  in d ep en d en ce  l o a n  from 
m e t r o p o l i t a n  governm ents  or  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  e x p a t r i a t e s  
t o  f i l l  such  p o s t s  was~.not  f a v o u r e d  u n l e s s  fo u n d  to  be 
a b s o l u t e l y  n e c e s s a r j . E x p e r ie n c e  s i n c e  t h e n  h a s  shown 
t h a t  t h e  young A f r i c a n s  ca n  q u i c k l y  b u i l d  up t&d 
q u a l i t i e s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  t a k e  up su ch  p o s i t i o n s  g iv e n  
t h e  r i g h t  t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e o r y  and p r a c i i c e . ^
S h o r ta g e  o f  t r a i n e d  manpower has  a  b e a r i n g  on 
t h e  p r e s e n t  i n q u i r y  b e c a u s e  ( i )  i t  c a n  i n h i b i t  t h e  a c t i o n  
o f  t n e  e x e c u t i v e  i n  c a r r y i n g  out  c e r t a i n  p o l i c i e s ,  o r  
even  i n  f o r m u l a t i n g  what t h e y ,  o r  t h e i r  p a r t i e s  b e l i e v e  
t o  be th e  r i g h t  p o l i c i e s ,  and ( i i )  i t  a f f e c t s  t h e  q u a l i t y
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o f  pe r fo rm an ce  i n  c a r r y i n g  out  government p l a n s  and
p ro g ra m m e s .  A g a i n ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  e v e n
where i t  i s  a v a i l a b l e ,  i s n o t  s u f f i c i e n t .  I n  a d d i t i o n
t o  t r a i n i n g ,  d e d i c a t i o n  and h o n e s ty  i s  needed;  and where
a l i m i t e d  number o f  q u a l i f i e d  p eo p le  a r e  a v a i l a b l e ,
t h e  c h o ic e  o f  t h e  government i n  appo in tm en t  t o  key p o s t s
becomes l i m i t e d .  This  p r e s e n t s  a  danger o f  p ro d u c in g
a smug or  even  c o r r u p t  b u r e a u - t e c h n o c r a t i c  e l i t e .  A l l
t h i s  has  some s e r i o u s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  to  government p o l i c y
and  a c t i o n .  For  example one of th e  o b s t a c l e s  t o  th e
im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  1964-69 f i v e  y e a r  p l a n  o f  T an z an ia
was th e  s h o r t a g e  of  s k i l l e d  p e r s o n n e l  which meant t h a t
some o f  t h e  p r o j e c t s  c o u ld  h o t  be s t a r t e d  w h i le  o t h e r s  
1were d e l a y e d .  S i m i l a r l y ,  development p r o j e c t s  m
M ali  and Guinea  have been  hampered by s i m i l a r  s h o r t a g e s .  
S h o r ta g e  o f  c a p i t a l ,  equipment and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
e x p e r i e n c e  a r e  o f  c o u r s e ^  e q u a l ly  k ee n ly  f e l t .  I n  t h e  
f a c e  or such  s h o r t a g e  when au d ac io u s  p l a n s  a r e  made and 
m e e t / f a i l u r e ^  th e  r e s u l t  o f t e n  is , -  a  tendency^ on t h e  p a r t  
o f  th e  b u r e a u c r a c y ^ th r o u g h  th e  p a r t y ^ t o  harangue  t h e ______
1 .  C f .  F i r s t  Year P r o f r e s s  R eport  on th e  Im p le m e n ta t io n  
o f  t h e  F iv e  yemr Development P la n  (P u b l ic  S e c t o r ) ,
1 J u l y  1964 to  30 June 1965* D a r -e s -S a la a m .
m a s s e s  f o r  e f f o r t s  a n d  t o  i s s u e  them  w i t h  o r d e r s  w h ic h  
t h e y  do n o t  r e a l l y  u n d e r s t a n d .  The s h o r t a g e  o f  
t r a i n e d  y o u n g  e x t e n s i o n  w o r k e r s  t o  go a n d  l i v e  w i t h  t h e  
m a s s e s  a n d  e x p l a i n  t o  th e m  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  p l a n s ,
£e£Lds t o  r e s o r t  b e i n g  made t o  t h e  p a r t y  a n d  f i i v i l  
s e r v i c e  h i e r a r c h y  t o  i s s u e  o r d e r s .  B u t  t h i s  c a n n o t  
c r e a t e  a  f r u i t f u l  d i a l o g u e  a n d  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  d e v e l o p m e n t .  
The m a s s e s  c a n  b e  a r o u s e d  t o  ftftee f u n d a m e n t a l  c h a n g e s  
( w h i c h  d e v e lo p m e n t  i m p l i e s )  by  b e i n g  f a c e d  w i t h  t h e  
f a i t  a c c o m p l i  o f  e x p e r i m e n t a l  p r o j e c t s  ( d i r e c t e d  by  
t e c h n i c i a n s  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s )  w h ic h  t h e y  c a n  s e e .
The p a r t y  c a n  t h e n  h e l p  i n  m o b i l i s i n g  th em  t o  a  s u s t a i n e d  
i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  e f f o r t s  f o r  c h a n g e  a l o n g  th e n e w  l i n e s  
d e m o n s t r a t e d  t o  th e m .  A b u r e a u c r a c y  i s s u i n g  o r d e r s  
f r o m  t h e  c o m f o r t  o f  t h e  c i t y  l i f e ,  r e m o t e  f r o m  t h e  
r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  p e a s a n t  l i f e  c a n n o t  b e #  a n  a g e n c y  f o r  
c h a n g e .  Y e t ,  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o f  i t s  pow er  w o u ld  
p r e s u p p o s e  ( i )  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  c o m p e t e n t  p e o p l e  a t  t h e  
p e r i p h e r y  t o  e n g a g e  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  an d  
( i i )  t h a t  t h e  p e r i p h e r y  i s  a l w a y s  l o y a l  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  w h ic h  i s  n o t  o f t e n  t h e  c a s e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
w h e re  c e r t a i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  f o r c e s  h a v e  b e e n  l e f t  i n t a c t .
R e c o g n i t i o n  o f  p r o b l e m s  o f  s h o r t a g e  o f  t r a i n e d  
man pow er  a n a  a l l i e d  p ro b lem sm '  an d  a t t e n d i n g  t o  them
w i t h  u r g e n c y  i s  one o f  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  
t h e  p r o g r e s s  o f  a  c o u n t r y .  S h o r t a g e  o f  t r a i n e d  p e o p l e  
i m p l i e s  a  l i m i t a t i o n  on  g o v e r n m e n t  d e c i s i o n  on  a l l  
d i r e c t i o n s .  I t  w o u ld  l i m i t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  avow ed s o c i a l i s t  
p o l i c i e s  i n ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e -  
owned i n d u s t r i e s ,  a s  t h i s  p r e s u p p o s e s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  
q u a l i f i e d ,  e x e c u t i v e ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  s t a f f
'(rod.ie)
c a p a b l e  o f  d i r e c t i n g  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s e d  t r a d e s w i t h  
e f f i c i e n c y .  D e p e n d en ce  on  e x p a t r i a t e  s t a f f  w o u ld  
im p o s e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on g o v e r n m e n t  a c t i o n  o r  o p t i o n  i n  
c a r r y i n g  o u t  c e r t a i n  p o l i c i e s  w i t h  w h ic h  e x p a t r i a t e
s t a f f  may n o t  b e  i n  a g r e e m e n t .
D i r e c t i o n  a n d  C o - o r d i n a t i o n
G overnm en t  i n v o l v e s  p o l i c y - m a k i n g  a s  w e l l  a s  
d i r e c t i o n  a n d  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  i n  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  o f  s u c h  
p o l i c y .  One o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a  s t r o n g  e x e c u t i v e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  i s  t h a t  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  m u s t  a s sum e  
m o re  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  
o f  p o l i c y  a s  i n  i t s  f o r m u l a t i o n .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  
d e v i s i n g  s u i t a b l e  m a c h i n e r y  f o r  t h e  p r o p e r  d i s c h a r g e  o f  
t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  o n e .
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The u s u a l  m a c h i n e r y  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t ,  o f  
c a b i n e t  c o m m i t t e e s ,  c a b i n e t  s e c r e t a r i a t ,  a n d  t h e  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  c a n  be u t i l i s e d , o f  c o u r s e .  B u t  undue d e p e n d e n c e  
o n  t h e  n o rm a l  c a b i n e t  s y s t e m  w o u ld  b e  u n s u i t a b l e  f o r  an  
e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n c y .  I t  w ould  d e f e a t  t h e  b a s i c  
p h i l o s o p h y  b e h i n d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  st a n d a r d o f  an  
e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n c y  w h ic h  im p o s e s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on 
t h e  p r e s i d e n t  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e s e  t a s k s ,  a s  i t  w o u ld  t r a n s f e r  
t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  c a b i n e t .  A c a b i n e t  s y s t e m  
h a s  i t s  own la w s  o f  d y n am ic s  w h ich  w o u ld  d i f f u s e  power  -  
p o w er  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a n  
e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n t  f o r  a  d e f i n i t e  p u r p o s e .  "fn a  c a b i n e t  
s y s t e m  e a c h  m i n i s t e r  h a s  a n  e q u a l  s t a t u s  t o  t h e  o t h e r s  
a n d  a n  au tonom ous  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  h i s  m i n i s t r y .  
And i n  t h e  B r i t i s h - t y p e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  T r e a s u r y  h a s  c e r t a i n  dom in a n ce  w i t h  an  
e m p h a s i s  on b u d g e t a r y  a n d  s h o r t - t e r m  f i n a n c i a l  p r o b l e m s .  
B u t t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d  p o l i t i c s  ox d e v e lo p m e n t  w h ic h  
u n d e r l i e s  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m  c o m p e l s  a  
d e p a r t u r e  f ro m  t h e  c a b i n e t  s y s t e m .
Deve lopm ent  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p r e s u p p o s e s  
d e v e lo p m e n t  p l a n n i n g ,  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  w h ic h  i s  a  
d e c i s i o n  m ak ing  p r o c e s s  i n  w h ich  g o v e rn m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  w h ic h
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b e a r  upon t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  a r e  t a k e n  w i t h  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  an d  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p h a n  a n d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  a g r e e d  an d  i n t e r n a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  s e t  o f  
n a t i o n a l  p r i o r i t i e s . ^ - The m os t  common m a c h i n e r y  w h ic h  
h a s  b e e n  a d o p t e d  t o  h e l p  d i r e c t  and  c o - o r d i n a t e  d e v e l o p ­
m e n t a l  d e c i s i o n  m ak ing  i s  a  m i n i s t r y  o f  D e v e lo p m e n t  p l a n n i n g  
( s o m e t im e s  c a l l e d  N a t i o n a l  p l a n ) .  T h i s  m i n i s t r y  i s  
u s u a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  p r e p a r i n g  a  n a t i o n a l  p l a n  i n  
c o n s u i t a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  m i n i s t r i e s  an d  o t h e r  u n i t s .
The w ho le  p r o c e s s  i s  t h e n  c o - o r d i n a t e d  a t  a  h i g h e r  l e v e l ,  
u s u a l l y  t h r o u g h  a  c a b i n e t  p l a n n i n g  c o m m is s io n  p r e s i d e d  
b y  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  o r  by a  m i n i s t e r  d e l e g a t e d  by  h im .
The m i n i s t r y  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t  p l a n n i n g  would, r e p o r t  t o  t h e  
p l a n n i n g  c o m m iss io n  a  p r o c e d u r e  w h ich  s h o u l d  n o r m a l l y  
o b v i a t e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  c o - o r d i n a t i o n .  B u t  e x p e r i e n c e  
i n  t h e  p a s t  few y e a r s  h a s  shown t h a t  t h i s  m a c h i n e r y  o f  
c o - o r d i n a t i o n  and  d i r e c t i o n  d o es  n o t  a l w a y s  w o rk  s a t i s ­
f a c t o r i l y .  E v i d e n t l y ^  t h e r e  m ust  b e ^ a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  
o f f i c e  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t ^ a  s t a f f  o f  e x p e r t s  t o  a d v i s e  a n d  
h e l p  him p r e p a r e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  d i r e c t i v e s  t o  b e  s e n t  
o u t  t o  m i n i s t r i e s  and  o t h e r  u n i t s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  o v erco m e 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  c a u s e d  by c o n f l i c t s  b e tw e en  d e p a r t m e n t s ,  
o f  w h ic h  t h e r e  have  b e e n  a  few e x a m p le s .  D a n g e r s  o f
1 .  Cf .  P r a t t ,  o p . c i t .  p . 39.
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s c a t t e r e d ,  im p le m e n ta t io n  have been seen i n  s e v e r a l  
A f r i c a n  p l a n n in g  e f f o r t s ,  l e a v in g  th e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  p lan*  to  remain  as  a  s e t  o f  i s o l a t e d  
programmes which  a r e  amended ad hoc by th e  T re a s u ry  
and by o t h e r  m in is tr ies ."*"
I n  such  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  e x e c u t iv e  d e c i s i o n s  would 
l o s e  meaning,  b e in g  s u b j e c t  to th e  h az a rd s  o f  u n c o n t r o l l e d  
e v e n t s .  As a  c l o s e  s t u d e n t  of th e  s u b j e c t  has  p u t  i t s
" im p o r ta n t  p r o j e c t s  a n d  i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  
dropped w i th o u t  r e - e s t i m a t i n g  th e  o v e r a l l  im p a c t ;  
p o l i c i e s  c r u c i a l  t o  development are m o d i f i e d  o r  
dropped f o r  in a d e q u a te  r e a s o n s . f , 2
A n d , i t  may be added, a g r e a t  dea l  o f  energy i s  sometimes
w a s te d  m  c l a s h e s  and r e c r i m i n a t i o n s .  An example
w i l l  s e rv e  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  th e  s o r t  of i s s u e s  i n v o lv e d
i n  such c o n f l i c t .
U s u a l ly  th e  c o n f l i c t  o cc u rs  be tw een  t h e
m i n i s t r y  o f  p l a n n in g  on t h e  one hand and t h e  T re a s u ry
and  th e  such  o t h e r  m i n i s t r i e s  a s  e d u c a t io n  and a g r i c u l t u r e .
P o r  example i n  T an z a n ia  th e  m i n i s t r y  of developm ent
p l a n n i n g  (which had been  c r e a t e d  i n  1963 and  a b o l i s h e d
i n  1964) was i n v o lv e d  i n  c l a s h e s  w i th  th e  T re a s u ry  over
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  and in  assum ptions  on t h e  r a t e
1 .  Gf. E.H. Green ,  o p . c i t .  p . 270.
2 .  i b i d .
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o f  g r o w t h .  The m i n i s t r y  was i n v o l v e d  i n  c l a s h e s
w i t h  t h e  m i n i s t r y  o f  e d u c a t i o n  o v e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f
e x p a n s i o n  o f  p r i m a r y  s c h o o l s ,  a n d  w i t h  t h e  m i n i s t r y  o f
a g r i c u l t u r e  ( p l u s  t h e T r e a s u r y ) o v e r  p o l i c y  o f  r u r a l
d e v e l o p m e n t .  The c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  m i n i s t r y  o f
0-
a g r i c u l t u r e  i l l u s t r a t e s  /w e a k n e s s  i n  t h e  m a c h i n e r y  o f  
c o - o r d i n a t i u n  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  d i r e c t i o n  o f  b a s i c  p o l i c y .  
The c o n f l i c t  i n v o l v e d  a  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  a p p r o a c h  t o  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  d e v e lo p m e n t .  The m i n i s t r y  o f  p l a n n i n g  
p r e f e r r e d  a  d r a m a t i c  chan g e  i n  r u r a l  l i f e  by m a j o r  
e f f o r t 5 t o  p l a n  uhe c o - o r d in a n c e ! #  c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  a g r i c ­
u l t u r a l  h o l d i n g s  an d  t o  g a t h e r  f a r m e r s  i n t o  v i l l a g e s  
w h e re  r e s o u r c e s  c o u l d  b e  more e a s i l y  p r o v i d e d  f o r  th e m .  
The m i n i s t r y  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
s t r e s s e d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e x t e n s i o n  w i t h  e m p h a s i s  on 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  w i t h o u t  i n v o l v i n g  m a j o r  
e f f o r t  By t o  t r a n s f o r m  t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  l i f e  
o f  t h e  r u r a l a r e a s . ^
D i s a g r e e m e n t s  l i k e  t h i s  p r o v e  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  
i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  p o l i c y  a n d  a  
m a c h i n e r y  o f  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  d i r e c t l y  
i s s u i n g  f rom  t h e  p r e s i d e n t ’ s o f f i c e ,  t h e r e  i s  a  t e n d e n c y
1 .  Cf.  P r a t t ,  o p . c i t .  p p . 45-6 .
f o r  th e  p la n n in g  m i n i s t r y  to  p r e s s j t t s  own v iew s s t r o n g l y  
on a  number of  im p o r tan t  m a t t e r s  which l i e  w i t h i n  t h e  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  and p r o f e s s i o n a l  competence o f  o t h e r  
m i n i s t r i e s .  The r e s i s t a n c e  from such o t h e r  m i n i s t r i e s  
i s ,  i n  such  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  u n d e r s t a n d a b le .  F o r ,  th e y  
have  w i t h i n  them X  ( e s p e c i a l l y  th e  T re a s u ry )  a  g r e a t e r  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  adm n i s t r a t i v e  and t e c h ­
n i c a l  s t a f f  ab le  to  cope w ith  p a t t e r s  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  
t h e i r  competence. C l e a r l y  more d e f i n i t e  p l a n n i n g  
p r o c e d u r e s  and e f f e c t i v e  r e p o r t i n g  system s and  co­
o r d i n a t i o n  by th e  o f f i c e  d?f t h e  P r e s i d e n t  i s  n e c e s s a r y .
E a r l i e r  e x p e r ie n c e s  have been u sed  t o  r e v i s e  
t h e  m ach inery  of d i r e c t i o n  and c o - o r d i n a t i o n  i n  th e  
d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s ,  i n  some s t a t e s .  The T a n z a n ia n  
e x p e r i e n c e  i s  a g a in  i n s t r u c t i v e ,  because o f  t h e  b o ld n e s s  
and  f re q u e n c y  w i th  which s t r u c t u r a l  changes have been  
made to  c o r r e c t  d e f e c t s .  The m i n i s t r y  o f  t h e  D evelop­
ment P l a n n in g  was a b o l i s h e d  i n  1964 and r e p l a c e d  by a  
D i r e c t o r a t e  of Development P lan n in g  which woula  f u n c t i o n  
w i t h i n  t h e  p r e s i d e n t s  o f f i c e .  But th e  p r e s i d e n t  a p p o i n t e d  
t h r e e  m i n i s t e r s  of s t a u e  i n  charge  of  planning*)and 
d e l e g a t e d  e x te n s iv e  powers to  them and to  t h e  D i r e c t o r a t e  > 
a u t h o r i s i n g  them to  g iv e  d i r e c t i v e s  to  i n d i v i d u a l
m i n i s t r i e s .  T h i s  a c t  c o n s t i t u t e d  a  d e f i n i t e  b r e a k  f ro m  
t h e  c a b i n e t  s y s t e m ;  e a c h  m i n i s t e r  c o u l d  now be  g i v e n  
d i r e c t i v e s  a b o u t  h i s  m i n i s t r y  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
p l a n .
The a r r a n g e m e n t  d i d  n o t  p rove  a  s u c c e s s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
f o r  r e a s o n s ,  t h e  d e t a i l s  o f  w n ich  n eed  n o t  d e t a i l !  us  
h e r e . ^  n u t  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t ,  a p a r t  f ro m  
the i n a d e q u a c y  o f  s t a f f  a n a  t h e  l a c k  o f  f l o w  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
a n d  p r o g r e s s  r e p o r t s ,  among t h e  c o n t r i b u t o r y  c a u s e s  w ere  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  m m i n i s t e r s  d id  n o t  u s e  t h e i r  
d e l e g a t e d  p o w e r s .  The^ d i d  n o t  i s s u e  any d i r e c t i v e ;  t h e y  
n e v e r  c o n s u l t e d  r e g u l a r l y  t o g e t h e r .  I n  s n o r t ,  t h e r e  was 
no  u n i t y ,  v i g o u r  a n d  s i n g l e - m i n d e d  dx’iv e  w h ic h  o u g h t  t o  
c h a r a c t e r i s e  s u c h  an  o f f i c e .  I t  was i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  
T r e a s u r y  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w ou ld  r e a s s e r t  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  i n  
s u c h  s i t u a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  d e v e lo p m e n t  a d m i n i s ­
t r a t i o n  w ou ld  be r e p l a c e d  by a ^ i h o c  and u n i n t e g r a t e d
*  • • 2 a e c i s 1o n - m a x in g .
The p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  i n  s u c h  
s i t u a t i o n s  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t .  The d i r e c t o r a t e  o f  p l a n n i n g  
w h i c h  i s  t h e  l i n k  w i t h  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  made a n  e f f o r t
1 .  F o r  f u r t h e r  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s ,  c f .  P r a t t ,  o p . c i t .
p p . 5 2 - 6 .
2 .  The t r i u m v i r a t e  o f  p l a n n i n g  m i n i s t e r s  was r e p l a c e d  oy 
a  new m i n i s t r y  o f  econom ic  a f f a i r s  and d e v e lo p m e n t  
p l a n n i n g .
t o  a s s e r t  i t s e l f  a t  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  l e v e l ,  b u t  m et  
w i t h  e q u a l  f a i l u r e . ^  F o r  i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  o f  c l a s h e s  
a n d  d i s u n i t y  a t  t h e  m i n i s t e r i a l  l e v e l  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  
i n  e a c h  m i n i s t r y  n o r m a l l y  b ack  t h e i r  m i n i s t e r s .  I n d e e d  
i n  many i n s t a n c e s  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  r e c a p t u r e  l o s t  
i n i t i a t i v e  a n d  f o r m u l a t e ,  p o s t  h a s t e ,  new a d  hoc  
p o l i c i e s  a n d  s u p p l y  t h e i r  m i n i s t e r s  with,  s u c h  p o l i c i e s  
a s  a m m u n i t i o n  i n  t h e  " b a t t l e "  w i t h  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
m i n i s t r y  o r  d i r e c t o r a t e .  The s h o r t a g e  o f  t r a i n e d  
p e o p l e  t o  c h e c k  on t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  a d  h o c  p o l i c i e s  
a n d  t o  a r b i t r a t e  b e tw e e n  c o n f l i c t i n g  p r o p o s a l s  c a n  l e a v e  
t h e  p r e s i d e n t ’ s  o f f i c e  c a p t i v e  t o  s u c h  h a p p e n i n g s .  A 
c o - o r d i n a t e d  d e c i s i o n  m aking  p r o c e s s  i m p l i e s  a  c o n t i n u o u s  
f o l l o w  up t h r o u g h  an  e f f e c t i v e  r e p o r t i n g  s y s t e m  a n d  a  p a n e l  
o f  e x p e r t s  t o  a p p r a i s e  t h e  p r o g r e s s  r e p o r t s  a n d  t o  
p r e p a r e  f u r t h e r  o r d e r s  o r  d i r e c t i v e s .  S h o r t a g e  o f  
q u a l i f i e d  and  e x p e r i e n c e d  s t a f f  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  
i n  t h i s  t a s n  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  make him d q e n d e n t  on  t h e  
c i v i l  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  m i n i s t r i e s ,  a s  was t h e  
c a s e  i n  T a n z a n i a ,  f o r  ex am p le .
I\Tow, i n  t h e  o r d i n a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e s s  
t h i s  n e e d  n o t  e n t a i l  any  p r o b le m .  Each p e r m a n e n t  
s e c r e t a r y  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  p r e p a r e  a  p o l i c y  p r o p o s a l  f o r  
h i s  m i n i s t e r  c o n c e r n i n g  h i s  m i n i s t r y ,  F u r t h e r m o r e ^ s u c h  a
1 .  i b i d .
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p r e p a r a t i o n  n o r m a l l y  i n v o l v e s  a  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p o l i c y .  W hether  t h i s  o r i g i n a t e s  a t  
t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r  o r  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  
s e c r e t a r y ,  t h e  r e l e v a n t  d e p a r t m e n t  o r  d i v i s i o n  c h i e f s  
who l i v e  w i t h  t h e  p r o b le m s  w i l l  h av e  h e l p e d  i n  t h e  
p r e p a r a t i o n .  P r e s i d e n t i a l  d ep e n d en c e  on t h e  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  o r d i n a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e s s  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  p e r f e c t l y  r e a s o n a b l e .  The m a c h i n e r y  o f  t h e  
c a b i n e t ,  i t s  c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  t h e  c a b i n e t  s e c r e t a r i a t  c a n  
a l s o  b e  u s e d ,  and  i s  u s e d .  P o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e ,  A .L .  Adu 
recom m ends  t h a t
" t h e r e  s h o u l d  be  p e r i o d i c a l  an d  r e g u l a r  c o n f e r e n c e s  
b e t w e e n  m i n i s t e r s  a n d  t h e i r  s t a f f s  f o r  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  and  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  m a jo r  p r o b l e m s ,  
o r  e v e n  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t a l k i n g  g e n e r a l l y  
a b o u t  t h e  g e n e r a l  p rogram m es o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
m i n i s t r i e s .  T h e re  s h o u l d  a l s o  be  o c c a s i o n a l  
m e e t i n g s  b e t w e e n  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  o r  p r im e  m i n i s t e r  
an d  p e rm a n e n t  s e c r e t a r i e s  an d  h e a d s  o f  d e p a r t ­
m e n t s .  So t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  g o v e rn m e n t  p o l i c y  
c a n  be  u n d e r s t o o d  a g a i n s t  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  o f  
d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  a u t h o r i t y  i n  t h e  l a n d  
an d  a l s o  t h a t  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  o r  p r im e  m i n i s t e r  
may come t o  h e a r  t h e  v ie w s  o f  t h e  t o p  l e v e l  
o f f i c i a l s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  
and  g e t  t o  know them  and  t h e i r  w o r t h . " !
T h i s  i s  no d o u b t  u& ual .  N o n e t h e l e s s  t h e r e  
m u s t  be  a  c e n t r a l  p l a n n i n g  w i t h  m a c h in e ry  w h ic h  e n s u r e s  
t h a t  a l l  p o l i c y  p r o p o s a l s  a r e  a s s e s s e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e
1 .  A.L.  Adu, o p . c i t .  p p . 233-4*
470-
p l a n  and  i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  b a s i c  econom ic  p r i o r i t i e s .
T h i s  m a c h i n e r y ,  w h a te v e r  i t s  f o rm  and  name, m u s t  be  
u n d e r  t h e  f<trm c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t ,  a n d  m u s t  
b e  s t a f f e d  a d e q u a t e l y  w i t h  p e o p l e  h i g h l y  q u a l i f i e d  a n d  
e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  a l l  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  s u b j e c t s .  The m a c h i n e r y  
o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  an d  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  s e c r e t a r i a t  c a n  be  
u s e d  a d d i t i o n a l l y  f o r  c o - o r d i n a t i o n .  B ut  . i t  m u s t  be  
s u b o r d i n a t e d  t o  a  c e n t r a l  d i r e c t i n g  and  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  
o f f i c e  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t .  The e x p e r i e n c e  
o f  t h e  p a s t  few e a r s  a n d  t n e  l o g i c  o f  t h e  w h o le  s y s t e m  
dem ands  t h i s .
T h i s  i s  n o t  m e re ly  a  m a t t e r  o f  t h e o r y ;  i t  
c o n c e r n s  p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r s  o f  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  n a t i o n a l  
g o a l s .  F a i l u r e  i n  d i r e c t i o n  an d  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  r e s u l t s  
i n  l a c k  o f  u n i f i e d  e f f o r t  and  dynamism. T h i s  i s  r e f l e c t e d  
a t  t h e  t o p - m i n i s t e r i a l  an d  c i v i l  s e r v i c e - l e v e l  a s  much a s  
a t  t h e  l o c a l  l e v e l .  E x p e r ie n c e h © $  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  
s u c h  f a i l u r e  makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  e v e n  f o r  e n t h u s i a s t i c  
l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s  t o  know how b e s t  t o  o rg an ise !  l o c a l  e f f o r t  
f o r  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  n a t i o n a l  g o a l s .  The a b s e n c e  o f  
c l e a r l y  s e t  o u t  d i r e c t i v e s  w i t h  im m e d ia te  a n d  s p e c i f i c  
t a r g e t s  a t  t h e  l o c a l  l e v e l  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  ( d i s s i p a t i o n  o f  
momentum; an d  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  y/vhich i s  i n i t i a l l y  
m o b i l i s e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p l a n  a n d  p u b l i c i t y
g i v e n  t o  i t ^ c a n  e a s i l y  g row  s p e p t i c a l  a b o u t  g o v e r n m e n t .
The o f f i c e  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  i s  e m i n e n t l y  s u i t e d  t o  g i v e  
t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o r r e c t i v e  t o  s u c h  d e f e c t s .  T h r o u g h  h i s  
p r e s i d e n c y  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  
p a r t y ,  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  c a n  i s s u e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  d i r e c t i v e s  
t o  t h e p a r t y  f o r  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  m o b i l i s a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  
o p i n i o n  a n d  e f f o r t .  B u t  b e f o r e  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  a n d  e f f o r t  
c a n  be  m o b i l i s e d  he  m u s t  h a v e  a t  h i s  d i s p o s a l  p o l i c y  
p r o p o s a l s  w o rk e d  o u t  on  t h e  b a s i s  o f  p e r i o d i c  r e s e a r c h  
a n d  acctttfxit'& i n f o r m a t i o n  s u p p l i e d  t o  h i s  o f f i c e  f r o m  
v a r i o u s  m i n i s t r i e s  a n o t h e r  u n i t s  t h r o u g h  a n  e f f e c t i v e  
r e p o r t i n g  m a c h i n e r y ,  a n d  a s s e s s e d  by  a  p a n e l  o f  e x p e r t s .
This  can avoidjwaste and f a c i l i t a t e  th e  e f f i c i e n t ^  
im plem entation  of  p o l i c y .
The n e e d  f o r  s u c h  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  d e c i s i o n  m a k in g  
p r o c e s s  a l t h o u g h  more u r g e n t  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  i s  
n o t  p e c u l i a r  t o  th e m .  I n  some d e v e l o p e d  s t a t e s  w h ere  
t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  o p e r a t e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  
p r o c e d u r e s ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  p o i n t e d  o u t  r e c e n t l y  t h a t  "w rong  a d v i c e "  
h a s  b e e n  g i v e n  by o f f i c i a l s  t o  m i n i s t e r s ,  f ro m  t i m e  t o  
t i m e ,  n o t a b l y  on e c o n o m ic s  a n d  f i n a n c e . ^  The r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p  b e t w e e n  m i n i s t e r s  a n d  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  i n  B r i t a i n  h a s
1 .  P e t e r  S h o r e  fE n t i t l e d  t o ‘ Know* (L ondon ,  I 9 6 0 ) .
b e e n  s a i d  t o  f a v o u r  a  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  d o m in a n ce ;  a n d  
t h i s ,  t h r o u g h  no w ea k n e ss  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  
a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  power s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  
w h i c h  comes f rom  a  h i e r a r c h i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  t h e i r  
p e r m a n e n t  p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  v e i l  o f  s e c r e c y  w h ic h  s e p a r a t e s  
t h e  p r e s e n t  f rom  t h e  p a s t  and  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r o ­
c e s s i n g  a n d  s e l e c t i o n  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The m a g n i t u d e  
o f  s u c h  p o w e r ,  i t  i s  m a i n t a i n e d ,  makes i t  e s s e n t i a l l y  
p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r .^
The m i n i s t e r - c i v i l  s e r v a n t  r e l a t i o n  i n  A f r i c a n  
i s  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  a t  t h e  moment, w i t h  t h e  b a l a n c e  i n  
f a v o u r  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r .  The f a c t o r  o f  t h e o n e - p a r t y  
s t a t e  /vhich p e r m i t s  l o n g e r  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r  
i n  a  m i n i s t r y  i s  one c a u s e .  A n o th e r  c a u s e  i s  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  many A f r i c a n  m i n i s t e r s  p o s s e s s  i n d i v i d u a l  q u a l i t i e s  
a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  w h ich  c o m p e ls  them  to  i n t e r v e n e  m ore a n d  
d o m i n a t e  t h e i r  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  w h ic h  i s  n o t  y e t  a  h i e r a r ­
c h i c a l l y  o r g a n i s e d  and d i s c i p l i n e d  " u n i o n " , u n l i k e  i n  
B r i t a i n ,  f o r  ex am p le .  T h e re  i s  a s  ye t , ,  no e s t a b l i s h e d  
• c o r r i d o r s  o f  power* -  no f i n e  g r a d a t i o n  o f  v a r i e g a t e d  
o f f i c i a l d o m .  Not y e t .  The one p a r t y  s y s t e m  i s  n o t  
c o n d u c i v e  f o r  t h e  g ro w th  o f  s u c h  p o w er .  B u t  a s  r e c e n t  
s t u d i e s  i n  t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  
s u g g e s t e d ,  i n  a  w o r l d  w here  b u r e a u c r a t i c  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n
a n d  power a c q u i s i t i o n  i s  t h e  g e n e r a l  t e n d e n c y ,  t h e  
b u r e a u c r a c y  c a n  v e r y  e a s i l y  become s t r o n g  e n o u g h  t o  
c h a l l e n g e  o r  r e s i s t  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  o f  h t h e r  I n s t i t u t i o n s  
o t h e  s t a t e  s u c h  a s  t h e  p a r t y .  I t s  m on o p o ly  ( o r  n e a r -  
m onopo ly )  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l  f a c i l i ­
t a t e s  t h i s  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  and. may, i n  t i . n e  m ake  i t s  
c o n t r o l  by o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h e  more d i f f i c u l t . ' 1'
The p ro b le m  o f  c o h t r o l  w i l l  be i n  t h i s  
c o n n e c t i o n  w i l l  be f e l t  m o re ,  a s  g o v e rn m e n t  p l a n s ,  an d  
program m es  become more a n d  m ore co m p le x  a n d  t h e  b u r e a u ­
c r a c y  a s su m es  more c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e i r  i m p l e u e n t a t i o n .  
The c o n t r o l l i n g  r o l e  o f  t h e  p a r t y  o f  p a r l i a m e n t  o f  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t  and  o f  o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  su c h  a s  c o m m i s s i o n s  
o f  e n q u i r y  w i l l  t h e n  demand c l o s e r  a t t e n t i o n .
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CHAPTER 8
The M i l i t a r y  I n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  P o l i t i c s
1 .  C a u s e s  o f  I n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l
B e tw een  J u n e  1965 and. J a n u a r y  1967 g o v e r n m e n t s  
h a v e  b e e n  c h a n g e d  by v i o l e n t  means i n  e l e v e n  o u t  o f  t h e  
t h i r t y - e i g h t  i n d e p e n d e n t  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s .  As a  r e s u l t ,  
A l g e r i a ,  B u r u n d i ,  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  R e p u b l i c ,  Congo 
( K i n s h a s a ) ,  Dahomey, G-hana, N i g e r i a ,  Togo a n d  U p p e r  
V o l t a  a r e  now r u l e d  by m i l i t a r y  men who a s su m ed  o f f i c e  
a f t e r  f o r c e f u l  o v e r t h r o w 5 o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r § g i m e s .  The 
S u d a n ,  a f t e r  a  m i l i t a r y  r u l e  l a s t i n g  s i x  y e a r s ,  h a s  
r e t u r n e d  t o  an  u n ea sy  c i v i l i a n  r u l e  w h ich  s t i l l  r u l e s
v jKvU\
u n d e r  a  t r a n s i t i o n a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n  w i th  p r o v i d e s  f o r  a  
p e c u l i a r  k i n d  o f  c o l l e g i a l  e x e c u t i v e .
Why h av e  t h e  m i l i t a r y  made s u c h  a  t h r u s t  i n  
p o l i t i c s ?  B e fo r e  we t r y  t o  an s w e r  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i t  
w i l l  b e  h e l p f u l  t o  make / r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  phenom enon  o f  
a rm e d  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  c i v i l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  i n  g e n e r a l .
C i v i l  g o v e rn m e n t  r e s t s  on a u t h o r i t y  l e g i t i m a t e d  by 
v a r i o u s  m e c h a n i s m s ,  w h ic h  s e c u r e  t h e  i a f e i f o a l  o b e d i e n c e  
o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  W he ther  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  i s  a  m o n a rc h y  
w h ic h  g o v e r n s  t h r o u g h  p r e s c r i p t i v e  r i g h t  o r  a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
r e g i m e  b a s e d  on p o p u l a r  m a n d a te  i t  commands a u t h o r i t y
i
b e c a u s e  t h e r e  i s  a  g e n e r a l  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  i t s  l e g i t i m a c y .
47£.
Legitimacy i s  a d if i ' icu l i ,  concept .  B a t , to  the e x te n t  ,   /
t h a t  one can g e n e r a l i s e  about any concept,  i t  may be 
s t a t e d  th at  the power o f  the government acq u ires  l e g i ­
tim acy because of a g en era l  r e c o g n it io n  e i t h e r  ( i )  th a t  
i t  i s  there  to  p r o t e c w and serve; or ( i i )  th a t  i t  i s  
capable  of manipulating organised  coerc ion  to  m ainta in  
i t s e l f ;  or because o f  a combination of both f a c t o r s .  
Indeed there  i s  a l in k  between p h y s ica l  power as mono­
p o l i s e d  by the government and the popular view as to  
i t s  l e g i t im a c y ,  because i t s  use (or abuse) has a s o c i a l  
c o n t e x t .  E ither  as a h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t  or a p o s t u la t e  
o f  reason i t  i s  b e l i e v e d  by p o l i t i c a l  £hebcri4fe th a t  at  
some time men^delegated t h e i r  own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  ( i n  
regard  to themselves and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  ) to  some amongst 
them to  e x e r c i s e  i t  for  a c e r t a in  end. This d e le g a te d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  became power in  the hands o f  i t s  h o ld e r s ,  
and the  (p o s tu la ted  or a c t u a l )  d e leg a t io n  l a i d  the  
fou n d at ion  of l e g i t im a c y .  A p sy ch o lo g ic a l  b a s i s  was 
needed fo r  t h i s  l e g i t im a c y ,  and i t  came in  the form o f  
the  requirement that  the power holder must be f i t  to  
e x e r c i s e  i t .  A so r t  of ’’comprehensive in su ra n ce” 
in v a r ia b ly  fo l low ed  purporting to a s c e r ta in  th a t  power i s  
i n  gooduhands, and t h i s  took r e l i g i o u s  form, sometimes by
i n v e s t i n g  s a n c t i t y  to the person who held  i t .  This  
e x p la in s  the o r ig in  of  d i v i n i t y  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a b s o lu te
r u l e r s 1
L e g i t i m a c y  may be  s a i d  t o  e x i s t  when a  g e n e r a l  
h a b i t  o f  o b e d i e n c e  h a s  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y
l o n g  t i m e .  T h i s  i s  how t h e  c o n c e p t  i s  l i n k e d  i n  t h e  
m in d s  an d  c o n d u c t  o f  p e o p l e  w h ich  i s  c o n d i t i o n e d  h i s ­
t o r i c a l l y ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ] e c o n o m i c a l l y  a n d  s o c i a l l y .
s o c i e t i e s  t h e  m ass  m e d ia  c o u n t s  f o r  much; a n d  c o e r c i o n  
m u s t  be  c o n c e i v e d  l e s s  i n  t e r m s  o f  p h y s i c a l  f o r c e ,  a n d  
m o re  i n  t e r m s  o f  m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  v a l u e s  a n d  s e n t i m e n t s
s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  t o  a c h i e v e  c o n t r o l  w i t h o u t  
r e s o r t  t o  b r u t e  f o r c e .  Even t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  
j u s t i c e ,  i n  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  x i s  t h e  s u b t l e  d i s ­
p e n s a t i o n  o f  c o e r c i e v e  p o w er ,  a s  t h e  S w ed ish  s c h o o l  o f
1 .  The o r i g i n  o f  r e l i g i o n  h a s  b e e n  e x p l a i n e d  i n  s i m i l a r  
t e r m s ;  c f .  e . g .  B e r t r a n t l  H u s s e l  ’ Human k n o w l e d g e ,  
I t s  Scope a n d  L i m i t  -  (London 1 9 4 6 ) ,  C h a p t e r  o n e .
2 .  c . f .  C h a p t e r  1 .
3 .  O l i v e c r o n a ,  'Law a s  E a c b '  (1939), ;  c f .  a l s o  a  
d i s c u s s i o n  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  i n  Dedfis L l o y d ' s  ' I n t r o ­
d u c t i o n  t o  J u r i s p r u d e n c e 1 (London 19590 p p . 2 4 8 -5 7 *
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And^ a s  a l r e a d y  e x p l a i n e d  i n  a  p r e v i o u s  c n a p t e r ,  i n  m o d e rn
a c c e p t e d  by t h e  s o c i e t y .  A l a r g e  p a r t  o f  t h e  u s e  o f
j u r i s p r u d e n c e  have  d e m o n s t r a te d .* ^
But a l l  t h i s  assumes a s t a t e  o;f t h in g s  in  which 
the government has the backing of a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t io n  
o f  the p opu lat ion  or o f  c r i t i c a l  s e c t io n s  o f  i t  
en ab lin g  i t  to  e x e r c ise  i t s  a u th o r i ty ,  W/here a s e r io u s  
break occurs in  the h a b it  o f  obedience^for some reason,  
r e s u l t i n g  in  a r e v o l t  the mechanisms of p e a c e f u l  per­
su a s io n  g ives  way to p h y s ic a l  co erc io n  no su p p ress  the  
r e v o l t .  A government which l o s e s  generaljpopular support  
cannot i n d e f i n i t e l y  use armed fo r c e s  to  m a in ta in  i t s e l f  
i n  o f f i c e . This i n  f a c t  i s  one way of i n v i t i n g  armed 
i n t e r v e n t io n  in  p o l i t i c s .  Bor, when a government becomes 
too  dependent on the armed fo r c e s  and makers use o f  them 
too  much or too fr e q u e n t ly  tne armed f o r c e s  tend to  end 
up s e i z i n g  co n tr o l  o f  the government in  t h e i r  own 
b e h a l f .
The pat&s of m i l i t a r y  men to  the h ig h
m agistracy  o f  the s t a t e  i s  strewn with  the human d eb r is
caused by the order o f  corru pt ,  ambitious or  d esp erate
p o l i t i c a l  m asters .-  T h is ,  as much as in d i v i d u a l
am bition  e x p la in s  the advent o f  the Qaesaris o f  which
Ul
h i s t o r y  os f i l l .  Caesar* s v i c t o r y  lair e l s  are a
prelude to h i s  crown. But the  ujgt&ue dependence on the
m i l i t a r y  caused by t h e i r  frequent use as r e p r e s s i v e  
a g e n ts  i s  not the\only s i t u a t i o n  which l e a d s  to  d i r e c t
m i l i t a r y  involvement in  p o l i t i c s .  Nor are a l l  m i l i t a r y  
coups l e d  by re lu c ta n t  h ero es .
In the Middle East the m i l i t a r y  have taken  
upon them selves  the ta sk  of  le a d in g  or prov id in g  
impetus to  r a d ic a l  change. Lati*i America has g iv e n  the  
world an image o f  a con t in en t  in  which power-hungry  
c o l o n e l s  deposed governments and each other  w ith  
astounding  r a p id i t y ,  f r eq u e n t ly  l e a v in g  t h e i r  n a t io n s  
to  be easy preys to  the cap r ice  of  whoever happened 
t o  have c o n tr o l  o f  any s e c t i o n  of  the armed f o r c e s .
M il i ta ry  involvement in  p o l i t i c s  has been
a s s o c i a t e d  by some with under development; i t  has been
exp la in ed  as “a response to  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  which the new
s t a t e s  have encountered in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  e s t a b l i s h
T Its
them selves  as modern s o v e r e i g n t i e s . 11 d i s c i p l i n e
and o r g a n isa t io n  and i t s  e f f e c t i v e  cha in  o f  command 
makes the m i l i t a r y  machine better s u i t e d  to  cope w ith  
s i t u a t i o n s  o f  c r i s e s  where a gen era l  breakdown o f  law  
and order i s  in vo lved .  hut t h i s  i s  not enough to  
e x p la in  the p o l i t i c a l  behaviour o f  m i l i t a r y  men and in
E. S h i l s  ’The m i l i ta r y  in  the p o l i t i c a l  development 
of the new s t a t e s ’ i n  uThe r o l e  o f  the m i l i t a r y  i n  
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s 11, J . J .  Johnson ( e d . )  1962 p . 8.
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p a r t i c u l a r  t h e i r  in t e r v e n t io n  i n  c i v i l  government,  
t o t a l l y  or s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e p la c in g  c o n s t i t u t e d  a u t h o r i t y .
Among the  f a c t o r s  which are c r u c i a l  i n  d e te r ­
mining the p o l i t i c a l  behaviour o f  the m i l i t a r y  are the  
ed u ca t io n a l  background and p r o f e s s i o n a l  e th o s  o f  the  
o f f i c e r s ,  the h i s t o r i c a l  background o f  the army ( i n  
some c a s e s  in c lu d in g  i t s  r e p u ta t io n  and r o l e  during  
the  c o l o n i a l  p er iod )  and ( i n  many c o u n t r i e s )  the e thn ic  
balance  o f  o f f i c e r s  and soldiers."*" Some o f  th e s e  
f a c t o r s  in f lu e n c e  the p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u u e  of  o f f i c e r s  
i n  the lon g  run, w h ile  c o n s id e r a t io n s  o f  s a la r y  in c r e a s e ,  
career  advancement and c o n d i t io n s  o f  s e r v ic e  are the  most 
l i k e l y  ca u ses  o f  m u t in ie s .  There can be no one s i n g l e  
f a c t o r  or one type o f  c o n d i t io n  a p p l i c a b le  to  every case  -  
which makes m i l i t a r y  coups l i k e l y .  A com bination o f  two 
or more f a c t o r s  may be p r e s e n t ,  though one f a c t o r  may 
t r i g g e r  o f f  the  a c t u a l  e v e n t .  A major d e c i s i o n  or 
blunder by the  government may do t h i s .  Or^ the  coup 
may be the  r e s u l t  o f  cum ulative  a c t s  or o m iss io n s  o f  the  
government. Whatever the  f i n a l  reason  g iv e n ,  the  
m o t iv a t io n  f o r  the coup may be found in  the  corporate  
i n t e r e s t  o f  the  army as an i n t e r e s t  group; or i t  may be
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t h a t  some r e g io n a l ,  e th n ic  or personal s e l f  i n t e r e s t  o f
s i g n i f i c a n t  lead ers  i s  involved; or i t  may be a c tu a te d
by genuine concern fo r  the n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t .  Any one
o f  th ese  i n t e r e s t s  except the n a t iu n a l  interest/may a l s o
be d o v e - t a i l e d  e i th e r  w ith  a c l a s s  i n t e r e s t  or w ith
1f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t s  or b o th .
Whatever i t s  motive ,  the c a p a c i ty  o f  the
army to  overthrow a government seems to  depend more on
i t s  cb h es iven ess  and on su rp r ise  rather  than  on i t s
eize or fire-power, as events in several african sta tes
have shown. We s h a l l  see  that t h i s  fa c to r  o f  c o h e s iv e n e s s
i s  ad verse ly  a f f e c t e d  in  some c a se s  where i n t e r - e t h n i c
or -  r e g io n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  reach the rank o f  th e  army
i t s e l f ,  as in  N iger ia .  (There, the danger i s  not l i m i t e d
t o  d isp u tes  between army o f f i c e r s  a lone,  but may a f f e c t
the  unity  o f  the s t a t e .  The ca p ac ity  to  overthrow
governments i s  one t h in g .  I t  i s  q u ite  another m atter  to
govern  ^ b e tter  or to  prepare a b e t te r  government. The
1 .  Whether or not th ere  i s  v a l i d i t y  in  the a l l e g a t i o n
th a t  some o f  ,thg coups in  A fr ic a ,  e.,g. th e  G-ha.ua coup,  
has been CIA i n s t i g a t e d ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  the  CIA 
has topped or otherwise  in t e r f e r e d  with governments  
i n  the past  decade. Cf. e . g .  The I n v i s i b l e  G-over ament 
Wise
bayonet i s  n o /  s u b s t i t u t e f o r  the b a l l o t  box in  t h i s  
m a tter ,  though the b a l l o t  box i s  i t s e l f  no s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  
th e  f u l f i l m e n t  of popular ex p ec ta t io n s  and fo r  bread  
and b u t t e r .  But i t  i s  c l e a r  from the h i s t o r y  o f  the  army1 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  p o l i t i c s  that  i t s  rea d in ess  to  in te r v e n e  
i s  not always matched by i t s  modesty as to i t s  a b i l i t y  
to  cope w ith  complex s i t u a t i o n s . ,  What i t  w i l l  do i n ^  
f a c e  o f  such problems w i l l  depend on various  f a c t o r s ,  
in c lu d in g  tne o r ig in a l  cause of in t e r v e n t io n ,  the  p o s t ­
in t e r v e n t io n  s i t u a t i o n  and the q u a l i ty  of the  m i l i t a r y  
l e a d e r s  in  q u est ion .
fn  A fr ica  the in fancy  of p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
i n h e r i t e d  or e s ta b l i s h e d  a t  the moment of  independence  
and the manifold  problems which the new s t a t e s  f a c e  
have made them vu lnerab le  and tempting t(^military i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n .  The ecstacy  o f  the n a t io n a l  b i r t h  was fo l lo w e d  
by growing p a in s .  The search  fo r  a form o f  government 
consonant w ith  the needs and a s p ir a t io n s  o f  a c o n t in e n t  
i n / p r o c e s s  o f  change, meets  danger s ig n s  a t  e v e r y tw is t  
and tu rn .  The movement fo r  independence and ( i n  
many c a s e s )  the sudden and dramatic ga in  o f  s o v e r e ig n t y  
had r a i s e d  high hopes i n  the  p eop les  o f  the l i b e r a t e d  
t e r r i t o r i e s .  Party programmes, e l e c t i o n  m a n i f e s to s ,
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m o b i l i s a t io n  campaigns and songs o f  freedom^ a l l  worked 
to  h igh ten  t h i s  sense o f  e x p e c ta t io n .  Promises bad been  
made whose f u l f i lm e n t  e lu d es  most l e a d e r s .  The 
’ r e v o lu t io n  o f  r i s i n g  e x p e c t a t i o n s 1 came f a c e  to  fa c e  w ith  
disappointment and f r u s t r a t i o n  aggravated, i n  a number 
o f  in s t a n c e s ,  by disenchantment w ith  p o l i t i c i a n s  and the  
s p e c t a c l e  o f  corrupt ion ,  waste and an ever widening gap 
between the few r ic h  and the c o u n t le s s  poor. As 
Edward S h i l s  has w r i t t e n
"In almost every aspect o f  their  social s t r u c t u r e s  
the s o c i e t i e s  in  which the  new s t a t e s  must be 
based are c h a r a c te r i s e d  by a gap* I t  i s  a gap 
between the few very r i c h  and the mass o f  the  
poor, between the educated and the uneducated,  
between the townsman and the v i l l a g e r ,  between  
the modern and the  t r a d i t i o n a l ,  between the  
r u le r s  and the r u le d .  Almost e v e ry fea tu r e  o f  
the s o c i a l  s tru c tu r e  o f  the new s t a t e s  
con sp ires  to sep arate  the ordinary peop le  from 
t h e i r  government. This i s  a fundamental  
fa c t  of l i f e  o f  the new s t a t e s . 112
1 .  C f .  e . g .  The Ghana freedom so ng$; "Ghana; Land of  
Ereedim4*, "Voice o f  the  Eree , You have j^oy fo r  
e v e r . . . . "  e t c .
2 .  E. S h i l s ,  o p . c i t .  p . 29.
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D e v e l o p i n g  n a t i o n s  have  t o  d e v e l o p  f a s t  en o u g h
t o  c a t c h  up w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  demands.  E d u c a t i o n  i s
u n i v e r s a l l y  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  t h e  key  t o  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a n d  a
l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  d i r e l y  n e e d e d  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s
h a v e  t o  b e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  e d u c a t i o n .  Y e t  t h e  s u p p l y  o f
e d u c a t e d  m an-pow er  n e e d e d  c a n n o t  c a t c h ' u p  w i t h  t h e  demand
f o r  d e c a d e s  t o  come. I n  t h e  m eantim e t h e r e  i s  a  r i s i n g
p o p u l a t i o n  o f  u n e m p lo y ed  o r  underem p lo y ed  s c h o o l
l e a v e r s .  T h e s e  a n d  t h e  many s c h o o l  f a i l u r e s  a d d  more
y e a s t  t o  f e r m e n t  u n r e s t .  The g ro w th  o f  t r a d e s  u n i o n s
a n d  c o - o p e r a t i v e s  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  r a i s e d  p r o b l e m s  w h ic h
h a v e  t o  b e  s o l v e d  by g o v e r n m e n t s .  The t r a d e ?  u n i o n s
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  y o u t h  a n d  womens* o r g a n i s a t i o n s  w e re  l i n k e d
2w i t h  t h e  m ovem ents  f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  A f t e r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  
t h e  o e j e c t  o f  c o m p l a i n t  i s  no l o n g e r  a  f o r e i g n  r u l e r .  
A n t i - g o v e r n m e n t  s t r i k e s  o r  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  a r e  now s e e n  
i n  q u i t e  a  d i f f e r e n t  l i g h t .  The i n t o l e r a n t  a t t i t u d e  
o f  g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  s u c h  p r o b l e m s  i s  so m e t im es  u n d e r ­
s t a n d a b l e .  B u t w n e t h e r  t h e i r  e x p l a n a t i o n s  c a n  c o n v i n c e  
u n e m p lo y e d  o r  d i s a f f e c t e d  men and women i s  a  d i f f e r e n t  
m a t t e r .
1 .  C f .  R e p o r t  (bn A f r i c a n  E d u c a t i o n  -  OAU C o n f e r e n c e  M arch  
1 7-2 4 ,  1964 OAU R ev iew  V o l .  1, Ho. 1 ,  p p .2 7 -3 8 .
2 .  C f .  T .L .  H o d g k in ,  A f r i c a n  P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s  (1962)
I n  t h e  m a e l s t r o m  o f  c u l t u r a l ,  econom ic^  s o c i a l
an d  p o l i t i c a l j c r o s s - c u r r e n t s  i n  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e s e  n a t i o n s ,
one f a c t  i s  p r i m a r y .  The i n c r e a s e  o f  f o o d  p r o d u c t i o n
g e t s  l e s s  e v e r y  y e a r  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n
p o p u l a t i o n .* ^  M e a n w h i le ,  t h e  h a r d e r  t h e  A f r i c a n
2w orks  t h e  l e s s  t h e  r e w a r d ,  i n  some c a s e s .  The r i c h
n a t i o n s  g e t  r i c h e r  and  t h e  p o o r  n a t i o n s  p o o r e r .  T h i s
i s  t h e  m ost  c r u c i a l  p r o b le m  t o  be f a c e d  by t h e  g e n e r a t i o n
o f  t h e  p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e  p e r i o d .  The i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e
g a p  w h ic h  Edward S h i l s  h a s  so v e r y  w e l l  e x p r e s s e d  i j$
t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  c l a s s  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s
w here  t h e r e  may n o t  h av e  e x i t e d  -  o r  n o t  t o  a  s i g n i f i c a n t
e x t e n t .  Taken  i n  a  g l o b a l  c o n t e x t ,  t h i s  w o u ld  c r e a t e
m CAAIc cl(XS5
a  s m a l l  i n v e s t i n g  f i n a n c i a l l y  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h e
c o m m e r c ia l  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  w o r l d .  On t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d  t h e r e  i s  t h e  v a s t  m ass  o f  p e a s a n t r y  w h ic h  h a s  b e e n  
d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  t r u e  p r o l e t a r i a t  o f  t h i s  c e n t u r y . ^
1 .  C f .  Rene* Dumont, • L ' A f r i q u e  n o i r e  e s t  m a l  p a r t i e ' ,  
( l a r i s  S e u l ,  1965) p . 7* Dumont g i v e s  t h e  a v e r a g e - r a t e  
o f  g r o w t h  s i n c e  1959 a s  1 . 7 $  p . a .  f o r  f o o d  a n d  2 . 5 $  
p . a .  f o r  p o p u l a t i o n .
2 .  The w o r l d p r i c e  o f  c o c o a  s t e a d i l y  w en t  down, u n t i l  
1966 when t h e r e  was a  s u d d e n  r i s e  w i t h  r h e  f a l l  o f  
Nkr umah.
3 .  C f .  R. Dumont, o p . c i t .  p .
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I n  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  t h e r e  i s  t h e  w h o le  p r o c e s s  o f  
m o d e r n i s a t i o n  (to w h ic h  r e f e r e n c e  was made i n .  C h a p t e r  O n e ) ,  
w i t h  i t s  i n e x o r a b l e  l o g i c  o f  econom ic  a n d  s o c i a l  c h a n g e ,  
and  t h e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  v a l u e  s y s t e m  w h i c h  t h i s  
change  i m p l i e s .  The m o d e rn  ( e d u c a t e d )  e l i t e  i s  a t  once  
a  r e s u l t  and  a n  a g e n t jo f  t h i s  m o d e r n i s a t i o n  p r o c e s s .
T h i s  e l i t e  g e n e r a l l y  r a n g e s  i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  t r a d i t i o n a l  
i d e a s  and  f o r c e s .  Even  when some members o f  t h e  e l i t e  
a f f i r m  t h e  p a s t  o f  t h e i r  c o u n t r y  t h e y  m us t  s t r e s s  i t s  
a d a p t a b i l i t y  t o  p r e s e n t  n e e d s ,  "There i s  a n  a m b i v a l e n c e  
i n  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  t o  some o f  t m e i r  p a s t  h e r i t a g e .  The 
m ost  c r u c i a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h i s  a m b i v a l e n c e  i s  s e e n  i n  
e t h n i c  t i e s  and  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  t h e  d e p e n d e n c e  on  s u c h  
t i e s  f o r  s u p p o r t  on t h e  p a r t  o f  some p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s .  
T h i s  c r e a t e s  m i s t r u s t  an d  c l e a v a g e .
A t k t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  l e v e l  t h i s  a l s o  g i v e s  r i s e  
t o  i n s t a b i l i t y .  The c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e ' s  r o l e ,  o r i g i n a l l y  
c a s t  a s  c a p t a i n  o r  s t e w a r d ,  becomes one o f  r e f e r e e  o r  
c o n c i l i a t o r .  And any  s i g n s  o f  p a r t i a l i t y  a r e  s i g n a l s  
o f  d a n g e r ,  a s  i t  e n h a n c e s  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  m i s t r u s t  an d  
u n d e rm in e s  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s h i p .
The o u t e r  ( n a t i o n a l )  sy m b o ls  o f  u n i t y  c a n  e a s i l y  be  
d i s c r e d i t e d  i n  s o c i e t i e s  w here  t h e  r u r a l  k i n s h i p  s y s t e m
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i s  d o m in a n t ,  a s  i t  i s  i n  a l l  A f r i c a / f ,  a n d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r
s u b - s a i i a r a  A f r i c a .  I n  s u c h  s o c i e t i e s  t h e  l o y a l t i e s  o f
t h e  o r d i n a r y  man a r e  c o n f i n e d  t o  a  n a r r o w  l o c a l  r a n g e .
T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  f a v o u r s  t h e  em erg en ce  o f  l e a d e r s  who
s e r v e  t h e s e  p a r o c h i a l  i n t e r e s t s ,  w h e re  p a r o c h i a l  i n t e r e s t s
a r e  f o s t e r e d  o r  a d v o c a t e d  an d  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t
d i c t a t e s  t h e y  c a n n o t  be  s a t i s f i e d ,  a  f u r t h e r  s t r i f e  i s
c r e a t e d .  A g a in  t h i s  h i n d e r s  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  s t a b l e
a n d  c o h e r e n t  n a t i o n - w i d e  p a r t i e s ,  a n d ; b y  c r e a t i n g  m i s t r u s t ^
i t  c r e a t e s  a  c r i s i s  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  w h ic h  one  s e c t i o n
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  f e e l s  d o m in a t e d  o r  e x p l o i t e d  by  a n o t h e r
s e c t i o n .  T h i s  i n  t u r n  w ea k en s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f
government.^*
Now t h e  army -  e v e n  i n  i t s  b a r r a c k s  -  i s  n o t
s e p a r a t e  f ro m  s o c i e t y .  The g e n e r a l  i l l s  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y
a f f e c t  i t  a s  t h e y  a f f e c t  o t h e r  u n i t s .  I t  h a s  b e e n  s a i d
t h a t  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  g i v e n  them  by  t h e i r  t r a i n i n g  a r e
c r u c i a l  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f j m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s .
I n  p a r t i c u l a r  i t  h a s  b e e n  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  c o m m i s s i o n e d
o f f i c e r s  f e e l  t h a t  t h e s e  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  ax' f r o n t e d  when t h e
s t a t e  whitfA t h e y  s e r v e  f l o u n d e r s  an d  t h e  c i v i l i a n  p o l i
2t i c i a n s ”make a  mess o f  t h i n g ' s . ”
1 .  C f .  E. S h i l s ,  o p . c i t .  p p . 1 4 -1 5 .
2 .  i b i d ,  p p . 18-23*
A l l  t h e  p ro n o u n c e m e n t s  u t t e r e d  by army coup^f l e a d e r s  l e n d
s u p p o r t  t o  s u c h  v i e w .  One i s  i m p r e s s e d  by t h e  p u r i t a n i c a l
t e n o r  w h ic h  s e e k s  t o  r e v i v e  f,m o r a l  s t a n d a r d s  o r  t o
a b o l i s h  c o r r u p t i o n .  Some o f  t h e s e  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  may,
o f  c o u r s e ,  be r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s . But i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  t r u e
t o  s a y  t h a t  a n  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e
m i l i t a r y  i s  a  s p i r i t  o f  d i s c i p l i n e  which  i n f l u e n c e s  i t s
p o l i t i c a l  o u t l o o k .  The l i f e  o f  t h e  army w h ic h  e m p h a s i s e s
a u s t e r i t y  af ,so c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  a  g e n e r a l  p u r i t a n i c a l
o u t l o o k  i n  p o l i t i c s .  A g a in  i n  t h e  u n d e r—d e v e l o p e d  w o r l d
s t u d i e s  h av e  shown t h a t  t h e  army " t e n d s  t o  r e c r u i t  i n t o
i t s  o f f i c e r  r a n k s  t h e  b r i g h t e s t  and  most a m b i t i o u s  yo u n g
men o f  t h e  s m a l l  tow ns  a n d  c o u n t r y s i d e . . ..who a r e  a w a re
o f  d i s t a x i c e  s e p a r a t i n g  them  f ro m  t h e  r i c h  a n d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
2e l i t e . "  As most  o f  t h e s e  come f rom  poo>r f a m i l i e s ,  i t  
i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  a f f e c t s  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r . ^  No
1 .  F o r  a  s am p le  o f  s u c h  p ro n o u n c e m e n ts  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  
r e c e n t  c o u p s  i n  A f r i c a  c f .  D e n n is  A u s t i n  ’The U n d e r ­
l y i n g  P ro b le m s  o f  t h e  Army Coups d ' E t a t  i n  A f r i c a ' ,  
'O p t i m a '  ( J u n e  1 9 6 6 ) .
2 .  E .  S h i l s ,  O j j . c i t .  p .  1 7 .
3 .  i b i d .
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f e t a i l e d  s t u d y  h a s  b e e n  made i n  A f r i c a n  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  
The p o l i c i e s  o f  r e c r u i t m e n t  may v a r y  f ro m  p l a c e  t o  p l a c e .  
F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  t h e  S udan  t h e r e  was a  p e r i o d  when  y o u n g  
p e o p l e  who f a i l e d  t o  a t t a i n  r e q u i r e d  s t a n d a r d s  o f  e n t r y  
i n t o  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  h i g h e r  l e a r n i n g  o f  t h e  S u d a n ^  
w ere  r e c r u i t e d  i n  t h e  a rm y .  The same m ust  b e  t r u e  o f  
many s t a t e s  w h ich  n e e d e d  t o  fo rm  t h e i r  o f f i c e r s  cotyps 
w i t h  some h a s t e  i n  t h e  p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e  p e r i o d s .  t T h i s  
i s  no d o u b t  t r u e  where  t h e  p a c e  o f  A f r i c a n i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  
army h ad  t o  be f o r c e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  g e n e r a l  
p o l i c i e s  o f  A f r i c a n i s a t i o n ,  Or a g a i n  j t a k e  t h e  c a s e  o f  
E t h i o p i a ,  w here  some among t h e  b r i g h t e s t  s t u d e n t s  w e re  
c h o s e n  f o r  t h e  m i l i t a r y  academy f o r  t h e  f i r s t  f e w  y e a r s .  
B u t  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  draw any  c o n c l u s i o n s  o n  t h e  
i m p o r t  o f  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  k i n d  o f  p o l i c y  on  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  young  o f f i c e r s . ^ "
1 .  D u r in g  t h e  c o l o n i a l  p e r i o d ,  t h e  c o l o n i a l  p o w e r s
a d o p t e d  a  p o l i c y  o f  r e c r u i t m e n t  d e s i g n e d  t o  p r e s e r v e  
an  e t h n i c  b a l a n c e  t o  f o r e s t a l l  a  u n i f i e d  r e v o l t  o f  
t h e  A f r i c a n  a r m e d ^ o j ^ c e s .  Thus t h e  u s u a l  p o l i c y  o f  
B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l  was t o  r e c r u i t  f r o m  among
t h e  m i n o r i t y  e t h n i c  g r o u p s  su c h  a s  t h e  T iv  i n  N i g e r i a ,  
and  t h e  Waka&aba i n  Kenya f o r  o f f i c e r  p o s t s ,  w h i l e  
t h e  s o l d i e r y  was drawn f ro m  o t h e r  e t h n i c  g r o u p s .
C f .  G e n e r a l l y  G u x t r i d g e  a n d  Brown * The A f r i c a n  
M i l i t a r y  B a l a n c e 1 I n s t i t u t e  o f  S t r a t e g i c  S t u d i e s ,  1964*
Much h a s  b e e n  made ox t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  m o s t
tx
A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  t h e  army i s / c o l o n i a l  c r e a t i o n  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  
i t s  b e h a v i o u r  m ust  f o l l o w " c r T t ^ r T a \ t h e .  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h i c s  l a i d  down by t h e  c o l o n i a l  a rm y .
Among t n e s e  i s  m e n t i o n e d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  army m u s t  be  
a p o l i t i c a l .  The sym b o ls  w h ic h  s e p a r a t e  t h e  s o l d i e r y '  
f r o m  t h e  c i v i l i a n  i s  more e n h a n c e d ,  i t  i s  a r g u e d ,  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  t h e  A f r i c a n /  who s t a n d s  o u t  a g a i n s t  a n  A f r i c a n  
j a c k g r o u n u . ^  But  t h e  f a c t  r e m a i n s  t h a t  t h o s e  u n i f o r m e d  
members  o f  a n  o r g a n i s e d  body c a l l e d  " t h e  army" a r e  a l s o  
m embers  ( a )  o f  a  m o d e r n i s i n g  e l i t e  an d  (b )  o f  k i n s h i p  
g r o u p ;  and  t h a t  t h e  i n f l u e n c e s  o f  t h e s e  two f a c t o r s  
i m p i n g e  on them , a s  t h e y  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  a  c o n s t a n t  i m p a c t  
o f  b o t h  f a c t o r s .  To g i v e  a  s im p le  i l l u s t r a t i o n .  A i s  
a  l i e u t e n a n t  i n  t h e  army o f  S t a t e  X. he comes f ro m  
e t h n i c  g ro u p  P a n d  i s  e d u c a t e d .  At one l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p  he i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  im p a c t  o f  m o d e r n i s t  i d e a s  a n d  
v a l u e s  by v i r t u e  o f  h i s  e d u c a t i o n  an d  m em b ersh ip  o f  a n  
o f f i c e r  c o r p s  w h ich  s h a r e s s i m i l a r  i d e a s  an d  v a l u e s .  He 
m e e t s  them i n  h i s  work a n d  a t  t h e  o f f i c e r s  M e ss .  He
1 .  Cih W .J .  P o l t z ,  ' P s y c h a n l y s e  a e s  a rm ees  s u d - s a h a r i e n n e s *  
Revue f ' r a n c a i s e  &• e t u d e s  p o l i t i q u e s  A f r i c a i n e s  ( P e v .  1967  
Ho. 14)  p p . 2 2 -3 0 ,  a t  p p . 2 3 - 4 .
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a l s o  m e e t s ,  a t  s u c h  Mess o r  e l s e w h e r e ,  c i v i l i a n  members
o f  t h e  ed u c a ted ,  m o d e r n i s i n g  e l i t e . ^  Among t h e  i s s u e s
d i s c u s s e d  a r e  p o l i t i c a l  s o c i a l  an d  economic i s s u e s  o f
is,$Me30
t o p i c a l  n a t u r e .  Some go d e e p e r  and  a n a l y s e  
p u t t i n g  them on a  l a r g e r  a n d  d e e p e r  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  i n e v i ­
t a b l y  t h e  l a t e s t  p o l i t i c a l  s c a n d a l s  or  c r i s e s  a n d  
g o s s i p ^  t i t  b i t s  come u p .  I n e v i t a b l y  a l s o  t h e r e  a r e  
a lw a y s  p e o p l e  i n  s u c h  a  g r o u p  \ a s  i n  any o t h e r  g r o u p )  
w hose  p a r t i c u l a r  b a c k g r o u n d  a n d  i n t e l l e c l ^ k n d  make up 
w i l l  f o r q e  them  t o  p u t  s u c h  q u e s t i o n s  on on  i d e o l o g i c a l  
p e r s p e c t i v e .  The c o n u u c t  o f  p o l i t i c i a n s  w i l l  s t a n d  
condem ned by su c h  p e o p l e  n o t  o e c a u s e  ( o r  n o t  o n l y  
b e c a u s e )  t h i s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a n  a f f r o n t  t o  n a r r o w l y  
c o n c e i v e d  s t a n d a r d s  im b i b e d  d u r i n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l  t r a i n i n g .  
B u t  ( a l s O )  b e c a u s e  t h e y  d e v i a t e  f rom  new v a l u e - s y s t e m s  
w h ic h  r e q u i r e  a  b a s i c  p o l i c y  o r i e n t a t i o n  a n d  a n  h o n e s t  
a n d  u n f l i n c h i n g  p u r s u i t  o f  s u c h  p o l i c y .  R o u g h ly  i t  may 
b e  c a l l e d  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e ,  a s  t h i s  c o n c e p t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e
1 .  F o r  ex a m p le ,  i n  a  num oer  o f  s t a t e s ,  many o f f i c e r s  
a t t e n d  e v e n i n g  c l a s s e s  i n  E x t e n s i o n  c o u r s e s  o f f e r e d  
oy c o l l e g e s ,  a n d ^  t h e r e ^  m ee t  an d  d i s c u s s  w i t h  
c i v i l i a n  g r o u p s  on many i s s u e s .  T h is  i s  b a s e d  on 
p r i v a t e  o b s e r v a t i o n  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n .
2 .  A g a in  t h i s  i s  b a s e d  on p e r s o n a l  o b s e r v a t i o n .
m o d e r n i s t  a s p i r a t i o n s  i n  i r s  s o c i o p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t .
I t  w i l l  be  s e e n  t h a t  ou.r army o f f i c e r  i s  n o t  r e s t r i c t e d  
by  t h e  n a r r o w  c o n f i n e s  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h i c s .
At a n o t h e r  l e v e l  o u r  l i e u t e n a n t  m e e t s  h i s
r e l a t i v e s  -  p a r e n t s ,  b r o t h e r s ,  s i s t e r s ,  c o u s i n s ,  a u n t s ,
u n c l e s ,  nep h ew s ,  n e i c e s  -  and  i t  m us t  be r e m e m b e re d  t h a t
t h e  t i e s  o f  t h e  e x t e n d e d  f a m i l y  i n  A f r i c a  a r e  s t r o n g
a n d  dem an d in g .  I t  i s  a  f a l l a c y  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  a n  A f r i c a n
o f f i c e r  w i l l  r e m a in  s e p a r a t e  b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  t r a i n i n g ,
u n i f o r m  an d  a l l  t h e  p a r a p h e r n a l i a  t h a t  go w i t h  a n  army
l i f e .  To be s u r e yt h i s  c a n n o t  be u n d e r e s t i m a t e d ;  army
t r a i n i n g , d r i l l  and d i s c i p l i n e  i s  a  s t r o n g  c o h e s i v e
f a c t o r .  But i t  does  n o t  i n s u l a t e  t h e  s o l d i e r  f r o m
t h e  d a i l y  i n f l u e n c e s  o f  t h e  more v i t a l  s o c i a l  c o n t a c t s
i n  t h e  A f r i c a n  c o n t e x t .  C o l .  A f r i f a ,  who s u b s c r i b e s
l kt
t o  t<5 t h e  v iew  t h a t / a r m y  m ust  be k e p t  o u t  o f  p o l i t i c s ,  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  w r i t e s :  " I  know t h a t  i n  Ghana p e o p l e  n o r m a l l y  
u n d e r r a t e  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  o f  t h e  s o l d i e r .  T h i s  h a s  a
1 .  As one o f f i c e r  p u t  i t  t o  me i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  "the 
i n t e r v i e w ,  ’ t h e r e  i s  no s u c h  a n i m a l . a s  " t h e  army" 
s e p a r a t e  f rom  s o c i e t y .  I  have  r e l a t i v e s  a n d  f r i e n d s  
o u t s i d e  t h e  army whose d a i l y  p ro b le m s  c o n c e r n  me a s  
much a s  t h e y  c o n c e r n  any c i v i l i a n .  What d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
t h e  army man f rom  t h e  c i v i l i a n  i s  t h a t  h e  f e e l s  a  
c e r t a i n  p r i u e  t o  b e l o n g  t o  a  body w h ich  i s  t h e  
d e f e n d e r  o f  t h e  n a t i o n  -  t h a t  i s  a l l .  B u t  t h i s  d o e s  
n o t  d e s t r o y  e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e . ”
49?.
l o n g  t r a d i t i o n .  The B r i t i s h  army d i d  n o t  a t  f i r s t  
a t t r a c t  t h e  m o s t  a b l e  o f  o u r  men. To o u r  p e o p l e ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  seem ed  / o n l y  t h e  f a i l u r e s  i n  o u r  s o c i e t y  
j o i n e d  t h e  a rm y ,  t h a t  o n l y  t h e  o n e s  who d i d  n o t  go t o  
s c h o o l ,  o r  w e re  n o t  a b l e  t o  t i l l  t h e  l a n d ,  o r  w e re  
d i s o b e d i e n t  t o  t h e i r  e l d e r s ,  p u t  on  t h e  w h i t e  m a n ' s  
u n i f o r m .  A new army h a d  h o w ev e r  g ro w n  i n  G hana ,  a n  arm,y 
o f  men who w e re  no l o n g e r  f a i l u r e s  b u t  p a r t  o f  a  g r e a t  
c o u n t r y  t h a t  h a d  won f r e e d o m  f ro m  B r i t i s h  r u l e .  An 
finny t h a t  h a s  come t o  i d e n t i f y  i t s e l f  w i t h  t h e  a s p i r a ­
t i o n s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  An army t h a t  s h a r e d  t h e i r  s u f f e r i n g s ,
1t h e i r  j o y s  a n d  t h e i r  h o p e s  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e . 11 A f t e r
m a k in g  some l a u d a t o r y  r e m a r k s  on  t h e  B r i t i s h  army
t r a d i t i o n ^  A f r i f a  g o e s  on t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  Ghana army
h a d  among i t s  r a n k s  men who " h a d  b e g u n  t o  a s k  q u e s t i o n s
a b o u t  o u r  c o u n t r y , a b o u t  Kwame Knrum ah,  a b o u t  t h e  f ion-
2v e n t i o n  P e o p l e s  P a r t y  a n d  i t s  i n t e n t i o n s .  I n  s h o r t
t h e  army d i d  n o t  s e e  i t s  p l a c e  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  b a r r a c k s  o¥* 
t o  t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d .
1 .  A.A. A f r i f a ,  o p . c i t .  p . 9 3 .
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Thus t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h i c  w h i c h  was d e v e l o p e d  
i n  d i f f e r e n t  s y s t e m s  o v e r  a  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e  a n d  
w h ic h  subsum es  o t h e r  s o c i o  p o l i t i c a j j b a s e s ,  c a n n o t  a c t  
a s  a  b a r r i e r  a g a i n s t  m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c s  
o f  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s .  As a l r e a d y  s t a t e d j " c h e  m o t i v e s  may 
v a r y  f rom  p l a c e  t o  p l a c e  an d  t h e y  may be  r a t i o n a l i s e d .  The 
m i l i t a r y  men may a l s o  d e c l a r e ,  a s  t h e y  a l w a y s  d o ,  t h a t  
t h e y  Vi/ill s t a y  i n  power  f o r  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  l o n g  en o u g h  t o  
“ c l e a r  t h e  r a e s s " ,  B u t ,  a s  we s h a l l  s e e  b e l o w ,  n o n e  o f  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  coup l e a d e r s j r a v e  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  b a r r a c k s  
o f  t h e i r  own f r e e  w i l l .  dome o b s e r v e r s  h a v e  e v e n  g o n e  
co t h e  e x t e n t  o f  s o l e m n ly  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  “A f r i c a  h a s  
e n t e r e d  t h e  e r a  o f  p r o n u n c i a m e n t o s "  The g r e a t  number  
o f  co u p s  a n d  t h e  q u i c k  s u c c e s s i o n  o f  t h e  e v e n t s  c e r t a i n l y  
l e n d s  c r e d e n c e  t o  s u c h  a s s e r t i o n ^  And t h e r e  i s  some 
e v i d e n c e  i n  t h e  p o s t - c o u p  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
e x e c u t i v e s  w h ich  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e y  h a v e  come t o  s t a y  
f o r  some t i m e .  W hether  more c i v i l i a n  h e a d s  w i l l  f a l l  
i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  c o n j e c t u r e .  One t h i n g  i s  c e r t a i n ,  v i o l e n c e  
b e g e t s  v i o l e n c e ,  and  t o  e v e r y  c o u p  T h e re  may be  a  c o u n t e r ­
c o u p .
1 .  C f .  Rev.  f r a n c a i s e  d 1 e t u d e s  p o l i v i ^ u e s  A f r i c a m e s  
( J a n .  1 9 6 6 ,  h o .  1 ,  p . 3*
The p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h i c s  and th e  a p o t i c a l  r o l e
w h ic h  i t  a s su m es  d o e s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  h a v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,
c
l o o k e d  a t  f ro m  t h e  a n g l e  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  m e n / a  c o r p o r a t e  
g r o u p .  W hi le  su ch  c o r p o r a t e  e x i s t e n c e  c a n n o t  w a rd  o f f  t h e  
i m p a c t  o f  f a c t o r s  m e n t i o n e d  i n  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  p a r a g r a p h s ,  
i t  d o e s  c r e a t e  a  c e r t a i n  p a t t e r n  o f  “i n t e r e s t ” w h ich ,  
r e s p o n d s  t o  c e r t a i n  t h r e a t s .  k e e p i n g  p o l i t i c s  o u t  o f  
t h e  army and  t h e  army s e p a r a t e  f ro m  p o l i t i c s ,  a s  m a j o r  
g e n e r a l  A l e x a n d e r  h a s  c a l l e d  i t , '* '  was one o f  t h e  l e s s o n s  
w h ic h  was s e d u l o u s l y  i n c u l c a t e d  i n  t h e  a r m i e s  o f  E u ro p e  
a n d  b i n c e  i n  t h e  c o l o n i a l  a rm y .  I t  i s  a  l e s s o n  w h ic h  
c a n  e a s i l y  be r e c / l l a e d  arm i n v o k e d  by army l e a d e r s  when 
t h e y  f e e l  c i v i l i a n  p o l i t i c i a n s  a r e  e n c r o a c h i n g  i n  w h a t  
t h e y  c o n s i d e r  t o  be  t h e i r  p r e s e r v e .  On^jof t h e  c o n s e q u e n ­
c e s  o f  what  h a s  e l s e w h e r e  b e e n  c a l l e d  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  
m o b i l i s a t i o n ,  where  t h e  p r im a c y  o f  p o l i t i c s  a s s e r t e d ,  
may oe a  s h a r p  r e a c t i o n  by  t h e  army w h ere  i t  f e e l s  i t s  
c o r p o r a t e  e x i s t e n c e  i s  b e i n g  t h r e a t e n e d .  T h i s  com es 
o u t  c l e a r l y  f ro m  t h e  w r i t i n g s  o r  u t t e r a n c e s  o f  some o f  t h e  
c o u p  l e a d e r s . ^
1 .  C f .  H .T .  A l e x a n d e r ,  A f r i c a n  T i g h t r o p e " , P a l l  M a l l  
P r e s s ,  1 9 6 5 .  ^
2 .  E . g .  C o l .  A.A. A f n f a f * / ( o p . c i t ) i s  a n  ex am p le  o f  how 
i n t r i c a t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  m o t i v e  f o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c a n  
b e .  A f r i f a 1s r e s e n t m e n t  t o  A p o l i t i c a l ” i n t e r f e r e n c e  
i n  army a f f a i r s  j p e r s o n n e l  a n d  s t r a t e g y  com es o u t
i n  h i s  d e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  N krum ai i 's  Gongo p o l i c y  -  a s
he saw i t )  and  i n  Nkrum ah’ s d i s m i s s a l  o f  g e n e r a l  A n k r a h .  
A c t s  w h ic h  a  G h a n a ia n  who a p p r o v e d  o f  N krum ah’ s Congo 
p o l i c y  may have  j u s t i f i e d ,  a r e  condem ned b y  a n  o f f i c e r  ■
V^o saw them through m i l i t a r y  s w n + . , i
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A t t e n t i o n  n e e d s  t o  be  p a i d  t o  t h e  e i u e s t i o n  o f  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  a n d  o f  t h e  arm ed  
f o r c e s  j p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  one p a r t y - s t a t e s .  S i n c e
t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  p r o v i d e s  t h e  m e e t i n g  p o i n t  b e t w e e n  
t h e s e  two f a c t o r s ,  t h e  p r o b l e m  i s  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  w ho le  
s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e .
We w i l l  now p r e s e n t  some c a s e - s t u d i e s  o f  m i l i t a r y
c o u p s  i n  A f r i c a ,  Then i n  t h e  s e c o n d  C h a p t e r  we w i l l
Strv^cVuv* im . tu t iv j
ex am in e  t h e  jwlrlyrffsr o f  H fe o t^ m i l i t a r^ jy f^ q c ^ 'v in  some o f
t h e s e  S t a t e s .
2• The M i l i t a r y  Coups i n  A f r i c a  
The B eg inn ing ;
E g y p t . The f i r s t  coup  d f e t a t  i n  A f r i c a n t o o k  p l a c e  
i n  E g y p t j  i n  J u l y  1952, when t h e  m o n a r c h i c a l  r e g i m e  o f  
K in g  F a r o u k  was o v e r th r o w n .  The E g y p t i a n  c o u p  was a  
m i l i t a r y  coup  i n  i t s  e x e c u t i o n  b u t  i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  
c o n c e p t i o n  a n d  im p ac t  i t  was a  r e v o l u t i o n  w h ic h  a b o l i s h e d  
a n  o l d  o r d e r  -  and  w i t h  i t  t h e  s e n s e  o f  h u m i l i a t i o n  
s u f f e r e d  by t h e  E g y p t i a n  p e o p l e  i n  c e n t u r i e s  o f  a l i e n  'V u le .  
I t  u s h e r e d  i n  a  new e r a  o f  s o c i a l  an a  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  i n  
a  way c o m p a r a b le  t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  f r e n c h  a n d  l u s s i a n
r e v o l u t i o n s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  f ro m  t i i e s e  l i e s  i n  t h e  f a c t
t h a t  t h e  E g y p t i a n  r e v o l u t i o n  was b l o o d l e s s .  i t  i s
c l e a r  t h a t  N a s s e r  an d  h i s  f e l l o w i ’r e e  O f f i c e r s  c o n c e i v e d  o f
a  s w i f t  b l o o d l e s s  coup  a s  a  way o f  s e c u r i n g  c o n t r o l  o f
t h e  s t a t e  a p p a r a t u s  b e f o r e  p r o c e e d i n g  t o  sw eep  t h e
A e g i a n  ( o r  r a t h e r  t h e  E g y p t i a n )  s t a b l e s  -  a n  a c t  w h ic h
t h e  o f f i c e r s  w ere  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  c a r r y  o u t  f ro m  t h e  v e r y
b e g i n n i n g . ^  N a s s e r  a n d  h i s  f e l l o w  11 f r e e  O f f i c e r s ” h a d  p l a n n e d
t h e  coup  f o r  o v e r  s e v e n  y e a r s  i n  s e c r e t  a g a i n s t  h e a v y  o a d s .
As one o b s e r v e r  h a s  r e p o r t e d :  “ t h e y  h a d  u  c l e a r  i d e a  o f  w h a t
t h e y  w a n te d  t o  d e s t r o y  i n  E g y p t  -  t h e  m o n a rc h y ,  t h e  poweh 
o f  t h e  l a n d  l o r d s ,  f o r e i g n  i n f l u e n c e  and  t h e  c o r r u p t i o n  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  -  a n d  t h e y h a d  a  v i s i o n  o f  t h e  k i n d  o f  s o c i e t y  
t h e y  w i s h e d  t o  becom e.  h u t  t h e y  h a d  h a d  v e r y  l i t t l e  t i m e  
t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  t e c h n i q u e s  n e e d e d  t o  make t h e  
v i s i o n  a  r e a l i t y . " ^
1 .  C f .  h i s  b o o k  "The P h i l o s o p h y  o f  t h e  R e v o l u t i o n " ,  C a i r o ,
1 9 5 4 .
2 .  P e t e r  M a n s f i e l d ,  o p . c i t .  p . 43*
The E g y p t i a n  r e v o l u t i o n  h a s  h a d  a  r p ’of 'ound
e f f e c t  i n  A f r i c a .  N a s s e r ' s  s t a t u r e  h a s  piz^yed a  p a r t  
i n  t h i s  i n f l u e n c e .  The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  h i s  
r e g im e  went a  l o n g  way i n  c r e a t i n g  c o n f i d e n c e  a n d  
s t a b i l i t y .  L e g i t i m a c y  was a c h i e v e d ,  a s  was m e n t i o n e d  
b e f o r e ^ t h r o u g h  p o p u l a r  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  a n d  t h e  
a s s e m b l y .  T h i s  h a s  i n d i r e c t l y  h e l p e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
coup  d ' e t a t  a s  a  v e h i c l e  o f  g a i n i n g  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r .
Any c o u p ,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  i n v o l v e s  a  h i a t u s  f ro m  
c o n s t i t u t e d  a u t h o r i t y  -  a  b r e a k  o f  l e g a l i t y .  D e m i l i t a r i ­
s a t i o n  i s  t h e r e f o r e  h e e e s s & r y  to establish l e g i t i m a c y .
I n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  t h e  m o nopo ly  o f  p h y s t e a l  f o r c e  w h ic h  t h e  
new r e g im e  e n j o y s  h a s  t o  be  l e g i t i m a t e d .  T h i s  i s  a  m a t t e r  
o f  g r e a t  moment f o r  any m i l i x a r y  r e g i m e .  I t  i s  n o t  m ere  
l e g a l i t y  w h ich  i s  a t  s t a k e ;  l e g i x i m a c y  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  
s h o u l d  be  u n d e r s t o o d  t o  i n v o l v e  p r ^ c t i c a l j q u e s t i o n s  o f  
t h e  ‘s u r v i v a l  and  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  r e g i m e .  F o i v  
o t h e r w i s e ,  i t  w i l l  be  p o s s i b l e  f o r  any  body o f  p e o p l e  t o  
c h a l l e n g e  t h e  b a s i s  o f  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  u s e  t h e  same 
m eth o d  t o  o v e r t h r o w  i t .  The a n s w e r  t o  s u c h  c h a l l e n g e  
c a n n o t  be  p h y s i c a l f o r c e o n l y ; o r  i f  i t  i s ,  i t  c a n n o t  
c o n x i n u e  i n d e f i n i t e l y .
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The l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  r e c e n t  c o u p s  i n  A f r i c a  r e a l i s e  
t h i s ,  j u d g i n g  b y t h e i r  d e c l a r a t i o n s t h a t  t h e r e  w o u ld  be  a  
r e t u r n  t o  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  I n  t h e  m e a n t im e  t h e y  
g o v e r n  by d e c r e e ,  an d  i t  i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  some d o u b t  w h e t h e r  
t h e y  w i l l  g i v e  up power s o o n .  I n  E g y p t  i s  t o o k  o v e r  t e n  
y e a r s  f o r  T ' r e s i d e n t  N a s s e r  t o  p r o d u c e  t h e  c e l e b r a t e d  
N a t i o n a l  C h a r t e r  w h ich  was t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
u n d e r  w h ic h  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A sse m b ly  and  l a t e r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
w e re  e l e c t e d .  The l e n g t h  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  may b e  p a r t l y  
e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  n a t u r e  ox t h e  cn a n g e  w h ic h ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  N g b p t ,  was f u n d a m e n t a l .  I n  any  a p p r a i s a l  o f  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  
o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  r e g im e  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c h a n g e  t h e y  b r o u g h t  
a b o u t  a n d  t h e  s e n s e  o f  m i s s i o n  t h e y  e s p o u s e d  m u s t  be  t a n e n  
i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  By b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  i s  m e an t  h e r e  
t h e  s p e e d  a n d  d e c r e e  o f  d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  a  
g r e a t e r  r o l e  p a l e y e d  by t h e  army i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n * .  I n  E g j p t ,  a f t e r  t h e  c o u p ,  N a s s e r  a n d  h i s  f e l l o w  F r e e  
O f f i c e r s  h a d  two a l t e r n a t i v e s  b e f o r e  th e m .  One was t o  go b a c k  
t o  t h e  b a r r a c k s  h o p in g  t h a t  w i t h  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  K in g  F a r o u k ,  
a l l  w o u ld  w e l l .  The o t h e r  was t o  s t a y  i n  p o w er  a n d  
g o v e r n  t h e  c o u n t r y  t h e m s e l v e s .  T h e i r  m i s s i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  
was  more t h a n  t h e  ' re m o v a l  o f  a  c o r r u p t  k i n g  a n d  h i s
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C o u r t .  As l o n g  a s  E g y p t ' s  s o c i a l  s y s t e m  r e m a i n e d  
u n c h a n g e d  n o t h i n g  w ould  c h a n g e .  The Y/AED p a r t y  w h i c h  
h a d  b e g u n  w i t h  p r o m is e  e a r l i e r  h a d  become h o l l o w  a n d  
d i s c r e d i t e d .  So t h e  new l e a d e r s  w ere  l e f t  w i t h  t h e  
s e c o n d  c o u r s e  w h ich  t h e y  f o l l o w e d  r e l e n t l e s s l y .  T h i s  
h a d  a p p e a r e d  t o  them a s  t h e  o n l y  s o l u t i o n  l o n g  b e f o r e  
t h e  c o u p ,  an d  e v e ry  one o f  t h e i r  s u b s e q u e n t  a c t s  c o n f i r m s  
t h i s  -  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c l i m a x  o f  t h e  r e v o l t u i o n ,  n a m e ly  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  C h a r t e r ,  an d  t h e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
r e g i m e  i n t o  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y .
T h i s  b r i e f  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  UAH h e r e  i s  j u s t i f i ­
a b l e  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  h a s  h ad  an  i m p a c t  on  t h e  
o t h e r s .  O t h e r w i s e  i t  f a i l s  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  s y s t e m s  u n d e r  w h ic h  i t  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  
d i s c u s s e d . ^
1 .  A n o th e r  a s p e c t  o f  UAH p o l o t i c s  w h ic h  i s  b e y o n d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  
t h i s  s t u d y ,  b u t  w h ic h  h a s  h a d  an  e f f e c t  on  E g y p t i a n  l i f e  
i s  i t s  i n v o lv e m e n t  i n  h l iu d l e  E a s t  p o l i t i c s .  T h i s  h a s  l e d  
t o  some u n f o r t u n a t e  a n d  w a s t e f u l  a d v e n t u r e s  w h i c h  h a v e  
b e e n  c o s t l y  i n  l i v e s  a n d  money, and  n a v e  i n  t u r n  
c o m p l i c a t e d  i n t e r n a l  p o l i c y .
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The Sudan
The n ex t  m i l i t a r y  coup i n  A f r i c a  t o o k  p l a c e  i n
t h e  Sudan, where G eneral  Ibrahim Abbhoud i n t e r v e n e d  i n
November 1958 to  putjajj end to  th e  i n t e r - p a r t y  s t r i f e  w h ich
had p a r a l y s e d  the  Sudan government s i n c e  i t s  in d e p e n d e n c e
two y e a r s  p r e v i o u s l y .
The f i r s t  p o l i t i c  a r t y  was form ed  i n  1938
when the  Graduates  C o n g r ess  o f  th e  e d u c a te d  S u d a n e se  was
fo u n d e d .  But s e c t a r i a n  ( r e l i g i o u s  and e t h n i c )  f a c t i o n s
i*eap eared  when e l e c t i o n s  t o o k  p l a c e .  These f a c t i o n s
w hich  had been  b u r ie d  i n  t h e  com m onstruggle  f o r  in d e p e n d e n c e
b e f o r e  1 9 5 6 , reappeared  soon  a f t e r j  n o m in a t in g  p o l i t i c s
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m  th e  n a t i o n a l  p a r l i a m e n t .  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e i r  m o d e r n i ty
and n a t i o n a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  depended  f o r
su p p o rt  on t r i b a l  g r o u p s ,  w i t h  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t
c o m b in a t io n s  o f  c o a l i t i o n  government p ro v ed  u n s t a b l e .
The economic problems c a u s e d  by poor c o t t o n  c r o p s  and
i t s  f a l l i n g  p r i c e  i n  th d  w o r ld  market added t o  t h e  c r i s i s .
1 .  The maxn f a c t i o n s  were t h e  A nsars  ( f o l l o w e r s  o f  t h e
l iah d i)  and th e  Khatmiyas ( f o l l o w e r s  o f  M ir g h a n i )
C f .  B .S .  Sharma 'The Sudan*, i n  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f
d e m i l i o a r i s a t i o n *  -  c o l l e c t e d  Seminar p a p e r s  ^f  t h e
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  London I n s t i t u t e  o f  Commonwealth  
S t u d i e s ,  April-Itiay 1 5 6 6 ,  p p . 3 2 - 4 0 .
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Abbhoud's i n t e r v e n t i o n  was made a t  t h e  
r e q u e s t  o f  A bdalla i i  .K h a l i l ,  t h e  prime m i n i s t e r ,  i n  t h e  
hope t h a t  h i s  p a r ty  ( t h e  Umma) c o u ld  come b a ck  t o  
power a f t e r  th e  s o l d i e r s  had deal's w i t h  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n .  
T h is  was n o t  g e n e r a l l y  known when he to o k  o v e r ,  and t h e  
p u b l i c  seemed to  have b e e n  p l e a s e d  b e c a u s e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
government had done nothing* b ut  f o s t e r  s t r i f e  and  
d i v i s i o n .  The m i l i t a r y  j u n t a  d id  n o t  d e c l a r e  any  
i d e o l o g y ,  but th e y  l a i d  s t r e s s  on t h e  ’“r e i n t r o  duct  i o n  
o f  moral v a l u e s  xn t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s 11 and a p p e a l e d  
t o  ■Jtjfafc the p u b l i c  over  th e  h ea d s  o f  p o l i t i c a l
p a r t i e s  and p o l i t i c i a n s . ^  They a l s o  d e c l a r e d  an  
i n t e n t i o n  to  go back t o  t h e  b a r r a c k s  w hich  added  t o  t h e  
g e n e r a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n .
As i t  happened Abbhoud and h i s  men were i n  
no p a r t i c u l a r  hurry t o  go back  to  th e  b a r r a c k s .  T h e i r  
Egypt ia n fc o u n te r -p a r t s  were s t i l l  ir^power, t h e y  must  
have f e l t ,  so why s h o u l d  th e y  hand o v e r  power t o  c i v i l i a n  
p o l i t i c i a n s  who were s t i l l  d i v i d e d ,  i n  any c a s e .  The 
m i l i t a r y  regime was i t s e l f  d i v i d e d  and en g a g ed  i n  an  
i n t e r n a l  power s t r u g g l e ,  d u r in g  th e  f i r s t  t w e l v e  m o n th s .
1» ib j .d ,  p . 33*
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There were a b o r t i v e  c o u n t e r - c o u p s  w hich  were c a u s e d  by 
p e r s o n a l  r i v a l r i e s .  In  t h e  l a s t  o f  t h e s e  a t t e m p t e d  
c o u n t e r - c o u p s ,  f i v e  young o f f i c e r s  were s e n t e n c e d  and  
e x e c u t e d .  And^ such e x e c u t i o n s  came a s  a  g r e a t  sh o ck  
t o  th e  Sudanese p e o p le  who began  to  q u e s t i o n  v.hat an 
o b s e r v e r  has  c a l l e d  11 t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  army" ^
I t  appears  t h a t  such a l e g i t i m a c y  had b ee n  assum ed f o r  
t h e  army on an u n d e r s ta n d in g  t h a t  i t  w ould  put  11 t h e  
house  i n  order" and t h e n  withdraw  t o  i t s  b a r r a c k s .  But  
a s  the  reg im e s t a r t e d  show ing i t s  r e a l  n a t u r e  by 
s u p p r e s s i n g  b a s i c  l i o e r t i e s  and d e c l a r i n g  a  s t a t e  o f  
aaergency,  a c u rr en t  o f  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  b eg a n  amon^fehe 
p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n s c i o u s .  P r e s s  was c e n s o r e d  and a l l  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and d e m o n s t r a t io n s  were b a n n ed .  Some 
p o l i t i c a l  l e a a e r s  p r o t e s t e d ^ p e t i i i t o n i m g  f o r  t h e  r e t u r n  
t o  p a r l ia m e n ta r y  governm ent .  l o r  t h i s  t h e y  were d e t a i l e d  
i n  a remote so u th ern  town.
G enera l  Abbhoud and h i s  Supreme C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  
Armed F o rc e s ,c o m p o se d  o f  t w e l v e  members and h i m s e l f  a s  
Chairman, r u l e d  theSudan f o r  s i x  y e a r s .  The Supreme 
C o u n c i l  nom inated  a C o u n c i l  o f  L i m i s t e r s  and t o o k  o v er  
t h e  whole b u r e a u c r a t i c  m ach in e ,  i n s e r t i n g  m i l i t a r y
1 .  i b i d ,  p . 34 .
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p e r s o n n e l  f o r  g e n e r a l  s u p e r v i s i o n  and c o n t r o l .  The
c l o s e  in v o lv e m e n t  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  i n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
la in ,  i t  o p en fo r  c h a r g e s  o f  c o r r u p t i o n ,  which  added
more f u e l  t o  th e  f i r e  o f  c i v i l i a n  r e s e n t m e n t .
However, when th e  reg im e was swept out o f  pow er ,  t h e
b urn in g  i s s u e  which a c t e d  a s  a c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  i n
p r e c i p i t a t i n g  th e  r e v o l t  was th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  S o u th e r n
S^dan. G enera l  Abbhoud's  reg im e was o v er th ro w n  by a
1c i v i l i a n  u p r i s i n g  i n  O cto b er  1964* T h is  r e v o l t  h a s
t h e  unique q u a l i t y  -  unique i n  A f r i c a  -  o f  b e i n g  t h e
f i r s t  i n  which  th e  m i l i t a r y  reg im e was o v er th ro w n  by
c i v i l i a n  u p r i s i n g ,  f o r  t h a t  r e a s o n  a lo n e  y t  so m e th in g
more must be s a i d  about i t .
I t  i s  i r o n i c  t h a t  a  m i l i t a r y  reg im e s h o u l d  be
overthrown on a q u e s t i o n  i n v o l v i n g  law  arid o r d e r .  The
Southern  Sudan was i n  a s t a t e  o f  r e b e l l i o n ,  w hich  t h e
m i l i t a r y  reg im e was unab le  t o  q u e l l .  The prob lem  was
p o l i t i c a l  but  £iad b een  t r a n s fo r m e d  i n t o  a  m i l i t a r y  one
during  Abbhoud’ s  r e i g n ;  and i t  was n a t u r a l  / f  t h a t
when a m i l i t a r y  reg im e f a i l e d  t o  s o l v e  a m i l i t a r y  prob lem ,
such f a i l u r e  s h o u ld  s e a l  i t s  doom. Y/hat i s  t h e  g o o d  o f
th e  m i l i t a r y ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  i f  t h e y  cannot  p u t  down a r e b e l l i o n .
1 .  Iiiany Sudanese  f o n d l y  r e f e r  t o  th e  ev e n t  a s  “t h e  
O ctober R e v o l u t i o n . ”
With p o l i t i c a l  m e e t in g s  banned and l e a d e r s  i n  d e t e n t i o n ,
i t  was l e f t  t o  u n i v e r s i t y  s t u d e n t s  to  o f f e r  s o l u t i o n s .
The s t u d e n t s  o f  th e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  nhartoum p r o c e e d e d
t o  do t h i s  b  ^ h o ld i n g  a c o n f e r e n c e  on t h e  p rob lem  o f  th e
S o u th .  But t h e i r  e f f o r t s  were f r u s t r a t e d  by o b s t r u c t i o n
from t n e  p o l i c e .  A c la s f ib e tw ee n  s t u d e n t s  and p o l i c e
t o o k  p l a c e ,  f o l l o w e d  by a l a r g e - s c a l e  d e m o n s t r a t i o n
s t a g e d  by th e  whole s tu d e n t  body and some members o f  t h e
s t a f f .  A gain . . ,  t h i s  met w i t h  p o l i t e  r e s i s t a n c e  and
f u r t h e r  c l a s h e s  to o k  p l a c e  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  d e a t h  o f
two s t u d e n t s .  The s i t u a t i o n  became ch a rg e d  w i t h  deep
em o t io n  which  was d em onstrated  by th e  huge t u r n - o u t  a t
t h e  f u n e r a l  o f  th e  two s t u d e n t s  k i l l e d  by t h e  p o l ic e .^ "  A
g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  was c a l l e d  by a r e v o l u t i o n a r y  co m m it te e
s e t  up i n  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  and th e  r e s p o n s e  was s w i f t  and
t o t a l .  The whole  co u n try  was p a r a ly s e d  c a u s i n g
s h o r t a g e  o f  v i t a l  s u p p l i e s  such  as  fo o d  G e n e r a l  Abbhoud
saw t h e  h o p e l e s s n e s s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  ga v e  i n  and
a g r e e d  to  hand over  power t o  a c a r e t a k e r  g o v e r n m e n t ,  u n t i l
an e l e c t i o n  was h e l d ,  and a  new government fo r m ed .
1 .  I  have i t  from an e y e - w i t n e s s  account  t h a t  h o s p i t a l  
n u r s e s  and d r e s s e r s  r e f u s e d  to  t r e a t  members o f  t h e  
p o l i c e  whe^ were in j u r e d  dur ing  th e  c l a s h .
5 0 i.
The e l e c t i o n  to o k  p l a c e  l a t e r ,  and th e  Umma p a r t y  formed  
a c i v i l i a n  g o v e r n m e n t ^
The New Trend  
The n ex t  m i l i t a r y  coup , and one w h ic h  s e t  a 
new tren d  i n  p o s t - in d e p e n d e n c e  A f r i c a  to o k  p l a c e  i n  A lger ia^  
i n  June 1 9 6 9 .^  The A l g e r i a n  coup d’ e t a t  o f  June 1 9 6 5  
marks a t u r n in g  p o i n t  i n  A f r i c a n  p o l i t i c s  i n  t h e  p o s t  
in depend en ce  er a ,  i n  th e  same way ( th o u g h  an  an  o p p o s i t e  
s e n s e )  t h a t  th e  Lkrumahist  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  I 9 6 0  was a  
t u r n i n g  p o i n t  i n  A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m .  The A l g e r i a n  
coup s e t  an example on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  
army i n  A f r i c a  which c o u l d  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  r e s p o n s e  
t o  s i tu a t io n ^ w l ie r e  A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m .  had e i t h e r  
o v e r -r e a c h e d  i t s e l f  or was n o t  a b le  or w i l l i n g  t o  cope w i t h
1 ,  There had been  army m u t i n i e s  l e d  Oj n o n - c o m m is s io n e d  
o f f i c e r s :  (1)  i n  Togo i n  January 1 9 6 3 ,  i n  w h ic h  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t ,  S y lv a n u s  Olpympio daaS frsrteh k i l l e d ;  ( 2 )  i n  
East  A f r i c a  in Janu ary  1 9 6 4 ,  which were put  down w i t h  
the  a i d  o f  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s  s e n t  a t  th e  r e q u e s t  o f  t h e  
gov ernments c one erne d ( i . e .  Tanganyika and U ganda) .
There was a l s o  an o l d - s t y l e  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  Z a n z ib a r  
which deposed  t h e  S u l t a n  i n  January 1 9 6 4 ;  ana b e f o r e  
th a t  vhere was a r e v o l t  i n  th e  Congo ( 3 ) ,  i n  A ugust  1963  
o r g a n is e d  by t h e  la b o u r  u n io n s  and r a d i c a r  m i l i t a n t  
grou p s ,  which r e s u l t e d  i n t h e  overthrow  o f  t h e  reg im e  o f  
P r e s i d e n t  (abb€) P u l b e r t  Y ou lou .  Two a b o r t i v e  cou p s  must  
be n o te d  v i z .  (a )  th e  E t h i o p i a n  a t t e m p te d  coup o f  
December I960  and ( j ) th e  a t te m p te d  coup i n  Gabon i n  
Pebruary 19b4 which was su p p r e s s e d  by I 'r en ch  t r o o p s  
s e n t  by P r e s i d e n t  de G a u l l e  a t  the  r e q u e s t  o f  P r e s i d e n t  
Leon M'ba.
w it h  c r i t i c a l  prob lem s.  Y/e w i l l  c o n s i d e r  some o f  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s  and e v e n t s  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  coup  i n  
A l g e r i a ,  and f o l l o w  i t  up w i t h  s i m i l a r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  on 
th e  coups  o f  the  Congo (K),  h i g e r i a ,  Ghana and T o g o ,  
l o g o  w i l l  s e r v e  as  an example f o r  th e  o t h e r  ' f ra n co p h o n ic  
s t a t e s  which  have s u f f e r e d  cou p s  ( i . e .  Dahomey,
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  R ep ub lic  and Upper V o l t a ) ,  a s  t h e  coup o f  
Togo has  c e r t a i n  f e a t u r e s  which  are  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  
t h e  o t h e r s .  A lso  th e  s h o r t  a cco u n t  g i v e n  e a r l i e r  on 
t h e  Sudan r e v o l t  and th e  Uganda ^uup ( g i v e n  m  c h a p t e r  
three^, w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  our p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e .
( i )  A l g e r i a
P r e s i d e n t  Ahmed h er^ e1 1 a  was d e p o s e d  by C o l .  
Kouari Boumedienne, n i s  m i n i s t e r  o f  D e fe n c e  and o n e ­
t im e  a l l y  i n  h i s  (Ben B e l l a ’ s )  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  Y o u s s o u f  
Ben Khedda f o r  the  A l g e r i a n  l e a d e r s h i p .  The coup  was 
a c h i e v e d  by t u r n in g  a m i l i t a r y  e x e r c i s e  i n t o  an  o p e r a t i o n  
t h u s  a v e r t i n g  s u s p i c i o n  and c a t c h i n g  th e  governm en t  
unawares and s e c u r in g  a l l  s t r a t e g i c  p o i n t s  i n  su r p r is e .^ "
1 .  Some u n i t s  o f  th e  army were out taking- p a r t  i n  t h e  
f i l m  on th e  b a t t l e  o f  A l g i e r s .  Thi:s a v o i d e d  
s u s p i c i o n .
The p r e t e x t  g i v e n  by the  p u t s c h i s t s  f o r  t h e i r
t a x e —over was tnhf P r e s i d e n t  Ben B e l l a  Had s e t  up a
d i c t a t o r i a l  r e g im e .  The p r e v i o u s  c a b i n e t  was
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e t a i n e d  w i t h  a r e s h u f f l e .
The ev e n t  c r e a t e d  s t r o n g  r e a c t i o n s  among
s t u d e n t s  and o th e r  o r g a n i s e d  o o o i e s  who s t a g e d  p r o t e s t
d e m o n s t r a t e s  i n  A l g i e r s  and o t h e r  b ig  c i t i e s ,  and were
i n v o l v e d  i n  c l a s h e s  w i t h  th e  m i l i t a r y ,  i h i ^ l a s t e d  f o r
over  a week.  Boon a f t e r w a r d s  a r e s i s t a n c e  movement was
form ed, c a l l i n g  i t s e l f  * 1 • o r g a n i s a t i  n ae l a  r e s i s t a n c e
p o p u l a i r e '  (ORP). Borne months l a t e r  a n o th e r  o p p o s i t i o n
group emerged under1 th e  name o f  11* o r g a n i s a t  i o n  c l a n d e s t i n e
de l a  r e v o l u t i o n  A lg e r ie n n e *  i-OCRn). CORA. s e a t e d  t h a t
i t  was a g a i n s t  m i l i t a r y  d i c t a t o r s h i p  and i n  f a v o u r  o f
th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l e g a l i t y . ' * '
The f a t e  o f  B e i /d e l la  and n i s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  reg im e
i s  l i n k e d  w i t h  th e  f a t e  o f  tn e  PLn ( f r o n t  ue l i b e r a t i o n
%n a t i o n a l e )  which we needy c o n s i d e r  i n  order  t o  g e t  a 
c l e a r e r ^  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  th e  events. The PLW was; by i t s  
origxm^a p o l i t i c a l  movement which  s e r v e d  a s  t n e  embodiment  
and t h e  d r i v i n g  f o r c e  o f  t h e  A l g e r i a n  s t r u g g l e  f o r  
m uependeixce  betw een  1954 and 1 9 6 2 .  i t  was a  movement
1 .  C f .  The k i d d l e  l a s t  J o u r n a l ,  V o l .  20, N c . 3, Autumn 
1 9 6 6 ,  p . 364.
f o r g e d  i n  a s t r u g g l e  -  i n  armed combat a g a i n s t  s u p e r i o r  
m i l i t a r y  power. Though u n i t e d  by t h i s  common f a c t o r ,  
i t s  l e a d e r s h i p  was n o n e t h e l e s s  composed o f  some d i s p a r a t e  
e le m e n ts ;  r a n g in g  from m oderate  l i b e r a l s ,  l i k e  Berfeat  
Abbas and Ben Khedda (who were m idd le  c l a s s  p i c f e s s i o n a l  
men) t o  Mohammed B o u d d ia f  and Ben B e l l a  h i m s e l f ,  who 
were m i l i t a n t  l e f t  wing s o c i a l i s t s .  Nor was t h e  
i n t e r n a l  d i v i s i o n  l i m i t e d  to  i h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  p l a n e .  Ben  
B e l l a  and B o u d ia f  were l o c k e d  i n  p e r s o n a l  r i v a l r y  and  
a n i m o s i t y .  The A rab -B eroer  d i v i s i o n  was a l s o  an e le m e n t  
p r e s e n t  though  k ep t  i n  t h e  background .  T'he BLN was 
t h u s  not  a p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y ,  m o n o l i t h i c  .and d i s c i p l i n e d  
i n  th e  L e n i n i s t  t r a d i t i o n .  I t  was a l i b e r a t i o n  
movement. With t h e  a c h ie v e m e n t  o f  in d e p e n d e n c e  i n  June  
1 9 62 ,  th e  BLN l o s t  much o f  i t s  d r iv e  and s e n s e  o f  d i r e c t i o n .  
The t e n s i o n  which had b een  subordinated ,  t o  t h e  common 
g o a l  d ur ing  t h e  s t r u g g l e  began  to  break  out*. The d iv i s io n  
emerged d u r in g  th e  T r i p o l i  m e e t in g  o f  t h e  BLN N a t i o n a l  
C o u n c i l  (CKRA) i n  June 1 9 6 2 .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  BLN 
s u r v i v e d  t h e  t e n s i o n  and came out w i t h  a g e n e r a l  programme 
which came t o  be r e g a r d e d  a s  i t s  g u i a e  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n .  Th
The e s s e n t i a l  e l e m e n ts  o f  th e  T r i p o l i  programme
w ere (1 )  t h a t  th e  armed combat sh ou ld  g i v e  way t o  an
i d e o l o g i c a l  combat and p e a c e f u l  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e
A l g e r i a n  N a t io n  a lo n g  s o c i a l i s t  l i n e s ;  (2 )  t h i s  t a s k  o f
p e a c e f u l  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  would embrace every  A l g e r i a n ,
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  c l a s s  o r i g i n ;  and t h a t  A l g e r i a n  c u l t u r e
w ould  be "revolutionary ,  n a t i o n a l  a n d / s c i e n t i f i c " ; ( 3 )
t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  would f o s t e r  an a g r a r ia n  r e v o l u t i o n
i n v o l v i n g  m o d e r n i s a t io n  o f  farm ing  and. g i v i n g  l a n d
t o  t h o s e  worked m  i t ;  (4)  t h e  BLN would s p o n s o r  t h e
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  c r e d i t ,  f o r e i g n  t r a d e ,  m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s
and r e s o u r c e s  o f  energy;  th e  BLN would a l s o  d i r e c t
programmes f o r  th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  a s p i r a t i o n s ,
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  improvement o f  t h e  s ta n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g ,
e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  i l l i t e r a c y ,  em a n c ip a t io n  o f  women, e t c ;
( 5 )  t h e  BLN i n  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  would be i n  t h e  f o r e f r o n t ,
c\gxirist
a s s i s t i n g  l i b e r a t i o n  movements, f i g h t i n g ^ i m p e r i a l i s m  
and f o r  Arab and A f r i c a n  u n i t y .  The T r i p o l i  programme 
was s l i g h t l y  m o d i f i e d  by t h e  c h a r t e r  o f  A l g i e r s  w h ich  was  
i s s u e d  a t  th e  end o f  th e  f i r s t  p o s t - i n u e p e n d e n c e  C o n g r e s s  
o f  BLIT ( h e l d  A p r i l  1 6 - 2 1 ,  l p 6 4 ) .  The n o t a b l e  a d d i t i o n s  
w ere (1 )  an emphasis  on the  d o c t r i n e s  o f  I s la m  and (2 )  
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n ^ !  th e  i d e a  o f  a u t o - g e s t i o n  (w o r k e rs  
management) o f  f a r m s .
1 .  Le iuonue, A p r i l  1 6 - 2 2 .
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I t  was u n d ers to o d  t h a t  th e  FLU w ould  e s t a b l i s h  
f u r t h e r  g u i d e l i n e s  o f  p o l i c y  and m a in t a in  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
t h e  government by a s s u r i n g  t h a t  th e  head  o f  t h e  governm ent  
and th e  m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  m i n i s t e r s  were i t s  members*
The i n f e r e n c e  from t h i s  was t h a t  th e  c a b i n e t  w ould  be  
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  the  p o l i t i c a l  Bureau o f  t h e  p a r t y .  These  
were th e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c i e s  w i t h  which  a l l  a g r e e d .  But  
t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  the  FLU l e f t  much t o  oe d e s i r e d .
Ben B e l l a  was aware o f  t h e  w eak ness  o f  t h e  
FLN; and he and his group conceived i t s  ro le  i n  term s  
o f  a p a r ty  machine run by uhe p o l i t i c a l  B u re a u ,  w h ich  
w ould  c o n t in u e  t o  be r e s p o n s i b l e  to  t h e  CKRA ( C o n s e i l  
N a t i o n a l  ae l a  r e v o l u t i o n  A l g e r i e u n e ) .  He w ould  be  
h ea d  o f  t h i s  p a r t y ,  which  would  be s e p a r a t e  from t h e  
governm en t .  The government would be e l e c t e d  by t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly ,  but s i n c e  t h e  p a r ty  would  n o m in a te  
c a n d i d a t e s  t o  th e  A ssem bly ,  i t  would c o n t r o l  t h e  g o v e r n ­
m en t .  T h is  c o n c e p t io n  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  FLN was g i v e n  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  e x p r e s s i o n  under the  1963 C o n s t i t u t i o n .
The C o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o v id e d  t h a t  t h e  FLN was t h e  o n l y  
p a r t y  i n  t h e  s t a t e . ^  The r i g h t  to  d e s i g n a t e  c a n d i d a t e s
f o r  th e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly and t o  th e  p r e s i d e n c y  o f  t h e
2R ep u b l ic  were e n t r u s t e d  t o  the FLN. The FnN was empowered
1 .  A r t .  56 .
2 .  A r ts .  23 and 34 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
t o  d e f i n e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y ,  i n s p i r e  th e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  
s t a t e  and c o n t r o l  th e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly and t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment
But th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  had a p p a r e n t l y  e n s h r i n e d
a myxh, I n  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  a t t e m p t i n g  to  c r e a t e  a
d i s c i p l i n e d  p a rty  w i t h  u n q u e s t io n e d  l e a d e r s h i p  Ben B e l l a
had alieraLed many o f  t h e  most  im portan t  l e a d e r s  who
commanded l a r g e  f o l l o w i n g s ,  l i k e  Mohammed B o u d i a f ,  B e l
Krim Kacem, A i t  Ahmed, Mohammed Khider  and Rabah B i t a t .
The m oderates  l i k e  Ben Khedda and E erhat  Abbas j £ l e f t
e a r l i e r .  These l e a d e r s  many o f  whom were f o u n d i n g
members o f  t h e  YLlly q u i t  one by one e i t h e r  t h r o u g h
r es ignat ior^ or  d i s m i s s a l ,  l e a v i n g  t h e  ELN t o  be f i l l e d
2by l e s s  q u a l i f i e d  and more o p p o r tu n is t ic  members.
T h is  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  c r e a t e d  more c o n f u s i o n  
th a n  c o n f i d e n c e  among a war—weary and j o b l e s s  m ass  o f  
A l g e r i a n s .  Then t h e r e  was t h e  ALN (armeede l i b e r a t i o n  
n a t i o n a l ) .  The ALN had b e e n  th e  m i l i t a r y  arm o f  t h e  
PLN during  t h e  s t r u g g l e .  I t  was t r a i n e d  and o r g a n i s e d  
m a in ly  out o f  A lg e r i a ^  and d ur ing  th e  struggle^, o p e r a t e d  
from th e  n e ig h b o u r in g  s t a t e s ,  i n  c o n s o r t  w i t h  t h e  
W il l a y a s  ( t h e  m i l i t a r y  d i s t r i c t s )  which, o p e r a t e d  g u e r i l l a
1 .  Art.  59.
2 .  C f .  W.H. L ew is ,  f The D e c l i n e  o f  ^ l g e r i a ' s  BLN* The 
M iddle  E a s t  J o u r n a l ,  S p r in g  1 9 6 6 ,  v o l .  2 0 ,  No* 2 ,
p p .161-172.
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war w ith in  A lger ia^  throughout the s t r u g g l e .  But th e  
ALN, which was b e t te r  tr a in e d  and organ ised ,  emerged 
towards the l a t t e r  days o f  the s t r u g g le  as  a t i g h t l y  
k n it  p r o fe s s io n a l  army.
Lleanwhile w ith  the mass exodus o f  f r e n c h  
s e t t l e r s ,  vacancies  had suddenly m a t e r ia l i s e d  i n  the  
government s e r v ic e  whic^ came to  be f i l l e d  by A lg e r ia n s .  
The army which commanded a h igh  p r e s t i g e  i n  the  country  
was a lso  reasonably w e l l t o f f  in  sa la r y  and r e l a t e d  
m atters .  The new c i v i l  ^bureaucracy a l s o  had s tepped  
in to  a new and comfortable l i f e .  In short a new c l a s s  
was born in to  a new way of l i f e ,  and the army and c i v i l  
bureaucracy shared t h i s  new l i f e .  As th e se  new c e n t r e s  
o f  power and i n t e r e s t  emerged a d iv ided  and d e b i l i t a t e d  
PIN could no longer at "tract any s i g n i f i c a n t  f o l l o w i n g .  
BenjBella s t i l l  enjoyed p o p u la r i ty  among the  masses but> 
i n  the absence of a v igorou s  p a r ty ,  h i s
c a l l  could  not get  any meaningful re sp o n ses .  In  the  
fa c e  o f  unresolved economic problems and p a r t i c u l a r l y  
unemployment, some of h i s  p o l i c i e s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  h i s  
f o r e ig n  p o l ic y )  were seen  w ith  growing s c e p t i c i s m  by 
the  army.
S tra in s  had appeared between Ben B e l l a  and 
Boumedienne which must have had a cumulative e f f e c t  on
51#.
t h e  d e c i s i o n  a b o u t  t h e  coup  d f e t a t .  B o u m ed ien n e  w i s h e d  
a  more d i r e c t  r o l e  f o r  t h e  army i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  a n d  
e x e c u t i o n  o f  p o l i c y . ^  T h i s  c o u l d  mean t h a t  e v e n  
a s s u m in g  t h a t  Ben B e l l a  h a d  s u c c e e d e d  i n  c e m e n t i n g  
a  u n i t e d  BLN l e a d e r s h i p  i n  t h e  f ra m e w o rk  o f  a  n e w ly  
d e f i n e d  r o l e  o f  t h e  BLN a s  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y ,  t h e  army 
would  have  e v e n t u a l l y  w i s h e d  t o  i n t e r v e n e  i n  p o l i t i c s .
On t h e  o u h e r  h an d ,  s u c h  a  demand may h a v e  b e e n  made 
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d i v i s i o n  among t h e  BLN l e a d e r s h i p .  
W hichever  i s  t h e  more l i k e l y  r e a s o n  Ben B e l l a  h a d  
c l e a r l y  l e f t  h i s  p o s i t i o n  a n d  t h a t  o f  h i s  c i v i l i a n  
r e g im e  v u l n e r a b l e  by h i s  unaue  d e p e n d e n c e  on  
B oum ed ienne ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  a  t im e  when h e  was 
" p u r g i n g ” t h e  BLN l e a d e r s h i p .  Boum edienne  w a t c h e d  t h e  
BLN l e a d e r s  -  t h e  " c h e f s  h i s t o r i q u e s "  among th em  -  
l e a v e  t h e  BLN one by o n e ,  a n d  Ben B e l l a  g e t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
i s o l a t e d .
Ben B e l l a  r e a l i s e d  t h i s  an d  h a d  g a m b le d  on  
B o u m e d ie n n e *s l o y a l t y  a n d  " s a f e n e s s " .  I t  was a  g am b le  
t h a t  c o u l d  h av e  p e r h a p s  p a i d  o f f  h a d  he a c t e d  s w i f t l y  
a n d  s t r u c k  t h e  r i g h t  t a r g e t  f i r s t .  He s t a r t e d  h i s  
p u r g e  o f  Boum edienne  by p e r i p h e r a l  a t t a c k s .  I n  O c t o b e r  
1963 he h a d  a p p o i n t e d  C o l .  Z b i r i > c h i e f  o f  s t a f f  o f  ALN
1 .  i b i d .
w h i l e  Boum edienne was v i s i t i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  I n  
1 9 6 4  he h i m s e l f  a ssum ed  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  m i n i s t r y  o f  
I n t e r i o r  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  Ahmed M e d i g h r i ,  
a  Boum edienne s u p p o r t e r .  He t h e n  a n n o u n c e d  p l a n s  t o  fo rm  
a  p e o p l e ’ s  m i l i t i a ,  a n d  t o  r e s h u f f l e  t h e  c a b i n e t .  And 
Then  by t h e  end  o f  t h a t  y e a r  (1964) he  made h i s  i n t e n t i o n  
know n t o  a  c o n f i d a n t  t h a t  he w ould  remove A b d e l  A z i z  
B o u t e f l i k a ,  m i n i s t e r  o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  a n d  t h e  m o s t  
I n f l u e n t i a l  p r o t e g §  o f  B oum ed ienne^ .  The a n n o u n c e m e n t  
o f  a  c a b i n e t  r e s h u f f l e  shows Ben B e l l a ’ s  p o s i t i o n  t o  be 
t h r e a t e n e d  f ro m  a n o t h e r  f r o n t ,  t h a t  o f  h i s  c a b i n e t  
i c o l l u a g u e s .  The d e c i s i o n  t o  c r e a t e  a  m i l i t i a  was c l e a r l y  
d e s i g n e d  t o  r e d n e s s  t h e  b a l a n c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  ALN; b u t  
. i t  was o b v i o u s l y  a  s e r i o u s  t a c t i c a l  m i s t a k e ,  w h a t e v e r  
. i t s  s u b s t a n t i v e  m e r i t .  A l l  i n  a l l  i t  was a n  u n h ap p y  
p o s i t i o n .  By t h e n  B e i^B e lla  may have  s e e n  e v i d e n c e  
•of B o u m ed ienne*s  p o l i t i c a l  a m b i t i o n .  He t o o k  i n i t i a t i v e s  
t o  r e c o n c i l e  w i t h  t h e  O p p o s i t i o n  c r e a t e d  by  h i s  f o r m e r  
• c o m r a d e s - a t - a r m s ,  n o t a b l y  w i t h  t h e  F . F . S .  ( F r o n t  de 
f o r c e s  S o c i a l i s t s )  l e d  by  A i t  Ahmed whom h e  h a d  p a r d o n e d  
by  com m uting  a  d e a t h  s e n t e n c e  p a s s e d  on h im  f o r  a rm e d  
r e b e l l i o n ,  t o  a  l i f e  s e n t e n c e .  The m i l i t a r y  w a n t e d  A i t  
Anmed^s e x e c u t i o n .
1 .  The c o n f i d a n t  t u r n e d  o u t  t o  be a  s e c r e t  a g e n t  o f  t h e  
B oum edienne  g r o u p .
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B u t  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  o f  t h e  A l g e r i a n  c o u p
c a n n o t  be  e x p l a i n e d  s i m p l y  i n  t e r m s  o f  p e r s o n a l  a m b i t i o n s .
I t  c o n t a i n s  s e v e r a l  o f  t h e  o t h e r  e l e m e n t s  m e n t i o n e d
b e f o r e :  p e r s o n a l ,  c o r p o r a t e ,  a n d  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  t h e
l a t t e r ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a s  i n t e r p r e t e d  by  t h e  a rm y ,  a n d  by
B o u m e d ie n n e , i n  p a r t i c u l a r .
The h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  s t r u g g l e  f o r  l i b e r a t i o n  a n d
t h e  m a s s i v e  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m ic  d i s r u p t i o n  w h ic h  i t  b r o u g h t
a b o u t  u n d o u b t e d l y  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  t h e
p r o b l e m s  f a c e d  by Ben B e l l a ’ s g o v e r n m e n t .  The f a i l u r e
o f  t h e  BLN a s  a n  e f f e c t i v e  p a r t y  was e m p h a s i s e d  ( i f
n o t  c a u s e d )  by  Ben B e l l a ' s  s t y l e  o f  l e a d e r s h i p .  H i s
f l a m b o y a n c e  a n d  c h a r i s m a  a p p e a l e d  t o  many, a n d  h i s  f o r e i g n
p o l i c y  i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  h i s  a d v o c a c y  o f  m ore
m i l i t a r y  a n d  o t h e r  h e l p  t o  A f r i c a n  l i b e r a t i o n  m ovem ents
n ih is
e n d e a r e d  h im t o  m i l l i o n s .  B u t  t t a n g f i  was e v i d e n t l y
n o t  f a v o u r e d  by  h i s  m i l i t a r y  h i g h  command. I t  i s
c o n c e i v a b l e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  t h e  army s t e p p e d  i n  ( p a r t f r
a t  an y  r a t e )  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  su p rem e  c o r p o r a t e
l e a d e r s h i p  w h ic h  t h e  BLN f a i l e d  t o  d o .  C l e a r l y  t h e  p a r t y
in
1 .  C f .  h i s  s p e e c h  t o  t h e  O .A .U .  sum m it .  May 1 9 6 3 ,  A d d i s  
A baba  w h e re  he  made a n  i m p a s s i o n e d  a p p e a l  " L e t  us  d i e  
a  l i t t l e  so  t h a t  more  w i l l  b e  f r e e . "
system  o f  th e  FLN and i t s  r e l a t i o n  w i th  t h e  government
was f o u n d  w a n t i n g ,  Suiae o b s e r v e r s  h av e  p u t  t h i s  f a i l u r e
a g a i n s t  a  more complex b a c k g r o u n d :  " t h e  r i s e  a n d  d e c l i n e
o f  t h e  FLN m i r r o r s  t h e  p a i n f u l  p r o c e s s  o f  s o c i a l  c h a n g e
i n  A l g e r i a  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  d i s l o c a t i o n s ,  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s
a n d  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s  w h ic h  more t h a n  s e v e n  y e a r s  o f
c o n f l i c t  w i t h  F r a n c e  h a v e  p r o d u c e d " ,
The r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y
r e g im e  was am b ig u o u s .  P o l i t i c a l l y  c o n s c i o u s  s e c t i o n s
m
a r e  d i s s a t i s f i e d  Wtibk. t h e  army r u l e  a s  c u n  be  s e e n  w i t h  
c o n s t a n t  t h r e a t s  o f  s t r i k e s  an d  a r r e s t s .  The u n d e r g r o u n d  
a l s o  i p r s i s t s ,  a s  t h e  r e c e n t  a s s a s s i n a t i o n  o f  Mohamed
p
K h i d e r ,  an d  t h e  s e r i o u s  o f  m i n i s t e r i a l  r e s i g n a t i o n s s h o w .
Boumedienne * s r e g i m e ,  on t h e  e t h e r  h a n d ,  seem s
d e t e r m i n e d  t o  o b t a i n  a  p o p u l a r  b a s i s  o f  s u p p o r t ,  a s
w i t n e s s  t h e  t im e  and  e f f o r t  i t  s p e n t  i n  p r e p a r i n g  a n d
3o r g a n i s i n g  t h e  m u n i c i p a l  e l e c t i o n s  o f  F e b r u a r y ,  I t  
i s  a l s o  m ak in g  d e t e r m i n e d  e f f o r t s  t o  im p ro v e  t h e  ec o n o m ic  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y .  T h e re  a r e  l e g i t i m a t e  a c t i v i t i e s
1 .  W.H. L e w is ,  o p . c i t .  p . 1 6 1 .
2 .  B a c h i r  Boumaza ( m i n i s t e r  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ) , A l i  Ivlahsas 
( m i n i s t e r  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e )  a n d  Mohammed Smain  
( m i n i s t e r  o f  R e c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  H o u s in g )  r e s i g n e d  a n d  
j o i n e d  OCRA, i n  t h e  c o u r p e  o f  1 9 6 6 .
3# c f .  Le Monde, F e b r u a r y  1367*
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o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  and  a r e  n o t  i n  t h e m s e l v e s  p r o o f  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  l e a d e r s ,  one way o r  t h e  o t h e r *
On t h e  o t h e r  hand) t h e  a d d r e s s  o f  B oum edienne  d e l i v e r e d  
b e f o r e  t h e  a s s e m b ly  o f  t h e  s i x  h u n d r e d  a n d  s e v e n t y - f i v e  
p r e s i d e n t s  o f  t h e  r e c e n t l y  e l e c t e d  m u n i c i p a l  b o d i e s  i s  
o ne  i n d e x  o f  h i s  i n t e n t i o n s *  He h a s  d e c l a r e d  n o t a b l y  
t h a t  " t h e  e l e c t i o n s  s h o u l d  n o t  be  c n s i d e r e d  a s  a
1p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  d e s i g n e d  f o r  f o r e i g n  c o n s u m p t i o n 11.
I n  t h e  same a d d r e s s  he a n n o u n c e d  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r e g i m e  i n c l u d i n g
p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n ,  e l e c t i o n  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e g i s l a t u r e
an d  r e f e r e n d u m ,  b e c a u s e  ( s i c )  t h e s e  h a d  s e r v e d  t o
c o n s o l i d a t e  Mune c e r t a i n ^ f o r m e  de p o u v o i r  p e r s o n n e l ,  une
2c e r t a i n e  t e n d a n c e  d e v i a t i o n i s t e . 11 The a d d r e s s  c o n t a i n e d
a t t a c k s  on t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r e g im e  c l a i m i n g
t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l i s m  w h ich  t h e  new r e g im e  i s  f o l l o w i n g  i s  
an
one b a s e d / " a u t h e n t i c  n o r m s ” , w i t h  " r e a l i s m  a n d  s e r i o u s n e s s ” , 
an d  w i t h o u t  any  " fo rm s  o f  demagogy a n d  a l l  f a c i l e  a t t e m p t s  
t o  g a i n  p o p u l a r  f a v o u r . ” ^ Boum edienne c o u l d  a l s o  b e
1 .  Le Monde, t la rc j i  1 ,  1 9 6 7 .
2 .  i b i d .
3 .  i b i d .
a c c u s e d  o f  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  g a i n  p o p u l a r  f a v o u r ,  now. B u t  
t h e  e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  i s  w h e t h e r  some m a t e r i a l  im p ro v e m e n t  
i n  t h e  econom ic  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  he made.  The e x t e n t  
o f  t h e  p r o b le m  i s  r e c o g n i s e d  by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  The 
o f f i c i a l  d a i l y ,  E l  L lo u ja h id  h a s  r e p o r t e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
"The A l g e r i a n  economy i s  i n c a p a b l e  o f  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  
t h e  e s s e n t i a l  n e e d s  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n :  em p loym en t
and  f o o d  ( c o n s o m a t i o n ) . .  . I t  g o e s  on  " i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  t h e  t o t a l  a c t i v e  p o p u l a t i o n  l e s s  t h a n  one  p e r s o n  
i n  f o u r  i s  more o r  l e s s  em p lo y ed .  I t  i s  i n  t h i s  
s e n s e  t h a t  i t  c a n  be s a i d  t h a t  w ork  i s  a n  e x c e p t i o n  
i n  A l g e r i a " .
F i g u r e s  show t h a t  o u t  o f  a  r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  s e v e n  
m i l l i o n  w h ich  h a s  an  a c t i v e  o p p u l a t i o n  o f  b e t w e e n  1 . 2  t o  
1 . 3  m i l l i o n  o n ly  2 5 0 ,0 0 0  a r e  p e r m a n e n t l y  e m p lo y e d .  The 
r e s t  a r e  unem ployed  o r  u n d e r - e m p lo y e d .
The p ro b le m  i s  a c u t e  and  i n  t n e  f a c e  o f  t h i s  
r e a l i t y  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  w i l l  b e  j u d g e d  
by  t h e  number of  j o b s  i t  c r e a t e s ,  a n d  t h e  h o u s e s  a n d  
s c h o o l s  i t  b u i l d s .  U l t i m a t e l y  a l l  g o v e r n m e n t s  a r e  j u d g e d  
by  t h e  f r u i t s  o f  t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  an d  t h e i r  s e r v i c e ,  w h ic h  
becom es  t h e  f i r s t  t a s k  o f  " l e g i t i m a c y "  i n  s u c h  
s i t u a t i o n s .
1 .  Jan 1 2 /1 9 6 7
( i i )  Coflgo ( K i n s h a s a )
G-eneral J o s e p h  Mobutu, C o m m a n d e r - in - C h ie f  
o f  xhe C o n g o l e s e  army l e d  a  coup  d ' e t a t  i n  November 
1 965 ,  o u s t i n g  P r e s i d e n t  J o s e p h  K a s a v a b u ,  a n d  h i s  p r i m e  
m i n i s t e r  E v a r i s t e  Kimba. Mobutu, t o o k  K a s a v u b u * s  p l a c e  
a n d  r e p l a c e d  Kimba^ by C o l ,  Mulamba, ox t h e  ANC (a rm e e  
n a t i o n a l  c o n g o l a i s ) .  The r e s t  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  was 
r e t a i n e d ,  Mobutu a n n o u n c ed  t h a t  p a r l i a m e n t  a n d  t h e  
p r o v i n c i a l  a s s e m b l i e s  w ou ld  c o n t i n u e  t o  s i t  a n d  t h a t  
e lec t ion s  w ould  be suspended f o r  f ive  }7ears d u r i n g  w h ic h  
t i m e  he a r r o g a t e d  power t o  h i m s e l f  t o  r u l e  a n d  p r e p a r e  
a  new c o n s t i t u t i o n .
The e v e n t  was p r e c e d e d  by s e v e r a l  w eek s  o f  
g o v e rn m e n t  c r i s i s  and  a  s t a t e  o f  p a r t i a l  p a r a l y s i s  o f  "fta 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  m a c h i n e r y ,  TheCongo h a d  s u f f e r e d  
more u p h e a v a l s  t h a n  any  o t h e r  A f r i c a n  s t a t e  i n  t h e  p o s t ­
i n d e p e n d e n c e  p e r i o d .  The c n i e f  c a u s e  i s  w e l l  known: 1
a  s t u b b o r n  r e f u s a l  o f  t h e  c o l o n i a l  g o v e rn m e n t  t o  p r e p a r e  \ 
t h e  C o n g o l e s e  e d u c a t i o n a l l y  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  f o r  *
i n d e p e n d e n c e .  T h i s  V&& g e n e r a l  a b s e n c e  o f  p r e p a r a t i o n  
was a g g r a v a t e d  by t h e  v e n g e f u l  a c t  o f  m ass  w i t h d r a w a l  o f
2B e l g i a n  c o l o n i a l  o f f i c i a l s ,  a t  t h e  moment o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
1 .  Kimba was l a t e r  h an g e d  w i t h  o t h e r s  on c h a r g e s  o f  
t r e a s o n ,  a f t e r  a  t r i a l  l a s t i n g  a few1 h o u r s ,
*3L. The B e l g i a n s  were n o t  a l o n e ,  i n  t h i s t y p e  o f  c o n d u c t .  
P r a n c e  " p u n i s h e d ” G u in ea  ( a n a  l a t e r  M a l i )  by  s i m i l a r  
w i t h d r a w a l s  p l u s  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  v i t a l  m e d i c a l  a n d  o t h e r
s u p p l i e s  an d  d o c u m en ts ,  when G u in ea  c h o s e  i n a e o e n d e n c e  
i n  1 0 5 8 .
Congo became i n d e p e n d e n t  on J u n e  3 0 ,  l p 6 0 j  
a n d  on J u l y  12 o f  t h a t  y e a r  t h e  f o r c e  J ? u b l iq u e  m u t i n i e d .
One o f  t h e  few h i g h  r a n k i n g  C o n g o le s e  o f f i c e r s  i n  t h i s
army) c a l l e d  t h e  f o r c e  f Ju b l iq u e  was a  young s e r g e a n t  c a l l e d  
J o s e p h  M otubu ,  who was e n g a g e d  i n  c i v i l i a n  w ork  a t  t h e  
t n n e .  The P r im e  m i n i s t e r ,  t h e  l a t e  P a t r i c e  Lumumba, 
a p p e a l e d  t o  t h e  b n i t e d  n a t i o n s  t o  h e l p  r e s t o r e  l a w  a n d  
o r d e r .  Thus b eg a n  t h e  t r a g i c  s t o r y  o f  " i n d e p e n d e n t "
Congo .  K a ta n g a  l a t e r  s e c e d e d  an d  t h e  UN i n t e r v e n t i o n  
becam e a  f u l l  s c a l e  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  a  c i v i l  w a r .  M o b u t u ' s  
C o n g o l e s e  army f o u g h t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  f i v e  y e a r s  o f  t h e  
w a r ,  a n d  t h e  f i n a l  p h a s e  o f  t h e  war t o  end t h e  s e c e s s i o n  
o f  K a ta n g a  h e l p e d  c r e a t e  a  s e n s e  o f  u n i t y  i n  t h i s  a rm y .
A f t e r  t h e  end o f  s e c e s s i o n  o f  K a t a n g a ,  Tshombe, 
t h e  p r im e  m i n i s t e r  o f  t h e  s e c e s s i o n i s t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  
p e r p e t r a t o r  o f  t h e  s e c e s s i o n  was a s k e d  by K a s a v u b u  t o  
f o rm  a  g o v e rn m e n t  o f  t h e  Congo,  The m o t i v e  i s  c l e a r .
I t  was f e l t  by K asavubu a n d  h i s  a d v i s o r s ,  t h a t  t h e r e
w o u la  be  no p e rm a n e n t  p e a c e  and  no u n i t y  i n  a  c o u n t r y
l i k e  t h e  Congo w i t h  t h r e e  w i d e l y  s e p a r a t e  c e n t r e s  o f
"l
p o w e r ,  ( L e o p o l d v i l l e ,  S t a n l e y v i l l e  and  E l i z a b e t h v i l l e ) , 
a n d  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e s e  p l a c e s  w ere  h e l d  by p e o p l e  w i t h  
d i f f e r i n g -  i d e a s  or  i n t e r e s t s .  So t h e y  d e c i d e d  t o  u s e  
T s /h o m b e  a s  t h e  s e a t i n g  s t i c k  a g a i n s t  t h e  S t a n l e y v i l l e
1 .  Now ren am ed  K i n s h a s a ,  K i s a n g a n i  and Lumumbashi,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .
'L u m u m b is ts1' . Tshombe a c c e p t e d  t h e  i n v i t a t i o n ^  f o r m e d  
a  g o v e rn m e n t  an d ,  u s i n g  w h i t e  m e r c e n a r i e s ,  e v e n t u a l l y  
c r u s h e d  t h e  r e b e l l i o n .  He t h e n  d e c i d e d  t o  f o rm  a  new 
p a r t y  w h ic h  a p p e a r e d  i n  F e b r u a r y  1^65 u n d e r  t h e  name 
nCGKACOn . CONACO w as,  i n  f a c t ,  a  p r o j e c t i o n  o n to  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  a r e n a  o f  h i s  o l u  K a ta n g a  p a r t y ,  t h e  CONAKAT,
I t  em braced  a  c o a l i t i o n  o f  f o r t y - n i n ^ b t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r m a \ t i o n s ,  and  r e l i e d  on t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  
e l e m e n t s .  At t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  w h ic h  f o l l o w e d  CoNACO 
em erged  w i t h  t h e  l a r g e s t  number o f  s e a t s  -  a  f a c t  t h a t  
threatened to assure Tshombe control of p a r l i a m e n t  a n d  
e v e n t u a l  e l e c t i o n  a s  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  C o n g o .  When i t  was 
known t h a t  Tshombe h a d  h i s  eye  on t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  o f f i c e  
K asavubu  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  h e  w ou ld  o f f e r  h i m s e l f  f o r  r e ­
f l e c t i o n .
A s e r i e s  o f  e v e n t s  f o l l o w e d  i n  q u i c k  s u c c e s s i o n  
w h ic h  showed t h e  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  Tshombe a n d  K a s a v u b u .  
E l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  t h r e e  p r o v i n c e s  w ere  q u a s h e d  by  t h e  
C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l  t o  CONACOf s l o s s .  B u t  Tshombe was s t i l l  
s t r o n g l y  p l a c e a .  Then i n  J u l y  1965 K a sa v u b u  g a v e  t h e
P ri*<.
I n t e r i o r  M i n i s t r y  t o  V i c t o r  N endaka o v e r ^ i a i n i s t e r  Tshombe 
p r o t e s t s .  Nendaka h a d  b e e n  e l e c t e d  on a  CONACO i i s t  
o f  c a n d i d a c y ,  b u t  q u i t  CONACOj p r e s u m a b ly  a t  K a s a v u b u 1 s  
s u g g e s t i o n  an d  o f f e r  o f  a  key  m i n i s t r y ,  a n d  f o r m e d  a n
a n t i -T s h o m b e  f r o n t  ( F r o n t  Democratiq_ue C o n g o l a i s )
h e l p e d  by o t h e r  p o l i t i c i a n s .  When p a r l ^ i m e n t  m et
P r e s i d e n t  K asa v u b u  a s k e d  Tshombe t o  d i s m i s s  h i s
p r o v i s i o n a l  g o v e rn m e n t  so  t h a t  a  b r o a d e r - b a s e d  g o v e r n m e n t
c o u l d  be f o rm e d .  Tshombe r e f u s e d  t o  r e s i g n  a n d  on
O c to b e r  1 3 ,  1965 K as a v u b u  d i s m i s s e d  him a n d  a s k e d
D v a r i s 'c e  Kimba t o  fo rm  a  new g o v e r n m e n t T h e  w h o le
e p i s o d e  i s  f u l l  o f  s h i f t i n g '  a l l e g i a n c e s  a n d  p o l i t i c a l
s O m m e r s a u l t s . The e v e n t s  t h a t  f o l l o w e d  a f t e r  O c t o b e r  \
1 3 ,  snow p a r l i a m e n t a r y  g o v e rn m e n t  a t  a  m o s t  f a r c i c a l  a s p e c t l .
A f t e r  a  l o n g  s e r i e s  o f  c o n s u l t a t i o n s , Kimba p r e s e n t e d
h i s  team  f o r  i n v e s t i t u t e  t o  p a r l i a m e n t  on Kovember 1 4 .
T sh o m o e 's  s t r e n g t h  was d e m o n s t r a t e d  when K i m b a ' s
" g o v e rn m e n t11 was r e j e c t e d  by a  v o t e  o f  134  a g a i n s t  121
2an d  s e v e n  a b s t e n t i o n s .
K a sa v u b u ,  who h a d  d i s m i s s e d  Lumumba a n d  g o t  
away w i t h  i t ,  was n o t  one ro  oudge a n  i n c h .  He a s k e d  
Kimba t o  s t a r t  a l l  o v e r  a g a i n  a n d  fo rm  a n o t h e r  g o v e r n m e n t .  
CCNACD a t t a c k e d  h i s  d e c i s i o n  i n  a  p r e s s  r e l e a s e ,
11 . . . t h e  p o l i t i c a l  B u re a u  o f  CONACO" i t  d e c l a r e d ,  " c o u l d
1 .  Kimba was one o f  T s h o m b e 's  c h i e f  l i e u t e n a n t s  d u r i n g  
K a t a n g a ' s  two a n d  a  h a l f  y e a r s  o f  s e c e s s i o n .  He was 
l a t e r  h a n g e d  w i t h  o t n e r s  on  c h a r g e d  o f  c o n s p i r a c y
t o  o v e r th r o w  t h e  A o b u tu  r e g i m e .
2 .  O f .  B. K a lo n g i  an d  Z. k i r b i d i ,  ' E l e c t i o n s  F o r c e  e t  
P a r i e m e n t  1 9 6 5 ' ,  n t u u e s  0 o n g o l a i s e s , J a n - F e v . 1 9 6 6 ,  
p p . 1-5*
52^,
not; t o l e r a t e  t h a t  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  s h o u l d  h e  l i m i t e d ,  w h e r e a s
i n  dem ocracy  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  g r o u p  w h ic h  d e f e a t s  a
g o v e rn m e n t  i $  a lw a y s  n e c e s s a r i l y  c a l l e d  upon t o  f o rm  a n
1
a l t e r n a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t . 11 T h i s  i s  t r u e  en o u g h  i n
p r i n c i p l e .  But u n d e r  t h e  C o n g o l e s e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  t h e
p r e s i d e n t  i s  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  an d  th e fc r im e  m i n i s t e r
i s  a p p o i n t e d  and d i s m i s s e d  by h im .  A c a m p a ig n  o f  m u t u a l
2v i l i f i c a t i o n  over  p r e s s  an d  r a d i o  f o l l o w e d .
Then on November 25 ,  1965 ,  t h e  arm y c o u p  t o o k  
p l a c e .  The eomrnuni^ug of t h e  army h i g h  command s t a t e d  
t h a t  i t  s e i z e d  power:  " A f t e r  h a v i n g  w i t n e s s e d  t h e  f a i l u r e
o f  t h e  c i v i l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  who o n ly  t h o u g h t  o f  t h e i r  f i g h t  
f o r  pow er ,  n e g l e c t i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y . "
T h i s  was l a t e r  e l a b o r a t e d  w i t h  a  v iew  t o  g a i n i n g  g e n e r a l  
Xcopuj_ar a c c e p t a n c e . ^
( i i i )  N i g e r i a
N i g e r i a n  c o u p ’ d* e t a t  t o o k  p l a c e  o n  J a n u a r y  1 5 ,
1965. I t  was o r g a n i s e d  by a  s m a l l  g r o u p  o f  o f f i c e r s  a n d  
men l e d  by f i v e  m a j o r s . ^  The g ro u p  s t r u c k  t h r o u g h o u t
1 .  i b i d .
2 .  I t  i s  c l a i m e d  t h a t  f sh o m b e  h a d  t r i e d  t o  s e i z e  p o w er  by 
a  coup  d ' e t a t  on Nov. 1965 a i d e d  oy a n  unnamed f o r e i g n  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  i b i d .
3 .  I n  a document e n t i t l e d  "De l a  l £ g a l i u e  a  l a  l e g i t i m i t ^ 1 
a p p e a r i n g  u n d e r  M o b u t u ' s  nam e.  I t  c o n t a i n s  c e r t a i n  
p o l i c y  s t a t e m e n t s  w h ic h  w i l l  be  ex a m in e d  1
4 .  The s i z e  i s  e s t i m a t e d  a t  200 c f .  L . w . J .  P o s t  1 The N i g e r i a n  
Case* i n  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  d e m i l i t a r i s a . l i o n , U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
London, I n s t i t u t e  o f  Commonwealth S t u d i e s ,  c o l l e c t e d  S e m in a r
5 2 § .
N i g e r i a  w i t h  r e m a r k a b l e  s p e e d  and  c o - o r d i n a t i o n .  I n  
t h e  n o r t h  t h e y  k i l l e d  t h e  p o w e r f u l  .R eg iona l  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r ,  
t h e  S a r d a u n a  o f  S o k o to ,  S i r  Ahmadu B e l l o .  I n  t h e  
W e s te rn  R e g io n  t h e y  k i l l e d  t h e  R e g i o n a l  P r e m i e r  ( a n d  
a l l y  o f  t h e  S a u d a u n a ) , C h i e f  A k i n t o l a ,  an d  k i d n a p p e d  
t h e  f e d e r a l  P r im e  m i n i s t e r ,  S i r  A b u b a k a f i a f e w a  B a le w a ,  
a n d  h i s  f i n a n c e  m i n i s t e r ,  C h i e f  P e s t u s  O k o t i e  E b o h .
The l a s t  two w ere  k i l l e d  l a t e r .
I t  i s  n o t  y e t  c l e a r  what  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  
f i r s t  coup i n t e n d e d  t o  do once i n  p o w e r .  The o n l y  
b r o a d c a s t  made by M ajo r  Nzeogwu f rom  k a d u n a  r a d i o  s t a t i o n  
sp o k e  o f  e n d i n g  t r i b a l i s m ,  n e p o t i s m  and  c o r r u p t i o n .  The 
co u p  f a i l e d  f o r  v a r i u s  r e a s o n s .  T h e re  i s  e v i d e n c e  t o  show 
t h a t  G e n e r a l  I r o n s i ,  t h e  C o m m a n d e r - in -C h ie f  o f  t h e  N i g e r i a n  
army was n o t  i n v o l v e d ,  a n d  t h a t  he was i n  f a c t  on t h e  
l i s t  o f  k ey  f i g u r e s  t o  be  e l im in a t e d .* ^  The G e n e r a l  
e s c a p e d ^ a n d  i n  r a l l y i n g  ro u n d  him a  l o y a l i s t  army; 
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  " t h e  coup  o f  t h e  m a j o r s 11.
I t  i s  a l s o  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  f e d e r a l  P r im e  M i n i s t e r  was 
k i d n a p p e d  w i t h  a  v iew  t o  f o r c i n g  him t o  c a l l  on  th em  t o  
fo rm  a  g o v e r n m e n t .  He d i e d y  w h i l e  t h e i r  p r i s o n e r  o r  was 
k i l l e d  by th e m ,  p e r h a p s  t a k i n g  w i t h  him one c h a n c e  o f  
s u c c e s s  f o r  t h e  c o u p .  I n s t e a d  t h e  rump c a b i n e t  c a l l e d
1 .  P o s t ,  i b i d ;  c f .  A ls o  P .  K e a t l y  'T he  G u a rd ia n *  J a n .
2 6 /2 7 ,  1 9 6 6 .
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on G e n e r a l  I r o n s !  t o  s e t  up a  m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n m e n t ,  w h ic h  
he  d i d .  A few  days  a f t e r  “c h a t  t h e  N o r t h e r n  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  
c o u p ,M a jo r  Nzeogwu a g r e e d  t o  s u r r e n d e r  t o  t h e  new 
g o v e r n m e n t .
The coup  d fe t a t  w h ic h  h a s  s h a k e n  N i g e r i a  h a s  
i t s  r o o t s  i n  t h e  e t h n i c ,  r e g i o n a l ,  r e l i g i o u s  a n d  p e r s o n a l  
c o n f l i c t s  w h ic h  p l a g u e d  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n .  C o r r u p t i o n  a n d  
thugge ry>  w h ic h  were r a m p a n t )  h av e  a l s o  no d o u b t  t h e i r  
p a r t  t o  p l a y  i n  t h e  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  l e d  t o  t h e  
d r a s t i c  a c t i o n  o f  t h e  m a j o r s .  The a s s a s s i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
S a r d a u n a  o f  Cokoto a n d  o f  C h i e f  A k i n t o l a  p r o v i d e s  one 
c l u e  t o  t h e  m o t i v a t i o n .  The S a r d a u n a  o f  S o k o to  was 
p r o b a b l y  t h e  m os t  p o w e r f u l  f i g u r e  i n  A l g e r i a .  As r u l e r  
o f  t h e  l a r g e s t  r e g i o n  o f  t r ie  f e d e r a t i o n  a n d  a s  h e a d  o f  
t h d  l a r g e r  p a r t y  (NPC) t h a t  was r u l i n g  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n  
i n  c o a l i t i o n , h e  e x e r t e d  immense power a n d  i n f l u e n c e .
I n  t h e  n o r t h ; he  combined) i n  h i s  p e r s o n ,  t r a d i t i o n a l  
a u t o c r a t i c  l e a d e r s h i p  an d  r e l i g i o u s  (M usl im )  s t a n d i n g .
I n  t h e  w e s t ,  he c o n n i v e d  a t  a n d  s u c c e e d e d  i n  c r e a t i n g  
a  p a r t n e r s h i p  w i t h  C h i e f  A k i n t o l a ,  a f t e r  t h e  l a t t e r  h a d  
b r o k e n  away f ro m  t h e  A c t i o n  G ro u p .^  The P r im e  M i n i s t e r
o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  b i r  A bubakar ; was h i s  d e p u t y
1 .  Cf.  Chapter f o u r .
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a s  h e a d  o f  t h e  NIC, a n d  many N i g e r i a n s  o p e n l y  c l a i m e d  
t h a t  he was h i s  l i e u t e n a n t  i n  L a g o s .
A l th o u g h  a m i l i t a r y  coup was n o t  g e n e r a l l y  
e x p e c t e d  i n  N i g e r i a ,  i n  r e s t o s p e c t ,  om inous  s i g n s  o f  
t h i n g s  t o  come c o u l d  be  s e e n  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  o f  
O c t o b e r ,  1 9 6 5 ,  i n  t h e  W e s t e r n  R e g io n .  T h a t  e l e c t i o n  was 
m a rk e d  by d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  l e a d i n g  t o  l o s s  o f  l i f e  a n d  
b i t t e r  r e c r i m i n a t i o n s  i n  w h ic h  c h a r g e s  o f  r i g g i n g  a n d  
i n t i m i d a t i o n  were  made.  The s u p p o r t e r s  o f  C h i e f  
A degben ro  ( A k i n t o l a * s  r i v a l )  were  u n w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  
t h e  v e r d i c t  r e t u r n e d  by t h e  b a l l o t  b o x e s .  Many em­
b i t t e r e d  S o u t h e r n  N i g e r i a n s  f e l t  a  t h r e a t  o f  n o r t h e r n  
(M uslim ) d o m i n a t i o n ,  a n d  s a w i n  A k i n t o l a  a  w i l l i n g  t o o l  
o f  t h e  S a r d a u n a * s  m a c h i n a t i o n  f o r  e v e n t u a l ,  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  
fmm t h e  N o r t h .  A f t e r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  d i s t u r b a n c e s  o f  
O c t o b e r ,  t h e  W es te rn  R e g io n  became t h e  r e a l  c h a l l e n g e  
l a c i n g  t h e  governm en t  o f  S i r  A b u b ak a r  T afew a  B a l e w a .
A l l  S o u t h e r n  N i g e r i a n s  ( L a s t  a n d  W est)  w e r e  u n i t e d  i n  
t h e  s e n t i m e n t s  i m p l i e d  i n  t h i s  c h a l l e n g e .  The f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e  c o u p  w e re  l o o s ‘d 
i s  p e r h a p s  one e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  u n i t y  a g a i n s t  t h e  t h r e a t  
o f  a  p o w e r f u l  N o r t h e r n  r u l e r .  i t  i s  a l s o  b o r n e  o u t  by  
t h e  f a c t  t n a t  t h e  S a r d a u n a  a n d  h i s  a l l y ,  A k i n t o l a } w e re  
t h e  f i r s t  t a r g e t s ,  a s  a l r e a d y  p o i n t e d  o u t .
1 .  c f .  N i g e r i a  1966,  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  
o f  N i g e r i a ,  L agos ,  p p . 5 - 6 .
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The g o v e rn m e n t  o f  S i r  AbubakfiLr T a few a  B a le w a
i t s e l f  -  a  r u l i n g  c o a l i t i o n  o f  NBC a n d  NCNC -  &ad become
t h o r o u g h l y  d i s c r e d i t e d  f o r  i n e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  c o r r u p t i o n ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y  among t h e  y o u n g .  I t  h a s  b e e n  a r g u e d  by
some o b s e r v e r s  t h a t  when t h e  young  m a j o r s  s t r u c k
on J a n u a r y  1 9 6 5 ,  t h e y  a c t e d  p o l i t i c a l l y  a s  t h e  arm  o f
t h e  y o u n g .^  T h ese  o f f i c e r s  were  r e c r u i t e d  i n  t h e  l a t e
f i f t i e s  and e a r l y  s i x t i e s ,  and  were  n o t  men who h a d
seeiij tong s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  a rm y .  They m u s t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d
miiong t h o s e  who l e a s t  r e g a r d e d  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  m em bers  o f
a c l o s e d  c o r p o r a t e  e n t i t y  ( t h e  army) e x i s t i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t l y
o f  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y .  S o c i o l o g i c  a l l y  t h e r e f o r e
t h e y  b e l o n g e d  t o  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  -  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s ,
2t e a c h e r s ,  g r a d u a t e s ,  s c h o o l  l e a v e r s ,  e t r #  I f  t h i s  
c o n c l u s i o n  i s  c o r r e c t  -  a n d  i t  i s  h a r d  t o  r e f u t e ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  v iew  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  mood o f  t h e  t i m e  
b e f o r e  t h e  coup  -  t h e n  i t  l e a d s  t o  a n o t h e r  c o n c l u s i o n  
t h a t  t h e  coup  o f  t h e  m a j o r s  h a d  a  d e f i n i t e  p o l i t i c a l  
p u r p o s e ,  m o t i v a t e d  p r i m a r i l y  by t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .
The f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  coup  saw t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  
o f  G e n e r a l  I r o n s i ,  Gommanuer o f  t h e  a rm y, a  s o l d i e r  o f  
l o n g  s e r v i c e  and  w i t h  a p r o f e s s i o n a l  s o l d i e r ’ s a t t i t u d e
1 .  P o s t ,  K. o p . c i t .  p p . 57-8'
2 .  i b i d .
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to p o l i t i c s .  He was p la ced  <j>n a p o s i t i o n  not o f  h i s  own 
making, and h i s  army was on t h in  ground i n  a country  
lime A lg e r ia ' s  s i z e . ^  He th e r e fo r e  had to  r e l y  on 
the c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  fo r  the  a d m in is tr a t io n  o f  the cou n try .
His top a d v ise r s  in c lu d ed  people l i k e  M essrs .
F .u .  Nwokedi (Permanent Secretary  in  the Ivlinistryjbf 
External A f f a i r s )  and A.A Ayida (Permanent S ecr e ta ry  
i n  the m in is try  of Economic Development), General I r o n s i  
s e t  up various  committees to review the c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  the  
structure of the educational system, the r e s t r u c t u r i n g  
o f  the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  and the fu ture  economic development,  
to  mention the most important.  The members o f  th e s e  
committees were a l l  c i v i l  serva n ts  and academics . As p o l i ­
t i c i a n s  were a s s o c ia te d  w ith  a d i s c r e d i t e d  regim e, none were 
included  in  any o f  th ese  com m ittees . Indeed a decree  
had been i s s u e d  banning a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and t r i b a l  
o r g a n is a t io n s .  The c o n s t i t u t i o n  was suspended.
Among the measures proposed by General I r o n s i
the  u n i f ic a t io n -D e c r e e  announted dm Ha, 24 ,  1966 c r e a te d
the sharpest r e a c t io n  in  the fo r th ,  where d is tu r b a n c e s
occurred on Llay 29 • Ihe background o f  th e s e  d is tu r b a n c e s
1 .  The s i z e  of the army i s  9 ,000  p lu s  24*0-00 p o l i c e  
in  a p opu la t ion  of over 50*000,000.
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and o f  th e  t r a g i c  e v e n t s  o f  J u ly  and Septem ber 1966  i n
which thousands were massacred i s  not e n t i r e l y  c l e a r  y e t .
The events  of July in v o lv ed  the kidnapping and death
o f  General I r o n s i , and th e  death of  majiy ib o s  r e s i d i n g
in  the north .  They a l s o  produced a counter-coup  which
i n s t a l l e d  C ol.  Yakubu Go wan to  head a new m i l i t a r y
government in  I r o n s i 1s p la c e .  Col. Gowan i s  d e sc r ib e d  
<xoy^publicat ion  of the n a t io n a l  m i l i t a r y  government as  "a 
s o ld i e r  r e l u c t a r t l y  in  government" and as  a " th irdy-one  
year o ld  son of a humble C h r is t ia n  e v a n g e l i s t  o f  the  
Church Missionary S o c ie ty  in  Zaria."^ The same 
p u b l ic a t io n  makes re fere n c e  to  other f a c t o r s  o th er  than  
the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  u n i f i c a t i o n  requ ired  by the U n i f i c a t i o n  
$rsffcioe>tpgr as giving- r i s e  to  the d is tu r b a n c e s .  Reference  
i s  made to the part p layed  by " lo ca l  p e t t y  c o n tr a c to r s  
and party fu n c t io n a r ie s  whose l i v e l i h o o d  depenued 
s o l e l y  on p o l i t i c a l  party  patronage. . . "  I t  i s  c la im ed  
th a t  such elements were the hardest h i t  by the change  
in  ohe government, e s p e c i a l l y  those  in debted  to  the  
Northern Marketing Board and the Northern A lg e r ia n
1 .  N iger ia  1966 l o c .  c i t . p . 57*
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Development Corporation were made to pa„ up t h e i r
a rrears .  They thus r e s o r te d  to whispering  campaigns and 
1
i n c i t e m e n t .
A fter  the Hay d isturbances  an uneasy calm
s e t t l e d  in  the country. The atmosphere was charged w ith
te n s io n  and mutual s u s p ic io n  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  th e  army.
" P o l i t i c a l"  r iv a lr y  w i th in  the army had assumed la r g e r
dimensions. The e t h n ic - r e g io n a l  fa c to r  had a s s e r t e d
i t s e l f  as predominant, and entered  the ranks o f  the
army. I t  i s  claimed, fo r  example, th a t  r e g u la r  channels
•tk&,
o f  communications ( in  which the e f f i c a c y ^ c h a in  o f  command
depends) were being bypassed in  the t r a n s m is s io n  o f  
2i n s  t r u e t i o n s .
The d e t a i l s  o f  the var iou s  i n c i d e n t s  which l e d  
t o  the July and September massacre as w e l l  as th e  kidnap
3and death o f  General I r o n s i  have n o tseen  g iv e n  y e t .
In u h e  meantime, a f t e r  a s t e a d i l y  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  
r e l a t i o n  between the c e n t r a l  m i l i t a r y  government and 
the  Eastern government of Col.  ©jukwu, r e s u l t i n g  from the
1 .  i b i d ,  p p . 8 - 9
2 .  ib id ,  p . 9-
3 .  The JTentral government has promised to  i s s u e  a white  
paper s e t t i n g  out a l l  the d e t a i l s .
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July  and September events  attempts were made to  s e t t l e  
d i f fe r e n c e s *  In the h ast  the problem cf /d isp laced
1
lo o s  coming mainly from the North was very gra ve .
Then the Aburri meeting was h e ld  to i r y  to s o lv e  the  
problem of the fu ture  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s tru c tu r e  N ig e r ia  
should take -  the c e n t r e -r e g io n  r e l a t i o n s h i p , the  p o s i t i o n  
o f  the c e n tr a l  government in  r e l a t i o n  to  the r e g io n s )  
the com posit ion  and fu n c t io n  of the N ationa l  Army e t c .
Butjthe Aburri "agreement1 did not r e s o lv e  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  -  
each gave a d i f f e r e n t  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  to  / i t  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
to  the fu tu re  of the northern soldiery's  s t a t i o n e d  i n  the  
south .
Chatfges and count e r - c ^ a ^ e s  o f  bad f a i t h
fo l lo w ed ;  th^se were fo l lo w e d  by th r e a ts  o f  s e c e s s i o n
or charges o f  £uch t h r e a t s  which were m ostly  den ied
2but were sometimes confirmed c o n d i t i o n a l l y •
1* I t  was claimed by the government ox the East th a t  as  
many as one m i l l i o n  and e ig h t  hundred thousand Ibos  
have returned to the East lea v in g  t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s .
2 .  Ojukwu had declared th a t  the East would only  secede  
i f  a ttacked  or blockaded. Cf. Y/est|A.frica, A ^ r i l  15 ,
1967, p . 507.
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Then the  Western re g io n  jo in ed  in  th e  demand fo r  th e  w ith ­
drawal o f n o rth e rn  s o ld ie r s  from i t s  reg ion*  This was soon 
follow ed by a se c e ss io n  of th e  E ast and the  d e c la r a t io n  o f  
a new s ta t e  -  B ia f ra . This i s  how m a tte rs  s tan d  now, w ith  
the  c e n tra l  m il i ta ry  government determ ined to  “c ru sh  th e  
r e b e l l io n ” and w ith  th e  new s ta te  determ ined  to  r e s i s t  such 
a t ta c k  would be fo o lh ard y  to  prophesy on th e  outcome* But 
one th in g  i s  c le a r ;  th e  people who have c re a te d  t h i s  new 
s ta te  speak and behave l ik e  men who have faced  d e a th , and 
w ith such people th e re  i s  a n a tu ra l tendency  to  go th e  whole 
hog, in  any such conflict. By a curious iro n y , th is f e e l in g  
o f having faced  dea th  and th e re fo re  in  a sense r e a l l y  l iv e d  
h is to ry  u su a lly  c h a ra c te r is e s  the  mood o f an army o r  a  se c ­
t io n  o f i t  befo re  i t  dec ides to  in te rv e n e  in  p o l i t i c s  -  to  
remove p o l i t i c i a n s ,  who, i t  f e e l s ,  have l iv e d  o f f  th e  la n d , 
w hile i t  faced  dea th  " in  th e  fro n t l i n e s ” . But th e  p a r a l l e l  
should no t be drawn too  far* A s o lu tio n  to  th e  c o n f l i c t  in  
N ig eria  i s  eag erly  aw aited  perhaps by a l l  A fr ic a , as  the: 
outcome may have im p lic a tio n s  which ex tend  beyond th e  
N igerian  f r o n t i e r s .
( iv )  Ghana
In  Ghana p re s id e n t Kwame Nkrumah was overthrow n 
»
by a m i l i ta ry  coup on February 24, 1966, w h ile  he was 
away on s ta te  v i s i t  in  China. The s to ry  o f th e  coup h as 
heen  to ld  by one o f th e  o rg a n ise rs , C ol. A frifa.*^
1. A. A. A frifa , o p .c i t .
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A c c o rd in g  t o  A f r i f a ,  t h e  coup  was p l a n n e d  a n d  c a r r i e d  o u t  
by t u r n i n g  a  t e s t  e x e r c i s e  o r d e r e d  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  
R h o \ d e s i a  i n t o  a  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
Nkrumah, s g o v e r n m e n t .  A f r i f a  e x p l a i n s  t h a t  s i n c e  Nov.
1965 ( a f t e r  UDI) the Ghana army had been i n  a h ig h  s t a t e  
o f  read in ess  to move in to  Rhodesia at short n o t i c e .
"We e x p l o i t e d  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n "  he s a y s  " t o  d e c e i v e  t h e  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  s y s t e m . " ^
The coup  was m a s t e r - m i n d e d  by C o l .  ( l a t e r  m a j o r -  
g e n e r a l )  Emanuel hotoka, who was a  brigade commander i n  
t h e  Ghana a rm y .  K o to k a  an d  h i s  f e l l o w - c o n s p i r a t o r s  
b r o u g h t  t h e  p o l i c e  c h i e f ,  i n s p e c t o r - g e n e r a l  J . K .  H a r l l e y ,  
i n t o  t h e  p la n n in g - .  B ut  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  coup  was 
c a r r i e d  o u t  by k o t o k a ' s  b r i g a d e .  The v i t a l  o p e r a t i o n  
was l e d  by C o l .  A f r i f a ,  who s e c u r e d  t h e  r a d i o  s t a t i o n .  
A f r i f a  r e c o u n t s  howAd i d  t h i s  w i t h  e i g h t  men, w h i l e  116 
men en g a g e d  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  g u a r d  a t  f l a g s t a f f  H ouse  
w h ic h  l a y  on  t h e  way t o  t h e  r a d i o  s t a t i o n  a n d  w h i c h  c o u l d  
n o t  be s e c u r e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  Commander o f  t h e  G u a r d ,  C o l .  
Z a n e r i g u ,  h a d  m anaged t o  e s c a p e  a n d  a l e r t  h i s  men.
1.  i b i d ,  p . 32.
The g u a r d  g av e  i n  a f t e r  a  f i g h t  l a s t i n g  two d a y s .
C o l .  K o to k a  a n n o u n c e d  t h e  coup d ' e t a t  o v e r  
t h e  r a d i o  a s  f o l l o w s :  " f e l l o w  c i t i z e n s  o f  G hana ,  I  h a v e
come t o  i n f o r m  you  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y ,  i n  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  
t h e  Ghana p o l i c e ,  have  t a k e n  o v e r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  Ghana
t o d a y .  The myth s u r r o u n d i n g  Nkrumah i s  b r o k e n .
P a r l i a m e n t  i s  d i s s o l v e d  a n d  Kwame Nkrumah i s  d i s m i s s e d  
f ro m  o f f i c e .  A l l  m i n i s t e r s  a r e  a l s o  d i s m i s s e d .  The 
C o n v e n t i o n  P e o p l e s  P a r t y  i s  d i s b a n d e d  w i t h  e f f e c t  f ro m  
now. I t  w i l l  b§ i l l e g a l  f o r  any  p e r s o n  t o  b e l o n g  t o  i t . . . " 1 
T h i s  was f o l l o w e d  by o t h e r  m e s s a g e s .  The e v e n t  was
g r e e t e d  w i t h  some d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  r e l i e f  on t h e  p a r t  o f
a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  A c c r a  p o p u l a t i o n .  The 
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h o s e  who t o o k  p a r t  i n  t h e  j o y o u s  demon­
s t r a t i o n  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h .  B u t  w h a t  c a n n o t  be  
d i s p u t e d  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  no c i v i l i a n  r e s i s t a n c e  e x p r e s s e d  
i t s e l f  i n  any  fo rm .
A r e v ie w  o f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  com m ents  p u b l i s h e d  
o r  u t t e r e d  on t h e  Ghana r a d i o  shows a n  a r r a y  o f  " r e a s o n s "  
g i v e n  t o  i j u s t i f y  t h e  o v e r t h r o w  o f  P r e s i d e n t  Nkrumah a n d  
h i s  g o v e r n m e n t .  One o f  t h e  e a r l i e s t  b r o a d c a s t s  f o l l o w i n g  
K o t o k a ’ s announcem ent  s t a t e d :  "The c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f
1 .  i b i d ,  p p .3 4 -5 «
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power in  the hands o f  one man has l e d  to the abuse o f
in d iv id u a l  r ig h t s  andfliberty • Power has been e x e r c i s e d
by the former p res id en t  c a p r i c i o u s l y .  The o p e r a t io n  o f
the laws has been suspended to  the advantage o f  h i s
f a v o u r i t e s  and he has been running the country as  h i s
1
own personal  p rop erty . '1 General Ankrah, Chairman o f
the N ational  L ib era t io n  Council  fo l lo w ed  t h i s  by a
statement on Peb. 28: " . . . t h e  r ig h t  o f  the  peop le  to
vote at a f r e e  gen era l  e l e c t i o n  fo r  t h e i r  own chosen
candidates  was reduced to & formal u n p r a c t ic a l  p r i v i l e g e
o f  san ct ion in g  the e l e c t i o n  o f  such ca n d id a tes  as Kwame
Nkrumah h im se l f  nominated. His lo ve  fo r  the  arbivnary
use o f  p o w e r . . .  l e d  him to  w h i t t l e  away g ra d u a l ly  the
independence o f  the Ju d ic ia r y  and to  suppress  academic 
2freed om .. ."  The same broadcast a l s o  s t a t e d  th a t  too  
much money was spent to  m aintain  a la r g e  fo r c e  o f  s e c u r i t y  
o f f i c e r s  to  secure Nkrumah*s personal  s a f e t y .  Reference  
i s  a lso  made to  the es tab l ishm en t  o f  a "pr ivate  army" at  
an annual c o s t  of  £500 ,000  as a c o u n te r -p o is e  to  the  
Ghana armed f o r c e s .  And again ,  there  was a charge o f  
"mismanagement, waste and unwise spending."
1. Radio Accra announcement by the army 24 Peb. 1966.
2 .  General Ankraih s b road cast ,  Peb. 2b, 1966.
Many more charges  and comments fo l lo w e d ,  and not
l e s s  than f i f t e e n  commissions of  enquiry were s e t  up to
i n v e s t i g a t e  every f a c e t  o f  the a c t i v i t y  o f  Nkrumah1s
government. Even i f  one were to q uest ion  the  v a l i d i t y
of  some of the  ch arges ,  n o n e th e le s s ,  i t  can he assumed
th a t  th ose  who made th e s e  charges b e l ie v e d  them to  be
w e l l - fo u n d e d .  I t  would be u n j u s t i f ia b l e  to  d ism is s  them
as mere post-cou p  " p u b l ic -r e la t io n "  s tu n t .  For th ey
would o f f e r  a c lu e  to  an unaerstanding o f  the c a u s e s .
F in a l  judgement must be postponed u n t i l  the  f u l l  r e p o r t s
o f  the Commissions are p ub lished .  At any r a t e ,  a d e t a i l e d
c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  such i s  not w ith in  the scope o f  the
p resen t  enquiry .^
Many "reasons" are g iven  as the cause o f  the
coup -  g iv e n  o f f i c i a l l y ,  or by in d iv id u a l  commentators.
One commentator, r e i t e r a t i n g  the charges made by General
Ankrah added th at  c a n d id a te s  were handpicked by Nkrumah
and the c e n t r a l  committee of the CPP and "forced down
the u n w i l l in g  th r o a t s  o f  the e l e c to r a te " .  He concluded
1 .  Por an i l lu m i n a t i n g  study on some o f  the h i s t o r i c a l  
soc io -econom ic  f o r c e s  which were at xhe roo t  o f  
the f a i l u r e  of  Nkrumah* s regime c f .  b .  F i t c h  and 
M. Oppenheimer: Ghana: End of an I l l u s i o n  (New
York and London, 1 9 6 6 . )
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by saying’ 11 the b la ta n t  d isp la y  o f  t h i s  t r i c k e r y  l a s t  
June ( 1 9 6 5 ) . . .must be accounted one o f  the d i r e c t  ca u ses  
o f  l a s t  week’ s overthrow of the  corrupt regime.""*’
2More "reasons" are su pp lied  by C o l .  A f r i f a .
The c r i t i c i s m s  l e v e l l e d  a g a in s t  the Nkrumah government,  
charged as they are w ith  emotional c o n te n t ,  cannot be 
passed unnoted, because t h e i r  are i n d i c e s  o f  what went 
wrong’. A f r i f a  r e f e r s ,  fo r  example, to  the s u f f e r i n g  
o f  the people on the o a s i s  of  h i s  own o b s e r v a t io n .  He 
has w r it ten :  "I came from the v i l l a g e ,  and I know th e  
s u f f e r in g s  o f  my p eo p le .  There were in s t a n c e s  when even  
s a l t  was in  short supply . Sugar and milk were nowhere 
to  be seen .  No drugs could  be found to  cux’e the  s i c k . . .  
Accra i s  organised  in  such a way as to  g iv e  an im p ress io n  
o f  happiness and a f f lu e n c e ;  there  were new s t r e e t s  and 
new l i g h t s ,  while  v a s t  areas  o f  t h i s  country were p la n te d  
with  misery and s u f f e r i n g . . . . I became convinced  th a t  
Nnrumah had f a i l e d  the nauion. I had not l i k e d  th e  man 
s in ce  he imposed h i s  party  on the country.  I ag a in  
resumed my thoughts  about a coup.'1 The p en u lt im a te
1 .  Eadio Accra, 1 March, 1 9 6 6 .
2. A.A. A f r i f a ,  o p . c i t .
sentence  i s  r e v e a l in g  as to  the mixed nature o f  
m o tiv a t io n  for  a coup. I t  i s  not p o s s ib l e  to  say which o f
the two reasons  -  i . e .  the n a t io n a l  sh o rta ge ,  and the
im p o s i t io n  o f  one-party r u le  -  weighed more h e a v i l y  i n  
the d e c i s io n  about a co u p . .  P o s s ib ly  the two are i n t e r ­
r e la t e d .  Again A fr i fa  complains of the su p p re ss io n  o f  
human r i g h t s .  In a statement g iv en  in  an in t e r v i e w  to  
the  London Observer, soon a f t e r  the coup, A f r i f a  s a id :  
"We've l i v e d  in  B r i ta in  b efore ,  and th e r e fo r e  d i d n ' t  
l i k e  t h i s  d ic t a t o r s h ip .  There was no freedom o f  the  
p ress  or o f  the in d iv id u a l  -  th in g s  we know are funda­
mental human r ig h t s ."  In the same in te r v ie w  A f r i f a
a l s o  s ta t e d  th a t  Nkrumah introduced party p o l i t i c s  i n t o  
the  army -  He went on: "He took a man w ith  no t r a i n i n g
as an o f f i c e r ,  a fir. Hassan, appointed  him a b r ig a d ie r  
and put him in  charge ox m i l i t a r y  i n t e l l i g e n c e . Here 
we had a s i t u a t i o n  in  which mess corp o ra ls  were watching  
commanding o f f i c e r s  and r e p o r t in g  them. What g r e a t e r  
inshft to our i n t e l l i g e n c e  and p a t r i o t i s m . ” *^
1 .  The Observer, March 13, 1966.
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Here, in  the l a s t  remark, we have a c l u e  to  the  
most important factory  which i s  exp la ined  here i n  terms  
o f  pride and p a tr io t i sm ,  undoubtedly no c i v i l i a n  
p o l i t i c i a n  has a monopoly o f  pride or p a tr io t i s m ;  the  
army has i t s  share o f  both .  Hut behind t h i s  th e r e  
l i e s  a more profound reason -  group i n t e r e s t .  The 
r e f l e c t i o n s  of  Col, A f r i f a  provide an in v a lu a b le  m a te r ia l  
f o r  a study of the m o t iv a t io n  o f  army o f f i c e r s  who l e a d  
coups d ' e t a t .  To an independent^ observer he p roves  
that the motives of a coup are not as simple and c l e a r  
cut as the f i r s t  u t tera n ces  o f  coup le a d e r s  t r y  to  make 
o u t .  A f r i f a  makes r e fe r e n c e ,  f o r  example, to  s tandards  
l e a r n t  at Sandhurst. His v iew s on the r o le  o f  th e  army 
c.nd i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  the p o l i t i c a l  head and to  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  r e v e a ls  the in f lu e n c e  o f  h i s  ed u c a t io n a l  background 
at  Sandhurst. But it^ C would be a mistake to  a t t r i b u t e  
h i s  conduct and that  o f  h i s  f e l l o w  c o n s p ir a to r s  s o l e l y  
tc/an e s o te r ic  p r o fe s s io n a l i s m  imbibed at m e tr o p o l i ta n  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  of 1 earning; though th ese  have t h e i r  sh a re .
A fr i fa ,  in  f a c t ,  r e p r e s e n ts  a new p r o f e s s i o n a l  
( e l i t e )  c l a s s  whose t r a in i n g  has been in f lu e n c e d  by 
m etrop o l i tan  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and v a lu e s .  This new c l a s s  
has an i n t e r e s t  to  p rese rv e .  The Off and the
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p o l i t i c i a n s  leaders  of the  CfP^  presented  a th r e a t  to  
th a t  i n t e r e s t .  The recurrent  theme in  A f r i f a 1s 
r e f l e c t i o n s  i s  the G-hana army as a corporate  group whose 
e f f i c i e n c y  and pride ,  and (above a l l )  -  i n t e g r i t y  was 
th rea ten ed  by p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e s .  "The Ghanaian 
s o ld i e r " ,  he w r ite s ,  " is  one of the f i n e s t  i n  th e  world .
He i s  g e n t l e ,  k ind-hearted ,  sym pathetic ,  and r e s o l u t e .
. . .  .The m ater ia l  to make the G-hana army form idab le  i s  
available*. We have the men. I always want to  remain 
w ith  the toops; the very s ig h t  o f  them g i v e s  me s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n .  These are the men fo r  whom above a l l  e l s e  
t h e i r  country comes f i r s t .  These are the men who made 
up the G-hana army during Kwame Nkrumah* s regim e.
Becuase of bad planning, economic mismanagement and 
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e , t h i s  army was rendered in c a p a b le ,  
i l l - e q u i p p e d ,  and had v i r t u a l l y  been reduced to  a rabble."'*" 
T his  wounded p r o fe s s io n a l  pr id e  i s  sometime^ mixed w ith  
other sen t im ents .  On the su b jec t  of Anodesia, fo r  
i n s t a n c e ,  A fr i fa  v o lu n te e r s  an opinion thus: "I
p e r s o n a l ly  know that Her m a je s ty ’ s Government was q u i te  
capable  of dea ling  w ith  the Rhodesian s i t u a t i o n .  I f e l t
1 .  The Ghana Coup. p . 1 0 3 .
th a t  Nkrumah was making too  much n o ise  about the whole
i s s u e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  by r a i s i n g  the peoples* m i l i t i a  and
h ur l in g  s logans  at everybody as  i f  Rhodesia was h i s
concern a lone ."  He goes  on: "But Nkrumah was a f a n a t i c
and i t  was wrong to  take  him fo r  gran ted .  We knew
he was capable o f  making d e c i s io n s  of  any n a tu re .
Prom concern fo r  my troop s  I f e l t  ct  ^ would be c r im in a l
and p urpose less  to  le a d  such an army of e x c e l l e n t  s o l d i e r s
i l l - e q u i p p e d ,  to f i g h t  an unnecessary w a r .11'*'
He had s im i la r  m isg iv in g s  on the Congo
o p era t io n .  He complained of in t e r f e r e n c e  by p o l i t i c i a n s ,
and in  particular^ by Nkrumah in  m i l i t a r y  m a t te r s .
V1 s ta r te d  asking h im self"he muses, "what had gone wrong.
We had l o s t  l i v e s  in  a s t r u g g le  th a t  was not ours ,  i n  a
cause th a t  was not ours.  I was at ohe very b eg in n in g o f
my career ,  and perhaps not w e l l -eq u ip p ed  to  grasp the
s i t u a t i o n .  I f e l t  that  g en era l  Alexander, the  commanding
o f f i c e r  was q u ite  capable o fhandling  the s i t u a t i o n  i f
2only our p o l i t i c i a n s  l e f t  him a lon e ."  Yes, in deed ,  he 
was not w el l -equ ipped  to  grasp the s i t u a t i o n  o f  th e  Congo 
which was not only a m i l i t a r y  arena, as he saw i t  but a 
p o l i t i c a l  arena in v o lv in g  in t e r n a t io n a l  power p o l i t i c s . ^
1. ib id ,  p . 105*
2. ib id ,  p p .70-71 .
3. Cf. Nkrumah* s  l a t e s t  book: Challenge o f  the  Congo
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  he m is s e d  t h e  c e n t r a l  p o i n t
about the Congo and th at  he did not share th e  v iew s  o f
h i s  head o f  S tate  and th o se  o f  the A fr ican  l e a d e r s  who
1had the same approach.
I t  i s  a l so  c l e a r  th at  ‘Chose and s i m i l a r  
r e f l e c t i o n s  o f  A fr i fa  are not those  o f  an o f f i c e r  who 
saw h is  duty as 1 not to  q u es t io n  why, but to  do and d ie ."  
A d m it t e d ly ,  the Congo exper ience  was a f r u s t r a t i n g  
experience to any i n t e l l i g e n t  and s e n s i t i v e  person  l ik e .  
Afrifa* but that was not in i t s e l f  s u f f i c ie n t  to  i n s t i l  
i n  the mind of a young o f f i c e r  thoughts o f  a coup.
I t  must be seen together  with the whole s i t u a t i o n  in  
G-hana and with p o s i t i o n  o f  the army and o f  o f f i c e r s  l i k e  
A f r i f a  in  that  s i t u a t i o n .  Again the way th ey  see  t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n  v i s - a - v i s  the whole Ghana s i t u a t i o n  would be 
in f lu e n c ed  by t h e i r  ed u cat ion a l  background, as  w e l l  as  by 
t h e i r  s o c i a l  background i n  G-hana.
1 .  On the quest ion  o f  the  Congo and the r o l e  o f  Ghana 
in  i t ,  I t  i s  worth nothing that  P res id en t  Nkrumah 
fo l low ed  a moderate course between the Casablanca  
S ta te s  who withdrew t h e i r  troops  and the Idonrovia
group which supported the UN continued p r e se n c e .  
NKrumah's (English) commander, General Alexander  
commended h i s  d e c i s io n  in  keeping the Ghana c o n t in g en t  
under UN command. Cf.  Alexander, o p . c i t .
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The s i t u a t i o n  was c o m p l i c a t e d  by  t h e  r o l e  o f  
t h e  CPP. The CPP w h ic h  h a d  l o s t  i t s  p o p u l a r i t y  l o n g  
b e f o r e  t h e  coup h a d  made a t t e m p t s  t o  i n d o c t r i n a t e  t h e  
G-hana army w i t h  Nkrumaism w h ich  t h e  army r e s e n t e d .
A b r a n c h  o f  t h e  p a r r y  was o p e n e d  a t  t h e  T e s h i  M i l i t a r y  
Academy f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e ,  and  o f f i c e r s  w e re  r e q u i r e d  t o  
j o i n  t h e  p a r t y .  A f r i f a  e x p l a i n s  t h a t  lie r e f u s e d  t o  f i l l  
t h e  fo rm  " on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t h e  army m u s t  b e  a b o v e  
p o l i t i c s ' 1, and  he g o e s  on " t h e  army and  t h e  p o l i c e  a r e  
t h e  c u s t o d i a n s  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ’ s  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I f  t h e  
army was made t o  i d e n t i f y  i t s e l f  o p e n ly  w i t h  t h e  GPP 
a n d  i t s  i d e o l o g y ,  i t  was bound  t o  l o s e  i t s  s e l f  r e s p e c t  
a n d  in d e p e n d e n c e  o f  o u t l o o k . "
I n  p o i n t  o f  f a c t  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  army a s  
c u s t o d i a n  o f  t h e  n a t i o n *  s c o n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  a s  b e i n g  a b o v e  
p o l i t i c s  i s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  i n  c o n c e p t i o n .  I f  t h e  a r m y ' s  
r o l e  i s  c o n c e i v e d  a s  a  c u s t o d i a n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i t  
c a n n o t  be  i n s u l a t e d  f ro m  p o l i t i c s .  O f f i c e r s  l i k e  C o l .  
A f r i f a  " p a r t i c i p a t e "  i n  p o l i t i c s  i n  s p i t e  o f  w h a t  
t h e v. say  a b o u t  t h e  a r m y ' s  r o l e  b e i n g  a b o v e  p o l i t i c s .  T h e i r  
" p a r t i c i p a t i o n "  may be  n e g a t i v e l y ^ x p r e s s e d  i h  t h e  s e n s e  
o f  a  r e j e c t i o n  o f  CPP s l o g a n s  o r  even  s e r i o u s  p ro g ra m m e s .
As s t a t e d  b e f o r e ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  i l l s  o f  s o c i e t y  a f f e c t  them
i n  one way o r  a n o t h e r  a n d  t h e y  r e a c t  t o  t h e s e  p o s i t i v e l y
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o r  n e g a t iv e ly *  Moreover i f  th e  a rm y 's  r o l e  i s  s e e n  a s
c u s t o d i a n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n * -  i n  t h e  G-hana s i t u a t i o n
t h e r e  w o u ld  have  b e e n  a  b u i l t - i n  r i v a l r y  b e t w e e n  t h e
army an d  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  r e p u b l i c  who i s  d e c l a r e d  t o
be t h e  g u a r d i a n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  A g ro u p ^v h ich  saw
i t s  r o l e  a s  c u s t o d i a n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  w o u ld
i n e v i t a b l y  s e e #  " b e t r a y a l  o f  t r u s t "  w r i t t e n  a c r o s s  any
p o l i t i c a l  a c t  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  w h e n e v e r  s u c h  a c t  d i s p l e a s e d
i t  f o r  some r e a s o n  o r  o t h e r .  T h e re  i s  t h u s  a  g a p  b e t w e e n
t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  army a s  b e i n g  above  p o l i t i c s  a n d  a s
c u s t o d i a n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n *
I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  CPP an d  nk rum ah  h i m s e l f
c o m m i t t e d  a  s e r i a l s  o f  a c t s  w h ic h  t h r e a t e n e d  t h e
cj
i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  army a s  a  g r o u p .  d i s m is s o f i / jC o l  •
(now (3-eneral) A nkrah  who was p o p u l a r  i n  t h e  army i s  one 
e x a m p le .  The a p p o i n tm e n t  o f  C o l .  H a ss an  a s  d i r e c t o r  
o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  i n t e l l i g e n c e  i s  a n o t h e r .  On t h e  i n t e r ­
f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  CPP w i t h  t h e  army A f r i f a  w r i t e s :  " t h e
army was v i r t u a l l y  a t  t h e  m ercy  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s  who
1
t r e a t e d  i t  w i t h  a r r o g a n c e  an d  o p en  c o n t e m p t . 11
A g a in  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  g u a r d s  n o t  o n l y
a s  a  c o u n t e r - p o i s e  b u t  a s  a f a v o u r e d  army u n i t  was
1 .  o p . c i t .  p . 100.
54tf.
d e e p l y  r e s e n t e d ,  a s  w i t n e s s  t h e s e  w o rd s :  "we w e re  a l s o
aw a re  t h a t  members o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t s  own g u a r d  r e g i m e n t  
w e re  r e c e i v i n g  k i n g l y  t r e a t m e n t .  T h e i r  p ay  was h i g h e r  
a n d  i t  was an  open f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  p o s s e s s e d  b e t t e r  
e q u i p m e n t .  The men who h ad  b e e n  t r a n s f e r r e d  f ro m  t h e  
r e g u l a r  army no l o n g e r  owed any  a l l e g i a n c e  a n d  l o y a l t y  
t o  t h e  c h i e f  o f  d e f e n c e  s t a f f ,  b u t  t o  kwame Nkrumah 
who h ad  become t h e i r  commanding o f f i c e r . ' 1^  A p o l i c y  
o f  c a l c u l a t e d  b a l a n c e  w i t h i n  t h e  arm ed  f o r c e s  seem s  t o  
h a v e  b e e n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
g u a r d  T h i s  c r e a t e d  m i s t r u s t  w i t h o u t  a c h i e v i n g  i t s  
p u r p o s e .
However,  #o d i v i s i o n  b a s e d  on e t h n i c  b a l a n c e  was
p r a c t i s e d .  Nor was t h e  " t r i b a l "  q u e s t i o n  i n v o l v e d  a s  a
c r i t i c a l  f a c t o r  i n  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  t h e  Ghana c o u p .  W e s t e r n
o b s e r v e r s  h a v e  g r e a t l y  e x a g g e r a t e d  t h e  " t r i b a l 11 f a c t o r .
When t h e  coup  to o k  p l a c e ,  t h e  f i r s t  j o u r n a l i s t i c  r e a c t i o n
w as  t h a t  i t  was on A s h a n t i  c o u p ,  b e c a u s e  K o t o k a * s
b r i g a d e  was s t a t i o n e d  i n  K um as i .  B u t ,  a s  A f r i f a ( h i m s e l f
a n  A s h a n t i )  r e m a rk s  " t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  c o r r e c t  t o  t h e
e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  coup  was p l a n n e d  i n  Kuinasi by C o l .  K o t o k a ,
M r.  H a r l l e y  an d  h i e s e l f .  But  C o l .  K o to k a  a n d  Mr.
H a r l l e y  a r e  n o t  A s h a n t i s .  The A s h a n t i s  a n d  t h e  Ewes,
2t h e i r  t r i b e s ,  a r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t r a d i t i o n a l  a l l i e s . "
1 .  i b i d .
2 .  o p . c i t .  p . 33 .
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A f a r  more s e r i o u s  q u e s t i o n  was Nkrumah* s  • 
u e e i s i o n  t o  se n d  c a d e t s  t o  E a s t e r n  E urope  f o r  m i l i t a r y  
t r a i n i n g .  T h i s  was s e r i o u s  f ro m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  
a W e s t e r n - t r a i n e d  o f f i c e r  c o r p  w h ich  f e l t  i t s  f u t u r e  
p o s i t i o n  t h r e a t e n e d .  G e n e r a l  A l e x a n d e r  h a s  w r i t t e n  t h a t  
he had  w a rn e d  Nkrumah t h a t  t h i s  w ou ld  s p l i t  t h e  o f f i c e r
l
c o r p s  o f  t h e  Ghana arrny i n t o  two cam ps.  H i s  o p p o s i ­
t i o n  t o  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  c a u s e d  Nkrumah on S e p t .  2 2 ,  l y 6 l  
t o  d i s m i s s  G e n e ra j jA le x a n d e r  and  t h e  o t h e r  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s  
who were  i n  t h e  Ghana a rm y .  I t  i s  now known t h a t  t h e  
G h a n a ia n  o f f i c e r s  h ad  b e e n  b e h i n d  g e n e r a l  A l e x a n d e r  a n d  
t h a t  t h e y  h a d  b e e n  p l o t t i n g  Nkrumah* s o v e r t h r o w  s i n c e  
1 9 6 1 .  The G h an a ia n  o f f i c e r s *  s u p p o r t  o f  G e n e r a l  
A l e x a n d e r  a n d  t h e i r  b i t t e r  c o n d e m n a t io n  o f  Nkrumah* s  
d e c i s i o n  t o  s e n d  c a d e t s  t o  E a s t e r n  E u ro p e  s h o u l d  b e  s e e n  
not;  o n ly  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e i r  e d u c a t i o n a l  b a c k g r o u n d ,  
b u t  i n  t e r m s  o f  how t h e y  saw i t  a s  a  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  
c o r p o r a t e  u n i t y  o f  t h e i r  g r o u p .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  i g n o r e
1 .  A l e x a n d e r ,  o p . c i t .  p . 9 2 .
2 .  c f .  P r e s s  r e l e a s e  No. 4 Ghana I n f o r m a t i o n  S e r v i c e ,
March 1 ,  1966 .  i n  t h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
r u l e r s  b i t t e r l y  condemn Nkrumah*s d e c i s i o n  t o  s e n d  
c a d e t s  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  U n io n .
5 4 2 .
o r  unuerestimate t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  o t n e r  f a c t o r s ,  
a n d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  some o f  txxe m e th o d s  ox t h e  GPP 
i n c l u d i n g  i n t i m i d a t i o n  w h ic h  a t  t i m e s  d e g e n e r a t e d  i n t o  
t h u g g e r y .
I n d e e d  t h e  i n t e r n a l  p r o b l e m s  o f  Ghana w e re
p r o j e c t e d  o n to  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s c e n e  i n  t h e  m in d s  o f  
cijjfi cl rs .
t n e  army To some o f  them N n ru m a h 's  a d v o c a c y
o f  A f r i c a n  u n i t y  an d  h i s  s u p p o r t  o f  A f r i c a n  l i b e r a t i o n  
movements  seemed c h i m e r i c a l  v i e w e d  w i t h  t h e  s p e c t a c l e  o f  
G h a n a ia n  p r o b l e m s .  The p r e s t i g e  o f  Nkrumah w h ic h  was 
h i g h  i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  A f r i c a ,  h ad  gone down i n  t h e  
e y e s  o f  many G h a n a ia n s ,  w h ich  e x p l a i n s  t h e  r e a c t i o n s  o f  
t h e  p o s t - c o u p  p e x i o u . ' L
A f r i f a ,  f o r  ex a m p le ,  condemns N k ru m ah ’ s s t a n d  
o n  A f r i c a n  u n i t y  a t  t h e  OA'U summit c o n f e r e n c e s  a t  A d d i s  
A baba ,  C a i r o  and  A c c r a  a n a  b l a m e s  him f o r  Jaav in^  t a k e n  
upon  h i m s e l f  “ u n i l a t e r a l  m i l i t a r y  p r e p a r a t i o n s  on  a n  
i s s u e  t h a t  a f f e c t e d  t h e  w h o le  C o n t i n e n t  a n d  t h e  common­
w e a l t h . "  He c l a i m s  thfltt Nkrumah became u n p o p u l a r  among
1 .  To my a s t o n i s h m e n t , n o t  one G h a n a ia n  s t u d e n t  t h a t
I  h av e  t a l n e a  t o  i n  E n g l a n d  b o t h  i m m e u i a t e l y  a f t e r  
t h e  coup and  s i n c e  h a s  r a i s e d  a  v o ic e , ,  e v e n  i n  
p r i v a t e  c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  t o  d e f e n d  Nkrumah a g a i n s t  
some o f  t n e  a t t a c x s  made by t h e  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e  o r  
by W e s te rn  P r e s s .
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t h e  Ghana army b e c a u s e  o f  t h i s ,  a n d  c o n c l u d e s  som ewhat 
v i n d i c t i v e l y  w i t h  t h e s e  f a t e f u l  w o rd s :  11 t h e y  r e a l i s e d
t h a t  he was s e n d i n g  them t o  war w i t h o u t  p r o p e r  e q u i p m e n t  
a n d  w i t h o u t  a d e q u a t e  p r e p a r a t i o n .  The moment t h e y  s t a r t e d  
c o m p l a i n i n g  I  knew t h a t  t h e  d ay s  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n  
P e o p l e s  P a r t y  were n u m b e r e d . At t h i s  t im e  i t  becam e 
common c o n v e r s a t i o n  among t h e  o f f i c e r s  a n d  t h e  men t h a t  
m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  N k ru iaah 's  r e g im e  was t h e  o n l y  
s o l u t i o n . " ( i t a l i c s  s u p p l i e d ) . ^
The Ghana s i t u a t i o n  p r e s e n t s  a  c o n t r a s t  t o  
t h e  N i g e r i a n  s i t u a t i o n ^  f ro m  s e v e r a l  a n g l e s .  The c o n t r a s t  
i s  now t h e  s h a r p e s t  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  ox e t h n i c  a n d  r e g i o n a l  
c o n f l i c t ;  N i g e r i a  i s  p l a g u e d  by su c h  c o n f l i c t  w h i c h  i s  
a b s e n t  i n  G hana .  The c o n t r a s t  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  two s t a t e s  
e x i s t e d  b e f o r e  t h e  c o u p s .  N i g e r i a  h a d  a  f e d e r a l  s t r u c t u r e  
w h e re  Ghana was a u n i t a r y  s t a t e .  N i g e r i a  h a d  a  m u l t i ­
p a r t y  s y s t e m  where  Ghana was a  o n e - p a r t y  s t a t e .  N i g e r i a  
h a d  a  b i c a m e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  a n d  a  d u a l  e x e c u t i v e  w h e re  
Ghana h a d  a  u n i - c a m e r a l  n a t i o n a l  a s s e m b l y  a n d  a  m i l i t a r y  
e x e c u t i v e .  At a  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l  -  ao t h e  l e v e l  o f  i d e a s  
a n d  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  -  no two s t a l e s  i n  A f r i c a  c o u l d  
h a v e  b e e n  more o p p o sed  t h a n  t h e  tw o ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e i r
1 .  o p . c i t .  p . 105.
e x t e r n a l  p o l i c i e s .  T h i s  coild be s e e n  i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
o f  t h e  Congo and  R h o d e s i a ,  f o r  e x a m p le .
Prom t h e  p o i n t  o f  v ie w  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  i n q u i r y  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m i l i t a r y  c o u p s  hav e  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  t h e  two 
c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r l i n e s  t n e  p o i n t  made e a r l i e r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
no one s i m p l e  c a u s e  o f  a  coup  d ’ e t a t .  'Whatever t h e  fo rm  
o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  and  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  g r i e v a n c e s  w h i c h  s p a r k  f t % 
o f f  t h e  d i s c o n t e n t  i t  c a n  b e  r e a s o n a b l y  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  ^  
m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  w i l l  be  i n e v i t a b l e ,  u n l e s s  t h e r e  
i s  a  s o l i d  p o p u l a r  b a s e  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  anci a c t i o n  o f  t h e  
g o v e r i i n e n t ,  w i t h  a  s o l i d l y  b u i l t  and  v i a b l e  p o l i t i c a l  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  f i r m l y  r o o t e d  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y .  The o n e -  
p a r t y  s y s te m  i s  one way o f  c r e a t i n g  s u c h  a  s o l i d  b a s e .  B u t  
w h ere  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  h a d  moved f u r t h e r  away f ro m  t h e  s o u r c e  
o f  i t s  pow er ,  d e p e n d in g  e n t i r e l y  o r  c h i e f l y  on i t s  s t a t e  
a p p a r a t u s  o f  c o n t r o l ,  a n d  w here  u n d e r  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
t h e  p a r t y  becom es d i s c r e d i t e d  a s  a  mere a g e n c y  o f  c o n t r o l ,  
m ore  g r i e v a n c e s  w ould  be  c r e a t e d .  And m i l i t a r y  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  w ou ld  n o t  o n l y  b e  i n e v i t a b l e ,  i n  s u c h  a  s i t u a t i o n ,  
b u t  t h e  p e o p l e ,  f a r  f rom  r e s i s t i n g ,  w ould  o r g a n i s e  s t r e e t  
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y .  S u ch  a p p e a r s  
t o  have  b e e n  t h e  c a s e  i n  Ghana.  The t h r e e  d a y s ’ 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  w h ich  f o l l o w e d  t h e  coup may h a v e  b e e n
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o r g a n i s e d  by t h e  new r u l e r s ,  b u t  i t  i s  h a r d  t o  e x p l a i n  
t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  s e c r e t a r i a t  o f  t h e  Ghana t r a d e s  
u n i o n  c o n g r e s s  (w h ich  h ad  r e s i s t e d  wage dem ands f o r  t h e
p a s t  t h r e e  .years  w h i l e  f o o d  p r i c e s  i n c r e a s e d  a s  much
wfwck ij'S  ,
a s  400 p e r  c e n t ) ,  d e c l a r e d  t&sswr s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  newA
r e g i m e .  " I n  t h e  name o f  t h e  w o r k e r s "  t h e  s e c r e t a r i a t  
g r e e t e d  " w i t h  _ , r e a t e s t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h e  d e l i v e r a n c e  o f  
t h e  c o u n t r y  a n d  t h e  end  o f  d i c t a t o r s h i p  a n d  e co n o m ic  
c h a o s . f i t c h  an d  O ppenhe im er  have  com mented  o n  t h e  
a p a t h y  o f  t h e  CPP i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e  coup a s  f o l l o w s :
"The C o n v e n t i o n  P e o p l e s  P a r t y ( C P p )  w i t h  i t s  two 
m i l l i o n  members a n d  5 0 0 ,0 0 0  m i l i t a n t s ,  a l l  
p l e d g e d  by o a t h  t o  s u p p o r t  D r .  Nkruraah, 
o r g a n i s e d  no r e s i s t a n c e  a t  a l l .  The C r r  h a d  
b een  fo u n u e d  i n  1949  when D r .  Nkrumah t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  co m m u n is t s  a n d  m i l i t a n t  n a t i o n a l i s t s  
d e c i d e d  t h a t  o n ly  a  m a s s - b a s e d  p a r t y  c o u l d  
c a r r y  o u t  t h e  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  B r i t i s h  c o l o n ­
i a l i s m .  I n  1956 ,  i t  h e l p e d  l a u n c h  t h e  f i r s t  
g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  i n  s u b - S a h a r a n  A f r i c a .  The 
s t r i k e  f o r c e d  t h e  c o n c e s s i o n s  w hich  b r o u g h t  
D r .  Knrumah f rom  f o r t  Jam es  p r i s o n  t o  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  " L e a d e r  o f  Government B u s i n e s s "  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  p o p u l a r l y  e l e c t e d  p a r l i a m e n t  i n  
C o l o n i a l  A f r i c a .  Now, a f t e r  15 y e a r s  a s  G h a n a ' s  
r u l i n g  p a r t y  The CPr a l l o w e d  i t s e l f  t o  be  
d i s s o l v e d  by a  s i m p l e  d e c r e e  a n n o u n c e d  o v e r  t h e  
r a d i o .  The day a f t e r  t h e  c o u p ,  t h e  g e n e r a l s  
wouftd up t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  CfP by s i m p l y  
a n n o u n c in g  o v e r  r a d i o  Ghana:  ' A l l  p e r s o n s  who
f i n d  t h e m s e l v e s  i n  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  v e h i c l e s  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  t h e  e x - p a r t y ,  t h e  CPI,  a r e  r e q u e s t e d  
t o  r e t u r n  them t o  t h e  n e a r e s t  p o l i c e  s t a t i o n . "2
1 .  c f .  f i t c h  and  O p p en h e im er ,  o p . c i t .  p . 2 .
2 .  o p . c i t .  p p . 2 - 3 .
And t h a t  was t h a t ,  u n t i l  A p r i l  1967 ,  when a n  a t t e m p t  was 
made a t  a  c o u n t e r - c o u p ,  by  y o u n g  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s .
The a t t e m p t  f a i l e d ,  b u t  t h e  young  o f f i c e r s  k i l l e d  G-enera l
T;- lh o to m a .
(v )  Toko
I n  Togo t h e  army t o o k  o v e r  pow er  f ro m  
P r e s i d e n t  G r u n i t s k y  on J a n .  13 1967* i t  w as  l e d  by  
L t .  C o l o n a l  E t i e n n e  Byadema, t h e  c h i e f  o f  s t a f f .
P r e s i d e n t  G r u n i t s k y  a n n o u n c e d  h i s  v o l u n t a r y  w i t h d r a w a l  
f r o m  o f f i c e ,  an d  C o l .  Byadema d e c l a r e d  i n  a  p r o c l a m a t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  army h ad  t a k e n  o v e r  f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  " i n  
o r d e r  t o  s t o p  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f u s i o n "  w h i c h  he  s a i d  was 
c r e a t i n g  a  “p s y c h o s i s  o f  im m in en t  c i v i l  w a r . "  The 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  was s u s p e n d e d ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  a s s e m b l y  d i s s o l v e d ,  
a l l  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  was p r o h i b i t e d  and  a  s t a t e  o f  
em erg en cy  d e c l a r e d .
2A " c o m m it te e  o f  N a t i o n a l  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n "  
was s e t  up on t h e  f o l l o w i n g  day an d  C o l .  Eyadema p r o m i s e d  
t h a t  t h i s  c o m m it t e e  w o u ld  t r y  t o  c r e a t e  w i t h i n  t h r e e  
m o n th s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e n a b l e  f r e e  e l e c t i o n s
1 .  Not much i s  known a b o u t  t h e  d e t a i l s  ox t h e  a t t e m p t e d  
c o u n t e r - c o u p .  Two o f  t h e  l e a d e r s ,  two l i e u t e n a n t s  w ere  
e x e c u t e d  a f t e r  a  summary t r i a l .  G e n e r a l  A n k ra h  h a s  
o r d e r e d  an  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  on t h e  a f f a i r .
2 .  The v a r i e t y  i n  t h e  t e r m s  u s e d  f o r  t h e  c o m m i t t e e s  i s  o f  
i n t e r e s t .  I n  N i g e r i a  t h e  c o m m i t t e e  'was c a l l e d  t h e  
Supreme M i l i t a r y  an d  F e d e r a l  E x e c u t i v e  C o u n c i l ,  i n  
Ghana i t  was c a l l e d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l ;  
i n  S i e r r a  Leone i t  was c a l l e d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  P i e f o r m a t i o n  
C o u n c i l .  Some o f  t h e  t e r m s  ( s u c h  a s  t h e  l a s t  two a n d  t h e
t o  be h e l d  a n d  t h a t  t h e  army w ou ld  s u r r e n d e r  pow er  t o  
c i v i l i a n s  i n  due c o u r s e .  The Com m ittee  w h ic h  c o n s i s t e d  
o f  e i g h t  i n c l u d e d  t h r e e  f o r m e r  members o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
c a b i n e t s  u n d e r  P r e s i d e n t  G r u n i t s k y .  I t  was p r e s i d e d  by  
C o l .  k l e b e r  D ad30 who was i n  c h a r g e  o f  d e f e n c e ,  a n d  
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  w h i l e  one o f  t h e  f o r m e r  G r u n i t s k y  
m i n i s t e r s  (M. B e n o i t  i.Ialou) was g i v e n  c h a r g e  o f  t h e  
k e y  m i n i s t r i e s  o f  i n t e r i o r ,  I n f o r m a t i o n  and  P r e s s .
The i n c l u s i o n  o f  c i v i l i a n  m i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  
c i v i l i a n  r e g im e  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  m anner  i n  w h ic h  t h e  coup  
w as  a n n o u n c e d  an d  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  members o f  t h e  f o r m e r  
g o v e rn m e n t  i s  enough t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i n  a  c e r t a i n  s e n s e  
t h e  Togo coup  h a d  c e r t a i n  o r i g i n a l  t r a i t s .  A c c o r d i n g  
t o  C o l .  Egadema, he and  t h e  f o r m e r / r r e s i d e n t  h a d  come t o  
a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  w hereby  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t o o k  p o w e r .
G r u n i t s n y  was a l l o w e d  t o  l e a v e  t o  Dahomey, f ro m  w h ic h  he 
w en t  t o  P a r i s .
The o r i g i n a l  t u s s l e  i n  t h e  p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e
y e a r s  s t a r t e d  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  p r e s i d e n t ^  S y l v a n u s  Olympio^
was m u r d e r e d  by m u t i n o u s  s o l d i e r s  on J a n u a r y  1 3 ,  1963*
( c o n t d . )  f i r s t )  a r e  r e v e a l i n g  a s  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m s
an d  t h e  p r e - o c c u p a t i o n  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s .
D u r i n g  Olympic* * s r u l e  t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  some t r o u b l e  c a u s e d  
m a i n l y  b j  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  a c t i o n  t a k e n  t o  i n v a l i d a t e  
j o i n t  o p p o s i t i o n  a t t e m p t s  t o  p u t  up c a n d i d a t e s  a t  t h e  
1961  p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  a n d  t o  bail one p a r t y  T 
t h e  JUYEKTG 7 and  a r r e s t  i t s  l e a d e r s .  G r u n i t s k y ,  l e a d e r  
o f  t h e  o t h e r  m a in  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t y  ( t h e  u n i o n  D e m o c r a t i q u e  
d e s  P o p u l a t i o n s  l o g o l a i s e s ) ,  h a d  gone  into- e x i l e  i n  
Dahomey.
The f l a s k p o i n t  t h a t  c a u s e d  t h e  d e m is e  o f  
O lym pio  an d  h i s  reg im e  was a  m u t i n y  c a u s e d  by  a rm e d  
f o r c e s  m a i n ly  composed o f  e x - s e r v i c e m e n  who h a d  dem anded  
t o  b e  a l l o w e d  t o  j o i n  t h e  Togo lesq /h rm y . O ly m p ic  h a d  
r e f u s e d  t h i s  on t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  a rm e d
f o r c e d ;  w ou ld  impose an i n t o l e r a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  burdjanon
1 ^ t h e  c o u n t r y .  On January^  1 9 63 a n  11 fliasurgency c o m m i t t e e 11
o f  t h e  arm ed f o r c e s  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  i t  h ad  r e q u e s t e d
G r u n i t s k y  a n d  A n to in e  Mat c h i  ( h i s  a l l y  m  e x i l e  a n d
A
l e a d e r  o f  t h e  O n ions  des  C h e f s  e t  d e s  p o p u l a t i o n s  du
1 .  The s i z e  o f  t h e  f o g o l e s e  army t h e n  was e s t i m a t e d  a t
400 men. ' The e x - s e r v i c e m e n  numbered  up t  o 1 , 0 0 0  men.
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l l o r d ,  a  b o d y ,  a f f i l i a t e d  t o  G r u n i t s k y 1 s p a r t y )  t o  r e t u r n  
f r o m  e x i l e  and  fo rm  a  g o v e r n m e n t .  G r u n i t  sk y  r e t u r n e d  t o  
f o r m  a  p r o v i s i o n a l  c i v i l i a n  g o v e rn m e n t  w i t h  a  m a in  t a s k  
t o  p r e p a r e  " f r e e  e l e c t i o n s " .  The m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  
d e c l i n e d  h i s  o f f e r  t o  tam e o f f i c e  i n  t h e  c a b i n e t  b u t  
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  c i v i l  a u t h o r i t y ,  s e t  up -at t h e i r  
r  e q u e s t j  m ust  be a  d e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n m e n t r  e s p e a t i n g  
a l l  f r e e d o m  o f  tho u g h t ; ,  b e l i e f  and  o p i n i o n . "
G r u n i t s k y  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  t h e  a rm e d  f o r c e s  
w o u l d  be e x p a n d e d  by t h e  r a i s i n g  o f  a s e c o n d  i n f a n t r y  
com pany  i n  t h e  im m ed ia te  f u t u r e  an d  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  
h a t t a l i o n  a t  a  l a t e r  d a t e . ^  He a l s o  a n n o u n c e d  t h e  
r a i s i n g  o f  t h e  b an  on t h e  O p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  im p o s e d  by 
O l y m p i o ' s  g o v e rn m e n t ,  g e n e r a l  a m n e s ty ,  a n d  a  4 0 - h o u r  
w o rk .
On May 5» 1963 G r u n i t s k y  was e l e c t e d
p r e s i d e n t  an d  A n to in e  M e a tc h i  v i c e - p r e s i d e n t  f o r  a  f i v e
y e a r  t e rm ,  u n d e r  a  new c o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  t o o k  p l a c e
a f t e r  a  s e r i e s  o f  r o u n d  t a b l e  c o n f e r e n c e s  w e re  h e l d
s i n c e  F e b r u a r y  b e tw e e n  d e l e g a t e s  f rom  t h e  f o u r  m a in
1 .  The arm ed f o r c e s  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  l a s t  c o u p  
c o n s i s t e d  o f  an  army o f  1200  men, a  n a v y  o f  250 
men a  g e n d a r m e r i e  o f  1 ,0 0 0  an d  a  p o l i c e  f o r c e  o f  
a b o u t  3 0 0 .
p a r t i e s  a n d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  a r m y ’ s  " c o m m i t t e e  
o f  v i g i l a n c e ” . The p a r t i e s  a g r e e d  on A p r i l  16 t o  n o m i n a t e  
G r u n i t s k y  a s  s o l e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e  w i t h  M e a t c h i  
a s  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  t h e  v i c e - p r e s i d e n c y . A g re e m e n t  was 
r e a c h e d  on a  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  w h ic h  was a p p r o v e d  by a  
n a t i o n a l  r e f e r e n d u m  a t  t h e  same t im e  a s  t h e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  
e l e c t i o n .  E l e c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  n a t i o n a l  a s s e m b l y  w e re  a l s o  
h e l d  c o n c u r r e n t l y  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  s i n g l e  ’ N a t i o n a l  
Union* l i s t  w h ich  had  b e e n  p u t  f o r w a r d  b y  t h e  f o u r  p a r t i e s .  
The a l l o c a t i o n  o f  p l a c e s  on t h e  j o i n t  l i s t  f o r  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  a s s e m b ly  e l e c t i o n  h a d  l e d  t o  a d i s p u t e  b e t w e e n  
t h e  CUT p a r t y  ( c o m i t e  de 1 ’U n i t e  T o g o l a i s ,  i . e .
O l y m p i c ’ s p a r t y )  w h ich  c l a i m e d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  h a l f  o f  t h e  
s e a t s  and  i t s  t h r e e  p a r t n e r s ,  who i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  s e a t s  
s h o u l d  be  d i v i d e d  e q u a l l y  b e t w e e n  a l l  f o u r  p a r t i e s .
OUT l e a d e r s  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  b o y c o t t  t h e  e l e c t i o n  i f  t h e i r  
demands w ere  no l /m et . They w ere  a r r e s t e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
d a y .  G r u n i t s k y  p r e s e n t e d  h i^ n e w  G overnm ent o t  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  a s s e m b ly  on Llay 1 6 .  He r e t a i n e d  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  
f o r  d e f e n c e  and  i n t e r i o r ,  w h i l e  t h e  v i c e  p r e s i d e n t  
r e t a i n e d  p o r t f o l i o  f o r  f i n a n c e  an d  f o r  t h e  m i n i s t r y  o f  
e c o n o m ic s  a n d  p l a n n i n g .
G r u n i t s k y ’ s g o v e rn m e n t  was s u b j e c t e d  t o
c e a s e l e s s  a t t a c k s  f rom  t h e  v e r y  o e g i n n i n g .  The f i r s t  
i s s u e  d n  w h ic h  i t  was s e r i o u s l y  t a k e n  t o  t a s k ,  m a i n l y  by
by  t h e  CUT l e a d e r s  was on i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  o p en  j u d i c i a l  
i n q u i r y  i n t o  t h e  f o rm e r  p r e s i d e n t ' s  d e a t h .  They p r e s s e d  
t h e i r  c l a i m s  f u r t h e r  by  dem and ing  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .  
G r u n i t s k y  a n s w e re d  by i m p r i s o n i n g  some o f  t h e  CUT l e a d e r s .  
The two y e a r s  (1 9 6 4 -6 6 )  o f  G r u n i t s k y ' s  r e g i m e  w e re  m a rk e d  
b y  p l o t s  o r  c h a r g e s  o f  s u c h  . t h r e a t s .  i n  e a r l y  J a n u a r y  
o f  1 9 6 5 ,  e i g h t  m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s ,  m ost  o f  th e m  P a g i n g  
f r o m  t h e  Moba t r i b e  o f  n o r t h e r n  Togo were  a r r e s t e d  on 
c h a r g e s  o f  p l o t t i n g  t o  o v e r t h r o w  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e re  
w. s a  m u t in y  w h ich  f o l l o w e d  i n  J u l y  o f  t h e  same y e a r .
B u t  t h e  m os t  s e r i o u s  a t t e m p t  t o o k  p l a c e  on  November 2 0 - 2 1 ,  
1 9 6 6 ,  a f t e r  G r u n i t s k y ' s  r e g im e  h a d  f a c e d  a i s s e n t i o n  i n  
t h e  c a b i n e t ,  an d  s e v e r a l  t h o u s a n d  p e o p l e  d e m o n s t r a t e d  
i n  t h e  s t r e e t s  o f  fcnme, t h e  c a p i t a l .  An a t t e m p t  t o  
s e i z e  power by CUT l e a d e r s  f a i l e d  when C o l .  Eyadema 
a n d  h i s  army re m a in e d  l ^ y a l  t o  G r u n i t s k y .  G r u n i t s k y  
t h e n  d i s m i s s e d  t h e  w hole  c a b i n e t  and  fo rm ed  a  new 
g o v e r n m e n t ,  an d  s h o r t l y  a f t e i j  s e c u r e d  f r o m  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  A ssem bly  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  v i c e ­
p r e s id e n c y . '* "
1 .  The v i c e - p r e s i d e n t  was i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  a i s s e n t i o n  
a n d  d n  G r u n i t s k y ' s  a b s e n c e ,  h a d  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  u se  
h i s  t e m p o r a r y  pow ers  a s  a c t i n g  p r e s i d e n t * -  t o  d i s m i s s  
t h e  m i n i s t e r s  h o l d i n g  o p p o s e d  v i e w s .  G r u n i t s k y ' s  
r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  o f f i c e  was t h a t  
" a  t w o - h e a d e d  e x e c u t i v e  was u n s u i t e d  t o  A f r i c a . "
But s o l u t i o n  t o  i n s t a b i l i t y  and  c o n t i n u a l  s t r i f e  
w as  now here  i n  t h e  h o r i z o n .  G r u n i t s k y  r e s h u f f l e d  h i s  
c a b i n e t  w i t h i n  t h e  same m o n th ,  an d  t h i n g s  h a d  p r a c t i c a l l y  
come t o  a  s t a n d s t i l l  when C o l .  Eyadema i n t e r v e n e d .
E yadem a l a t e r  ab a n d o n ed  t h e  n a t i o n a l  c o n c i l i a t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  
a n d  on A p r i l  1 4 ,  1967 f o rm e d  a  new g o v e r n m e n t .  He 
d i s s o l v e d  t h e  C om m it tee  a n d  he h i m s e l f  p r e s i d e d  o v e r  a  
new g o v e rn m e n t  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  f o u r  m i l i t a r y  men a n d  e i g h t  
c i v i l i a n s .  tie as sum ed  t h e  p r e s i d e n c y  a n d  r e t a i n e d  t h e  
p o r t f o l i o  f o r  d e f e n c e ,  w h i l e  a n o t h e r  m i l i t a r y  c o l l e a g u e  
w a s  i n  c h a r g e  o f  i n t e r i o r .  He p r o m i s e u ,  ass t h e y  a l  
t h a t  a s  s o o n  a s  p e a c e  a n d  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  idetd b e e n  
a c h i e v e d  t h e  army w ould  s u r r e n d e r  a l l  i t s  po w er  t o  
c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y  ."*■
R e c o n c i l i a t i o n s ,  h o w e y e r ,  w ere  n o t  e a s y  t o  
come by*- i n  Togo; a s  e l s e w h e r e  i n  A f r i c a .  One o f  t h e  
i r o n i c  f a c t s  a b o u t  p r e s e n t  day A f r i c a n  p o l i t i c s  i s  t h a t  
c i v i l i a n  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  c a n n o t  grow a b o v e  t h e i r  
d i f f e r e n c e s  t o  u n i t e  e v e n  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  a  "common enem y") 
w h i c h  shows t h a t  t h e i r  " d i f f e r e n c e s "  must b e  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  
c o n n e c t e d  ^ h av e  a  g r e a t  d e a l  t o  do w i t h  p e r s o n a l  a m b i t i o n ^
1 .  c f .  Le Monde, 15 A p r i l  1967.
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m o re  t h a n  any  o t h e r  i s s u e .  The s i t u a t i o n  ir jDahomey 
w as  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  Togo ,  b e f o r e  t h e  c o u p s  t o o k  
p l a c e  i n  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s .  The g o v e rn m e n t  o f  t h e  f i r s t  
p r e s i d e n t  o f  Dahomey, H u b e r t  Maga, was d e p o s e d  by  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  i n  1963 and r e p l a c e d  by  a n o t h e r  c i v i l i a n  g o v e r n ­
m e n t ,  w i t h  lviigan Apijfoy a s  p r e s i d e n t  and  Ahomadegbe 
a s  p r im e  m i n i s t e r .  A f t e r  c o n t i n u a l  f r i c t i o n  b e t w e e n  
t h e s e  two an d  t h e i r  f a c t i o n s ,  Ahomadegbe d i s m i s s e d  
4 p i t h y  i n  November 1 9 6 5 , o n ly  t o  be  d e p o s e d  h y  h i m s e l f  
on  December 2,  by t h e  army u n d e r  C o l .  Co&Eo, t h e  c h i e f  
o f  s t a f f . 1 E ach  m i l i t a r y  coup  h a s  i t s  own p e c u l i a r
t r a i t s  b a s e d  onfLocal c o n d i t i o n s .  But a l l  c o u p  l e a d e r s ,
1 .  The coup  i n  Dahomey was f o l l o w e d  i n  q u i c k  s u c c e s s i o n  
by a  coup  i n  t h e  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  R e p u b l i c  ( J a n .  1 ,  
196 6 )  w here  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  o f  D a v id  Dacko was o v e r ­
th r o w n  by C o l .  B o k a s s a ;  a n d  i n  t h e  U pper  V o l t a  
( J a n .  4 t h  1 9 6 6 ) where t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  o<f M a u r i c e  
Yameogo was o v e r th r o w n  by C o l .  Lam izam a.  I n  B u r u n d i ,  
a f t e r  some c a b i n e t  i n s t a b i l i t y  an d  t h e  E iu rder  o f  two 
p r im e  m i n i s t e r s  and  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  o f  many p o l i t i c a l  
l e a d e r s  f o r  a l l e g e d  p l o t s  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h r e e  
y e a r s ,  t h e  k i n g  (Mwambutsa V) was d e p o s e d  by h i s  
s o n ,  19 y e a r  o l d  p r i n c e  C h a r l e s  N d izo y e  w i t h  t h e  
c o n n i v a n c e  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y ,  on J u l y  b, 1 9 6 6 .  The 
p r i n c e  a c c e d e d  t o  h i s  f a t h e r ’ s  t h r o n e  u n d e r  t h e  
name o f  Mwami N ta r e  V and  a p p o i n t e d  C a p t a i l  M i c h e l  
H ic o m b e ro ,  t h e  m i n i s t e r  o f  d e f e n c e ,  a s  p r im e  m i n i s t e r .  
On November 2 9 t h ,  1 9 6 6 ,  C a p t a i n  H icom bero  d e p o s e d  t h e  
new k i n g ,  and  he h i m s e l f  a s su m e d  p r e s i d e n t i a l  p o w e r s .  
T h i s  d i d  n o t  come a s  a  s u r p r i s e ,  n o t  e v e n ,  p e r h a p s ,  
t o  t h e  young  k i n g  who was on  a  s t a t e  v i s i t  t o  t h e  
Congo a n d  who commented w i t h  w hat  must s u r e l y  go 
down a s  t h e  u n d e r s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  y e a r ,  t h a t  
C a p t a i n  H icom bero  was ,fd i s c o u r t e o u s "I
a s  a l r e a d y  s t a t e d  c h a rg e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  t h e y  d e p o s e d  w i t h  
e i t h e r  c o r r u p t i o n ,  i n e f f i c i e n c y , n e p o t i s m ,  i n a b i l i t y  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  econom ic  a n d / o r  p o l i t i c a l  c r i s e s  o r  w i t h  any 
o n e  o f  t h e s e  o r  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  a l l .  I n t h e  T o g o l e s e  
s i t u a t i o n ,  a s  i n  t h e  Dahomeyan s i t u a t i o n ,  c i v i l i a n  
i n t e r n i c i n e  c o n f l i c t  e c l i p s e d  a l l  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  a n d  
f a c i l i t a t e d  a  m i l i t a r y  t a k e o v e r .
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C h a p t e r  N in e  
The L l i l i t a r y  a s  a n  E x e c u t i v e
Some w r i t e r s  make a  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n
m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e s  and  r e g i m e s  o f  m i l i t a r y  p r o v e n a n c e .
The l a t t e r  c o m p r i s e  a l l  r e g i m e s  t h a t  s u c c e e d  a  m i l i t a r y
i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  m o s t l y  w i t h  a c i v i l i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  o r  w i t h
a  c i v i l i a n  d o m in a te d  g o v e r n m e n t .  The g o v e rn m e n t  o f  t h e
^ i . f t h  R e p u b l i c  o f  F r a n c e  i s  c l a s s e d  by  t h e s e  w r i t e r s
1
u n d e r  a  r e g im e  o f  m i l i t a r y  p r o v e n a n c e .  L i l i t a r y  r e g i m e s ,
o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a r e  Mr e g i m e s  i n  w h ic h  t h e  c i v i l i a h
a u t h o r i t i e s  a c t  w h o l ly  o r  i n  m a j o r  p a r t  u n a e r  t h e  c o v e r t
d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s h i p ,  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,
2w h e r e  t h e  m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e i r  own n a m e . ”
T h e  p r e s e n t  r e g i m e s  i n  t h e  A f r i c a n  s t a t e s  w h e re  s u c c e s s f u l
m i l i t a r y  c o u p s  have  t a k e n  p l a c e  w i t h i n  t h e  p a s t  two 
ureter
y e a r s ,  f a l l  i n  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n .  The v a l i d i t y  o f  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  g o v ernm en t  o f  t h e  f i f t h  R e p u b l i c  i n  r e g i m e s  
o f  m i l i t a r y  p rovenax .ee  may be  q u e s t i o n e d ,  b u t  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e  g i v e n  h e r e  may b e  t a k e n  
a s  a  v a l i d  f r a m e  o f  r e f e r e n c e .
1 .  c f .  S . F .  F i n e r ,  'The  m i l i t a r y  D is e n g a g e m e n t  f ro m  
P o l i t i c s ' ,  i n  t h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  D e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n ,  l o c .  
c i t ,  p p . 1 - 1 0 ,  a t  p . l .
2 .  i b i d .
5 62
Here, i t  may be r e i t e r a t e d  th a t  a l l  m i l i t a r y  
reg im es  s t a r t  by d ec la r in g  t h e i r  t r a n s i t i o n a l  nature:  
t h a t  they  have come "to put the house i n  order'1, "to 
conduct a mopping up operat ion" ,  and th a t  as soon as  
peace  and s t a b i l i t y  has been ach ieved  (or whatever  
m is s io n  they ass igned  them se lves)  they would surrender  
a l l  power to  a c i v i l i a n  government;. So f a r ,  no 
m i l i t a r y  regime has surrendered power o f  i t s  own accord .
I1 he only m i l i t a r y  regime which has surrendered power to  
a  c i v i l i a n  government ( in  the Sudan) has don£ so a f t e r  
a c i v i l i a n  u p r is in g .  In the meantime th e  m i l i t a r y  are  
r u l i n g ^  i n  sev era l  A fr ican  s t a t e s .  An exam ination  
o f  the s tru c tu r e  of the ex ecu t iv e  under a m i l i t a r y  regime  
i s  t h e r e f o r e  re levant  to  the present  s tu d y .
The S tru ctu re  ox the m i l i ta r y  hxecuuive
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a tu r e  o f  the  m i l i t a r y  
e x e c u t i v e  i s  the complete con cen tra t ion  o f  governmental  
power in  i t s  hands and i t s  d ir e c t  s u p e r v is io n  o f  c r i t i c a l  
s e c t o r s  of  the government a d m in is tr a t io n .  A l l  m i l i t a r y  
e x e c u t i v e s  are ,  in  e ssen ce ,  the  same, whatever the  
v a r i e t y  o f  e x tr a -m i l i ta r y  means they use as  in stru m en ts  
o f  c o n t r o l  as l o c a l  c o n d i t io n s  may demand. In t h i s
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chapter me w i l l  examine s i g n i f i c a n t  asxoects o f  the
m i l i t a r y  ex e cu t iv e  through s e l e c t i v e  examples, and thereby
o f f e r  some comments on trends and p r o s p e c ts ,  i n  g e n e r a l .
The th ree  s t a t e s  chosen for  the purpose o f  t h i s  chapter
are A lg e r ia ,  Congo (A) and Ghana. The f a c t  th a t  th e se
s t a t e s  were former fren ch ,  B e lg ian  and B r i t i s h  p o s s e s s i o n s
r e s p e c t i v e l y  i s  ^urely a c c id e n t a l .  The reason  f o r  t h e i r
ch o ice  i s  r e la t e d  to the nature o f  the change brought
-bout by the coup in  each s t a t e :  in  A lg e r ia ,  th e  coup
l e a d e r s  d e c l a r e d  t h e i r  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  B e n  B e l l a  a n d  t h a t
tit
they  were carrying  on the r e v o lu t io n ;  in  Congo^ Mobutu.
in terv e n e d  to  put an end to endemic p o l i t i c a l  s t r i f e
without b a s ic  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  change at the o u t s e t  but
l a t e r  made some basic  cnanges. In Ghana, the  coup l e a d e r s
s e t  out not only to depose one man and h i s  c o l l e a g u e s ,
rt
but to  bring  about com plete^versal  o f  h i s  p o l i c  e s .
whatever the b a s ic  o r i e n t a t io n  o f  a m i l i t a r y  
regim e, one important f a c t  of  psychology impinges upon 
the  o r g a n is a t io n  o f  power under i t :  i t  i s  or i s
p e r c e iv e d  g e n e r a l ly  as being more c o e r c iv e  than any c i v i l i a n  
regim e. The presence o f  tne s o l d i e r  i s  f e l t  i n  a l l  
important s e c to r s  of  public  l i f e .  N e v e r th e le s s  the  
m i l i t a r y  le a d e r s  are con sc iou s  of t h e i r  l i m i t a t i o n s  and
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in v a r ia b ly  persuade some c i v i l i a n  le a d e r s  to  g iv e  them 
support or to co l la b o r a te  with them even a t  the  
e x e c u t iv e  l e v e l .  Their d e c la r a t io n  th a t  they would  
hand over power to c i v i l i a n  ru le  and t h e i r  p r e -o ccu p a t io n  
w ith  l e g i t im a c y  may be seen; at best ,  as a genuine d e s ir e  
to  re tu rn  government to i t s  r i g h t f u l  c la im an ts ;  i . e .  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the people; or at worst^as th e  com­
plim ent r e lu c t a n t ly  paid by Might to  R ight ,  I t  i s  an 
a sp e c t  o f  the l i m i t a t i o n s  of Might. I t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  
to understand this limitation in order t9 a p p r e c ia te  the  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  m i l i t a r y  regimes and the a c t io n s  o f  t h e i r  
l e a d e r s .
(a) A lg e r ia
The proclamation of the A lger ian  R evo lu t ion ary  
o o u n c i l  v e s te d  supreme au th or ity  in  A lg e r ia  a f t e r  the  
coup d * e ta t ,  in  the Revolutionary C ouncil ,  headed by 
C o l.  Boumedieniie, Having proclaimed the overthrow  
o f  P r e s id e n t  Ben B e l la  and h is  government, the  
R evolutionary  Council persuaded the members o f  the  
n a t i o n a l  assembly to  s ign  a r e s o lu t i o n  e n t r u s t in g  the
56$“.
powers of  th e  fo rm er p r e s i d e n t  to  i t .  Then, t h e  C o u n c i l ,
i n  i t s  c a p a c i ty  as Mhead o f  S t a t e ’J passed th re e  d ecrees
( ordonnances) pub lished  on July 13th, 1965, one o f
which e s ta b l i s h e d  the o r g a n isa t io n  o f  the e x e c u t iv e  power
1
o f  the m i l i t a r y  regime.
In the A lger ian  s i t u a t i o n  where the  A lg e r ia n
r e v o lu t io n  and i t s  instrum ent,  the FLK, was not r e j e c t e d
but was reco gn ised  as the source of  l e g i t im a c y )  the
t r a n s f e r  of  ^ower to the Council a lso  meant th a t  the
C o u n c i l  rep laced  the le a d e r sh ip  o f  the FLN. The Bureau
P o l i t i q u e  and the c e n t r a l  committee of the FLN disappeared
— on the fa c e  o f  i t ,  tem porar i ly .  The only h igher  organ
o f  the party which was l e f t  to  fu n ct ion  was the e x e c u t iv e  
2s e c r e t a r i a t .  “JJhe fu n c t io n  of  the ex e cu t iv e  s e c r e t a r i a t
1 .  c f .  Ordonnance ( i )  No. 65-130) o f  June 22, 1965";
(2) No. 65-131) o f  June 22, 1965; and (3) No. 65-102^ o f  
July 10, 1965. The f i r s t  two were concerned w ith  
amnesty and the r e l e a s e  o f  c e r ta in  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  
p r i s o n e r s .  The t h i r d ,  ordonnance No. 65-132, provided  
that  pending the promulgationof a c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
the Revolutionary Council  was to be the d e p o s i to r y  
o f  so vere ign  a u th o r i ty .
2 .  c f .  Francois  B o r e l la ,  ’A lg e r ie ,  L1 o r g a n is a t io n  a c t u e l l e  
des pouvo irs ,  i n  r£vue Alger ienne des s c i e n c e s  
ju r id iq u e s ,  p o l i t i q u e s  e t  economiques -  December 1965,  
Nos. 3 -4 ,  p p .29-39 at  p . 37.
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i s  not one o f  d e c i s io n ,  but/of preparation  and e x e c u t io n  
of  d e c i s i o n s  taken by the Revolutionary C ou n ci l ,
(and p r e v io u s ly  oy the bureau p o l i t iq u e  and the  
s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l ) .  In other words, the Council  sub­
s t i t u t e d  i t s e l f  for  the bureau and for the s e c r e t a r y -  
g en er a l  01 frKhe Jrfoncy&tt ‘tfxje XMyvYxxy-gvyinrxxzi. &£
the  YLh, in  the fu n c t io n  of  i s s u i n g  orders to  th e  party  
through the ex ecu t iv e  s e c r e t a r i a t .  The Council  pays 
l i p  s e r v ic e  to  the primacy o f  the party ,  as i t  diu during
i t s  meeting h e ld  from November 15 to 30, 1965 i n  the
f o l l o w i n g  terms: nthe party i s  the f i r s t  i n s t i t u t i o n
o f  the country , that  which e x a l t s  and gu ides  the  c r e a t i v e  
power o f  the p e o p l e . 1'^ "
A fter  he had been in s t r u c te d  to form h i s  
government, Col .  baumedienne s ta t e d  in  a broadcast  on
J u ly  5, th a t  the ILN*s task  would be "to e la b o r a te  and
g u iu e ,  animate and c o n tr o l ,  and not to  conduct or sub­
s t i t u t e  i t s e l f  fo r  the s t a t e " . i t  i s  not remarkable  
t h a t  the lea d er  of an army coup should be a t  p a in s  to  warn 
a g a in s t  the party s u b s t i t u t in g  i t s e l f  for  the s t a t e ,  
when i t  i s  remembered th at  thatjpj was p r e c i s e l y  what the
1 .  c f .  El Ivloujahid, Dec. 2, 1965.
army did i t s e l f ,  a l b e i t  p r o v i s i o n a l l y .  I t  must thus
tm
seej*the ELK an a l t e r n a t i v e  source o f  s t a t e  a u t h o r i t y .
■'(phe f a c t  o f  paying l i p  s e r v ic e  to the party as a source o f  
l e g i t im a c y  i s  d i s t in g u i s h e d  from i t* b e in g  the source o f  
a u th o r i ty  which i s  now p la in ^ ly  in  the army. I t  i s  
th e r e fo r e  reaspnable to  q u es t io n  the a u t h e n t i c i t y  o f  
t h i s  t r ib u t e  to  l e g i t im a c y ,  though i t  m a i f e s t s  the  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  the army as a power-holder.
Boumedienne1s cab in et  was announced on July  
1 0 ,  1965. i t  was a broad-based c i v i l i a n  government in
1
c o n t r a s t  to  the m il i tary-d om in ated  Revolutionary C o u n c i l .
The ca b in e t  c o n s i s t e d  o f  nine members of the outgo ing  
c a b i n e t ,  three  former m in i s t e r s  who had r e s ig n ed  from the  
BunBella  cab inet  (gabah B i t a t ,  Ahmed Ledagri,  and Ahmed 
K a id ) ,  and e ig h t  newcomers. S ix  o f  the n ine  members 
o f  the former cab inet  r e ta in e d  t h e i r  p o s t s .  C o l .
Boumedienne was chairman of the cab inet  as w e l l  as o f
t h e  Revolutionary C ou n ci l .  I t  maybe concluded from t h i s
t h a t  the head of the government i s  a l so  the head 01
s t a t e .  Diplomatic p r a c t i c e  s in ce  then supports t h i s
v iew ;  a l l  ambassadors have been rece iv ed  by C ol .  Boumedienne.
1 .  Out o f  the 26 members o f  the Council ,  15 were m i l i t a r y  
men.
2 .  c f .  1 .  B o r e l la ,  o p . c i t .  p . 37. ^ o l .  Boumedienne 
$s g e n e r a l ly  r e fe r r e d  to as .re s id en t .
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Ordonnance no. 65-162 provides th a t  th e  
government, Oj d e leg a t io n  from the Revolutionary  Council  
"holds power necessary  fo r  the fu n c t io n in g  o f  the  organs  
o f  the s t a t e  and for  the l i f e  o f  the n a t i o n . I t  
i s  fu r th er  provided that  "the measures tanen by the  govern
r*
ment are talien according ,the su bject  matter under the
r>
fo rm  o f  ordon*xances and  d ecrcts" .^
This meano that  the government has been e n tr u s te d  
w ith  l e g i s l a t i v e  ^s w e l l  as execu t ive  powers. "Ordonnaxxce" 
i n  i t s  use in  french  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  ]aw and u n u e r  the  
b r i e f  per iod  o f  const itu t iona l  convention i n  A l g e r i a ,  
i s  used to s i g n i f y  a l e g i s la t iv e  meaning. - .One d i f f i c u l t y  
here was ohe in t e r p o la t io n  of the phrase "according t o  
the  s u b jec t  matter" ( s e lo n  l a  m a t i c r e ) . The 1963 c o n s t i t u  
t i o n  o f  A lg e r ia  unlike most c o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  f r a n c o  p h o n i c  
s t a t e s  did not provide for  a l i s t  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  m a t t e r s ,
1 .  A r t .  5 .
2. A rt .  6. The term aecree in  E nglish  represexxts the  
two terms i . e .  ordonnances and d e c r e t s ,  which a r e  
sometimes used in terch a n g ea b ly .
as d i s t in g u i s h e d  from reg u la to ry  m a tters .  One way out 
o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  i s  to s t a t e  that  any maxter which,  
b efo r e  July 10, 1965;had been d ea lt  w ith  by a law (une 
l o i )  or by an "ordonnance*, i s  a l e g i s l a x i v e  m atter;  and 
any matter otherwise d ea lt  with  i s  re g u la to r y  m atter .^  
A l l  the ordonnances i s s u e d  by the head o f  the government 
( i n  c o u n c i l  o f  m in is te r s )  s in c e  July l u ,  1^65 are  
l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t s .
The government i s  subordinate to  xhe 
Revolutionary Council,  under whose authority and c o n tr o l  
i t  e x e r c i s e s  i t s  fu n c t io n s .  The t o t a l  or p a r t i a l  
r e s h u f f l e  o f  the Cabinet i s  decided by the  C ouncil  under 
an Ordonnance (par v o ie  d ’ une ordonnance c o n c i l i a r e ) .
The m in i s t e r s  are in d iv id u a l ly  r e s p o n s ib le  to  the  head 
o f  the government and the cab inet  i s  c o l l e c t i v e l y  
r e s p o n s ib le  to  the Revolutionary C ouncil .  As to
1 .  F. B o r e l la ,  has suggested  t h i s ,  o p . c i t .  p .3b .
2 .  A rt .  3, Ordan.iJo. 65-102. The term Ordonnance- 
c o n c i l i a r e  i s  used w ith  xhe s u f f i x  " c o n c i l i a r e ” 
in  d i s t i n c t i o n  from one withoux such s u f f i x  which  
o r i g i n a t e s  from the c a b in e t .
in d iv id u a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , t h i s  g iv e s  the head o f  the  
government power to  d ism iss  a m in is ter  i n d i v i d u a l l y  
and thus maintain d i s c i p l i n e ,  although h i s  replacement  
another i s  apparently a matter for  the Revolutionary  
Council  to  decide.*^" hi  ^ chairmanship o f  the R evo lu t ionary  
Council  f a c i l i t a t e s  h i s  ch o ice  of a new m i n i s t e r .
This proves to  be p r a c t i c a l  and i s  l o g i c a l  in  v iew o f  
what has been sa id  a lready that  he i s  head o f  s t a t e  
a s  w e l l  as of  government.
As to c o l l e c t i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  the p o s i t i o n  
i s  ob v iou s ly  d i f f e r e n t  from a parliamentary system  
under which there  are o p p o s i t io n a l  f o r c e s .  The r o l e  
o f  the Revolutionary Council  may be compared more p r o f i t ­
a b ly  to  th a t  of  the n a t io n a l  a ssem b lies  injdfrican  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  systems. The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  th a t  in  the  
c a se  o f  the Revolutionary Council i t  i s  p r es id ed  by the  
c h i e f  e x e cu t iv e  h im se lf  whxch reduces the r o l e  o f  the  
C ouncil  to  a " c o n fe s s io n a l11 or an a u t o - c r i t i c a l  one.
The p o int  of  resemblance emerges in  the predominant 
p o s i t i o n  o f  the Chief ex e cu t iv e  and 111 the c o l l a b o r a t i v e  
r e la t io n s h i p  between the ex ecu t iv e  and the n a t i o n a l  
c f .  1‘. B o r e l la ,  o p . c i t .  p .3 o .
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assem bly,  which, i s  a l s o  the case  with  the R evo lu t ion ary  
Council  and the c h i e f / e x e c u t i v e s  p o s i t i o n  i n  it.^" The 
Mcon-trolling" r o le  o f  the FLN, to which r e fe r e n c e  has been  
made in  the d e c la r a t io n  of Boumedienne made onJuly 5,
1965, does not extend to  maicing the government answer-  
a b le  for  any a c t s  or o m iss io n s .  Under the 1963 con­
s t i t u t i o n  the FLN had the r ig h t  to do t h i s .  But even i f  
th a t  had not been changed, the post- independence  FLN 
had l i t t l e  v i t a l i t y  l e f t  s e r io u s ly  to c h a l le n g e  a m i l i t a r y  
regim e, as was expla ined  i n  the preceding c h a p te r .  Control  
01 the  FLN had now passed  to  the m i l i t a r y .
The m i l i ta r y  regime i s  anxious to p r e se r v e  the
c o n t i n u i t y  of the p o l ic y  s e t  out in  the T r i p o l i  programme
2and in  the Charter o f  A l g i e r s .  The r o l e  o f  th e  FLN i s
r e c a s t  as an instrument o f  t h e ”execu t ion  o f  a coh eren t  
■3
p o l i c y . 11J But how i t  can d ischarge t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
1. Another comparison has been made with the assembly  
government (presumably) o f  the p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n  era  
o f  the French assembly, c f .  F. B o r e l la  o p ^ c it  p . 39.
2 .  c f .  Proclamation of June 19, and July 5, 19651 See 
a l s o  Chapter 8, for  a summary o f  the T r i p o l i  programme.
2J. i b i d .
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i s  not s t a t e d .  On the other handjtwo key co n ce p ts  are  
c o n t i n u a l l y  p ro jec ted :  ( i )  the s t a t e  must be o r g a n ise d  
on xhe b a s i s  ox re sp e c t  o f  "Arab and Is lam ic  v a l u e s 11 *,
/ N cand ( i i )  the c i t i z e n  must be more civ^-minded; must 
develop  the c u l t  of the "chose publique", and show 
s e r io u s n e s s  and put up constant e f f o r t .  S o c ia l i s m  i s  
a s s e r t e d  as part of the h i s t o r i c a l  h e r i ta g e  o f  the  
A lg e r ia n  n a t io n .  A l l  t h i s  p a r t ly  ex p la in s  the paradox  
o f  th e  FLN's p o s i t i o n  in  the con tex t  o f  what i s  i n d i s ­
putab ly  a m i l i t a r y  regime. I t  may a lso  be rea son a b ly  
assumed th at  the experiment of  the Arab S o c i a l i s t  
Union in  the UAH must be watched with  care  i n  A l g e r i a .
The A lg er ia n  m i l i t a r y  loan ers  must r e a l i s e  th a t  a party  
embracing the masses i s  u l t im a te ly  a n ece ssa r y  source  o f
of
l e g i t i m a c y  and guarantee s u c c e s s .  Without t h i s  any
reg im e,  whatever i t s  s u c c e s s e s  in  other spheres^ i s  
doomed to dependence on brute fo r c e ,  which i n  th e  end 
d e s tr o y s  i t s e l f .  The i n d ic a t io n s  in  A lg e r ia  are th a t  the  
N a s s e r i t e  experiment w i l l  be fo l lo w ed .
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( c ) Ti^e Congo (A)
As already exp la ined  m  the preceding ch a p ter ,
4
th e  army under Mobutu took over power cj>n Nov. 1965.
The High Command of the/ANC, under General Mobutu i s s u e d
a 1 3 -p o in t  proclamation, dated Nov. 24, 1965. P r e s id e n t
K a s a v u b u  was r e p l a c e d  by G e n e r a l  Mobutu, and  C o l .  Liulamba
was appointed  prime m in i s t e r .  But the i n s t i t u t i o n s
o f  the re p u b l ic  were otherwise  l e f t  in ta c t .^ - In the
a f te r n o o n  o f  the same day both House of Parliament
r e c o g n i s e d  G en e ra l /m o b u tu 1 s coup  by a p p r o v i n g  h i s
i n v e s t  i t  ute by acc lam ation . The c o n s t i t u t i o n  was not
suspended, but i t s  a r t i c l e s  r e l a t i n g  to the h o ld in g  o f
p r e s i d e n t i a l  e le c t io n ^  were suspended and the p r e s id e n t
imposed a 1 s t a t e  of e x c e p t io n ” (^ tat  df urgence) f o r  
2l i v e  y e a r s .
The p res id en t  a l s o ,  by decree^ extended the  
3 u r i s d i c t i o n  of m i l i ta r y  cou rts  so as to  in c lu d e ,  i n t e r  
a l i a ,  c a s e s  o f  corruption* embezzlement e t c .  He 
p la c e d  the  p o l i c e  under m i l i t a r y  c o n tr o l .  The d r a s t i c
1 .  c f .  para. 1, 3 and 4 o f  the Proclamation.
2 .  Under the c o n s t i t u t i o n  of 1964 the p res id en t  was 
e l e c t e d  for  f i v e  years  by members of p ar l ia m en t ,  by 
the d e le g a te s  of  L eo p o ld ^ v i l le  and the members o f  
the  p r o v in c ia l  a s se m b l ie s .  He was e l i g i b l e  fo r  r e ­
r e - e l e c t i o n  for  one c o n s e c tu t iv e  term -  c f .  a r t s .  55 
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n a t u r e  o f  t h e  C o n g o le s e  coup was t h u s  b e g i n n i n g  t o  
em erg e  g r a d u a l l y A x  t h e  o u t s e t  t h e  C o n g o l e s e  coup h a d  
c e r t a i n  t r a i t s  w h ich  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  i t  f ro m  t h e  o t h e r  cou p s  
t h a t  h a v e  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  A f r i c a ,  The p r i n c i p a l  d i s -  
t i n g u i s h m g  f e a t u r e  was i t s  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e t e n t i o n  o f  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o r d e r  a s  i t  e x i s t e u  b e f o r e  N ov.  24 ,
1 9 6 5 .  The c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  s u c h  a s  
p a r l i a m e n t  d i u  no d o u b t  h e l p  t h e  m i l i t a r y  r e g im e  t o  
m u s t e r  some c i v i l i a n  s u p p o r t .  The nr.ve t o  o o t a i n  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  r e s o l u t i o n  r e c o g n i s i n g  t h e  r e g i m e  was a  
p r o o f  o f  t h i s .  I t  was also perhaps a measure o f  the 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  l e g i t i m a c y .  T h i s  i s  borne ou t  by 
s e v e r a l  s t a t e m e n t s  madeby p r e s i d e n t  Mobutu and i n  
p a r t i c u l a r /  i n  an  o f f i c i a l  p u b l i c a t i o n  uixder t h e  
r e v  e a l i n g  t i t l e  "Be l a  l e g a l i t e a  l a  16 g i t  m i t e ” .
P r e s i d e n t  Mobutu a p p o i n t e d  C o l .  L e o n a r d  Mulamba 
p r i m e  m i n i s t e r ,  he h i m s e l f  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  d e f e n c e  p o r t ­
f o l i o .  The Mulamba C a b i n e t  ( o f  21) c o n s i s t e d  o f
1 .  c f .  A. R ubens ,  ’La j u s t i c e  m i l i t a i r e * ,  Revue 
j u r i d i ^ u e  du C o ^ o ,  j a n - f  eb . - m a r s ,  i 9 6 0 , No. 1 ,  p p .  3 - 1 2 .
2 .  H au t  C o m m i s s a r i a t  a  1 * I n f o r m a t i o n ,  Congo,  K i n s a s h a  
196 . Mobutu a r g u e s  i n  t h i s  docum ent t h a t  h i s  r e g i m e  
was i n v e s t e d  w i t h  a  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  f a c t ,  i s s u i n g  f ro m  
t h e  power  vacuum e x i s t i n g  o w i m  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c h a o s  
i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r e g i m e : -  " _ l u t o t  ^ue  p a r l e r  d f une 
p r i s e  du p o u v o i r  p a r  i ’a rm ee ,  i l  f a u d r a i t  en  c e  c a s  
s a l u e r  l a  r e n a i s s a n c e  du p o u v o i r ” ( p . 1 3 ) .
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CONACO members and o f  th e  C o n g o le s e  D em ocrat ic  F r o n t ,
B a c h  p r o v i n c e  e x c e p t  o n e  w a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  C a b i n e t
i ’h e  r e a l  n a t u r e  o f  M o b u t u *  s  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e
b a g a n  t o  e m e r g e  i n  t h e  n e w  a r .  O p e n i n g  a  n e w  s e s s i o n
o f  P a r l i a m e n t  oi£;Iarch 7 ,  1 966 ,  p r e s i d e n t  L o b u t u  d e c l a r e d
t h a t  h e n c e f o r t h  p a r l i a m e n t  s h a l l  n o t  d e b a t e  d e c r e e s
i s s u e d  by h im ;  and  a  p r e s i d e n t i a l  d e c r e e  a p p e a r e d  on t h e
2same day V e s t in g '  l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w ers  m  t n e  p r e s i d e n t .
A r t i c l e  2  o f  t h i s  law  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  a l l  d e c r e e s  i s s u e d  
b y  t h e  p r e s i d e n t  w ou ld  be p r e s e n t e d  t o  p a r l i a m e n t ,  f o r  
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  w i t h i n  two m o n th s  o f  t n e i r  r e c e i v i n g  
s i g n a t u r e .  b i n c e  t h e  c o u p  t h e  p o s i t i o n  up t o  t h e n  r a d  
b e e n  r e g u l a t e d  by a  la w  u n d e r  w h ic h  t n e  p r e s i d e n t  c o u l d  
l e g i s l a t e  by d e c r e e ;  b u t  any s u c h  d e c r e e  c o u l d  be  
a n n u l l e d  b y  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t . ^  Now t h e  ^ r ^ s i d e n t  t o o k  
comxJlete  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n i t i a t i v e  w i t h o u t  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  v e t o . ^
1 .  c f .  O rd o n n an ce  No. l o f  2 4 * 1 1 .6 5 ;  No. 2  o f  2 6 . 1 1 . 6 5  
a n d  No. 10 o f  7 .1 2 . 6 5 *
2 .  O rd o n n an ce  No. 6 6 /9 2  o i s  o f  M arch  7 ,  1 9 6 6 .
3 .  O r d o n n a n c e - l o i  No. 7 o f  Nov. 3 0 ,  1965*
4 . I 'h e se  m e a s u r e s  a r e  r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  t h e  c o l o n i a l  s y s t e m ,  
b n d e r  t h e  B e l g i a n  C h a r t e  C o l o n i a l e  ( a r t . 2:2),  t h e  c e n t r a l  
e x e c u t i v e  h a d  power, by d e c r e e ,  t o  t a k e  m e a s u r e s  w h ic h  
f e l l  n o r m a l l y  w i t h i n  t h e  d o m a in  o f  l a w .  T h e  l o i  f o n d a -  
r n e n t a l e  o f  May 1 9 ,  I 9 6 0 ,  w h ic h  was t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  
I n d e p e n d e n c e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a l s o  r e t a i n e d  t h i s  pow er  t o  
l e g i s l a t e  by d e c r e e ,  w i t h  t h e  p r o v i s o  t h a t  p a r l i a m e n t  
c o u l d ,  w i t h i n  s i x  m o n th s ,  r e j e c t  t h e  d e c r e e .
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P r e s i d e n t  Mobutu e x p l a i n e d  t h i s  move by s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e p u t i e s  w ere  n o t  i n  a c c o r d  w i t h  some o f  h i s  
g o v e r n m e n t s 1 p o l i c i e s ,  o r  a s  he p u t  i t :  " u n f o r t u n a t e l y
some o f  t h o s e  who s t i l l  d e p e n d e d  on c o l o n i a l i s t s  d i d  n o t  
l i k e  o u r  p r o g r e s s i v e n e s s .  ** I  h ad  t h e r e f o r e  t o  assum e 
l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e r • n"^
f uk
T h i s  move t o w a r d s  more power t o  ?<2b0e by d e c r e e  
was p e r h a p s  l o g i c a l  i n  v ie w  o f  t h e ( n a t u r e  o f  a  m i l i t a r y  
r e g i m e  w h ich  h a s  n e t  , e t  c o n s o l i d a t e d  i t s  ^ o w e r .  T h i s  
i s  more n a t u r a l  i n  a  c o u n t r y  w i t h  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  h i s t o r y  
a n d  g e o g r a p h y  o f  t h e  Congo.  The move t o w a r d s  m ore  power 
was a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  (o n  O c t o b e r  2 6 ,  1 966 ;  
w h i c h  p r e s i d e n t  Liobutu r e a c h e d  t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  
t h e  p r im e  m in is te r  and  a s su m e  t h e  p o s t  h i m s e l f .  The 
e x p l a n a t i o n  g i v e n  by r a d i o  K in sk o f ta  was t h a t  a  d i v i d e d  
e x e c u t i v e  im peded  " f u l f i l m e n t  o f  t h e  t a s k  o f  n a t i o n a l  
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " . At t h e  same t i m e  t h e  c a b i n e t  was 
r e d u c e d  f rom  2 1  t o  1 , ,  e i g h t  m i n i s t e r s  w e x e  d r o p p e d  f ro m  
t h e  new l i s t ,  f i v e  m i n i s t e r s  c h a n g e d  p o r t f o l i o s  a n d  
f o u r  new m i n i s t e r s  w ere  a p p o i n t e d .
P r e s i d e n t  Liobutu a n n o u n c e d  a  num ber  o f  f a r -  
r e a c h i n g  m e a s u r e s  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  
c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  and  a l s o  a f f e c t i n g  m c L - s t r i a l  a n d
1 .  Le Llonde, S e p t .  3> 1 9 6 6 .
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c o m m e r c i a l  i n t e r e s t s .  A u e c r e e  was i s s u e d  on A p r i l  
1 0 , 1 9 6 7 , a f f e c t i n g  t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  
p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  p r o v i n c e s . ^  The p r o v i n c i a l  
au tonom y  t h a t  h a s  e x i s t e d  h i t h e r t o  was d r a s t i c a l l y  
c u r t a i l e d .  A g o v e r n o r  i s  a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  p r e s i d e n t  
t o  e a c h  p r o v i n c e ,  who was a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  an d  d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  m i n i s t e r  o f  i n ­
t e r i o r  and  t o  t h e  o t h e r  m i n i s t e r s  on m a t t e r s  i n v o l v i n g
2t h e i r  m i n i s t r i e s .  The p r o v i n c i a l  a s s e m b l i e s ,  w ere  
r e d u c e d  t o  p r o v i n c i a l  c o u n c i l s  ( t o  be d i r e c t l y  
e l e c t e d )  w i t h  a d v i s o r y  f u n c t i  n s .
M eanw hile  a  d r a f t  c o n s t i t u t i o n  was p r e p a r e d  a n d  
p r e s i d e n t  Mobutu e x p l a i n e d  i t s  m a tu r e  a n d  o b j e c t  i n  a  
m e s s a g e  t o  t h e  p e o p l e  g i v e n  i n  A p r i l  7 ,  1 ^ 6 7 .  A f t e r
1 .  O rd o n n a n ce  h o .  6 7 - 1 7 7 > A p r i l  10,  1 9 6 7 .
2 .  A r t .  5 O rdonnance  67-177* B e f o r e  t h e  d e c r e e  was 
i s s u e d ,  new g o v e r n o r s  h a d  b e e n  sw orn  i n  f o r  t h e  
n ew ly  r e d u c e d  e i g h t  p r o v i n c e s .  The new g o v e r n o r s  
who w ere  c a r e e r  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  and  s t a t e  e m p lo y e e s  
w ere  r e q u i r e d  t o  s e r v e  i n  p r o v i n c e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  
p l a c e  o f  t - i e i r  o r i g i n ,  a  m e a su re  d e s i g n e d  t o  e n s u r e  
l o y a l t y  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  g o v e rn m e n t  p e r h a p s  a s  w e l l a s  
i m p a r t i a l i t y .
3 * a r t .  1 1 , i b i d .
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r e m i n d i n g  t h e  C o n g o le s e  p e o p l e  o f  t h e  e v i l s  o f  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  r e g im e  a n d  e x p r e s s i n g  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  p r o g r e s s  
made s i n c e  t h e  coup  and o f  t h e  p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t  h i s  
r e g i m e  r e c e i v e d  a s  m a n i f e s t e d  i n  t h e i r  r e c e p t i o n  d u r i n g  
a  r e c e n t  p r e s i d e n t i a l  t o u r ,  he s t a t e d  t h a t  t n e  p r o g r e s s  o f  
t h e  " r e v o l u t i o n 11 must  o b t a i n  a  l e ^ a l  f o u n d a t i o n .  "The 
s e c o n d  r e p u b l i c "  he now d e c l a r e d  "must  c r e a t e  a  new 
o r d e r ,  f i n d  new c e n t r e s  (ox pow er)  a n d  l a y  t h e  new. 
f o u n d a t i o n s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  a f f a i r s . "  
P r e s i d e n t  i/iobutu now b eg a n  t o  s p e a k  a b o u t  "La d e v o l u t i o n "  
w h e r e a s  b e f o r e  he was content to step i n t o  k a s a v u b u ' s  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  c h a i r  ( t h o u g h  he p r o v e d  t o  be a  m ore com- 
pe tvSnt  p r e s i d e n t )  w i t h o u t  d i s t u r b i n g  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e .  Low he spoke o f  t h e  s e c o n a  d e p u b l i c ;  a n d  
w h e r e a s  b e f o r e  he spoke  o f  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  f a c t  
( l e g i t i n i i t e  de f a i t ) ,  he now a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  " t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n  i m p l i e s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  new o r d e r  t h e  v a l i d i t y  
o f  w h i c h  i s  f o u n d e d . . . o n  ajLegal o r d e r  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  
m a j o r i t y .  T h i s  means t h a t  we m u s i j t r a n s f o r m  i n t o  lay/ 
t o d a y ’ s f a c t  u n a n im o u s ly  a d m i t t e d  by t h e  m a s s  o f  p e a s a n t s  
a n d  u r b a n  d w e l l e r s . The p o r p o s e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n  f o l l o w s
✓ ^
1 .  C f .  E t u d e s  C o n g o l a i s e s  Iv iars .-Av.  I ^ b 7  p p . 6 5 - 9 2 .
i n  t h e  l i n e  o f  A f r i c a n  p r e s i u e n t i a l i s m . T h e r e  w i l l  be
a  m i l i t a r y  e x e c u t i v e ,  a  u n i c a m e r a l  n a t i o n a l  a s s e m b l y  a n d
a  u n i t a r y  s t a t e .  The p r e s i d e n t  w i l l  d e s e l e c t e d  by  u n i v e r s a l
s u f f r a g e  an d  w i l l  have  e x t e n s i v e  povvers i n c l u d i n g
1
em erg e n cy  p o w e r s .  a n d  t n e  r i ^ h t  t o  r e f e r  a  m a t t e r  f o r
p o p u l a r  r e f e r e n d u m  i n  c a s e  o f  d i s p u t e  w i t h  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
2a s s e m b l y .
The Congo h a s  t r a v e l l e d  a  l o n g  way s i n c e  t h e
c r i s i s  o c c u r r e d  f o l l o w i n g  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
a s  L lobutu 1 s r e g im e  p r o u d l y  c l a i m s .  B u t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n
o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  i s  o n ly  j u s t  b e g i n n i n g  t o
em erg e  w i t h  any  d e g re e  o f  c l a r i t y .  The p r e s e n c e  o f
r i c h  m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s  h a s  made i t  an  a r e a  o f  i n t r i g u e ,
a t  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  an d  t h i s ,  p l u s  t h e  d i s p u t e  b e t w e e n
v
t h e  C o n g o l e s e  g o v e rn m e n t  an d  U n io n  L l i n i e r e  w i l l  
u n d o u b t e d l y  a f f e c t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  f u t u r e  g o v e r n m e n t  
o f  t h e  Congo.  One o p i n i o n  may be h a z a r d e d  a s  t o  t h e  
l i n e  o f  d i r e c t i o n  t o  be  f o l l o w e d  by  Llobutu* s  r e g i m e .
L lobutu  seem s t o  fee i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  i d e a  o f  a  p e ^ p u l a r  
movement a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  a  m i l i t a r y  r e g im e  c o n v e r t e d  
a l o n g  t n e  E g y p t i a n  m o d e l .  He r e c e n t l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  new
1 .  A r t .  54 ,  D r a f t  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2 .  A r t .  29» D r a f t C o n s t i t . - t i c n .
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p a r t y  t n e  n a t u r e  ^nd o r g a n i s a t i o n  0 1  w h ic h  i s  a s  y e t  n o t  
An own. On t h e  o t h e r  iianu; he t a l k s  o i  a  two p a r t y  
s y s t e m  >-e he d i d  i n  n i s  m e ssa g e  i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e  d r a f t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  i f  he o e i i e v e s  i n  t h i s ;  t h e n  i t  i s  a  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t o  t h e  A f r i c a n  p r e s i d e n t i a l i s m  i n  t e r m s  
o f  w h ic h  he c o n c e i v e d  t h e  d r a f t  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h i s  
a p p a r e n t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  r e v e a l s  t h e  s t a t e  o i  i n u e c i s i o n  
o n  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  s y s t e m s  w h ic h  m i l i t a r y  r e g i m e s  s e e m  
t o  f a c e .  T h i s  p e r h a p s  s t e m s  f ro m  a  l a c k  o f  c o n v i c t i o n  
on t n e  part o f  some military leaders tli&t W y  o n e  t y p e  
o f  c i v i l i a n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m  c a n  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e p l a c e  
t h e m .
( c ) G-hana
The Ghana m i l i t a r y  r e g im e  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  
th e  A lger ia n  r eg im e  i n  t h a t  i t  n o t  only a b o l i s h e d  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o i  t n e  p r e v i o u s  r e g i m e  b u t  
p u r p o r t e d  t o  i n s t a l l  a n  e n t i r e l y  o p p o se d  r e g i m e  i n  i t s  
p l a c e .  On F e b r u a r y  26, 1966 ,  two days  a f t e r  t h e  c o u p ,  
a  P r o c l a m a t i o n  was i s s u e d  t h e  Congo l e a d e r s ,  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t n e  N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  C o u n c i l  ( N L C )
11 f o r  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  Ghana and  f o r  t h e  m a t t e r s  
c o n n e c t e d  t h e r e t o . ” The P r o c l a m a t i o n ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,
s u s p e n d e d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Ghana, 1960 j a n d  a l l  
am dndm ents  t h e r e t o . ^  The n a t i o n a l  a s s e m b l y  was d i s ­
s o l v e d ,  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  w ere  b a n n e d ,  a n d  a l l  t h e  
m em bers  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  g o v e rn m e n t  w ere  d i s m i s s e d .
The hLG c o n s i s t e d  o f  e i g h t  members £  i n c l u d i n g
t h e  c h a i r m a n ,  g e n e r a l  J o s e p h  A n k ra h ,  an d  t h e  d e p u t y
2'C ha irm an ,  p o l i c e  c o m m is s i o n e r  H a r l l e y .  The m embers  
'were named by  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n  a s  amdnded by D e c r e e  
i s s u e d  l a t e r . ^
The NLC assum ed suprem e pow er ;  l e g i s l a t i v e  a n d  
e x e c u t i v e  p o w ers  w ere  v e s t e d  i n  i t .  I t  was em powered  
t o  l e g i s l a t e  by d e c r e e  u n t i l  a  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  was 
p r o m u l g a t e d  an d  a  new g o v e rn m e n t  b a s e d  t h e r e o n  
i s  f o r m e d . ^  P a r a .  3 ( 3 )  o f  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n  p r o v i d e s  
t h a t  i n  c a s e  o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  b e tw e e n  e x i s t i n g  l a w s  o f  
G hana  w h ic h  r e m a in  i n  f o r c e  a n d  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  any 
I\TLC d e c r e e ,  t h e  l a t t e r  s h a l l  p r e v a i l .
1 .  P a r a .  2 o f  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n .
2 .  I t s  c o m p o s i t i o n  was e v e n l y  d i v i u e d  D e t w e e n  t h e  army 
an d  t h e  p o l i c e .
3 .  P a r a  1 ,  P r o c l a m a t i o n ,  and  D ec ree  No. 1 o f  M a rc h  1 , 1 9 6 6 .
4 .  P a r a  3 o f  P r o c l a m a t i o n ,  a s  amended by D e c r e e  No. 1 .
A l l  t h e  D e c r e e s  i s s u e d  by t h e  NLC s h a l l  b e  r e f e r r e d  
h e r e a f t e r  a s  NLCD.
E x e c u t i v e  power was r e t a i n e d  by  t h e  NLC But  
t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  w ho le  Nkrumah c a b i n e t  h a d  l e f t  a  
vacuum w h ic h  c o u l d  n o t  be  f i l l e d  by t h e  NLC i t s e l f .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  NLC p a s s e d  t h e  M i n i s t e r s  f u n c t i o n s  
( D e l e g a t i o n )  D e c r e e ,  1 9 6 6 a u t h o r i s i n g  p r i n c i p a l  
s e c r e t a r i e s  t o  e x e r c i s e  m i n i s t e r i a l  f u n c t i o n ,  w h i l e  t h e  
NLC r e t a i n e d  s u p e r v i s o r y  c o n t r o l .  Thus t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  
c i v i l  s e r v a n t  assum ed  g r e a t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i m m e d i a t e l y  
a f t e r  t h e  c o u p .  The m a g n i tu d e  o f  t h e  work an d  t h e  
c o m p a r a t i v e  l a c k  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  army o f f i c e r s  i n  
m i n i s t e r i a l  f u n c t i o n s  c o m p e l l e d  t h e  p a s s i n g  o f  NLCD 11 
p l a c i n g  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  i n  m i n i s t e r i a l  p o s i t i o n s .  I t  
h a s  o f t e n  s e e n  w r i t t e n  t h a t  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  a n d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
make b e t t e r  “p a r t n e r s ” i n  v iew  o f  t h e i r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h i n g s .  Such  a  b e l i e f  p r e s u m e s  
t h a t  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  a n a  army o f f i c e r s  a r e  a p o l i t i c a l ,  
c o n c e r n e d  o n l y  w i t h  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  
s i d e  o f  t h i n g s ,  w hidh  i s  a  q u e s t i o n a b l e  p r e s u m p t i o n .
At any  r a t e ,  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  i n  Ghana s o o n  p r o v e d  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . i n  s p i t e  o f  NLCD.11 a n d  t h e  r e a s o n s  
b e h i n d  i t ,  i t  was c l e a i f  t h a t  t h e  NLC, u n l i k e  t h e  
i • NLCD•11•
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R e v o l u t i o n a r y  C o u n c i l  i n  A l g e r i a ,  r e t a i n e d  c l o s e r  
s u p e r v i s o r y  a n d  d i r e c t i v e  l i n k ,  and  so o n  d e e i d e d i t  m u s t  
a s su m e  f u l l  e x e c u t i v e  f u n c t i o n .  NLCD.11 was a b o l i s h e d  
a n d  t h e  NLC d i v i d e d  up t h e  m i n i s t r i e s  among i t s  m e m b e r s .^  
The NLC p r o c l a m a t i o n  was amended on November 1 5 ,  1966  
t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  t h e  NLC may a p p o i n t  any  
one  o f  i t s  mem bers  t o  e x e r c i s e  any  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  
p o w e r s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  t o  t a k e  c h a r g e ,  u n d e r  i t s  d i r e c ­
t i o n ,  s u c h  d e p a r t m e n t s  o f  s t a t e  a s  i t  may a s s i g n  t o  
2h im .
cf 1‘S rrtiS ^  f
The pow er  o f  a p p o i n t m e n t  and  i s  i n
t h e  hand* o f  t h e  NLC i n  a l l  r e s p e c t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  j u d i c i a l  
a n d  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  p o s t s .  As t o  j u d i c i a l  a p p o i n t m e n t ,
1 .  NLCD.67 o f  J u n e  25 ,  1 9 6 6 .  S e v e n t e e n  m i n i s t r i e s  w e re  
d i v i d e d  among t h e  s e v e n  members o f  t h e  NLC, i n c l u d i n g  
t h e  v i c e - c h a i r m a n ,  Lir. U a r l l e y ,  who h e l d  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  
f o r  I n t e r i o r ,  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s ,  I n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  S e c ­
r e t a r i a t  o f  D e p a r t m e n t s  u n d e r  t h e  NLC. D e f e n c e  was 
h e l d  by  G-eneral  h o t  o k a ,  and ,  g e n e r a l  A n k ra h  r e m a i n e d  
a s  C h a i r m a n j  b u t  a s sum ed  command o f  t h e  a rm e d  f o r c e s ,  
upon  h o t o k a  s  d e a t h .
2 .  NLCD. 1 0 4 ,  p a r a .  1 ( a )
33#.
t h e  J u d i c i a l  S e r v i c e  A c t  I9 6 0  was am ended ,  r e i n t r o d u c i n g
t h e  j u d i c i a l  s e r v i c e  c o m m is s io n  w h ich  h a d  b e e n  a b o l i s h e d
p r e v i o u s l y .  The J u d i c i a l  S e r v i c e  C om m iss ion  i s  a p p o i n t e d
by t h e  NLC. I n i t i a l l y  i t  was t o  c o n s i s t  o f  s e v e n  m em bers ,
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c h i e f  j u s t i c e . ' * '  T h i s  was c h a n g e d  l a t e r .
The C o m m iss io n  now c o n s i s t s  o f  (1 )  t h e  C h i e f  J u s t i c e ,
( 2 )  t h e  o t h e r  j u s t i c e s  o f  t h e  suprem e c o u r t ,  ( 3 )  o t h e r
j u d g e s  a n d  m a g i s t r a t e s  a n d  t h e  j u d i c i a l  s e c r e t a r y ,
( 4 ) t h e  p e r s o n s  h o l d i n g  p o s t s  c r e a t e d  u n d e r  any  o t h e r
e n a c t m e n t ,  b e i n g  d e s i g n a t e d  by law  a s  j u d i c i a l  s e r v i c e  
0
p o s t s .  J u d g e s  a r e  t o  bo removable on t h e  a d v i c e
o f  t h e  J u d i c i a l  S e r v i c e  C om m iss ion ;  on t h e  g r o u n d s  o f  
" s t a t e d  m i s b e h a v i o u r  o r  i n f i r m i t y  o f  body  o r  m in d "
The r o l e  o f  t h e  C o m m iss io n  i s  a d v i s o r y ;  t h e  h'LC i s  n o t  
b o u n d  t o  a c t  on a n y  o f  ims a d v i c e .
I n  S e p te m b e r  a n d  O c t o b e r  o f  1 9 6 6 ,  t h e  NLC 
a n n o u n c e d  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  number o f  j u d g e s  f ro m  36 
t_  29 a n d  16 o f  t h e  f o r m e r  j u d g e s  i n c l u d i n g '  LIr. S a r k o d e e -  
Adoo, t h e  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  s i n c e  F e b r u a r y  1 9 6 4 , w e re
1 .  J u d i c i a l  S e r v i c e  A ct  (Amendment! A c t ,  1 9 6 6 ,  NLCD. 39.
2 .  NLCD. 8 3 ,  1 9 6 6 .
3 .  NLCD.3 9  p a r a g • 1 ( 5 )
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d ism issed .  In h i s  p lace ,  h r .  Akafu-Adoo was sworn i n .
He had been d ism issed  by p res id en t  Kkrumah i n  Teoruary  
1964  from h i s  post as judge o f  the Supreme c o u r t .
The m i l i t a r y  regime a l s o  d ism issed  a l a r g e  
number of  l o c a l  m a g is tr a te s  a l l e g i n g  th a t  th ey  were 
u n q u a l i f ie d ,  i n e f f i c i e n t y  or corrupt .  S i m i l a r l y , c h i e f 3 
dism issed  by Nkrumah were r e s to r e d  and 194 paramount 
c h i e f s  appointed by ukrumah were reduced to  t h e i r  former  
s t a t u s .  A l l  t h i s  could  be in te r p r e te d  as  b e in g  part  
o f  a purge or a ’’mopping up operation" -  o f  removing  
a l l  v e s t i g e s  o f  support fo r  the  previous  reg im e, and 
c o n s o l id a t in g  the new regime.
As to  c i v i l  s e r v ic e  appointments, th e  c i v i l  
s e r v ic e  commission which had been a b o l i s h e d ,  was r e ­
introduced  ^and with i t^ th e  persons who were members o f  
the  commission were r e i n s t a t e d  fo r  the remaining p a r ts
o f  t h e i r  term with  e f f e c t  from the time im m ediate ly  b e fo r e
2the  commission was d i s s o lv e d .  I t  i s  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  the  
view taken by the m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  as to  the  r o l e  o f  the
1 .  c f .  NLCD.112.
2 .  NLCD. 17, parag. 3(2)
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v a r io u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  under the previous regime (a s  w e l l  
as. under t h e i r  own) th a t  they "purged*the ju d ic ia r y  
and d ism issed  the members of parliam ent,  w h ile  th e j  l e f t  
th.e c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  An observer has w r i t ten  in  t h i s  
regard  as fo l lo w s
MAt no po int  was the c i v i l  s e r v ic e  purged..The  
NLC insta l led  o f f i c i a l s  from the F la g s t a f f  
House cab in et  s e c r e t a r ia t  who were known fo r  
t h e i r  a b i l i t y  and were l e a s t  invo lved  in  p o l i c y ­
making under the o lder  regime. (The two most 
sen io r  h e ld -o v ers  were g iven  re sp e c ta b le  but l e s s
s e n s i t i v e  p o s i t i o n s  e lsew h e re ) .  I t  a l so  
brought in  a gvtnyp o f  competent a d v isers  from
the m i n i s t r i e s ,  wno have added to  the a i r  o f
professionalism now evident in policy-making
at the top."-L
The NLC a lso  appointed various committees to
a d v i s e  i t  in  d ischarg ing  i t s  fu n c t io n  such as n o ta b ly  at  the
2o u t s e t  the p o l i t i c a l  committee, and the a d m in is t r a t iv e  
committee.*^ The p o l i t i c a l  committee was i n i t i a l l y  
p r e s id e d  by tne present Chief J u s t i c e ,  and had tw en ty -  
t h r e e  members, most of  whom were prominexit o p p o s i t i o n  
l e a d e r s  such as Dr. Busia  (who was deputy chairman) 
and Mr. Joe Appiah. The committee a lso  co n ta in ed  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  a l l  e igh t  reg io n s  of G-hana and uf the
1*. V/. S co tt  Thomson, 'New D ir e c t io n s  in  G-hana*, in  
A fr ic a  Report, Nov. 1966, p . l b .
2 .  NLCD.59 June 14, 1966,
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v a r io u s  i n t e r e s t ^ o f  the community. I t s  f u n c t io n  was to
a d v ise  tne NLC on any p o l i c y ,  d ec is io n s  made or enactments
passed  s in c e  the coup. I t  reported  weekly to  the  NLC
1
in  f u l f i lm e n t  o f  such fu n c t io n .
The a d m in is tr a t iv e  committee was appointed  to  
a d v ise  the NLC on a l l  m atters  r e la t in g  to c e n t r a l  and 
l o c a l  government a d m in is tr a t io n .  I t  was req u ired  to  work 
i n  c lo s e  c o n s u l t a t io n  w ith  the p o l i t i c a l  committee  
a d v is in g  on the p o l i t i c a l  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  NLC's d e c i ­
s i o n s .  I t  can make recommendations in  r e s p e c t  o f  the  
machinery fo r  the implementation of e x e c u t iv e  d e c i s i o n s  
and the g en era l  o r g a n is a t io n  of the m i n i s t r i e s  and 
departments .
In matters of l o c a l  government the  NLC has 
made some d r a s t ic  changes. The l o c a l  government 
(In ter im  Adm inistration)  Decree, 1966 -  NLCD 26, amended 
th e  l o c a l  Government Act 1961 to  allow fo r  the e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of  management Committees, which are made up o f  
c e n t r a l  and l o c a l  government personnel .  These
committees have assumed the fu n c t io n s  o f  tne  e l e c t e d
2l o c a l  c o u n c i l s  under the 1961 Act.
1 .  c f ,  West A fr ic a  Deb. 25, 1966.
;2. c f .  parag. 3, o f  the Decree.
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The g e n e r a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of  t h e  Ghana m i l i t a r y
regime seemed to be i n  a d i r e c t io n  d ia m e tr ic a l ly  opposed
to  that of  the previous  government, l o r  example,
General Ankrah announced a "new l i b e r a l  economy" i n  which
a c t i v e  s t a t e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  would be liini'ced to  c e r t a i n
key b as ic  p r o je c t s  and the p r iv a te  sec to r  would remain
"the l a r g e s t  se c to r  in  terms o f  ftUmber o f  persons
employed and gro ss  o u t p u t . I n  ex tern a l  p o l i c y ,
Dr. Nkrumah*s d ed ica t io n  to  the s tr u g g le  f o r  the t o t a l
l ib e r a t io n  of Africa and African unity was to be
r e v i s e d ,  or,  as General Ankrah put i t  "would be p la ced
2i n  a proper p e r s p e c t i v e ."
In in te r n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  the NLC appears to  be 
moving towards c i v i l i a n  r u l e .  A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  commis­
s i o n  was s e t  up and s t a r t e d  i t s  work in  the Summer o f
1966. The numerous committees which were s e t  up (some 
f i f t e e n  in  a l l )  to  purge the o ld  regime and to  a d v ise  
the  new one have mostly f i n i s h e d  t h e i r  work. The 
p r in c ip a l  o b jec t  o f  the m i l i t a r y  regime in  s e t t i n g  up 
th e s e  committees was-to  reco n s tru c t  the whole government  
machinery according to  a d i f f e r e n t  p h i lo sop h y .  The
1 .  Statement o f  March 12, 1986.
2 .  i b i d .
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  commission was e n tr u s te d  with, the ta sk  
o f  d e v i s in g  a c o n s t i t u t i o n  wherein power would be 
d iv id e d  or d i s t r i b u t e d  to  a vo id  i t s  c o n c e n t r a t io n  in  the  
hand o f  one man. At the same time Kwame Nkrumah*s 
achievement o f  a u n i f i e d  c e n t r a l  a d m in is tr a t io n  has been  
adopted and co n t in u ed .  Ghana i s  to  co n t in u e  as a 
u n ita r y  r e p u b l ic  and th e  d i v i s i o n  o f  the r e g io n s  would 
co n t in u e  as  b e fo re  the coup.'*"
As fo r  a move to  c i v i l i a n  r u l e ,  the  p o l i t i c a l  
committee was one s tep  i n  th a t  d i r e c t i o n .  The e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  commission to  prepare a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  and the  appointment,  t h i s  y ea r ,  o f  C i v i l i a n  
S p e c ia l  Commissioners to  be i n  charge of  a d m in is te r in g  
th e  m i n i s t r i e s  can only be d escr ib ed  as s i g n s  o f  a 
p o l i c y  o f  d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n .  The S p e c ia l  Commissioners  
w i l l  have f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  a d m in is te r in g  the  
m i n i s t r i e s  a s s ig n e d  to  them su b je c t  to  the o v e r r id in g  
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  as l a i d  down by the NLC. hut the  
p o r t f o l i o s  d i s t r i b u t e d ,to  fo u r te e n  c i v i l i a n  s p e c i a l  
com m issioners do not in c lu d e  the  key m i n i s t r i e s  o f  
Defence which i s  s t i l l  headed by General Ankrah; I n t e r i o r
1 .  c f .  NLCD.73.
and E xterna l  A f f a i r s  r e t a in e d  by n r .  H a r l le y ,  the deputy  
chairman o f  the NLC; and f in a n c e  h e ld  by B r ig a d ie r  
A f r i f a .
A n a t io n a l  a d v iso r y  committee i s  a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  
to  ac t  as a g en er a l  "clearing- house" fo r  the s p e c i a l  
com m issioners ,  and a l l  the  s ta n d in g  committees save -fouaj 
have now been a b o l i s h e d .  The remaining four are the  
economic committee, a d m in i s t r a t iv e  committee ,  l o g i s t i c s  
committee and the e x p e d i t in g  com mittee .  The Ghana 
regime in  dem olish ing  the p rev io u s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  and 
a d m in i s t r a t iv e  machine was fa c ed  w ith  a complex s e t  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  and a d m in i s t r a t iv e  problems which com pelled  
the  c r e a t i o n  o f  committees and more su p e rv iso ry  machinery.  
Thusthe e x p e d i t in g  committee was charged w ith  the  duty of  
making freq uent  and unannounced v i s i t s  to  p u b l ic  
o ± i i c e s ,  of  r e c e i v i n g  and i n v e s t i g a t i n g  com pla in ts  fro*  
any member o f  the p u b l ic  and o f  f o l l o w i n g  up d e c i s i o n s  
o f  the T^LC and ensur ing  t h e i r  due e x e c u t io n .^
1 .  c f .  NLCD.99 parag. 3 (a )  (b) and (c )
The s p e c i a l  commissioners w i l l  o b v io u s ly  
have more ^ower tnan the p r in c ip a l  s e c r e t a r i e s  had. They 
are a lso  expected to  be imre bold and im a g in a t iv e . The 
Ghanaian Times has warned them to nin su la te "  th em se lves  
a ga in st  "the t  emptation to  l e a n  too h e a v i ly  on the  
advice  o i  c i v i l  serv a n ts" ,  and advised  them to  be  
prepared "to analyse  c r i t i c a l l y  red - tap e  id e a s  and 
i n i t i a t e  p r a c t i c a l  p o l i c i e s  that  are o r i g i n a l  and s u i t e d  
to  our t im es ."  That the m i l i t a r y  regime i s  t r e a d in g  
w ith  caution i s  shewn not only by t h e i r  r e t e n t i o n  o f  
lcey m i n i s t r i e s  but also by t h e i r  d e c i s io n  to  e s t a b l i s h  
a n a t io n a l  centre  for  c i v i c  education  to  be headed by 
Dr. Bugia. Among txie ta s k s  o f  txxim c e n tr e  i s  the  
important one to  m o b i l i s e  the c i t i z e n s  behind the  
regime and to  take an a c t i v e  part in  the  government o f  
the  country, presumably w ith  a view t o  preparing  them 
to  c i v i l i a n  r u le .
in
The uLC i s  a dilemma. I t s  members have
A
d ec lared  th at  they were not in sp ired  bg p erso n a l  am bition  
and that they would hand over to c i v i l i a n s  soon. On 
th e  other hand) th ere  <X^J as y e t ,  no p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and 
no c i v i l i a r ^ p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  of Nkrumah's sta ture-w ho  
can take over power from the KLG. One weekly which i s





I anti-Nkrumah and pro-NLC has put the m atter  thus:
"One o f  Ghana’ s g re a t  problems i s  th a t  no c i v i l i a n
p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  have ajjpreared, the grea t  m a jo r i ty  o f
CPP le a d e r s  ar« t o t a l l y  d i s c r e d i t e d ,  and the  o p p o s i t io n
g e n e r a t io n  re p r esen ted  by Dr. B uria ,  i s  u n l ik e ly  to
arouse popular enthusiasm . That i s  why i t  i s  su g g es ted
th a t  under a c i v i l i a n  regime General Ankrah h im s e l f
mighi become p r e s id e n t ,  or th a t  young s o l d i e r s ,  such as
C o l .  A f r i f a  might stand o f f i c e .  I n s p i t e  o f  c r i t i c i s m s
o f  the p rese n t  reg im e . . .nobody would d isp u te  th a t
Ghana would be much b e t t e r  o f f  under continued  NLG
r u le  ra th er  than under a weak and unpopular c i v i l i a n
government. 11 ^
This indeed  i s  the  dilemma fa c in g  the  NLC
a s  a l l  m i l i t a r y  r e g im es>assuming th a t  they wish to
. ad e m i l i t a r i s e  the  regime, whicn i s  t a x in g  sanguine view  
o f  human n a tu r e .  Those who do not take such v iew , or 
who see  too  much in  terms o f  a L a t in  American p a r a l l e l  
have concluded  th a t  an era  of  pronunciamentos has begun 
in jh fr ica .
1 .  V / e s t j a f r i c a , l e b . 25, 1967 .
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C on clu s ion
The s u g g e s t io n  b lu n t ly  made b y MWest Africa*  
th^t g en er a l  Ankrah might become p r e s id e n t  under a 
c i v i l i a n  r u le  in  Ghana h o ld s  the c lu e  to  the p ost-cou p  
problems. Even m i l i t a r y  men who g e n u in e ly  s t a r t e d  with  
the  ia e a  o f  a "c lean  up" and handing over to  c i v i l i a n s  
i n  the end, tend to  l i n g e r  onjin o f f i c e .  P o l i t i c a l  power 
has i t s  own o c c u p a t io n a l  hazards and s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i o n  
in jo f f ice  i s  the p r e s c r i p t i o n  a g a in s t  such hazard. This  
i s  true o f  on e-p arty  as o f  m i l i t a r y  reg im es .  The o r i g i n a l  
purpose can g e t  l o s t  e a s i l y  in  the maze o f  d a i ly  pre­
o cc u p a t io n s .  Whether the  m i l i t a r y  s e t  out s imply  
dis^ p l^ce  c i v i l i a n  l e a d e r s  without b a s ic  change o f  
s t r u c tu r e  (as  in  A l g e r ia ,  or whether they  s t a r t  to  d i s ­
mantle the whole system )a s  i n  Ghana) the problems o f  
disengagement a r i s e  i n e v i t a b l y .  One a u th o r i ty  on the  
s u b je c t  has w r i t t e n :  "the key to  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  l i e s
i n  th a t  d isp lacem ent or s u b s t i t u t i o n  im p l ie s  the d i s ­
placement/of , or s u b s t i t u t i o n  f o r ,  a p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i a l  and/  
or p o l i t i c a l  grouping ( e .g . ,  P e r s o n i s t s ,  the CPP, the  
l a n d lo r d s ,  e t c )  and i s  m a d e . . . . i n  the name o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  
m i l i t a r y  c o n c e p t io n  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  i n t e r e s t ,  which
59^.
d e f i i i i t i o n a l l y , i s  opposed to th a t  o i  the  groups/they
have e jec te d  and/or replaced."^*
Every m i l i t a r y  regime thus f e a r s  the re tu rn
o f  the people i t  has rep la ced  or the re in s ta tem en t  o f  the
p r in c ip le s  and p o l i c i e s  i t  has r e v e r s e d ,a s  must be the
case  with moso o f  the m i l i t a r y  regimes in  A f r i c a .  Nor
i s  th i s  the main sourc^of th r e a t ,  There i s  a r e a l  f e a r
o f  counter-coup from w i th in  the m i l i t a r y  i t s e l f  fo r
whatever reason or p r e t e x t .  There may be "young Turks"
who demand more r a d ic a l  p o l i t i c s .  Or there  may be
parti (>t<j
sympathisers with  the prev ious  regime, as was the ca se  
i n  the ab ort ive  counter-coup injdhana.
These d i f f i c u l t i e s  ( l a r g e l y ) determine the p o s t ­
coup behaviour of m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s .  In Ghana the  
shock of the attempted c o u n te r -c o u p , in  which the  
a r c h i t e c t  ox the f i r s t  coup was k i l l e d ,  seems to  h..ve 
driven the regime to  make more e n e r g e t i c  g e s tu r e s  o f  
d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n  as the appointment of  the c i v i l i a n  
s p e c ia l  commissioners shows. Other regimes may be 
a t tr a c te d  by the example o f  the N a s s e r i t e  experim ent.
1 .  3.E. F i n e r ,  o p . c i t .  p . 2.
I f  the UAR example i s  emulated i t  r a i s e s  the problem of  
e v o lv in g  a genuine p o l i t i c a l  p arty  and an a c c e p ta b le  
l e a d e r s h i p .  The A lg e r ia n  regime has l a i d  emphasis on 
l o c a l  communes as a b a s i s  o f  su pp ort .  But even there^ 
the  I?LN a c te d  as  a Trojan Horse, w ithout producing  
much enthusiasm from the p o p u la t io n .  In  c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  
Ghana where the  dominant party  has been p r o s c r ib e d ,  and 
th ere  i s  no a l t e r n a t i v e  party  t h i s  problem i s  more a c u te .  
In  the Congo, p r e s id e n t  Liobutu*s c a u t io u s  experiment  
in  c r e a t i n g  h i s  ownparty, the  LiPRC shows an 
i n c l i n a t i o n  towards the UAR type  o f  s o l u t i o n .  But 
th ere  i s  as  y e t  no true  fou n d at ion  fo r  i t s  s u c c e s s f u l  
o p e r a t io n .  And t h i s  i s  the  problem fa c in g  most m i l i t a r y  
reg im es .  This problem l i m i t s  the p o l i t i c a l  freedom o f  
the  m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  and ca u ses  them to  l o s e  i n i t i a t i v e  
and c o n t r o l ,  d r i f t i n g  to  a s i t u a t i  n where they  f i n a l l y  
l o s e  out to  the  p o l i t i c i a n s .  The course  o f  p o l i t i c s  in  
such a s i t u a t i o n  i s  not always p red ic t ib le* ,  but one th in g  
i s  c l e a r ,  i f  they  d r i f t  and co n t in u e  to  r u le  w ithout much 
b etterm ent in  the  c o n d i t i o n  o f  l i f e  o f  the p eo p le ,  th ere  
w i l l  be o th er  coups or c i v i l i a n  u p r i s i n g s .
The m i l i t a r y  by tak in g  a d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  o f  
government have l o s t  t h e i r  n e u t r a l i t y  and p o l i t i c a l  
"innocence", and w i l l  be now d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s ib le  fo r  any 
rutss th a t  i s  c r e a te d .  S u c c e s s ,  i n  t h e i r  case ,  i s  o f  more 
im portance .  The s l i g h t e s t  g o s s ip  o f  corru p t ion *  in ­
e f f i c i e n c y  i s  more l i k e l y  to  harm t h e i r  image than i t  
would a c i v i l i a n  regime, because they  abandoned t h e i r  
n e u t r a l  p o s i t i o n ,  broke l e g a l i t y  in  order to  put an end 
t o  such e v i l .  They must not on ly  be honest  and e f f i c i e n t  
but they must be seen  to  be s o .  Above a l l  the^y must 
c r e a t e  the  right, c o n d i t io n s  fo r  d isengagem ent. The 
UAR model i s  one p o s s i b i l i t y  to  be used v/ith the  n ecessary  
a d a p ta t io n s  to  s u i t  l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  i n  s t a l e s  where 
ih e  one party  system was made to  be synonimous w ith  m is­
r u l e  and one o f  the r e a so n s  fo r  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  the  
m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  ma^have a p r e ju d ic e  a g a in s t  such an 
exper im ent.  But th o se  who have the  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e i r  
n a t io n s  a t  hearct -  and th er e  are many such -  should  be 
reminded th a t  whatever m is ta k es  the p ast  regime made, 
th ey  must not a l low  th em se lv es  to  be d r iven  to  make 
s i m i l a r  m is ta k e s  in  the o p p o s i te  d i r e c t i o n .  The 
problems need to  be re-exam ined w ith  depth and v i s i o n ,
59?
£KDf9G©8®gf bearing in  mind the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  p e o p le .
Let th ere  be d e v ic e s  a g a in s t  abuse o f  power, by a l l  
means. But exp er ien ce  has shown th a t  d iv id ed  power can 
be i n e f f e c t i v e  and a source  o f  d i s u n i t y  and t h e r e f o r e  
more s t r i a e .  This woulu mear^nore coups and cou n ter ­
coups which w i l l  reduce p o l i c i e s  in  the A fr ica n  co n t in e n t  
to  a game o f  m usica l  c h a i r s .  The peop le  o f  A fr ic a ,  as  
indeed  a l l  o ther  p e o p le ; do not deserve such a f a t e .
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